Currie v. Robert Jackson & Assoc.
Filed 12/12/12 Currie v. Robert Jackson &
Assoc. CA2/5
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
FIVE
MANEVA A. CURRIE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
ROBERT J. JACKSON &
ASSOCIATES, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.
B237126
(Los Angeles
County Super.
Ct.
No. SC108184)
APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court
of
County, Elizabeth Allen White, Judge. Affirmed.
Maneva A.
Currie, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Wright,
Finlay & Zak, Jonathan D. Fink and Magdalena D. Kozinska for Defendant and
Respondent.
________________________________
Plaintiff and appellant Maneva A.
Currie appeals from a judgment following an order granting a special motion to
strike under the anti-SLAPP statute,
favor of respondent law firm Robert J. Jackson & Associates, Inc.
(Jackson), in this action arising out of a foreclosure on
allowed her leave to amend her complaint.
We conclude the anti-SLAPP statute does not allow leave to amend under
the circumstances of this case.
Therefore, we affirm
BACKGROUND
Facts Alleged in the
Operative Complaint
On April
1, 2009, Currie rented a house in Los Angeles for a two-year term and a
monthly rent of $750. She lived in the
house with her adult child Miranda White and her two minor children. A single man rented the detached garage unit
from the owner.
In July 2009, One West Bank, FSB,
FKA IndyMac Bank, FSB purchased the house at a foreclosure sale. Currie spoke with a realtor for One West
about relocation expenses and the conditions around the house that required repair. Currie submitted a form to One West
describing her lease and her concerns about habitability issues.
On November
10, 2009, Currie contacted One West’s attorney at Jackson with the information that
she had located a prospective residence. The attorney said Currie was not being asked
to move and was not given notice of a request to move. However, the attorney asked Currie to submit
a written request for relocation costs along with the prospective residential
lease.
On November
16, 2009, Currie received a notice to cure or quit which stated that she had
failed to provide access for the purpose of inspections, repairs, and showing
the unit to prospective buyers. However,
Currie had not failed to provide access.
On November
18, 2009, Currie signed a lease to move into a new residence on January 1, 2010, contingent upon receipt of $6,000 from One
West. Currie faxed documents to Jackson the following day. Despite multiple telephone calls in which she
left messages, she never heard from Jackson. In January 2010, Currie’s attorney, Matthew
May, told her that he had called Jackson to discuss relocation costs
and habitability issues.
On February
4, 2010, One West served Currie, White, and the minor children with a three-day
notice to pay rent or quit. The notice
stated that Currie had not paid rent since August 2009. On February 16,
2010,
One West filed an unlawful detainer action against Currie, White, and the minor
children. On February
23, 2010, Currie filed an answer to One West’s unlawful detainer action on behalf
of herself and her children.
The next day, Currie received a
stipulation in the mail from One West offering $6,000 in exchange for Currie to
vacate by March 18, 2010. However, the offer did not give Currie enough
time to find another residence. On March 17, 2010, the man living in the garage unit on the property
relocated.
On March
23, 2010, Currie received an entry of default.
Currie appeared on April 12, 2010, in connection with the
unlawful detainer action and learned that One West was dismissing the
case. On April
15, 2010, one of Currie’s minor children was served with a notice to vacate the
rear unit on the property within five days or One West would proceed with
forcible entry and detainer proceedings.
On April
21, 2010, a notice of intent to enter the main house was posted at the property
to allow One West to cure code violations set forth in a notice of violation
issues by the County of Los Angeles, Department of Public
Health. On April
22, 2010, Currie filed a complaint with the Office of the District Attorney,
Consumer Protection Division about One West’s practices. On April 26,
2010,
One West’s realtor, Benedict Garcia, told Currie that he met with Jackson, explained that she had
been ignored and had lost her prospective residence. Garcia told her that Jackson again offered $6,000. Currie said she had been forced to take legal
action against One West.
On April
28, 2010, Currie spoke to May by telephone.
In this conversation, May was adamant that he had never said he spoke to
anyone at Jackson. He explained that someone else in his office
had spoken to someone at Jackson.
On May
2, 2010, a notice to cure or quit the main house was placed on her front porch
concerning access to cure code violations.
On May 8, 2010, Currie received copies of
unlawful detainer actions filed by One West as to the rear unit on the
property. Currie filed an answer. Prowlers tried to break into a building on
the property and someone broke into her car the following night. On May 20, 2010, Currie heard from an
environmental health specialist at the County of Los Angeles, Department of Public
Health. The specialist said he had met
with One West concerning repairs to the house.
