>San
Jose v. >Los
Angeles >County>
MTA>



















Filed 1/15/13 San Jose v. Los Angeles County MTA CA2/2













>NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE
OFFICIAL REPORTS

>





California Rules of Court, rule
8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115>.







IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA



SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT



DIVISION TWO




>

EDITH SAN JOSE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY et al., Defendants and Respondents.

B234317 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC445978)

APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior Court of href="http://www.adrservices.org/neutrals/frederick-mandabach.php">Los Angeles
County. Ruth Ann
Kwan, Judge. Affirmed.



Carpenter,
Zuckerman & Rowley, John C. Carpenter and Maureen Johnson for Plaintiff and
Appellant.



Law
Offices of York & Wainfeld, James R. York; Greines, Martin, Stein &
Richland, Martin Stein and Gary J. Wax for Defendants and Respondents.



* *
* * * *

The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of defendants and respondents the Los Angeles County
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) and Joseph Billingsley on the
complaint filed by plaintiff and appellant Edith San Jose. Appellant alleged she was injured after being
struck by an MTA bus driven by Billingsley.
The trial court ruled that appellant’s complaint was untimely, having
been filed more than six months after the rejection of her href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">government tort claim.

We
affirm. The undisputed evidence showed
that appellant filed her complaint more than six months after her claim was
rejected. Contrary to appellant’s effort
to create a triable issue of fact, nothing in the applicable statutory scheme
precluded the MTA from administering its claims handling through a third party,
and evidence showing the third party’s consistent rejection of claims did not
indicate a constitutional violation.



FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Appellant’s Tort
Claim.

The MTA is a
public entity. On January 12, 2010, appellant was crossing a street when she was struck by an MTA bus
driven by MTA employee Billingsley. She
retained counsel, who requested that all communication from the MTA be directed
to him.

Through
her counsel, appellant submitted a tort claim to the MTA that was received on February 16, 2010. The claim
provided that appellant was hit by a bus while crossing at an intersection, and
that as a result she suffered injury to her head, neck, shoulders and left
side. On March 2, 2010, Hertz Claim
Management (Hertz) mailed appellant’s counsel a notice (Hertz notice) that her
claim was rejected as of that date “by an authorized agent of the Board of
Directors of the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, [a]
public corporation.” The notice of
rejection further provided, in all capital letters, that appellant had only six
months from the date the notice was mailed to file an action in court on the
claim and directed her to Government Code section 945.6.href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">^[1] Appellant’s counsel received the notice on March 8, 2010.

Since
1987, Hertz has operated as the third party administrator, evaluating a
majority of the claims of the MTA and its predecessor. Neither Hertz nor its employees are employed
by the MTA. Effective September 2006,
Hertz began to operate pursuant to a fixed-price contract with the MTA (Hertz
contract) that required it “to provide Public Liability/Property Damage (PL/PD)
claims administration services for all pending Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (METRO) claims and new claims filed on or after September 1, 2006.” The Hertz contract limited
Hertz’s authority to claims valued at less than $50,000. The MTA Board of Directors (MTA Board) approved
the Hertz contract at a July 27, 2006 board meeting.

The
MTA receives approximately 3,000 claims per year. Consistent with instructions from the MTA,
Hertz typically rejects claims for bodily injury. In her over 20 years of experience, MTA
claims administrator Nita Welch was aware of fewer than five times the MTA had
accepted a claim.

No
MTA employee was involved in the rejection of appellant’s claim. Hertz claims examiner Krisztina Renaud,
alone, made the determination to reject the claim the day after she received
it. The rejection was unrelated to any
determination of MTA’s fault or the extent of appellant’s injuries.

>Pleadings
and Summary Judgment.

Appellant
filed her complaint for personal
injury and property damage against the MTA and Billingsleyhref="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="">^[2] on September 22, 2010,
specifically alleging that she either complied with the applicable claims
statutes or was excused from compliance. The MTA answered, generally denying the
allegations and asserting affirmative defenses, including the failure to comply
with the claims provisions of the Government Code.

