v. Howell
Filed
7/3/12 P. v. Howell CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits
courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
RONNIE EARL
HOWELL,
Defendant and Appellant.
F062341
(Fresno Sup. Ct. No. F10904409)
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Jon N. Kapetan, Judge.
Paul
Bernstein, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Catherine Chatman and
R. Todd Marshall, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Appellant/defendant
Ronnie Earl Howell (defendant) was charged with several offenses after he ran
through a stop sign, attempted to evade a police officer, and was determined to
be intoxicated. During the course of the
criminal proceedings, he repeatedly
made motions pursuant to People v.
be represented by any court-appointed attorney because each such attorney was
employed by a office that was involved in a conspiracy to take away his child
in a dependency case. The court
eventually suspended criminal proceedings and declared a doubt about his
competency pursuant to Penal Code
concluded that defendant was incompetent to stand trial because he was unable
to cooperate with his defense attorney based on his delusions about every
defense counsel’s purported involvement in the alleged
Atascadero State Hospital.
On appeal,
defendant contends there is insufficient
evidence to support the court’s initial decision to suspend proceedings
because it was solely based on defense counsel’s declaration that defendant was
not competent. Defendant also challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence as to the court’s finding that he was not
competent.
While this
appeal was pending, we asked the parties to update this court regarding
defendant’s status. The parties advised
this court that defendant had been restored to competency, he was in county
jail, and criminal proceedings were reinstated.
The People request this court to dismiss the instant appeal as
moot. Defendant asserts this court
should still address the issues he originally raised in his brief. We decline defendant’s invitation and will
dismiss the instant appeal.
BACKGROUND
At
12:45 a.m. on August 26, 2010, Fresno Police Officer Sean Cowart was on patrol
in a marked squad car.
name="_ftnref2" title="">[2] He saw a vehicle driving
erratically through the neighborhood.
The vehicle, which was driven by defendant, was going too fast for
Cowart to catch up. Defendant pulled the
car into an apartment complex. Officer
Cowart parked on the street and waited to see if the vehicle would
reappear. After a few minutes, the
defendant drove out of the parking lot and went through a stop sign. Officer Cowart activated the patrol car’s
flashing lights and siren and attempted to perform a traffic stop. Defendant kept driving and continued to run
stop signs. Defendant eventually stopped
his car, and Cowart ordered him out of the vehicle.
Defendant
identified himself and said he was on parole.
His driver’s license was suspended.
He also smelled of alcohol and had bloodshot and watery eyes.
Defendant was
placed in handcuffs and seated in the
back of the patrol car. Defendant kicked
the window and complained his handcuffs were too tight. Defendant said he was on “psych†medication.
Defendant failed
field sobriety tests, and officers advised him that he was under arrest for
driving under the influence. Defendant
refused to submit to a chemical test, and he was transported to the police
department for a blood test. During the
drive, he again kicked the back windows of the patrol car. At the police department, defendant
repeatedly refused to cooperate for a blood test. The officers had to handcuff and restrain him
to a chair to obtain the blood sample.
Defendant’s blood-alcohol level was 0.16 percent.
The complaint
On
August 27, 2010, a complaint was filed in the Superior Court of Fresno County
case No. F10904409, charging defendant with count I, driving with a
blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd.
(b)), count II, driving under the influence (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a));
count III, misdemeanor evading an officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.1, subd.
(a)); and count IV, misdemeanor driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code,
§ 14601.2, subd. (a)). As to count
I, it was alleged that defendant had a blood-alcohol level of 0.15 percent or
higher (Veh. Code, § 23578). As to
counts I and II, it was alleged that he had one prior conviction for driving
with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or higher (Veh. Code,
§ 23550.5, subd. (a)). It was also
alleged that he had served five prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
Initial
Marsden motions
On
August 30, 2010, defendant appeared for arraignment before Judge Jon N. Kapetan
and objected to the appointment of the public defender’s office, John Barker
& Associates, the Alternate Defender’s Office (ADO), and Ciummo &
Associates. Defendant claimed he had
conflicts of interests with all these offices because of prior criminal
cases. The court appointed the deputy
public defender, who said that he would determine whether his office could
represent defendant or had to declare a conflict. Defendant said that he would provide
documents to prove the alleged conflict of interest. The court asked defendant who he wanted to be
represented by. Defendant asked for the
court to appoint independent counsel, “maybe John Smur[r].†The court explained that Mr. Smurr was no
longer practicing law. Defendant pleaded
not guilty and denied the enhancements.
