>In
re J.G.



















Filed 1/11/13 In re J.G. CA5















NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS







California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits
courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115>.





IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE
DISTRICT




>

In re J.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.G., Defendant and Appellant.	F064346 (Super. Ct. No. JL003480) >OPINION

THE COURThref="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">^*

APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior Court of href="http://www.adrservices.org/neutrals/frederick-mandabach.php">Merced
County. David W. Moranda, Judge.

Candice
L. Christensen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.

Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Charles A. French and
John G. McLean, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.



>-ooOoo-

At a contested href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court
found true allegations that appellant, J.G., a minor, committed second degree
robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)) and second degree burglary (Pen.
Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b)), and violated probation that had been granted in
a prior wardship proceeding. At the
subsequent disposition hearing, the court continued appellant as a ward of the
court, placed him under the supervision of the probation officer for placement
in the home of appellant’s parents, and ordered him committed to the Bear Creek
Academy Short Term Program, Level 3.

On
appeal, appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the instant
adjudications. We affirm.

FACTS

Prosecution Case

At
approximately 7:58 p.m. on November 16, 2011, Mathew Martinez, the manager of
the Save Mart grocery store (the store) in Merced, was in his office in the
store when he observed the following by means of the store’s video surveillance
system: Appellant and another minor
entered and exited the store three or four times.href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="">^[1] Inside the store, “[o]ne [of
the minors] had a basket” which “[t]hey [sic]
[set] down on the floor.” Thereafter,
the two “met up” and spoke to each other, and appellant “select[ed]” an item
and placed it the basket, at which point the two minors “looked around for a
couple of seconds.” At that point,
appellant’s companion picked up the basket, which was full of merchandise, and
walked out of the store.

Martinez
left his office and ran toward the door through which appellant’s companion had
exited the store. The minor with the
basket was outside the store, approximately “10 steps in front of [Martinez],”
when appellant, who was running, “came from [Martinez’s] right-hand side” and
“stopped” Martinez by “yelling.” This
“got [Martinez’s] attention.” Martinez
“turned around and ... faced” appellant, who “threw a jab” at Martinez. Martinez “then grabbed [appellant] and was
wrestling with him,” and that allowed appellant’s companion to “get away.” The two struggled, as Martinez tried to “keep
[appellant] within the store.” During
this struggle, appellant “[said] that he was stopping [Martinez] so [the minor
with the basket] could get away.”

Appellant’s
companion was never apprehended.

When
asked if he told store employees or the investigating officer who his companion
was, appellant testified that he did not know the person’s name. Appellant also testified that he was asked
for the address of the party he had planned to attend, but he did not “have
that information.”

A
video taken with the store’s surveillance camera, admitted into evidence,
showed the following: Appellant’s
companion left the store with a basket in hand.
Within seconds thereafter, the store manager ran to the door, appellant
ran up to him, and a physical altercation between the two ensued.

Defense Case

Appellant
testified that he and his companion were at the store to “pick[] out grocery
items for the party” the two planned to attend.href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title="">^[2] Appellant’s companion said
he had an EBT card and “[h]e would be able to pay for all the items.” Appellant was “surprised … that [his
companion] exited the store without telling [appellant] he was going to [do
so].” When the other minor left the
store, appellant “ran after him to try to stop him.”

As
appellant “looked up[,] [Martinez] was already coming [at appellant] and it was
just a natural reaction [for appellant] to put [his] hands up .…” Appellant was “involved in a scuffle,” but he
did not “swing at” Martinez, he did not tell Martinez he (appellant) was trying
to stop Martinez from “pursuing the other guy,” he was not trying to “hold
onto” Martinez, and he was not “attempting to interfere with Mr. Martinez’s
pursuit of the guy who had the basket[.]”


City
of Merced Police Officer Christopher McLane testified to the following: At approximately 7:58 p.m. on November 16,
2011, he received a dispatch call which informed him that “a petty theft … had
just occurred” and that “one of the subjects was fighting with Save Mart
staff .…”

At the store,
McLane spoke with Martinez. Martinez did
not say that appellant “stopped” him or “yelled at” him. Martinez did say that “there was some
grabbing and wrestling that took place between … Martinez and [appellant],” and
that appellant “initiated this physical encounter .…”

However, in his
written report of his investigation, McLane wrote that Martinez stated that he
(Martinez) “grabbed” appellant, at which point, appellant “turned around to
punch [Martinez].” McLane admitted there
was nothing in his report indicating that Martinez told the officer that
appellant “initiated the physical encounter .…”

DISCUSSION

As
indicated earlier, appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support
his adjudications of second degree robbery and second degree burglary. We first set forth the applicable standard of
review, and then consider the two offenses separately.