In
March 2011, the MTA moved for summary judgment on the ground that appellant
failed to file her complaint within six months of service of the rejection of
her claim as required by section 945.6.
In support of the motion the MTA submitted the declarations of Hertz
senior claims examiner Renaud and Hertz claims assistant Lisa Oechsel,
counsel’s declaration, and a copy of appellant’s claim and complaint.

Appellant
opposed the motion. Among other
arguments, appellant contended that authority to reject a claim was not
properly delegated to Hertz in accordance with section 935.4. According to appellant, the Hertz notice did
not constitute a valid rejection of her claim and, therefore, she had until six
months after March 28, 2010—the date her claim was rejected by operation of
law—to file her complaint. She further
contended that the claims statute was unconstitutional as applied to her, because
her evidence showed that the MTA had rejected all personal injury claims
submitted during the past 23 years, a total of over 80,000 claims. In support of her opposition, she submitted
deposition excerpts from MTA claims administrator Welch, Hertz claims examiner
Renaud, Hertz unit supervisor Leesa Carberry and Hertz claims assistant
Oechsel, and her own discovery responses.
She also filed evidentiary objections to the declarations submitted by
the MTA.

In
reply, the MTA offered additional evidence, including a copy of the Hertz
contract, effective September 2006; minutes from the July 27, 2006 MTA Board
meeting approving the Hertz contract; the declaration of MTA director of
general liability claims administration Welch; the declaration of bus driver
Billingsley; and Renaud’s supplemental declaration. It argued that the MTA had properly delegated
claims administration authority to Hertz in accordance with the Public
Utilities Code. Appellant objected to
the MTA’s submission of further evidence.
On June 6, 2011, the trial court issued a tentative ruling granting the
motion, but continued the hearing to permit both parties to file supplemental
briefing. It reasoned that the MTA met
its threshold burden on summary judgment to show that appellant’s complaint was
untimely, and it overruled appellant’s objection to the supplemental evidence,
explaining that the MTA had no reason to address the issue of Hertz’s
authorization in its moving papers because appellant did not specifically
allege the lack of authorization in her complaint. In addition to her brief, appellant also
filed supplemental evidentiary objections and offered Billingsley’s deposition
excerpts which indicated that the MTA found him at fault for appellant’s
accident and terminated him.

Following
a June 20, 2011 hearing, the trial court granted the motion. It ruled that the MTA met its threshold burden
to show was no triable issue of fact as to whether appellant filed her
complaint more than six months after her claim was rejected. It further ruled that appellant failed to
meet her burden to establish a triable issue of fact as to whether her
complaint was timely filed, construing the Government Code and the Public
Utilities Code as allowing the MTA to contract with a third party for claims
administration. Finally, it concluded
that appellant failed to raise a triable issue concerning the constitutionality
of the claims statutes as applied by the MTA, reasoning that appellant would
have had full access to the courts had she satisfied the statutory time
frames. The trial court overruled all
evidentiary objections.

Appellant
appealed from the judgment entered in favor of the MTA.



DISCUSSION

On
appeal, appellant renews two arguments she raised below. She contends that the statutory scheme
governing the claims procedures does not permit the MTA to contract with a
third party for claims administration, and alternatively, that the evidence
established a triable issue of fact as to whether the claims procedures as
implemented violated her constitutional rights.
We find no merit to her contentions.



>I.
Standard
of Review.

name="citeas((Cite_as:_2012_WL_286886,_*2_(Cal">Summary
judgment is properly granted when no triable issue exists as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)name=FN1>
A defendant moving for summary judgment meets “his or her burden of
showing that a cause of action has no merit if that party has shown that one or
more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be
established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Once the moving defendant has met its initial
burden, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a
triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action
or a defense thereto.” (>Ibid.)

