Marriage of Garris
Filed 12/28/12
Marriage of Garris CA2/1
OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule
8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re the
Marriage of
EVANGELINE
F. and CHRISTIAN J.
GARRIS.
___________________________________
EVANGELINE F.
GARRIS,
Respondent,
v.
CHRISTIAN J.
GARRIS,
Appellant.
B236767
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
KD063324)
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior Court of
County. Susan Lopez-Giss, Judge. Affirmed.
______
Christian J.
Garris, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Lawrence M. Gassner
for Respondent.
______
In this marital dissolution action,
Christian Garris challenges the trial court’s determination of the amount of
the equalization payment he owes his former wife, Evangeline Garris.
BACKGROUND
Evangeline
and Christian married on October 30, 1999, and separated
on May 25, 2003. Evangeline filed her
on January 12,
2005.
The record on appeal does not contain the petition. The issues on appeal relate exclusively to
the status of the marital home located in San Marino and the division of the home’s value between the parties.
Evangeline
and Christian purchased the San Marino home in early 2000, taking title as joint tenants. When they separated, Evangeline moved out,
and Christian continued to reside in the home.
In 2004, Christian refinanced the mortgage on the home. He asked Evangeline to sign a quitclaim deed
as part of that transaction, and she did.
In
this dissolution action, Christian moved for
“is the sole owner†of the home and that Evangeline “has no claim to, title to,
or interest in†the home. Christian
argued on several grounds that the presumption of undue influence did not
apply to the quitclaim deed, because (1) he did not seek spousal support and
(2) he signed a quitclaim deed on a property in Claremont that
Evangeline purchased after separation.
In opposition, Evangeline submitted a declaration stating that (1) she
did not fully understand the implications of the quitclaim deed on the San Marino home when she signed it, and (2) she never discussed or agreed with
Christian that she would quitclaim the San Marino home in exchange for his quitclaiming the Claremont home and
not seeking spousal support. The trial
court denied Christian’s motion.
The
issues of the status of the marital home and the parties’ interests in it were
tried to the court on July 28, 2009. Evangeline’s testimony at trial largely
paralleled the statements in her declaration—her quitclaim deed on the San
Marino property was not part of a quid pro quo, she did not mean to give up her
interest in the property, and she merely thought the quitclaim deed was a
document she needed to sign in order to help Christian refinance the mortgage. The court found her testimony credible and
found Christian’s version of events not credible. The court also determined that the date of
trial (July
28, 2009) would be the valuation date for
the property.
After
the court determined that Evangeline retained her community interest in the San Marino property, the parties proceeded to litigate the value of the
parties’ respective interests, including some work that Christian had done on
the house, for which he sought reimbursement.
On April
19, 2010, after a number of continuances,
the court set the hearing on the valuation issues for July 26, 2010. Evangeline was to file her
points and authorities and her expert’s appraisal report by June 1, and
Christian was to file “any opposition†by July 7.
Evangeline’s
expert did not complete his appraisal report until June 29, 2010. Evangeline’s counsel claims
to have faxed it to Christian on June 29 and mailed it on June 30, and
Christian admitted receiving it in the mail on July 2. According to a declaration by Evangeline’s
expert, the delay in preparing the report was caused largely by Christian’s
failure to provide proper documentation concerning the work for which he sought
reimbursement. Christian sought to
exclude Evangeline’s expert’s report as untimely.
At
the hearing on July 26, 2010, the court denied
Christian’s request and allowed the expert to testify. At the time of the hearing, Christian had not
yet obtained a report from an expert of his own. The court criticized Christian for his
failure to retain an expert or otherwise assemble evidence to support his
reimbursement claims. The court heard
testimony from Evangeline’s expert that day, but the court also continued the
hearing to September 13 in order to give Christian a further opportunity to
retain an expert of his own. The court
instructed Christian to “have your expert ready on that date.†When Christian asked whether the parties
could also “submit additional briefing before that date,†the court responded,
“If it is based on [certain documents that had been discussed at the hearing],
but if you have an expert’s report, you must at least –†and Christian
interjected, “I will provide that to the other side.â€
At
the continued hearing on September 13, 2010, Evangeline’s
counsel informed the court that earlier that day he had received from
Christian, for the first time, an appraisal report by Christian’s expert, a
(new) trial brief, and other related documents.
He sought to exclude Christian’s evidence on the ground that it had not
been timely provided. The court reviewed
the chronology of the proceedings, which included multiple continuances, and
described the July 26 hearing, at which Christian “was not prepared†and at
which the court “continued that matter until today’s date in order for him to
get an appraisal.†The court excluded
Christian’s evidence on the ground that it was untimely because it was not
provided to Evangeline at least five court days before the hearing. Christian argued that Evangeline’s expert’s
report was untimely (because it was provided to him later than the date ordered
by the court) but was admitted, and he would “like to be afforded the same
opportunity.†The court rejected his
argument on the ground that the situations were not comparable—Christian
received Evangeline’s expert’s report more than three weeks before the July 26
hearing, but Evangeline received Christian’s expert’s report on the day of the
September 13 hearing. The court also
declined to grant another continuance.
