P. v. Root
Filed 9/6/12 P. v. Root CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE
DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
GWENN DANIELLE ROOT,
Defendant and
Appellant.
2d Crim. No.
B237777
(Super. Ct. No.
2011014501)
(Ventura
County)
A defendant is not
entitled to a retroactive application of an amendment to Penal Code section
4019 granting one-for-one presentence custody credits.
v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314.) We
affirm.
FACT
On May 5, 2011, Gwenn Danielle Root pled guilty to
(a).) The trial court placed her on
formal probation pursuant to Proposition 36.
(§ 1210.1.)
On November 29, 2011, Root admitted violating the
terms of probation. The trial court
revoked her Proposition 36 probation and continued her on formal
probation. As a condition of probation,
the trial court ordered Root to serve 90 days in jail. The court gave her credit for 50 days of
actual custody and 24 days of conduct credit, for a total of 74 days. The court rejected Root's argument that she
should receive one-for-one conduct credits.
DISCUSSION
Root contends the
federal and California equal
protection clauses require a retroactive application of the October 1, 2011, amendment to section
4019.
Root does not contest
that the version of section 4019 under which she was sentenced provided for two
days of conduct credit for every four days of actual presentence custody. She further concedes that one amendment to
section 4019 granting day-for-day conduct credits is by its terms not
applicable to offenses committed prior to October 1, 2011.
(§ 4019, subd. (h).) Her
offense was committed prior to that date.
Root relies on the
and state Constitutions. (U.S.
Const., 14th Amend; Cal. Const.,
art. I, § 7, subd. (a).) But a
prerequisite to a meritorious equal protection claim is a showing that the
state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated
groups in an unequal manner. (
Our Supreme Court in Brown
rejected the argument that prisoners serving time before and after a conduct
credit statutory amendment takes effect are similarly situated. (Id. at
p. 330.) Thus, equal protection does not
compel a retroactive application of the amendment to section 4019. We are bound by Auto Equity Sales v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450.
The
judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
GILBERT,
P.J.
We concur:
YEGAN, J.
PERREN, J.
Bruce
A. Young, Judge
Superior
Court County
of Ventura
______________________________
Stephen P. Lipson,
Public Defender, Michael C. McMahon, Chief Deputy and Paul Drevensted, Deputy
Public Defender for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris,
Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E.
Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, Chung L. Mar, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
name="_ftn1" title=""> [1]
All statutory
references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