We review the name="SR;2652">trial court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo, independently evaluating the
correctness of the trial court’s ruling and applying the name="SR;2672">same legal standards as the trial
court. (Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th
1138, 1142; Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield
Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843–857.)
Issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation likewise raise
pure questions of law, subject to independent appellate review. (American
Civil Rights Foundation v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2008) 169
Cal.App.4th 436, 448; Slocum v. State Bd.
of Equalization (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 969, 974.)



II.
The Trial Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment.

A.
>The
Undisputed Evidence Showed That Appellant’s Complaint Was Untimely.

Harmonizing the applicable provisions of the Government Code
and the Public Utilities Code, the trial court concluded that appellant failed
to file her complaint within six months after the MTA rejected it, specifically
finding that nothing precluded the MTA’s delegation of claims administration to
a third party.

It
was undisputed that the MTA is a public entity.
(See generally Breda Costruzioni
Ferroviarie v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (1997)
56 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1437.) Under the California Tort Claims Act (§ 810 et
seq.) (Act), liability against a public entity must be based on statute. (§ 815, subd. (a); Guzman v. County of Monterey (2009) 46 Cal.4th 887, 897; >Miklosy v.
Regents of University of California (2008)
44 Cal.4th 876, 899–900.) The timeliness of an action against a public entity is governed by
the statute of limitations set forth in the Act—not the limitations periods
applicable to private defendants. (>County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court
(2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1267 (County
of Los Angeles).)

The County of Los Angeles court summarized the statutory time frames
relevant here: “Under the Act, no person
may sue a public entity or public employee for ‘money or damages’ unless a
timely written claim has been presented to and denied by the public
entity. [Citations.] A claim pertaining to a cause of action for
personal injury must be filed within six months after the cause of action
accrues. [Citations.] With certain exceptions, an action against a
public entity on a cause of action for which a claim must be presented must be
commenced ‘not later than six months’ after written notice rejecting the claim
is name="citeas((Cite_as:_127_Cal.App.4th_1263,_*">delivered to the claimant
personally or deposited in the mail.
[Citation.] If the public entity
deposits written notice of rejection in the mail, the six-month limitations
period within which to file suit applies regardless of whether notice is
actually received. [Citation.]” (County
of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1267–1268.)

Here, the undisputed evidence
established that appellant’s accident occurred on January 12, 2010. It was likewise undisputed that she satisfied
the Act’s first applicable time limit, filing her claim on February 10,
2010. (See § 911.2, subd. (a) [personal
injury claims must be presented within six months after accrual of the cause of
action].)

Once a public entity receives a timely claim, it must either
approve or reject it within 45 days and provide written notice to the
claimant. (§§ 912.4,name="SR;3821"> 912.6, 913.) Section 913 specifies
the required content of the written notice of any action taken pursuant to
section 912.6 or of any inaction that is deemed a rejection under
section 912.4, including the
warning that a court action must be filed within six months from the date the
notice was personally delivered or deposited in the mail;
it also directs that notice be given in the manner prescribed by section
915.4. (§ 913,
subd. (a).) Section 915.4, subdivision
(a), in turn, requires notice be given either by personal delivery to the
claimant; by mailing notice to the address, if any, stated in the claim as the
address to which the claimant desires notices to be sent; or by mailing the
notice to the address, if any, of the claimant as stated in the claim.

The
MTA offered evidence establishing that Hertz, acting on behalf of the MTA,
received appellant’s claim and, on March 2, 2010, mailed to appellant’s
attorney a rejection letter by certified mail, with return receipt
requested. Appellant’s claim, itself,
had identified her attorney, and he later sent a letter to the MTA requesting
that all communications be directed to him exclusively. The Hertz letter contained a warning that
appellant had six months from the date the notice was mailed to file a court
action on her claim. The MTA’s evidence
further showed that appellant received the Hertz letter on March 5, 2010.