On
September 21, 2010, defendant again appeared before Judge Kapetan, and
requested a Marsden hearing as to Ms.
Girard, his deputy public defender. At
the Marsden hearing, defendant said
he had a conflict with the entire public defender’s office because it
represented him in a prior DUI case.
Defendant further stated that if the court granted his motion, he would
object to an attorney from either “John Barker, ADO, Ciummo and Associates
representation due to conflict also.â€
Defendant
launched into a lengthy statement that his children were involved in a
dependency case, he was initially represented by the public defender, the
public defender also represented the children’s mother, Barker & Associates
represented him in a criminal case and made him plead guilty, Barker also
represented the children’s mother, and he lost custody because of his guilty
pleas.
Ms. Girard
stated that defendant refused to speak to her investigator and said he would
not cooperate with anyone from the public defender’s office. Defendant interrupted and said the dependency
case was still active. He also claimed
to have made a successful Marsden
motion against another public defender in another criminal case. He further claimed that “Catherine Hartâ€
represented him in a criminal case, and claimed she worked for the public
defender’s office “and used to be a Fresno Superior Court Judge.†Defendant said he asked Ms. Girard’s
investigator to investigate the conflict of interest with his dependency
case. Defendant added that the public
defender was representing “my son that is in the Fresno County Jail.â€
The court denied
defendant’s Marsden motion and found
he was manipulating the system, trying to set up an appeal, and his attitude
was the sole cause of any deterioration in the relationship with his attorney.
On
October 1, 2010, Judge Kapetan convened the preliminary hearing. Defendant appeared with Ms. Harbottle, his
deputy public defender, and made another Marsden
motion. Defendant complained he had
several tactical disagreements with Ms. Harbottle. Ms. Harbottle stated that she had discussed
the case with defendant and he failed to explain his objections or desired
tactics. The court denied defendant’s
and held defendant to answer.
The
information was subsequently filed which charged defendant with the same four
counts as the complaint, but included eight prior prison term enhancements.
Defendant’s successive Marsden motions
On
October 15, 2010, defendant appeared before Judge Kapetan for arraignment on
the information. The deputy public
defender attempted to set various court dates.
Defendant repeatedly interrupted.
The court asked him to remain quiet.
Defendant again interrupted and objected to his deputy public
defender. The court ordered him removed:
“For the
record, the Court has admonished [defendant] on several different occasions
regarding his outburst in court, and the Court is going to have him taken out
of the courtroom due to those outbursts.â€
After
a brief recess, the court resumed the hearing with defendant present. The court admonished defendant that he would
be removed unless he was willing to conduct himself with decorum. Defendant pleaded not guilty and declared the
prior convictions were “unconstitutional due to they have been used over
multiple times against me.â€
On
November 18, 2010, Judge Kapetan convened the trial confirmation hearing. Defendant made another Marsden motion as to his deputy public defender, Ms. Boulger. Defendant made a lengthy and rambling
statement in which he repeated his prior Marsden
complaints: that he had a conflict of
interest with the entire public defender’s office based on prior criminal
cases; he was charged with assaulting the mother of his children, and that
woman was also represented by the public defender’s office; the public
defender’s office was involved in his ongoing dependency matter, and he made
successful Marsden motions against
the public defender’s office in those cases.
Defendant also complained that his attorney had failed to file any
motions to challenge his prior convictions.
Ms. Boulger
stated that defendant had prepared his own motion to challenge his prior
convictions, she refused to file his motion under her name, and she would
research and prepare her own motion.
The court found
there was no breakdown in the relationship between defendant and his attorney,
Ms. Boulger was competently representing him, and that defendant was “setting
up an appeal. It is the exact same
argument each and every time.â€
Thereafter,
the court resumed the hearing and granted Ms. Boulger’s motion for a continuance. As the court called a recess and stepped off
the bench, defendant “hollered out for a Faretta
motion.â€
title="">[4] The court continued the
matter.
On
November 19, 2010, defendant withdrew his Faretta
request.
Defendant’s
motion to dismiss the prior convictions
On
December 10, 2010, the deputy public defender filed an extensive motion to
dismiss defendant’s multiple prior conviction allegations because of alleged
constitutional violations when defendant entered his pleas in those cases.
