In re J.P.
Filed 7/9/12 In re J.P. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits
courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re J.P. et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
STANISLAUS
COUNTY COMMUNITY SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
VICKIE S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
F064076
(Super. Ct. Nos. 515736, 515737)
THE COURT
APPEAL
from orders of the Superior Court of
County. Ann Q. Ameral, Judge.
Jesse
F. Rodriguez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
John
P. Doering, County Counsel, and Robin L. McIver, Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Vickie S. appeals the
juvenile court’s order issued at a postpermanency review hearing (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 366.3)
name="_ftnref2" title="">[1] denying her request for reinstatement of
12-year-old son, J.P.
name="_ftnref3" title="">[2] Vickie contends the juvenile court’s order
was an abuse of discretion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
K.C. and J.P., and a daughter, R.Q. The
children range in age from 11 to 14; R.Q. being the youngest and K.C. the
eldest. The whereabouts of the fathers
of J.P. and R.Q. were unknown throughout the dependency proceedings under
review. K.C.’s father is deceased.
Vickie’s involvement with the Stanislaus County Community Services
Agency (agency) began in earnest in November 2008 after law enforcement
responded repeatedly to her home to arrest parolees. Vickie, an admitted methamphetamine user, lived
there with then 10-year-old K.C., 9-year-old J.P., and 8-year-old R.Q. Vickie accepted voluntary services, made good
progress, and was drug-free for one year.
Consequently, the agency closed the case in December 2009. However, Vickie’s methamphetamine use and
association with parolees and probationers continued. In March 2010, the agency took the children
into protective custody and placed them in
foster care.
In June 2010, the juvenile court
adjudged the children dependents and approved a plan of reunification for
Vickie that required her to participate in various services, including
substance abuse counseling and random drug testing.
By November 2010, Vickie had not
made much progress and was not regularly visiting the children. In addition, the children were no longer
placed together. J.P. and R.Q. were
having behavioral problems and were moved from the original placement. J.P. was in his fifth placement and showing
signs of depression and attention deficit disorder (ADD).
In December 2010, the juvenile court
conducted the six-month review hearing and continued Vickie’s reunification
services to the 12-month review hearing which it set for June 2011.
In February 2011, the juvenile court
suspended Vickie’s educational rights as to J.P. and assigned them to a
court-appointed special advocate (CASA).
He was struggling in school and mourning the separation from his mother
and siblings.
In its report for the 12-month review hearing, the agency
recommended that the juvenile court terminate Vickie’s reunification services
and set a section 366.26 hearing to establish permanent plans for the
children. The agency reported that
Vickie had not visited the children since December 2010 and made poor progress
in her services plan. The plan at that
time was for K.C. and R.Q. to be adopted by their caregivers but there was no
specific plan in mind for J.P.
juvenile court terminated Vickie’s reunification services at the 12-month
review hearing. Vickie did not appear
and her attorney did not know how to contact her. The court set a section 366.26 hearing for
K.C. and R.Q. in October 2011 and a section 366.3 hearing as to J.P. in
December 2011. The court also ordered
group counseling for the children and sibling visitation.
In October 2011,
the juvenile court conducted the section 366.26 hearing and ordered K.C. into a
planned permanent living arrangement with his caregiver after finding that he
was not adoptable. The court found R.Q. adoptable
and terminated Vickie’s parental rights.
In November 2011, Vickie’s attorney
filed a section 388 petition on her behalf asking the juvenile court to
reinstate her reunification services with J.P.
She declared in her petition that her circumstances had changed since
the juvenile court terminated her services in that she completed a parenting
class, obtained a sponsor and attained 248 days of sobriety. In addition, she was participating in
individual counseling and regularly attending Narcotics/Alcoholics Anonymous
(NA/AA) meetings. She further declared
that an order reinstating reunification services would serve J.P.’s best
interests by allowing him a continuing relationship with his mother and
furthering a familial bond through visitation with her. Vickie attached various documents to her
section 388 petition as supporting evidence.
Among the various documents was a letter she wrote explaining that she
was depressed, which caused her to miss visits with her children.
The juvenile court set a hearing for
December 2011 to coincide with the section 366.3 hearing.