“Government Code section 945.6 requires that suit be brought against a public
entity no later than six months after the public entity that receivesname="SR;1765"> a claimname="citeas((Cite_as:_175_Cal.App.4th_474,_*4">
rejects it and issues a warning pursuant to section 913. [Citation.]”
(Roberts v. County of Los Angeles (2009)
175 Cal.App.4th 474, 478–479, fn. omitted; accord, Martell v. Antelope Valley Hospital Medical Center (1998) 67
Cal.App.4th 978, 982.) The evidence was undisputed that appellant’s
complaint was filed on September 22, 2010, more than six months following the
March 2, 2010 Hertz letter. We agree
with the trial court that this evidence satisfied the MTA’s threshold burden to
show that appellant’s complaint was untimely under the Act. (See County
of Los Angeles, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1267–1268.)

Appellant maintains
she demonstrated a triable issue of fact as to the timeliness of her complaint,
asserting that the Hertz letter was not a proper rejection of her claim. (See § 945.6, subd. (a)(2) [if notice is not
given in accordance with § 913, the claimant may file an action in court within
two years from the date of accrual].)
Specifically, she contends that Hertz was not statutorily authorized to
reject her claim. She relies on section
912.6, which provides in pertinent
part how the public entity’s “board” may act on a claim: “(a) In the case of a claim against a local
public entity, the board may act on a claim in one of the
following ways: [¶] (1) If the board finds
the claim is not a proper charge against the public entity, it shall reject the
claim. [¶] (2) If the board finds the claim is a proper
charge against the public entity and is for an amount justly due, it shall
allow the claim. [¶] (3) If the board finds the claim is a proper
charge against the public entity but is for an amount greater than is justly
due, it shall either reject the claim or allow it in the amount justly due and
reject it as to the balance. [¶] (4) If legal liability of the public entity
or the amount justly due is disputed, the board may reject the claim or may
compromise the claim.” (See also §
912.4, subd. (a) [“The board shall act on a claim in the manner provided in
Section 912.6, 912.7 or 912.8 within 45 days after the claim has been
presented”]; § 945.4 [“no suit for money or damages may be brought against a
public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented
. . . until a written claim therefor has been presented to
the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to
have been rejected by the board”].)

As defined in section 900.2, subdivision name="SR;2550">(a) “‘[b]oard’”
means “[i]n the case of a local public entity, the governing body of the local
public entity.” In addition to allowing
board action, the Government Code permits a public entity to delegate the
duties of resolving claims to an employee via an ordinance or resolution. (§ 935.4; see Cal. Government Tort Liability
Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1992) § 6.62, pp. 715–716.)

Appellant
contends there was a triable issue of fact as to whether the Act’s six-month
time limit in section 945.6 was triggered by the Hertz letter because the evidence
showed Hertz was not the board or governing body of the MTA, nor one of its
employees, and thus she had two years from the date of accrual to file her
complaint. (§ 945.6, subd. (a)(2).) But in addition to the Government Code, the
MTA is also governed by the Public Utilities Code. (See Pub. Util. Code, §§ 30001, 31000; >Kajima/Ray Wilson v. Los
Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2000) 23 Cal.4th 305, 314.)
The Public Utilities Code expressly authorizes the MTA Board to delegate
its duties by contract, providing: “The
board may contract and take any and all actions and proceedings and do any and
all other things necessary to carry out the purposes of this part.” (Pub. Util. Code, § 30253; see also Pub. Util. Code, § 30258 name=I26D9E311EF3E11E19601D851161595BC>[“The
board may contract for or employ any professional services required by the
district or for the performance of work or services for the district which, in
the opinion of the board, cannot satisfactorily be performed by the officers or
employees of the district], § 30530
[“The district may make contracts and enter into
stipulations of any nature whatsoever, . . . including, without
limiting the generality of the foregoing, contracts . . . to do
all acts necessary for, incidental to, or convenient for the full exercise of
the powers granted in this part”], §
30531 [“The district may contract with any department
or agency of the United States of America or of the State of California or with
any public or private corporation upon such terms and conditions as the directors
find is for the best interests of the district”].)