Standard of Review

In general, in determining whether the
evidence is sufficient to support a finding in a href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">juvenile court proceeding, the reviewing
court is bound by the same principles as to sufficiency and the substantiality
of the evidence that govern the review of criminal convictions generally. (In re
Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809.)
Those principles include the following:
We resolve neither
credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts. (People
v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
“[T]he reviewing court must examine the whole record in the light
most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence--evidence
that is reasonable, credible and of solid value--such that a reasonable trier
of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]
The appellate court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of
every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People
v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) “Reversal on this ground [i.e., insufficiency
of the evidence] is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis
whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the
adjudication].” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)

“Substantial evidence includes
circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that
evidence.” (In re Michael D. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 115, 126.) “‘[W]hile substantial
evidence may consist of inferences,
such inferences must be “a product of logic and reason”
and “must rest on the evidence” [citation]; inferences
that are the result of mere speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding
[citations.]’” (In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1393-1394, italics
omitted.) “Evidence which merely raises a strong
suspicion of the defendant’s guilt is not sufficient to support a
conviction.” (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.)

Appellant’s Burglary Adjudication

Appellant
contends the evidence was insufficient to establish he aided and abetted in the
commission of a burglary because he “had no prior knowledge that the other
juvenile would abruptly leave without paying” and he “maintains that he was
unaware of the burglary throughout the incident and never intended to
facilitate its commission.” He asserts
that the video evidence shows that the store manager was the aggressor and that
he (appellant) was merely defending himself.


Burglary
consists of entry into, inter alia, a building, accompanied by the specific
intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony. (Pen. Code, § 459; People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1041 (Montoya).) To aid and abet a
burglary, the aider and abettor must learn of the perpetrator’s unlawful
purpose and form the intent to facilitate or encourage commission of the
offense before the perpetrator’s final exit from the burglarized
structure. (Montoya, at p. 1046.)
Probative factors relative to aiding and abetting include presence at
the scene of the crime and companionship and conduct before and after the
offense. (People v. Mitchell (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 325, 330.) “Mere presence at the scene of a crime which
does not itself assist its commission or mere knowledge that a crime is being
committed and the failure to prevent it does not amount to aiding and
abetting.” (In re Michael T. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 907, 911.)

When
we apply the principles of appellate review set forth above, we conclude the
juvenile court reasonably could have concluded, based on both video evidence,
which we have viewed, and Martinez’s testimony, as follows: First, appellant and his companion entered
the store and exited multiple times, conduct consistent with casing the
store. Second, after appellant placed an
item in the basket and before his companion left the store with the basket,
appellant, as well as his companion, looked around for a few seconds, conduct
consistent with looking to see if anyone was watching. Finally, after appellant’s companion left the
store, appellant approached the store manager on the run, punched him, and
stated he (appellant) was stopping the manager so appellant’s companion could
escape. Although no one of these factors
is sufficient to establish appellant’s guilt, when we consider the whole
record, we conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could find that appellant
formed the intent to assist his companion in committing theft, at the very
latest, at some point while the two juveniles were inside store.

Contrary to
appellant’s claim, the video evidence does not compel the conclusion that
Martinez was the aggressor in the altercation between him and appellant, or
that appellant did not punch
Martinez. Appellant’s argument asks, in
effect, that we reweigh the evidence.
This we cannot, and will not, do.
On this record, the evidence supports the conclusion that appellant
aided and abetted in a burglary.

Appellant’s Robbery Adjudication

Appellant
contends his adjudication of robbery cannot stand because (1) the video
evidence shows that appellant is “charging at” his companion, in an attempt to
keep him from leaving the store, not assisting his companion in getting away,
and (2) appellant “was not an aider and abettor because the robbery had already
concluded.” We disagree.

“Robbery is the felonious taking
of the personal property in the possession of another, from his person or
immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or
fear.” (Pen. Code, § 211). Thus, the elements of robbery are (1) the
taking of personal property (2) from a person or the person’s immediate
presence (3) by means of force or fear (4) with the intent to permanently
deprive the person of the property. (>Ibid.; People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 34.) The “taking” element “has two aspects: (1) achieving possession of the
property, known as ‘caption,’ and (2) carrying the property away, or ‘asportation.’” (People
v. Gomez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 249,
255 (Gomez).) Although the slightest movement may
constitute asportation (People v. Davis
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 301, 305), the robbery continues “as long as the loot is
being carried away to a place of temporary safety” (People v. Cooper
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1165). The
“force or fear” element may occur at any point during which the property is
being carried to a place of temporary safety, as the crime has not yet
concluded. (Gomez, supra, 43 Cal.4th
at p. 257.) The scene of the crime is
not a place of temporary safety, especially when the victim remains present
there. (People v. Ramirez (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1375.)

Based on the evidence in its
totality, including the video evidence and the evidence of appellant’s
statement to Martinez, the juvenile court reasonably could have rejected
appellant’s interpretation of the evidence and concluded that appellant was
trying to forcibly prevent Martinez from stopping the other juvenile from
escaping with the stolen property.
Therefore, substantial evidence
supports the conclusion that appellant aided and abetted in a robbery.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is
affirmed.