P. v. Valdovinos
Filed 2/6/13 P. v. Valdovinos CA1/3
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
PEDRO
VALDOVINOS,
Defendant and Appellant.
A135143
(San Mateo County
Super. Ct.
No. SC74561A)
After
the court denied his motion to suppress
evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5, defendant Pedro Valdovinos
was convicted of felony possession of heroin with a previous conviction,
falsely identifying himself to a police officer, and driving on a suspended
license. This appeal challenges the
ruling on the motion to suppress and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the conviction for giving false identification to a police officer. We affirm.
Menlo
Park Police Officer Josh Russell was driving west on Marsh Road around 8:00
p.m. on a September evening when he noticed a Dodge Durango stopped at a red
traffic light at the Highway 101 overpass.
The Durango was on an incline, but the
center brake light was not illuminated.
When the light turned green and the car pulled away, the tail lights on
either side of the brake light did not dim.
Officer Russell concluded the vehicle’s brake lights were not
functioning and that the Durango posed a hazard to other
cars on the road.
Officer
Russell activated his patrol car’s overhead lights to effect a traffic
stop. Instead of immediately yielding to
the right, where there was ample space to pull over, the Durango went around the turnabout
onto Highway 101. About 15 to 20 seconds
after Russell activated his lights, the vehicle pulled over to the side of the
road.
Officer
Russell approached the driver, later identified as defendant, and explained the
reason for the stop. Defendant said that
his brake lights were working, but that he had not been depressing the brake
pedal at the traffic light. He asked
Officer Russell to check the brake lights because if he did so he would learn
they were functioning.
Officer
Russell asked defendant for his driver’s license or identification. Defendant said he was Ricardo Torres and gave
an August 2, 1975 date of birth. He said he did not have a driver’s license
because “he had entered the country illegally three years earlier.†Officer Russell disbelieved him because
defendant’s English seemed too good for someone who had only been in the United States for three years. A DMV check by police dispatch disclosed that
the name and birth date defendant supplied did not match any DMV records.
After
Russell gave defendant’s information to police dispatch, he went behind the Durango and had defendant step on
the brake pedal to confirm whether the brake lights were working. They were.
When he was asked at the preliminary hearing why he did not observe that
the lights were working when he pulled the Durango over in front of his patrol
car, Officer Russell explained that at that point he was focused on why
defendant was taking so long to stop and whether his safety was at risk. “At that point, I was so focused on why he
was clearly driving slowly, aware of my presence, and yet he didn’t yield to
the right where the[re] was plenty of space underneath the overpass; he didn’t
yield to the right at the onramp or traffic that was coming from eastbound
Marsh Road onto 101. I was so focused on
where this guy was going and what was taking so long to stop and then getting
my lights adjusted and everything I just didn’t see it.†Officer Russell “was paying attention to
other things that are very important when conducting a traffic [s]top,
especially one that’s taking so long to actually yield to the right.â€
After
ascertaining that defendant had no identification in his wallet, Officer
Russell asked whether he had anything illegal on him. Defendant said he did not, and consented when
the officer then asked for permission to search him. Officer Russell searched defendant and found
in his pants pocket a cellophane packet that contained a substance later
stipulated to be 3.3 grams of heroin.
Defendant
moved to suppress all evidence seized as a result of the traffic stop. The magistrate found that Officer Russell had
a valid reason to stop the Durango and that, once having effected the lawful
stop, was entitled to ask for defendant’s license or identification. Defendant renewed the motion to suppress
before the trial court, with the same result.
Defendant
waived a jury and proceeded to a bench trial on charges of heroin possession,
falsely identifying himself to a police officer, and driving on a suspended
license. Officer Russell’s testimony at
trial was consistent with his testimony at the
counts.
This
appeal timely followed.
DISCUSSION
Where,
as here, a motion to suppress is submitted to the superior court on the
preliminary hearing transcript, “the appellate court disregards the findings of
the superior court and reviews the determination of the magistrate who ruled on
the motion to suppress, drawing all presumptions in favor of the factual
determinations of the magistrate, upholding the magistrate’s express or implied
findings if they are supported by substantial evidence, and measuring the facts
as found by the trier against the constitutional standard of
reasonableness.†(People v. Thompson (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 923, 940.) We independently identify the applicable law
and apply it to the established facts. (
1140.)
