P. v. Mumin
Filed 9/17/12 P. v. Mumin CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
RAHEEM MUMIN,
Defendant and Appellant.
B237010
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA088660)
APPEAL from a
judgment of the Superior Court of
County, Arthur Jean, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Cindy Brines, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________________
On April
8, 2009, Los
Angeles Police Officer Michael Saragueta worked in an undercover capacity with
several other officers, conducting a controlled narcotic purchase. As part of this operation, Officer Saragueta
and his partner, Officer Olsen, went to a location known as a high narcotics
area. When they arrived, appellant
approached them and asked if they needed anything. Officer Saragueta testified he told appellant
he was looking for a “40,†which meant he wanted $40 worth of rock
cocaine. Appellant asked the officers if
they knew anyone in the neighborhood and if they were police. Officer Saragueta responded by “dropping some
names or mentioning some names of individuals that I knew in the area as well
as telling him that we were not the police.â€
Appellant then retrieved a clear plastic bindle from his rear waistband,
and removed two off-white solids resembling rock cocaine. He handed the two objects to Officer
Saragueta and in return, Officer Saragueta gave appellant $40 in cash. The two officers then left.
Appellant got into a car and drove
westbound. He was stopped by Officer
Allan Rabina and his partner, Officer Walden, who were part of the
operation. Officer Rabina testified that
he asked appellant for his driver’s license, filled out a field identification
card with appellant’s information, took appellant’s picture, and released
him.
Officer Saragueta testified that the
person in the picture taken by Officer Rabina was the same person who sold him
the cocaine. He further testified that appellant
was not arrested until two years after the controlled buy because the operation
was part of a long-term investigation being conducted over several months in
conjunction with federal agencies, and the police did not want “people on the
street [to] start talking and get leery of dealing with people or making
additional deals.â€
Veronica Chiquillo, a
the items Officer Saragueta purchased from appellant, and determined that they
were cocaine base.
Appellant testified on his own
behalf. He denied selling anything to
Officers Saragueta or Olsen. He admitted
he was pulled over, and that his picture was taken before he was let go.
After a mistrial was granted due to the
unavailability of a defense witness, an amended information, filed October
12, 2011,
charged appellant with one count of sale/transportation/offer to sell a
controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11352,
subdivision (a). It was further alleged
that appellant had served nine prior prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd.
(b)), and has suffered four “strikes†(Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i),
1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)).
On the date of trial, the trial court
offered appellant a continuance to allow him time to subpoena defense
witnesses. Appellant, who was proceeding
in propria persona, declined and declared himself ready. A jury found appellant guilty on the charged
count. In a bifurcated bench trial, the
trial judge found all prior allegations to be true. The trial court struck three of the strikes,
denied probation, and sentenced appellant to
follows: the high term of five years on
the charged count, doubled because of the remaining strike, plus two one-year
enhancements for the two most recent prison priors.
After appellant filed a timely notice
of appeal, this court appointed counsel to represent him. After examining the record, appointed appellate
counsel filed a brief raising no issues, but asking this court to independently
review the record on appeal pursuant to People
v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441-442.
(See Smith v. Robbins (2000)
528 U.S. 259, 264.) On May 21, 2012, we
advised appellant he had 30 days within which to submit by brief or letter any
contentions or arguments he wished this court to consider. On May 16, 2012, appellant filed a request
for new appellate counsel. This court
denied the request June 1, 2012. On June
11, 2012, appellant filed a letter brief raising the following issues.
First, he contends the trial court
erred in finding one of the strikes to be true.
The information alleged three strikes based upon three robbery
convictions. Appellant contends he
pleaded no contest on all three robbery counts, partially because of a
purported promise that the three convictions would only count as one
strike. Even if true, appellant was not
prejudiced, as the court struck two of the robbery convictions and used the
remaining conviction as a strike. Thus,
appellant received the benefit of the purported promise since the three robbery
convictions were counted only as one strike.
Second,
appellant contends the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to
authenticate the Penal Code section 969b package used to prove a 1991
conviction by the testimony of a fingerprint expert. A review of the record, however, shows
appellant did not raise authentication issues.
Rather, he asked to “see the fingerprint card under Perry,†and the prosecution called a fingerprint expert to address
appellant’s concern. Moreover, even if
true, appellant was not prejudiced because the trial court did not use the 1991
conviction to impose any additional punishment, such as a one-year enhancement.
Third,
appellant complains he was denied his right
to a speedy trial, but concedes that on June 29, 2011, his trial counsel
filed a motion to dismiss on this ground.
As appellant provides no further analysis on this issue, he has
forfeited this claim. (See
Constructors (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 581, 608 [point raised without legal
analysis or authority is forfeited].)
Fourth, he
contends the prosecution committed misconduct and/or violated his rights under
by suppressing the “source and ledger†of the funding used in the controlled
narcotic buy. As appellant provides no
case authority or analysis on this issue, he has forfeited this claim. (See Diamond
Springs Lime Co. v. American River Constructors, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d at p. 608.) In addition, the information about the source
of the money used in the controlled buy is not legally relevant to appellant’s
defense, as his conviction was based on the jury’s finding that he sold drugs
to an undercover police officer.
Fifth,
appellant contends he was denied a fair trial because he was in his prison
jumpsuit on the first day of trial. A
review of the record, however, shows that the trial court asked appellant if he
had civilian clothes, and appellant responded, “No sir. I don’t have civilian clothes. It is not even necessary at this point.†Appellant’s concession that it was not
necessary for him to be in civilian clothes constituted a forfeiture of this
claim of error.
Sixth,
appellant contends the trial court erred in imposing a high term of five years,
as the charging statute does not provide for that term. A review of Health and Safety Code section
11352, subdivision (a), effective on the date of appellant’s conviction, shows
that a defendant was subject to imprisonment for “three, four, or five yearsâ€
for violating the statute. Thus, the
trial court could have sentenced appellant to a high term of five years under
section 11352, subdivision (a). There
was no error.
Finally,
appellant contends the prosecution committed Brady violations, but does not specify the purported
error. (See Diamond Springs Lime Co. v. American River Constructors,
This court has examined the entire
record in accordance with People v. Wende,
supra, 25 Cal.3d at pages 441-442,
and is satisfied defendant’s attorney
has fully complied with the
responsibilities of counsel, and no arguable issues exist. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of
conviction.
OFFICIAL REPORTS.
MANELLA,
J.
We concur:
WILLHITE, Acting P. J.
SUZUKAWA, J.