On December 13,
2010, the prosecution filed opposition and argued defendant had raised
noncognizable collateral attacks on the prior convictions.
On December 16,
2010, the court heard and denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the prior
conviction allegations.
Further
motions
On
January 6, 2011, Judge Kapetan convened the continued trial confirmation
hearing. Defendant said he was going to
file a Marsden motion to dismiss his
deputy public defender because the court had denied his motion to dismiss on a
“technicality.â€
On
January 10, 2011, defendant filed a written motion to dismiss the instant
criminal case, based entirely on the alleged proceedings in the dependency
case. Defendant asserted he was the
nonoffending parent in the dependency matter; he was represented by Ciummo
& Associates in that matter; and his attorney had submitted the matter
without showing defendant the petition.
The court grants defendant’s Marsden motion
On
January 20, 2011, Judge Nunez conducted a hearing on defendant’s
conflict with the public defender’s office because it also represented the
mother of his children in other criminal and dependency cases. The court asked Ms. Boulger, the deputy public
defender, if there were “some kind of walls†in such situations. Ms. Boulger said there were such separations
between the criminal and dependency divisions of the public defender’s office,
and the current case had nothing to do with defendant’s prior cases or the
dependency matter. She also said that
defendant was so concerned with “past injustices that we can’t seem to focus on
the current case. And that’s frankly
what I’m worried about, because he’s got eight prison priors .…†She had tried to settle the case but
defendant refused. Defendant was “so
convinced that any public defender or anybody that’s ever been a public
defender doesn’t care about him, and I can’t convince him otherwise.â€
The
court advised defendant there was a “wall of separation†in the public
defender’s office between criminal and dependency matters. Defendant launched into a lengthy account of
his “active†dependency matter with the children’s mother, the public defender
represented both of them, and the mother was also represented by Barker &
Associates.
The court thought
defendant was “fixated†on the idea that it was improper to work with the
public defender. Ms. Boulger agreed that
defendant’s fixation was on the entire public defender’s office and not just
about her.
The court
decided to grant defendant’s Marsden
motion as to the public defender’s office:
“I’m convinced, sir, that in your mind
the Public Defender’s Office cannot represent you, it’s improper, and I think
no matter what I say or do or the Public Defender’s Office says or does, you’re
just not going to be able to work with them, sir. So I’m going to find that there’s, in fact, a
conflict, sir.â€
The court
relieved the public defender’s office and appointed an attorney from Ciummo
& Associates. Defendant objected
because “Ciummo purchased Barker,†and he also had complaints against
Barker. The court then decided to
appoint an attorney from the ADO.
Defendant objected to the ADO and claimed he had filed successful
both Barker and the ADO, and “they got me to plead guilty to the battery†that
led to the dependency ruling which removed his children.
The court
explained that the ADO was not an office or a firm, but composed of different
attorneys from different offices, and defendant could not file a
itself. Defendant again claimed he had “
dependency case in 2000. The court again
tried to explain the difference.
Defendant said that if the court appointed an attorney from the ADO, then
he would file another Marsden
motion. Defendant also intended to sue
all the attorneys who were involved in the dependency case.
The court
appointed Bonnie Bitter from the ADO, given defendant’s inability to recall if
she had been involved in his prior criminal or dependency cases. However, defendant said he would file a
and Barker & Associates. The court
again explained that Barker was not involved in the case.
Defendant’s
Marsden motion against the ADO
On
January 24, 2011, defendant appeared before Judge Kapetan with Ms. Bitter from
the ADO. Defendant made a
and claimed the ADO represented the mother of his children during the prior
dependency case. The court asked
defendant to state specific complaints about Ms. Bitter. Defendant ignored the court’s statement,
continued to recount the ADO’s alleged involvement in the dependency case and
claimed the ADO, Barker, and Ciummo withheld evidence and committed “perjury.â€
Ms.
Bitter stated that an attorney from the ADO represented defendant in 2000
during the dependency case; that attorney was relieved the same year, and no
one from the ADO represented anyone else in the case. Defendant interrupted and said he made a
for withholding evidence, and the attorney worked with a judge to have his
children removed.
The
court noted that it had heard several of defendant’s Marsden motions in this case, and that he had raised “exactly the
same things at every Marsden
Hearing.†The court denied the
failed to show any reason why Ms. Bitter could not competently represent him.