One West claimed that Currie was not available for repairs, which she
denied. An unknown person watched and
followed her but later went into a neighbor’s home. Currie has not been able to return to work
due to stress.
Procedural Background
On May
27, 2010, Currie and her children filed a complaint against One West and other
defendants. On July 6, 2010, One West obtained a judgment against Currie and
White for possession of the rear unit on the property. On December
14, 2010, Currie and her children filed the operative verified second amended
complaint against One West and other defendants. The complaint alleged causes of action for
wrongful forcible entry and detainer proceedings, breach of the covenant of
quiet enjoyment, fraud and deceit, injunctive relief, unlawful eviction
proceedings, discrimination, defamation, landlord retaliation, quiet title and
declaratory relief, breach of contract, legal malpractice, unfair competition,
and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. That same day, Currie filed an amendment
substituting US Bank as a Doe defendant, based on a corrected grant deed
showing US Bank was the true owner of the property after the foreclosure.
On April 20, 2011, Currie filed an
amendment to the second amended complaint substituting Jackson as a Doe
defendant. On June 15, 2011, Jackson
filed an anti-SLAPP motion and a demurrer.
Currie did not file an opposition to either pleading. A hearing was held on August 25, 2011. Currie requested leave to amend, which the
trial court denied. The court granted
the anti-SLAPP motion and awarded attorney fees of $1,575 to Jackson. As a result, the court found the demurrer was
moot. A judgment of dismissal based on
the order granting the motion to strike was entered on September 7, 2011. Currie filed a timely notice of appeal.
Additional Allegations on
Appeal
Currie states in her brief on appeal
that the motion to strike prevented her from amending her complaint to allege
that Jackson led a conspiracy to force her to move out rapidly and
involuntarily. She would allege that she
had a right to use the garage. The
notices that she received of intent to enter, to pay rent or quit, to vacate,
and to cure or quit constituted a pattern of harassment in violation of her
tenant rights. In addition, the unlawful
detainer actions that Jackson filed against her on behalf of One West were an
unfair business practice, filed with malice and without probable cause, to
force her from her home in violation of the local rent stabilization ordinance.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Currie does not contend
that the motion to strike should have been denied. Rather, she contends the trial court should
have granted her leave to amend to include allegations of conspiracy and
Jackson. We disagree.
“The trial court engages in a
two-step process to determine whether to grant or deny a [Code of Civil
Procedure] section 425.16 motion to strike.
(Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88 (Navellier).) The court first decides whether the defendant
has made a threshold showing that the acts at issue arose from protected
activity. ([Code Civ. Proc.,] § 425.16,
subd. (b)(1); Navellier, supra, at p. 88.) Once the defendant meets this burden, then
the court determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability that
he or she will prevail on the claim. ([Ibid.])
On appeal, we independently review whether [Code of Civil Procedure]
section 425.16 applies and whether the plaintiff has a probability of
prevailing on the merits. (ComputerXpress,
Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 999; Lieberman v. KCOP
Television, Inc. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 156, 163–164.)†(Summerfield
v. Randolph (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 127, 135.)
However,
“[Code of Civil Procedure] section 425.16 provides no mechanism for granting
1072–1074; Sylmar [Air Conditioning
v. Pueblo Contracting Services, Inc. (2004)] 122 Cal.App.4th [1049,] 1055];
Schaffer [v. City and County of
San Francisco (2008)] 168 Cal.App.4th [992,] 1004–1005.) Trial courts should either grant or deny such
motions in toto, i.e., without leave
to amend, prior to ruling on any pending demurrers. A proper ruling on the anti-
cases, obviate the need to rule on the demurrer at all or, at the very least,
in its entirety.†(Martin v. Inland Empire Utilities Agency (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th
611, 629 [order granting anti-SLAPP motion with leave to amend was the
functional equivalent of an order denying anti-SLAPP motion because defendants
could not meet their burden under the first prong].)
Currie has
not provided argument or evidence that the motion to strike should have been
denied. (Cf. Nguyen-Lam v. Cao (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 858, 871-872 [order
granting motion to strike with leave to amend effectively denied motion to
strike because plaintiff’s evidence demonstrated a probability of prevailing
under the second prong].) There is no
right to amendment under the circumstances of this case. Therefore, the order granting the motion to
strike and the judgment of dismissal were proper.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent Robert J. Jackson &
Associates, Inc., is awarded its costs on appeal.
KRIEGLER, J.
We
concur:
ARMSTRONG, Acting P. J.
MOSK, J.
lawsuit against public participation.’â€
(Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 732,
fn. 1.)
