In re Mario L.
Filed 1/17/13 In
re Mario L. CA2/2
NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule
8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In
re MARIO L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
B237059
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. JJ17367)
THE
PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MARIO
L.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior Court of
County. Donna Groman,
Judge. Modified and affirmed.
Ronald
L. Brown, Public Defender, Albert J. Menaster, Reginald Fleming-Peters, and
Megan N. Gallow, Deputy Public Defenders for Minor and Appellant.
Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr.
and Robert C. Schneider, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant
Mario L. (minor) appeals from the denial of a petition to vacate an order for
restitution and abstract of judgment (Judicial Counsel form No. CR-110/JV-790)
on the ground that it was issued after he turned 21 years old, when the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction terminated by operation
of law. In the alternative, minor
seeks correction of the amount of the judgment to reflect the original
restitution order of $12,988. We
conclude that the juvenile court acted within its authority in issuing the
order and abstract of judgment, but did not correctly state the original
restitution order. We thus order the
juvenile court to issue a new order and abstract of judgment showing the
correct amount, and we affirm the order denying the petition.
On November 17, 2009, the juvenile court declared minor a ward of the court pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code section 602.
reported that minor had etched and painted graffiti on numerous MTA buses,
causing extensive damage estimated at $31,800.
Among other conditions of probation, the probation officer recommended
an order for restitution. After minor
entered into a plea agreement in which he admitted three counts of felony
vandalism in violation of Penal Code section 594, subdivision (a), eight
remaining counts of vandalism were dismissed.
The juvenile court placed minor at home on probation and ordered him to
pay victim restitution in the amount of $12,988. Minor did not appeal the disposition.
Several
progress hearings were held over the following year and another hearing was
scheduled to take place in July 2011, shortly before minor turned 21. The Probation Department reported that although
restitution payments had been made there remained a balance owing. The juvenile court terminated jurisdiction
but stayed the order and continued the matter pending receipt of a proposed
abstract of judgment. After several more
continuances the abstract was submitted to the court for issuance on October 4, 2011.
The
abstract of judgment submitted to the court was the standard Judicial Council
form No. CR-110/JV-790, entitled “Order for Restitution and Abstract of
Judgment†(Order/Abstract). The juvenile
court signed the first page of the form, on which a checked box under paragraph
3(a) stated (with added language): “The
court orders defendant/child to pay restitution to the victim . . . MTA in the
amount of: $13,357.76.†The second page of the form contained the
abstract of judgment and was signed by the deputy clerk. Upon signing the form, the juvenile court
terminated probation and its jurisdiction.
On October 21, 2011, minor filed a petition pursuant to section 778 to modify the
court’s order.
name="_ftnref3" title="">[3] The body of the petition
stated: “Minor does hereby move to quash
the [Order/Abstract], terminate probation and juvenile court jurisdiction, or,
in the alternative, move for an alternative disposition based on a change in
circumstance and new evidence.â€
petition alleged that the juvenile court’s jurisdiction expired by operation of
law on minor’s 21st birthday in June 2011, and that the juvenile court signed
the Order for Restitution and Abstract of Judgment after that date. The petition concludes that the
Order/Abstract was unlawful due to lack of jurisdiction and should therefore be
vacated.
The
petition was argued and denied October 28, 2011. Minor filed a timely notice of appeal from
the order denying his petition.
Minor
contends that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to issue the
Order/Abstract after he turned 21 years old.
Subject to exceptions inapplicable here, the juvenile court loses
jurisdiction over a ward or dependent child who has attained the age of 21
years. (§ 607, subd. (a).) Minor’s argument that the Order/Abstract was
beyond the court’s jurisdiction is apparently based upon an assumption that it
was a new or “subsequent†order for restitution, not simply a summary of the
restitution order contained in the judgment entered November 17, 2009. If so, he is mistaken. We agree with respondent that the order in
the Order/Abstract was nothing more than a “memorialization†of the original
restitution order which minor did not challenge. The Order/Abstract would more clearly reflect
the nature of the document had the juvenile court checked the appropriate box
or boxes under paragraph “No. 2†or number two; however, it is apparent from
the record that no new or subsequent order was created.
As
respondent notes, the juvenile court had a constitutional
and statutory duty to order restitution be made to the victim by the
minor. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd.
(b); § 730.6; In re Brittany L.
(2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1386-1387.)
“In keeping with the ‘unequivocal intention’ that victim restitution be
made, statutory provisions implementing the constitutional directive have been
broadly and liberally construed.
[Citations.]†(
1521, 1525; see also People v. Stanley
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 734, 737.) The victim
of a juvenile’s crime is entitled to enforce a restitution order as provided in
Penal Code section 1214 and in the same manner as a civil judgment. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.6, subds.