On
January 31, 2011, defendant appeared before Judge Hoff with Amy Guerra of the
ADO. Defendant again complained he had a
conflict with the ADO and asked for the office to be relieved. The court replied that issue had already been
heard and denied. Defendant offered
another lengthy statement about his prior dependency case in 2000, and
complained he was represented by the ADO and lost custody. The court denied defendant’s motion to
relieve the ADO without prejudice. The
court advised defendant that he needed to file a written motion as to his
alleged conflict with the ADO.
Competency
proceedings
On
February 17, 2011, Judge Kapetan convened the continued trial confirmation
hearing. Defendant appeared with Ms.
Guerra of the ADO. The prosecution
stated its intent to file an amended information. Ms. Guerra advised the court:
“MS. GUERRA: At this time, after the last jail visit, I
have to express doubts as to [defendant’s] competency. I would ask the Court to appoint a doctor to
assess him pursuant to [section] 1368.
“THE DEFENDANT: I’ll be objecting to that, Your Honor.
“MS. GUERRA: As an officer of the court, I’m making that
statement.
“THE COURT: Making the statement as to what? You’re expressing a doubt as to his
competency?
“Ms. GUERRA: Yes, Your Honor, based on our last jail visit.
“THE DEFENDANT: I’ll be objecting to that.â€
The
court suspended criminal proceedings and appointed two experts to examine
defendant. Defendant immediately made
another Marsden motion.
The
court then conducted a Marsden
hearing. Defendant again objected to the
entire ADO because of alleged conflicts from his prior criminal and dependency
cases. Defendant also claimed that Judge
Nunez, who had appointed an attorney from the ADO to represent him in this
case, had ruled against him and in favor of the children’s mother during the
dependency case. Defendant launched into
another lengthy account about his complaints against the public defender’s
office, Barker & Associates, Ciummo & Associates, and the ADO, claimed
he had successfully made Marsden
motions against all those offices, and that his dependency case was still pending. Defendant declared there was a major conflict
of interest “that has still been carried out in order to try to secure the
possession of my kids through the Fresno County Superior state dependency
proceeds [sic]†by having him
committed.
Ms. Guerra stated
her office had checked for conflicts and had not found anything to prevent her
from representing defendant. The court
denied defendant’s Marsden motion
because it had “heard nothing, again.â€
The
experts’ reports
Dr.
Robert C. Taylor, Ph.D., a clinical
psychologist, examined defendant on March 4, 2011, at the county jail. Defendant made numerous confusing and
rambling remarks about the dependency case.
He declared that attorneys from both Ciummo and the ADO had engaged in
dual representation of the children’s mother and himself, that he was
previously sent to prison because of this conflict, and that imprisonment was
used against him in the dependency case.
Defendant
said he drank every day because he was “ ‘wrapped up’ †in the
dependency case. Defendant stated that
he might have heard internal voices in 2007, which told him to “ ‘do
violence to someone.’ †Defendant
had the paranoid ideation that the people involved in his dependency case were
trying to harm or hurt him. Defendant’s
responses during the competency evaluation “were often interrupted by
digressions into long-winded and rambling explanations of some dependency case
he has been or is involved with.†He
claimed to have been receiving psychiatric or psychological treatment since
2002, when he discovered “ ‘a major conflict of interest’ †during
his dependency case about “ ‘how they got me in prison,’ †and he
lost custody.
Dr.
Taylor reported that defendant had a county mental health history dating back
to 1992. Defendant said he was committed
to Atascadero State Hospital pursuant to section 1368 in May 2007. In August 2007, a psychiatrist’s follow-up note
described defendant as “ ‘somewhat delusional,’ †with a differential
diagnosis between schizophrenia, paranoid type, and delusional disorder. In April 2008, a psychiatric assessment
diagnosed defendant with delusional disorder upon his discharge from
Atascadero. In July 2008, he was
diagnosed with major depressive disorder with psychotic features. According to a February 2011 progress note,
he had complied with all his medication requirements, but he continued to talk
about his legal issues, and his speech was rambling.
Dr.
Taylor found that defendant was able to understand the nature of the criminal
proceedings, but “his disorganized
thought processes make him NOT able to assist counsel in the conduct of his
defense in a rational manner,†and recommended the court find defendant
incompetent to stand trial. (Emphasis in
original.) Defendant displayed
“disordered thinking†and his “frequent tangential comments about the
dependency case along with his odd, rambling account of why his attorney would
not adequately represent him were prime examples of the disjointed quality of his
thinking.†Defendant was hospitalized in
2008 at Atascadero State Hospital and received a diagnosis of delusional
disorder upon discharge.