The
court did, however, allow Christian himself to testify concerning his opinion
of the value of the property. Christian
testified that, as of the valuation date set by the court, the home was worth
$935,000 with the improvements for which he sought reimbursement, and $820,000
without those improvements; he sought reimbursement for the full $115,000
difference in value. According to
Evangeline’s expert, the home was worth $940,000 with the improvements, and he
also opined that Christian should be reimbursed for 10 percent of the cost
(“total paid billsâ€) of the various putative improvements that Christian had
done; according to Evangeline’s expert, most of the work was merely maintenance
rather than improvements, but some of it did enhance the value of the property
“a little bit.†Evangeline’s expert also
testified concerning the fair market rental value of the property during the
postseparation period, for which Evangeline sought reimbursement to the
community (after crediting Christian for continuing to pay the mortgage on the
property).
The
parties stipulated to the values of various credits to and charges against the
value of the property, such as Christian’s separate property contribution to
the down payment and his postseparation payment of property taxes. On the basis of those stipulations and the
evidence presented on disputed issues, the court calculated that Evangeline was
entitled to an equalization payment of $310,221.43 from Christian. The court entered judgment accordingly,
and Christian timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Christian
argues on two grounds that Evangeline gave up her community interest in the
home by signing the quitclaim deed.
First, he argues that the quitclaim transaction did not advantage him
over Evangeline so the presumption of undue influence does not apply, because
in exchange for the quitclaim deed on the San Marino home (1) Christian signed
a quitclaim deed on the Claremont home that Evangeline purchased postseparation
and (2) he declined to seek spousal support.
Evangeline testified, however, that her execution of the quitclaim deed
on the San Marino home was not given in exchange for the quitclaim on the
Claremont home or for Christian’s decision not to seek spousal support. The trial court’s determination that the
quitclaim transaction advantaged one spouse over the other and that the presumption
of undue influence applied was therefore supported by substantial
evidence. (See Marriage of Birnbaum (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1508, 1513 [testimony of
a single witness, even if a party to the action, may constitute substantial
evidence].)
Second,
Christian argues that even if the presumption of undue influence applies, he
rebutted it by showing that when Evangeline executed the quitclaim deed on the San Marino home, the transfer “was freely and voluntarily made, and with a
full knowledge of all the facts, and with a complete understanding of the
effect of the transfer.†(
277, 296.) Evangeline testified,
however, that she did not understand that she was giving up her community
interest in the property (“[I]t was not my intent to give up my share of the
property. . . . [H]e never told me that I was giving up my share
of the property.â€) That is substantial
evidence supporting the trial court’s determination that the presumption of
undue influence was not rebutted. (
argument.
Christian
also argues that the trial court erred by excluding Christian’s expert’s
testimony. But Christian never mentions
the trial court’s basis for that ruling, namely, that Christian did not provide
his expert’s report to Evangeline’s counsel until the day of the September 13
hearing. Because Christian never
identifies the objection that the trial court sustained, he likewise fails to
show that the trial court’s ruling constituted an abuse of
discretion. (See Zhou v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc. (2007) 157, Cal.App.4th 1471,
1476 [rulings on the admission or exclusion of evidence are reviewed for abuse
of discretion].) We must therefore reject
this argument as well.
Finally,
Christian argues that the trial court’s calculation of the amount of the
equalization payment was erroneous. But
with one exception, Christian fails to identify any specific error made by the
trial court—he merely presents his own calculations without explaining where
they differ from the trial court’s or arguing why the trial court’s approach
was wrong.
The
one exception concerns the rental value of the property. Christian states that Evangeline’s expert
“did not provide a single comparable property for the rental values that he
offered at trial.†Christian’s citation
to the record, however, does not support that assertion, so we need not
consider it. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.204(a)(1)(C)); City of
Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239 & fn. 16.) Moreover, Christian never mentions, let alone
criticizes, the testimony of Evangeline’s expert concerning the sources and
methods he used to determine the property’s rental value. Christian therefore has not shown that the
trial court’s determination of rental value was not supported by
Evangeline’s expert’s testimony.
On
the basis of his unsupported assertion about the basis for Evangeline’s
expert’s opinion on rental value, Christian argues, as he did in the trial
court, that “the reasonable rental rate and the mortgage were equivalent so
that there should be no reimbursement owed by [Christian] to the community.†But according to Evangeline, the mortgage
payment fluctuated considerably during the postseparation period, and her
calculations took those fluctuations into account. In his argument on appeal, Christian never
acknowledges this point, let alone rebuts Evangeline’s claims about the
mortgage payment fluctuations.
Apart
from the issue of reimbursement for rental value, Christian does not identify
the particular respects in which he believes the trial court’s calculations
were erroneous. Moreover, we note that
the calculations that Christian advocates on appeal differ radically from the
calculations he advocated in the trial court.
In his trial brief for the September 13 hearing, Christian proposed
calculations that resulted in an equalization payment to Evangeline of
$55,432.74. The calculations presented
in his opening brief on appeal would result in an equalization payment of
$212,707.01. Christian never
acknowledges this discrepancy, never identifies where the differences lie, and
never explains why he should be permitted to advocate on appeal a position that
he did not advance in the trial court.
For
all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment.
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall
recover her costs of appeal.
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD,
Acting P. J.
We concur:
CHANEY, J.
JOHNSON, J.
refer to the parties by their first names because they share a last name. No disrespect is intended.
does not challenge the court’s refusal to grant another continuance.