(i), (r).) Civil money judgments are
enforced under the procedures set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section
695.010 et seq., and these provisions apply to a juvenile court
restitution order. (In re Michael S. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1456 (
“‘Money
judgment’ means that part of a judgment that requires the payment of
money.†(Code Civ. Proc., §
680.270.) It follows that the victim
must have a judgment or order before it can be enforced. To that end, Penal Code section 1214
provides, with specified conditions, that the restitution order is deemed to be
a money judgment, and the victim is entitled to a certified copy of it for
purposes of enforcement. (Pen. Code,
§ 1214, subd. (b).) Penal Code
section 1214 is applicable to juvenile restitution orders. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.6, subd.
(r).) The victim was thus entitled to a
certified copy of an enforceable order.
Minor
contends that the restitution condition of the dispositional order cannot be
deemed a money judgment under Penal Code section 1214 because the minute order
of November 17, 2009, does not refer to a hearing, findings or a stipulation to
the amount of restitution. Penal Code
section 1214, subdivision (b), provides that a restitution order “is deemed a
money judgment if the defendant was informed of his or her right to have a
judicial determination of the amount and was provided with a hearing, waived a
hearing, or stipulated to the amount of the restitution
ordered . . . .â€
Though
there is no reporter’s transcript for November 17, 2009, respondent represents
that minor agreed to the amount of victim restitution as part of the plea
bargain. Further, minor has not provided
either a settled statement or written plea agreement in the clerk’s
transcript. Applying normal principles
of appellate review we presume the juvenile court’s orders are correct as to
matters on which the record is silent, and that “that official duty has been
regularly performed.†(Evid. Code,
§ 664; In re Julian R. (2009) 47
Cal.4th 487, 498-499; Denham v. Superior
Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
Thus we presume that the juvenile court properly entered a restitution
order, either as stipulated under the plea agreement or after a hearing with
appropriate findings, and that the Order/Abstract may be deemed a money
judgment under Penal Code section 1214, subdivision (b).
Minor
contends that even if the Order/Abstract was authorized by Penal Code section
1214, the juvenile court was not authorized to issue it on its own motion, as
the statute provides that the court must provide a certified copy of the order
“[u]pon the victim’s request . . . .†We
find minor’s construction strained and illogical. Requiring the court to act upon the victim’s
request does not imply that the court is powerless to act without a
request. In any event, minor did not
make this contention below and presented no evidence to suggest that the
Order/Abstract was not requested by the victim.
In fact, the dispositional order named “MTA†as the victim entitled to restitution,
and the Order/Abstract identifies “MTA-Hertz Claim Mgmnt†as the judgment
creditor and requesting party.
As
minor has conceded, the obligation to pay restitution survives termination of
juvenile jurisdiction. (§ 730.6, subd.
(l); see Michael S.,
1456-1457.) An abstract of judgment must
be issued by the same court in which the judgment was entered. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 674, subd. (a).) A civil judgment may be enforced for 10 years
and may be renewed anytime in those 10 years.
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 683.020, 683.010.)
The juvenile court thus had the authority to renew restitution orders
and the obligation to issue abstracts of judgment for at least 10 years. To engraft a requirement that the judgment
debtor be no older than 21 years at the time of issuance would negate the
express intent of the Legislature to permit victims to enforce juvenile
restitution orders in the same manner as civil judgments. (See § 730.6, subds. (i), (r).) It follows that the court did not lose
jurisdiction over the restitution order or the abstract of judgment.
In
sum, Judicial Counsel form No. CR-110/JV-790 does not create a new or
subsequent judgment but is merely a restatement of the original order. The juvenile court’s jurisdiction to issue
the order and abstract of judgment did not terminate on minor’s 21st birthday,
as restitution orders may be enforced for 10 years and may be renewed within
that time. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 683.020,
683.010.)
Minor
contends that even if correctly entered, the Order/Abstract incorrectly states
that $13,357.76, rather than $12,988, was the amount of the restitution order
originally entered. The record does not
contain an explanation of this discrepancy.
the Order/Abstract to conform to the original restitution order. Minor’s petition to modify the juvenile
court’s order made no mention of this issue, but minor relies on
181, 185 [clerical errors may be corrected at any time].
Respondent
has no objection to a modification, but claims that the difference between
$12,988 and $13,357.76 correctly reflects an added service charge as authorized
by section 276, subdivision (c).
However, respondent acknowledges that the minute order of November 17,
2009, stated that the service charge was included
in the $12,988. Language
overall amount cannot logically be construed as adding a service charge to the overall amount. Moreover, respondent impliedly concedes that
there has been no hearing to determine the propriety of adding any amount to
the original $12,988. In any event, we
order the juvenile court to issue a corrected Order/Abstract.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the petition to
modify court order is affirmed. The
juvenile court is ordered to issue the victim a corrected Order for Restitution
and Abstract of Judgment (Judicial Counsel form No. CR-110/JV-790), showing the
amount of the restitution order as originally entered, the sum of $12,988.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS.
___________________________,
J.
CHAVEZ
We concur:
_____________________________, P. J.
BOREN
_____________________________, J.
DOI TODD
Code unless otherwise indicated.
is the judgment. (In re Mario C. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1307-1308.)