A
traffic stop is justified at its inception when an officer has a reasonable
suspicion the driver has violated the Vehicle Code. (People
v. Bell (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 754, 761.)
The facts here supported Officer Russell’s reasonable suspicion that the
Durango was being driven with brake lights that were not functioning in
violation of Vehicle Code section 24603.
He testified that the Durango’s center brake light was not illuminated
while the car was stopped on an incline, and that the tail lights did not dim
when the traffic light turned green and the Durango pulled away. Russell did not notice that defendant’s tail
lights went on when the Durango subsequently slowed and stopped in front of his
police car because, he explained, he was focused on safely effecting the
traffic stop, particularly since defendant did not immediately pull over. The magistrate found Officer Russell’s
testimony to be credible: “[W]e’ve heard
the officer’s testimony. And
essentially, he said that he didn’t notice the brake lights because of the
situation because the car didn’t yield and he was getting . . . more
and more concerned about that. So when
you kind of put that on top of the first issue, which was, was the equipment
operating correctly; either the lights or the brakes or both; and then you put
on top of that the fact that the defendant is not yielding in the timeframe
that the officer assumes he will; I think that in fact gives the officer a
reason to stop the vehicle.†We agree that Officer Russell acted reasonably
under the circumstances when he stopped the Durango and asked defendant for his
license and identification.
Defendant
contends that an officer’s “mistake of law that a Vehicle Code
section 24603, subdivision (b) violation occurred†does not provide
objectively reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. His contention is meritless. Reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code
violation justifies a traffic stop. (
1403, 1408.) The magistrate’s finding of
reasonable suspicion is amply supported by Officer Russell’s testimony that the
Durango’s center brake light was not illuminated when the vehicle was stopped
on an incline and that the tail lights were “dimly illuminated consistent with
taillights, but they appeared to be too dim for brake lights†and did not
change when the vehicle proceeded through the green light. While this case involves a mistake of fact,
not law as claimed by defendant, because the brake lights later turned out to
be working, that mistake neither invalidated the stop nor the ensuing
consensual search. “If the officer turns
out to have been mistaken the mistake must be one which would have been made by
a reasonable person acting on the facts known to the officer at the time of the
stop. Under the foregoing test, a
traffic stop will not violate the Fourth Amendment if the officer making the
stop reasonably suspects the violation of a traffic law even if later
investigation dispels that suspicion.†(People
v. Rodriguez (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1137,
1148-1149; see also In re Raymond C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 303, 308 [officer
is not required to eliminate all innocent explanations that might account for the
facts supporting a particularized suspicion].)
The magistrate found that Officer Russell’s suspicion of a traffic code
violation was reasonable under the circumstances. We agree.
Defendant also argues there was
insufficient evidence to prove he falsely identified himself to a police
officer in violation of Penal Code section 148.9, subdivision (a). His argument is premised entirely on his
assertion that Officer Russell was not lawfully performing his duties as a
peace officer when he requested defendant’s identification because he lacked a
reasonable suspicion that the Durango’s brake lights were not working. (See People
v. Simons (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1109 [defendant cannot be convicted
of an offense against an officer engaged in the performance of official duties
unless the officer was acting lawfully at the time].) This argument is no more persuasive in this
context than in the context of the suppression motion. Officer Russell testified at trial, as he did
at the suppression hearing, that he did not notice whether or not the Durango’s
brake lights were working while he was pulling it over because at that point
his focus had shifted to safety, “[d]ue to the amount of time that it had taken
from the time I activated my emergency lights and equipment to the time the
driver yielded, and the fact that he passed several locations that I thought
were better suited for a traffic stop.â€
The trial court reasonably credited the officer’s testimony, and as a
reviewing court, we are not at liberty to reevaluate it.
The
judgment is affirmed.
_________________________
Siggins,
J.
We concur:
_________________________
Pollak, Acting P. J.
_________________________
Jenkins, J.
