In re David M.
Filed 1/24/13 In re David M. CA2/4
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In
re DAVID M.,
a
Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
B240333
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VJ41463)
THE
PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
DAVID
M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
County, Fumiko Wasserman, Judge. Affirmed.
Courtney M. Selan, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General,
Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant
Attorney General, Lawrence M. Daniels and Rene Judkiewicz, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
David M. appeals from an order of wardship
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) following a finding he committed the crime
of grand theft auto (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (d)(1)).
to support the juvenile court’s finding.
We find the evidence sufficient and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
The evidence at the
22, 2011,
around 9:45 p.m., Mary Ransom was collecting recyclables in the City of Lynwood.
After she put her car keys in her car and the cans in the back of the
car, two men approached her from behind and told her to give them the car. It was dark, and both men were wearing
hoodies, so she was not able to see their faces. She moved away from the car, and the men
drove away in her car.
Ransom told an officer that the men
were Hispanic and that one of them was 20 to 25 years old and 5’8†to 5’10â€
tall. She described the other man as
5’6†to 5’9†tall. Ransom testified that
she was unsure of their heights, but that she is 5’6†tall and was standing in
the street while the men were on the curb, so they were taller than her. Appellant was estimated to be 5’2†to 5’4â€
tall.
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department Detective Gregory Campbell testified that he responded to the call
about Ransom’s car and was directed to a white minivan in Lynwood.
J.A., a minor, was one of the occupants of the minivan. Detective Campbell searched the minivan and found
Ransom’s car keys inside. J.A. told
Detective Campbell that he and appellant had taken Ransom’s car and driven
around all night.
At the hearing, J.A. testified that he
alone took the car. He stated that he
was friends with appellant, but appellant was not with him when he took the
car. J.A. did not mention appellant in
his written statement to the police, and during his testimony, he denied
telling Detective Campbell that appellant was with him when he took the
car. Detective Campbell testified that someone who testifies
against a friend could be considered a “snitch,†which could result in
punishment by a gang.
Susannah Baker, a forensic
identification specialist with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
crime lab, testified that she took fingerprints from Ransom’s car and
determined that they matched appellant’s.
His fingerprints were found on the outside, but not the inside of the
car.
A petition was filed under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 602, alleging that appellant committed the crimes of
receiving stolen property (Ransom’s car keys and lanyard) (§ 496, subd.
(a)) and grand theft auto (§ 487, subd. (d)(1)). The court dismissed count 1, the receipt of
stolen property count.
As to count 2, the court found the
allegations of the petition true, sustained the petition, and declared the
offense a felony with a maximum confinement term of three years. The court declared appellant a ward of the
court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and removed him
from the care and custody of his parents.
The court ordered appellant into suitable placement and vested temporary
placement and care with the probation department. Appellant filed a timely
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the evidence is
insufficient to sustain the finding that he committed the crime of grand theft
auto. We disagree and therefore affirm.
The standard of review of an
insufficiency of the evidence claim is the same in juvenile cases as in adult
criminal cases: “we review the whole record
in the light most favorable to the judgment to decide whether substantial
evidence supports the conviction, so that a reasonable fact finder could find
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
[Citations.]†(
537, 540.) “‘We must presume in support
of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably
deduce from the evidence . . . and we must make all reasonable inferences that
support the finding of the juvenile court.
[Citation.]’ [Citations.]†(In re
Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1089 (Babak).) In determining the
sufficiency of the evidence, “[w]e need not be convinced of the defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; we merely ask whether ‘“any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.â€
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]†(People
v. Tripp (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 951, 955 (Tripp).)
“Theft
is the felonious taking, carrying, or driving away of the personal property of
another; the crime is grand theft auto
when the property taken is an automobile and it is taken with the specific
intent to permanently deprive the
owner of her property.
[Citations.]†(
1064, 1067; § 487, subds. (a), (c), (d)(1).)
Appellant argues that there was
evidence that he did not help J.A. steal Ransom’s car, citing Ransom’s
testimony that one of the men was between 20 and 25 years old, whereas
appellant was only 14 years old at the time of the incident. He also cites Ransom’s testimony that one man
was 5’6†to 5’9†and the other was 5’8†to 5’10â€, but appellant is only 5’2†to
5’4†tall.
Appellant also points to Baker’s
testimony that appellant’s fingerprints were found on the outside of Ransom’s
car, but not the inside. He argues that,
if he had been with J.A. when he took the car and drove around in it,
appellant’s fingerprints would have been inside the car.
Appellant relies on
Cal.App.4th 601, Tripp, supra, 151
Cal.App.4th 951, and People v. Johnson
(1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 850, to argue that the juvenile court’s finding was based
on “speculation and conjecture,†but those cases do not help appellant because
the evidence here was more than merely speculation.
Appellant relies on the difference
between Ransom’s estimate of the two men’s heights and his own height, and
asserts that his fingerprints should have been found inside the car. But Ransom testified that it was dark and she
was scared, so the discrepancy between her estimate and appellant’s height is
not sufficient to cast doubt on the juvenile court’s finding. In addition, Detective Campbell testified
that J.A. told him appellant was with him when he took the car, and appellant’s
fingerprints were found on the car. In
addition, all inferences are to be drawn in favor of the court’s finding. (Babak,
supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p.
1089.) Thus, it can reasonably be
inferred that J.A.’s denial on the stand of appellant’s participation in the
theft was attributable to his fear of being a “snitch.â€
“We may not reverse a conviction for
insufficiency of the evidence unless it appears that upon no hypothesis
whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the
conviction. [Citation.]†(Tripp,
supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p.
955.) We find that the evidence is
sufficient to sustain the juvenile court’s finding.
The order of wardship is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
WILLHITE,
Acting P. J.
We concur:
MANELLA, J.
SUZUKAWA, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] All further statutory references are
to the Penal Code section unless otherwise specified.