Dr.
Taylor concluded:
“[Defendant is] borderline incompetent
to stand trial, his tangential thought processes causing significant
interference in his ability to focus and concentrate and understand the role of
his attorney. His delusional thought
processes about his attorney having a conflict of interest representing him because
of the firm allegedly being involved in his dependency case would seriously
undermine his ability to function rationally with counsel.… His thought disorganization would impair his
ability to assist his attorney in [a] rational manner in the conduct of his
defense.â€
Dr.
Taylor conceded that defendant’s knowledge of the legal proceedings was
basically intact. However, he believed
“[a] brief hospitalization, during which [defendant] can be skillfully treated
with appropriate psychotropic medications, can be expected to stabilize his
functioning and restore his trial competency.
Once stabilized he will need to remain on psychotropic medication in
order to maintain trial competency or risk another regression.â€
Dr.
Harold L. Seymour, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist, evaluated defendant on March
3, 2011. Dr. Seymour found the
dependency matter was defendant’s “central obsession.†Defendant was unable “to disengage from his
well-developed paranoid delusional system†about the ADO and its alleged
involvement in his dependency case.
Defendant provided “extended and detailed summaries of all manner of
assumed connections between attorneys, judges, police, etc., all designed to
thwart him.†“No matter what topic or
question was presented to [defendant], he always managed to connect it back to
the Dependency Court case. In many
instances, he would be reciting his delusions and he would not even hear the
question or the attempt at interruption.â€
Dr.
Seymour found that defendant had sufficient intelligence and knowledge to be
competent, but he was “clearly too delusional and disconnected from reality to
be able to competently assist his legal counsel at this time.†Defendant’s thought processes were
tangential, with “well-developed paranoid and persecutory delusions.†His insight and judgment were both impaired.
Dr.
Seymour concluded that defendant was not competent:
“ … [Defendant] presents with a fixed
persecutory delusional system that was identified some years ago. He has in the past been treated with
antispsychotic medication, but he is not prescribed this at this time.
“He
currently presents as too impaired to competently assist his legal counsel in
preparing a defense against the criminal charges. He was not even able to maintain an
appropriate focus for this evaluation.
He would not be able to maintain his focus during an actual criminal
trial.
“Delusions
are notoriously difficult to treat, but sometimes a combination of
antidepressant and antipsychotic medication can be effective. This appears to be how [defendant] was
treated in the past, and this may be needed once again to help restore him to
competency.â€
The court’s ruling
On
March 17, 2011, Judge Kapetan received and reviewed the experts’ reports. The prosecutor and defense counsel submitted
the matter on the reports. The court found
defendant was not competent to stand trial.
On
April 1, 2011, Judge Kapetan obtained defendant’s voluntary consent to the
administration of antipsychotic medications, and ordered defendant committed to
Atascadero State Hospital. Defendant
objected to the commitment for the record.
On
April 6, 2011, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the court’s order
of April 1, 2011.
DISCUSSION
THIS APPEAL ARE MOOT
This
court asked the parties for further briefing as to defendant’s current
status. The parties agree that defendant
has been restored to competency and returned to county jail, and his
information. The People request this
court to dismiss the instant appeal as moot.
Defendant asserts that this court should address his appellate issues
because they are capable of repetition and he could again be found incompetent. We decline defendant’s invitation for the following
reasons.
A. Briefing order
On
April 26, 2012, while the instant appeal was pending, this court requested the
parties to report on the current status of criminal proceedings in case No.
F10904409, and to provide appropriate documentation. This court further requested the parties to
address the question of whether this appeal should be dismissed as moot if
defendant has been restored to competency, and criminal proceedings have
resumed in case No. F10904409.
B. Current status of the case
In
response, this court has received copies of minute orders from case No.
F10904409, which reflect the following information.
On March 9,
2012, defendant and his attorney appeared before Judge Kapetan. Defendant was in custody at the county
jail. The court reinstated criminal
proceedings. It also issued an ongoing
order for the jail to continue to give defendant all prescribed medications.