The
undisputed evidence showed that the MTA Board entered into a contract with
Hertz for the administration of its general liability claims valued at less
than $50,000, approving the contract via a motion at a regular board
meeting. (See Pub. Util. Code, § 30273, subd. (a) [acts of the board may
be expressed by motion, resolution or ordinance].) The Hertz contract codified the role Hertz
had served for the MTA and its predecessors since 1987. Hertz has consistently operated as the MTA’s
claim administrator under the written agreement since 2006.

The
validity of this arrangement hinges on the construction of Public Utilities
Code section 30670, which specifically addresses claims for money or damages
and provides: “All claims for money or
damages against the district are governed by Part 3 (commencing with Section
900) and Part 4 (commencing with Section 940) of Division 3.6 of Title 1
of the Government Code except as provided therein, or by other statutes or
regulations expressly applicable thereto.”
While appellant asserts that this provision requires us to look
exclusively to the Government Code to determine whether the MTA was authorized
to contract out its claims administration duties, the MTA maintains that the
final clause of the statute requires us to harmonize the Act’s claims
procedures with the Public Utilities Code’s multiple provisions permitting the
contractual delegation of duties.
Applying established principles of statutory construction, we agree with
the trial court that the MTA’s construction is more reasonable.

“The
rules governing name="citeas((Cite_as:_186_Cal.App.4th_480,_*4">statutory interpretation
are well settled. We begin with the
fundamental principle that ‘[t]he objective of statutory construction is to
determine the intent of the enacting body so that the law may receive the
interpretation that best effectuates that intent. [Citation.]’
[Citation.] To ascertain that
intent, ‘we turn first to the words of the statute, giving them their usual and
ordinary meaning. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]
The statute’s every word and clause should be given effect so that no
part or provision is rendered meaningless or inoperative. [Citations.]
A statute is not to be read in isolation, but construed in context and
‘“with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all
may be harmonized and have effect.
[Citations.]”’ [Citation.] ‘If the statutory language is unambiguous,
“we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute
governs.” [Citations.]’ [Citations.]”
(Koszdin v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (2010)
186 Cal.App.4th 480, 487–488; accord, Neily
v. Manhattan Beach Unified School Dist. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 187, 192 [“The various parts of a statute, or of a statutory name="SR;1787">scheme, must be harmonized by
considering a particular clause or section in the context of the statutory
framework as a whole”].) “An
interpretation that renders related provisions nugatory must be avoided
[citation]; each sentence must be read not in isolation but in the light of the
statutory scheme [citation]; and if a statute is
amenable to two alternative interpretations, the one that leads to the more
reasonable result will be followed [citation].” (Lungren
v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735.)

Harmonizing the relevant provisions
of the Government Code and the Public Utilities Code, we conclude that a more
reasonable construction of Public Utilities Code section 30670 allows for the
MTA to contract with a third party claims administrator. While the statute directs that claims are to
be governed by the Act, it expressly allows for the application of other
statutes or regulations. (Pub. Util.
Code, § 30670.) Correspondingly, nothing
in the Government Code precludes the application of other statutes in
determining the validity of the “board” action required by section 912.6 and
related provisions. Indeed, the
enactment of section 912.6 preceded the enactment of the Public Utilities
Code provisions relating to the MTA’s ability to contract. (Compare § 912.6, added by Stats. 1963, ch. 1715, p. 3372, § 1, with Pub. Util. Code, § 30258, added by Stats. 1964, 1st
Ex. Sess., ch. 62, p. 208, § 1 & Pub. Util. Code, §
30530, added by Stats. 1964, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 62, p.
215, § 1.) The Legislature is deemed to
be aware of existing statutes and we presume it acts in light of the law in
effect at the time. (>Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007)
42 Cal.4th 201, 212.) Thus, if the
Legislature had intended to limit the MTA’s ability to contract for the
performance of its board duties, it could have expressly excluded from the
Public Utilities Code the delegation of claims handling procedures. It did not.
Instead, it enacted broad provisions, enabling the MTA Board to
“contract for or employ any professional services required by the district”
(Pub. Util. Code, § 30258) and to “make contracts . . . to do
all acts necessary for, incidental to, or convenient for the full exercise of
the powers granted in this part” (Pub. Util. Code, § 30530). Against this backdrop, we construe the
qualifying provision in Public Utilities Code section 30670 to refer to “other
statutes” in the Public Utilities Code relating to the MTA’s ability to
contract.