In its report for the December 2011
hearing, the agency recommended that the juvenile court approve a permanent
plan of long-term foster care for J.P with his care providers. The agency informed the court that J.P. remained
in his fifth placement, was receiving weekly mental health counseling and
treatment for behavioral problems in the foster home and at school and was
taking medication for ADD and to sleep.
He was also receiving education support from the CASA and services for
emotionally disturbed students. The
agency also informed the juvenile court that J.P. was strongly bonded to Vickie
but stated that she manipulated him in her efforts to reunify with him. Consequently, following visitation with her,
J.P. became defiant and disrespectful with his care providers and
teachers.
The CASA also filed a report for the
hearing, informing the juvenile court that J.P. had adjusted well to his foster
placement. He expressed satisfaction and
contentment there and hoped to stay there for a significant amount of
time. He had also made progress in
school. Asked what he wanted the court
to know, he said he wanted to visit his siblings.
The juvenile court continued the
December 2011 hearing and conducted it in January 2012 as a combined hearing to
review J.P.’s permanent plan pursuant to section 366.3 and adjudicate Vickie’s
section 388 petition. Vickie’s trial
counsel submitted an offer of proof that if called, Vickie would testify that
she had 309 days of sobriety and continued to attend NA/AA and church
meetings. Minors’ trial counsel
submitted an offer of proof that if called, J.P. would testify that he wanted
to return to his mother and visit her.
At the conclusion of the hearing,
the juvenile court denied Vickie’s section 388 petition, ruled that J.P.’s
foster care placement was necessary and scheduled another review hearing for
April 2012. This appeal ensued.
Vickie contends that the juvenile
court abused its discretion by denying her request for reinstatement of family
reunification services as to J.P. at his section 366.3 review hearing. Specifically, she contends, that the juvenile
court should have found under section 366.3, subdivision (f) that reunification
was the best alternative for J.P. given her efforts to resolve the problems
that required his removal and the absence of a prospective adoptive home or
guardian. We find no abuse of
discretion.
“The legislative preference is ‘for
adoption over legal guardianship over long-term foster care.’ [Citation.]â€
(Sheri T. v. Superior Court
(2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 334, 340-341.)
When a child is placed in long-term foster care, section 366.3 requires
the juvenile court to review the child’s status at least every six months. (§ 366.3, subd. (d).) In reviewing the child’s status, subdivision
(f) of section 366.3 requires the juvenile court to presume that “continued
care is in the best interests of the child, unless the parent … [proves], by a
preponderance of the evidence, that further efforts at reunification are the
best alternative for the child. In those
cases, the court may order that further reunification services to return the
child to a safe home environment be provided to the parent .…â€
In denying Vickie’s request for
reinstatement of reunification efforts, the juvenile court explained that it
believed her request was premature. The
court stated:
“I don’t want you to think that I
don’t appreciate you stepping up to the plate and working on resolving your
issues. Again, I just feel that it is a
little bit early, and I encourage you to continue to make all these efforts so
your sons can see that you are really working hard and stepping up to the plate
for them. And … I would certainly
consider a [section 388 petition] at another time, but I just want to make sure
that you are doing everything you need to do, and you are going to continue
down that road, because children’s [psyches] are very fragile, and they get
their hopes up and dashed, and it is not fair to them. So I want you to understand that I do
appreciate the work that you are putting into this for yourself as well as for
your sons. And I just need to see a
continuing effort, and then I would certainly be willing to consider a new
[section 388 petition] at that time.â€
We conclude that the juvenile court
exercised sound discretion in concluding that reunification with Vickie was not
the best alternative for J.P. According
to the evidence, J.P. was doing well in foster care. He was better managing his behavior with the
structure provided by his foster parents and access to special services at
school. Had the juvenile court
reinstated reunification efforts, it would have risked reviving J.P.’s hope to
reunify and the behavioral problems associated with it at a time when Vickie
was still in the early stages of recovery.
In our view, the juvenile court properly ruled when it denied her
request, but left open the possibility that it would entertain a new request if
her efforts continued. Thus,
reunification was not J.P.’s best alternative and the juvenile court did not
err in denying Vickie’s request.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
Wiseman, Acting P.J., Levy, J., and Cornell, J.
Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