On March 26,
2012, defendant and his attorney again appeared before Judge Kapetan. The People filed the first amended information,
and defendant pleaded not guilty and denied all special allegations. The court granted defense counsel’s motion
for a continuance in order to prepare a suppression motion pursuant to section
1538.5. Defendant entered a general time
waiver, and the court set the next hearing for April 19, 2012. Defendant remained in custody.
On
April 19, 2012, defendant again appeared in court and entered a general time
waiver. The court set a tentative jury
trial date for July 9, 2012.
C. The parties’ arguments
Based
on these minute orders, the People assert that the instant appeal should be
dismissed as moot because defendant has been restored to competency.
Defendant has
not challenged the veracity of the information contained in the minute orders.
has submitted a declaration about conversations he had with defendant’s prior
and current defense attorneys about defendant’s status. Both defense attorneys concurred that
defendant had been returned to court and criminal proceedings were
reinstated. However, they stated
defendant was not doing well, he was not getting his required medication, and
his current defense attorney was considering whether to declare a doubt as to
his competency. However, there is no
evidence before this court that criminal proceedings have again been suspended.
Based on this
declaration, defendant argues that this appeal should not be dismissed as moot
because there is a reasonable expectation that he will be declared incompetent
again, the same issues will recur, and dismissal would thwart appellate review
of his case.
D. Analysis
The question
before this court is whether the instant appeal should be dismissed as
moot. “As a general rule, an appellate
court only decides actual controversies. It is not the function of the
appellate court to render opinions ‘ “ ‘ “upon moot questions or
abstract propositions, or ... declare principles or rules of law which cannot
affect the matter in issue in the case before it.†’ †[Citation.]
‘[A] case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no practical effect
or cannot provide the parties with effective relief. [Citation.]’
[Citation.]†(People v. Rish
(2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1380.)
Thus, “ ‘[a]n action that originally was based on a justiciable
controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all the questions have become
moot by subsequent acts or events. A
reversal in such a case would be without practical effect, and the appeal will
therefore be dismissed.’
[Citation.]†(In re Dani R.
(2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 402, 404; People v. DeLong (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th
482, 486.)
v. Lindsey (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 742 (Lindsey) is directly on point
on this issue. In that case, the
superior court determined after a hearing that a criminal defendant was insane
and ordered him committed to a state hospital.
The defendant appealed the order.
During the pendency of the appeal, the defendant was certified as sane
and criminal proceedings resumed. (Id.
at p. 743.) Lindsey dismissed the
defendant’s pending appeal of the original commitment as moot because “the
superintendent’s certification of sanity terminates the commitment, leaving
no prejudicial consequences which could be ameliorated by a successful
appeal.†(Id. at p. 744, italics
added.)
Lindsey
clearly controls the resolution of the instant case. In this case, as in Lindsey, the
superior court found defendant was not competent to stand trial, and defendant
filed an appeal from the court’s judgment on that issue. In the interim, defendant was apparently
restored to competency, which has rendered the court’s initial finding moot.
Defendant
raises several arguments in support of his opposition to the People’s motion to
dismiss. First, defendant asserts this
court should not dismiss the instant appeal because of the continuing stigma of
a wrongful commitment. Lindsey
rejected the identical argument.
“The certificate of [sanity] ... attests that defendant is no longer
under ... a [mental] disability. The law imposes no disadvantageous
collateral consequences upon one whose trial has had to be postponed by
reason of such a temporary disability....
If defendant’s mental state is considered in future proceedings, the
issue will turn upon what that state is found to be as of the relevant time,
and not the fact that an order was made under ... section 1370 [in May
1971]. If any social opprobrium is
thought to attach by reason of the commitment, that is nothing which is likely
to be relieved by an appellate decision.
The temporary commitment is nothing from which defendant needs to ‘clear
his name.’ †(Lindsey, supra,
20 Cal.App.3d at pp. 744-745, italics added.)
exercise its discretion to consider his appeal because the question of his
competency could recur. This court may
exercise its discretion to decide the issues raised in his appeal if they
involve important issues of public interest that are capable of repetition yet
evade review. (See, e.g., People v.
Cheek (2001) 25 Cal.4th 894, 897-898; Conservatorship v. Wendland
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 524, fn. 1; In re David H. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th
1626, 1634.) We decline to do so in this
case, however, because defendant has not identified any issue of public
interest that this court should address in order to resolve the ongoing disputed
issues between the parties. (See, e.g. In
re Michelle M. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326, 329.)