Construing that
provision in the limited manner advocated by appellant would be
unreasonable. Restricting the phrase
“other statutes or regulations expressly applicable thereto” in Public
Utilities Code section 30670 to mean only the Government Code or other
provisions directed to claims administration would require us to infer that the
statutes relating to the MTA’s ability to contract must be read to exclude
contracts for claims handling procedures, which is a construction contrary to
the language of the Public Utilities Code.
“It is our task to construe, not
to amend, the statute. ‘In the
construction of a statute . . . the office of the judge is
simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substancename="sp_3484_283">name="SDU_301"> contained
therein, not to insert what has been omitted or omit what has been inserted
. . . .’ [Citation.] We may not, under the guise of construction,
rewrite the law or give the words an effect different from the plain and direct
import of the terms used. [¶] ‘We
must assume that the Legislature knew how to create an exception if it wished
to do so . . . .’ [Citation.]”
(California Fed. Savings &
Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 11 Cal.4th 342, 349.)

In sum, we conclude that a reasonable
and common sense construction of the Government Code and the Public Utilities
Code—one that harmonizes the statutory schemes and gives effect to the language
selected by the Legislature—provides that the MTA may contract for the
provision of claims administration services.
Accordingly, the Hertz letter sufficed as a rejection of appellant’s
claim under section 913, thereby triggering the six-month limitations
period in section 945.6. Because
appellant did not file her complaint within that six-month time frame, her
complaint was untimely.

>B.
>The
Undisputed Evidence Failed to Show That the MTA’s Claims Administration Procedures
Were Unconstitutional as Applied.

In
opposition to summary judgment, appellant offered evidence that, pursuant to
instructions from the MTA, it is Hertz’s practice to reject all claims for
bodily injury. Hertz unit supervisor
Carberry testified:

“A. [CARBERRY]
All—valid claims—all claims that are filed are accepted. We make a determination whether they’re to be
rejected. If it’s a bodily injury claim,
they’re rejected.

“Q. [COUNSEL]
Why?

“A. [CARBERRY]
To limit the statute.

“Q. [COUNSEL]
Even for—even for claims where the MTA is conceding being at fault?

“A. [CARBERRY]
Correct.”

After explaining that Hertz conducts an
analysis of each claim, Carberry continued:

“Q. [COUNSEL]
Okay. So in—so there is an
analysis, and even if—even if the claim is reasonable and even if MTA is at
fault, under the analysis the claim is still rejected?

“A. [CARBERRY]
Correct.

“Q. [COUNSEL]
Okay, and why is that?

“A. [CARBERRY]
To limit the statute.”

Carberry further responded “Correct” to the
question “But 100 percent of all bodily injury claims are rejected, correct?”

Appellant
contends that this evidence, at a minimum, created a triable issue of fact as
to whether the MTA’s claims administration procedures as applied violated her
constitutional rights to equal protection and due process, as well as her
rights under article III, section 5 of the California Constitution providing
that “[s]uits may be brought against the State in such manner and in such
courts as shall be directed by law.”

It
is well settled that the power of the Legislature to control governmental tort
liability is broad, limited by the principles that such power must be exercised
reasonably and not arbitrarily. (>Reed v. City & County of San Francisco (1965)
237 Cal.App.2d 23, 24; Flournoy v. State
of California (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 520, 523–524.) Consequently, “the California
authorities have unanimously upheld the constitutionality of the claims statute
and concluded that the statutory requirement for presenting claims to a public
entity before suit may be brought does not violate the constitutional
guarantees of due process or equal protection of laws [citations].” (Stanley v. City and County of San Francisco (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d
575, 582; accord, Tammen v. County of San
Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 481; Tsingaris
v. State of California (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 312, 315; Carr v. State of California (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 139, 143–144.)

As
summarized in Carr v. State of
California, supra, 58 Cal.App.3d at page 143: “[W]here, as in California, the right to
bring suit against the state is granted (Cal. Const., art. III, § 5), the state
may impose conditions as a prerequisite to the commencement of the action
against it and place limitations upon the enforcement of such action [citation]. . . . [T]he claims statute defines with precision
and clarity the respective rights and duties of both the individual claimants
and public entities and, therefore, cannot be said to be unreasonable,
arbitrary or vague so as to be subject to constitutional attack on due process
grounds [citation].” The >Carr court likewise explained the basis
for the rejection of an equal protection challenge, as name="SDU_733">“the classification made between governmental and
non-governmental tort victims does have a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, promotes a number of legitimate state interests and
is thus in full conformity with the constitutional precepts of equal protection
[citation].” (Ibid.)

In view of these principles, we cannot
conclude that appellant’s evidence of the MTA’s and Hertz’s consistent denial
of claims valued at less than $50,000 raised a triable issue as to the
constitutionality of the claim requirements.
Rejecting a comparable due process challenge, the court in >Stanley v. City and
County of San Francisco, supra, 48 Cal.App.3d at
page 580 determined that the plaintiffs who failed to file an action within six
months after the timely rejection of their claim “may not invoke the constitutional precept of due process in an
attempt to avoid the result of their own inadvertence and neglect in complying
with clearly phrased and reasonable legislation.” Also rejecting the plaintiffs’ equal
protection challenge, the Stanley
court stated that “the classification made between governmental and
nongovernmental tort victims may be said to have a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation and to promote a number of legitimate
state interests.” (Id. at p. 581.)

We find no merit to appellant’s
contention that she presented a valid constitutional challenge because the
policy of rejecting all claims valued at less than $50,000 serves no legitimate
purpose. The claim presentation
requirement serves multiple valid purposes:
It provides the public entity prompt notice of a claim to
enable it to investigate in a timely manner; it allows the public entity an
opportunity to resolve the matter without the necessity of litigation; it enables the public entity to take account of
the claim in making advance fiscal preparations; and it affords the public
entity an opportunity to correct the conditions or practices giving rise to the
claim. (Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1776; >Stanley v. City and County
of San Francisco, supra, 48 Cal.App.3d at p.
581.) These purposes must be considered,
however, in view of the “[t]he
intent of the Tort Claims Act . . . not to expand the rights of
plaintiffs against governmental entities.
Rather, the intent of the act is to confine potential governmental
liability to rigidly delineated circumstances.
[Citation.]” (>Munoz v. State of California, supra, at
p. 1776.)

Here, as in Stanley, appellant’s inability to litigate her claim on the merits
was the result of her filing her complaint in an untimely manner—not any due
process violation. (>Stanley v. City> and County of San
Francisco, supra, 48 Cal.App.3d at p. 580.) Further, given that the policies behind the
claim requirement are designed solely to benefit the public entity, we cannot
say that the MTA’s practice to reject claims valued at less than $50,000 serves
no legitimate purpose. Here, rejecting
appellant’s claim enabled the MTA to account for the value of the claim in its
fiscal planning, and the evidence showed that it permitted the MTA to correct
the conditions that led to the accident, terminating Billingsley’s employment. Accordingly, we find no evidence of any
constitutional violation sufficient to establish a triable issue of material
fact precluding summary judgment.



DISPOSITION

The
judgment is affirmed. The MTA is
entitled to its costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE
OFFICIAL REPORTS.



_____________________, J.

DOI TODD

We
concur:



____________________________,
P. J.

BOREN



____________________________,
J.

ASHMANN-GERST