An
argument similar to defendant’s position in this case was addressed in People
v. Harris (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 984 (Harris), where the superior
court found the defendant was not competent to stand trial. During the pendency of the defendant’s
appeal, he was found competent to stand trial and criminal proceedings were
reinstated. (Id. at pp.
989-990.) Harris declined to
dismiss the defendant’s appeal because the defendant raised several issues that
were of “sufficient public importance that it is appropriate to address them on
the merits despite the fact that [the defendant’s] commitment has expired. [Citation.]â€
(Id. at p. 990.) These
issues included whether defense counsel, over the defendant’s objections, could
waive the defendant’s right to a jury trial on the question of competency;
whether counsel could waive the defendant’s presence at the competency hearing
itself; and whether the court was required to appoint two experts pursuant to
section 1369, subdivision (a), an issue that had not been previously addressed
by an appellate court. (Harris,
supra, at pp. 990-996.)
While
Harris addressed these issues on the merits, it declined to decide
whether any of the superior court’s errors would have required reversal of the
defendant’s commitment order. Harris
concluded that “[n]o purpose would be served by vacating the expired commitment
order†and ultimately affirmed the judgment.
(Harris, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 996, fn. 5.)
In
contrast to Harris, the issues raised in defendant’s appeal do not
involve disputed legal standards or questions likely to recur among other
parties, but instead exclusively focused on whether the superior court’s
findings and orders – as to this
defendant – were supported by substantial evidence.
Defendant further argues that this court may address his appeal
based on the analysis set forth in People v. Solorzano (2005) 126
Cal.App.4th 1063 (Solorzano).
However, Solorzano did not address whether an appeal from a
commitment order should be dismissed as moot if the defendant subsequently has
been restored to competency. Instead, Solorzano
dealt with a defendant’s appeal after he had been convicted of multiple felony
offenses and sentenced to four consecutive third strike terms. Prior to trial on the substantive charges,
the superior court conducted a jury trial on the defendant’s competency. The defendant repeatedly tried to make a Marsden
motion during the competency trial, but the court “abrupt[ly]†refused to hear
the motion, continued to conduct the competency trial, and found him
competent. Later, a jury found him
sane. (Solorzano, supra, at pp.
1066-1068.) In his appeal after
conviction, the defendant argued that the superior court should have heard his Marsden
motion during the competency hearing. Solorzano
agreed, reversed the judgment of conviction, and ordered a new trial. Solorzano further ordered that if the
question of the defendant’s competency recurred, and if he again made a Marsden
motion during competency proceedings, the superior court was required to
promptly hear that motion before terminating the proceedings. (Solorzano, supra, at pp. 1071-1072.)
defendant’s position in this case. While
the defendant in Solorzano had been found competent to stand trial, his
appeal was brought after the judgment of conviction and sentence on the
underlying substantive offenses, and his convictions were reversed because the
superior court’s refusal to hear his Marsden motion violated his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. Solorzano
never addressed whether the subsequent finding of competency rendered the
defendant’s appeal as moot, which is not surprising since the defendant’s
appeal was filed after his conviction and sentence. (Solorzano, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1069-1070.)
Finally,
defendant argues this court should address his appellate issues because the
superior court might again declare a doubt as to his competency and these same
issues could recur. The instant appeal
challenged the superior court’s order of April 1, 2011, which committed
defendant to Atascadero State Hospital based on the experts’ findings and
reports. Defendant was restored to
competency and criminal proceedings were resumed during the pendency of this
appeal. If, at some future time, the
superior court declares a doubt as to defendant’s competency, suspends criminal
proceedings, and commits defendant to Atascadero, defendant may seek appellate
review of those new orders. At this
point, however, there are no longer any justiciable controversies for this
court to review, arising from the superior court’s order of April 1, 2011.
We conclude subsequent events have rendered the present appeal
moot. This case is not one where
defendant may suffer future collateral disabilities as a result of the
challenged ruling. The appropriate
remedy is dismissal. (Lindsey, supra,
20 Cal.App.3d at p. 744.)
The
People’s motion for dismissal is granted.
The appeal is dismissed as moot and the judgment is affirmed.
_____________________
Poochigian,
J.
WE CONCUR:
_____________________
Wiseman, Acting P.J.
_____________________
Franson, J.
citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
the preliminary hearing.
