In re J.P.
Filed 8/10/12 In re J.P. CA4/3
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re J.P. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.
ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Julio P.,
Defendant and Appellant;
A.A.,
Defendant and Respondent.
G046052
(Super. Ct. Nos. DP021577,
DP021578, DP021579)
O P I
N I O N
Appeal from an order of
the Superior Court
of
County, Gary Bischoff, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal.
Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.
Grace E. Clark, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Nicholas S. Chrisos, County
Counsel, and Karen L. Christensen,
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Linda Rehm, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.
No appearance for
Minors.
* * *
The juvenile court did
not err when it did not offer reunification
services to the father nor when it placed the minors with the mother. We affirm.
I
FACTS
On August 23, 2011, minors J.P., now eight years
old, R.P., now seven years old and S.P., now four years old, were removed from
the home of their paternal grandmother who was their primary caretaker. The father, Julio P., the minors and the
grandmother all lived together. Ten days
earlier, on August 13, 2011,
the father was arrested and cited for being under the influence of a controlled
substance.
The court found the
allegations of the first amended petition
true by a preponderance of the evidence.
Those allegations included the following: “As long as the children . . . have resided
in the home with their father [Julio P.] and their paternal grandmother
. . . there have been acts of domestic violence between their
father and
paternal
grandmother, with the children present in the home. The acts of domestic violence between the
children’s father and paternal grandmother include yelling, using strong
language, pushing, verbal and physical fighting, throwing objects, breaking
plates, punching objects such as walls and a radiator heater.”
Five years earlier, in
2006, Riverside County
substantiated general neglect and emotional abuse by the mother, A.A., and the
father due to ongoing domestic violence.
Allegations in the first amended petition about this prior incident
state: “On or about January 24, 2006, allegations of emotional abuse
and general neglect to the children [J.P. and R.P.], and the children’s half
siblings . . . by the mother [A.A.], and the father/stepfather
[Julio P.] were substantiated by Riverside County Juvenile Court due to ongoing
domestic violence in the home. Voluntary
Family Services were provided and the case was open from January 24, 2006, to October 25, 2006. It was closed as the family refused services,
placing the children at risk of harm.
Specifically, the mother failed to successfully participate in and
complete a domestic violence/batterer’s treatment program and was dropped from
the program due to excessive absences.
The mother also failed to participate in the in-home parenting program,
thus placing the children at substantial risk in her care.”
Prior to the
case, SSA recommended the court find suitable placement for the children, and
that the placement not be with either parent.
The agency further recommended reunification services be offered to both
parents.
After a contested
dispositional hearing, the court stated:
“The court, in fashioning the subsection or — identifying the subsection
to proceed under with respect to [Welfare and Institutions Code
in something of a quandary. I don’t
believe that it would be beneficial to this family to have a situation where
these two parents were vying for who gets to have custody of these
children. I think that’s already caused
a great deal of damage to these children, as it is — as was evident by their
conduct that’s been reported in these reports, and so I don’t want to — I think
it’s inappropriate. [¶] I don’t think
it’s in the children’s interest to provide reunification services to the father
because, again, that puts it into the context as the — as subsection (3)
indicates, services could be provided to both parents, in which case the court
shall determine at review hearings held pursuant to section 366 which parent,
if either, shall have custody of the child.
[¶] I’m concerned about that because I think that that’s a dynamic that
would not be — would not be helpful to either father’s recovery regarding
domestic violence issues, nor to the children, who are — so far, have been put
in the middle here. [¶] . . . [¶]
Subsection (3), that the court will not offer services to the father, but
instead, offer services to the mother.”
The minute order
states: “Pursuant to 361.3, court will
not offer services to father.” But
because the reporter’s transcript contains the above-quoted detailed analysis
regarding section 361.2, we assume the minute
order is incorrect with regard to section 361.3.
The post dispositional
hearing minute order contains the following entries: “[T]o vest custody with father would be
detrimental to child (due to domestic violence; father has difficulty
controlling himself with the professional in this matter; that father has
substance abuse problem.)” “Court finds
to vest custody with mother is required to serve child’s best interest.” “Court finds it is not in children’s best
interest to provide father with reunification services.” “Court offers services to mother.” Because the mother resides in Riverside
County, the court ordered the matter transferred to that county.
II
DISCUSSION
The father argues that
as a matter of law the juvenile court erred when it did not offer him
reunification services. He also contends
the court did not conduct an analysis under section 361.5.
Section 361.2,
subdivision (a) states that when the court orders removal, the court shall
determine whether “there is a parent of the child, with whom the child was not
residing at the time that the events or conditions arose that brought the child
within the provisions of Section 300, who desires to assume custody of the
child. If that parent requests custody,
the court shall place the child with the parent unless it finds that placement
with that parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection or physical or
emotional well-being of the child.” In
this matter, the juvenile court proceeded to follow subdivision (b) of section
361.2 which states the court may order reunification services to the parent who
is assuming custody. The court ordered
the matter to remain within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, that
services be provided to the mother and that home visits by the social worker be
conducted.
“[T]he juvenile court
must normally order the social services agency to provide reunification
services to the child and the parent.
Without such services, a parent whose child has been removed has little
hope of ever regaining custody of the child.”
(Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001)
26 Cal.4th 735, 751 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).
When there is no current need to reunify a family, the goal of the
dependency proceeding is simply to eliminate the conditions or factors
requiring court supervision. (
140-141.) Section 16501, subdivision (h)
states that family reunification services are designed for use when a child
cannot safely remain at home, but here, while the court determined that to vest
custody with the father would be detrimental to the children’s best interests
because of the father’s domestic violence, the children were not ordered to be
placed in foster care, but to be placed at home with their mother.
The juvenile court was
well within its discretion when it ordered services to the parent who is
assuming custody, the mother. Section
361.2, subdivision (b)(3) states in part:
“the court may order that services be provided solely to the parent who is assuming physical custody in order to
allow that parent to retain later custody without court supervision . . .
.” (Italics added.)
Under the circumstances
we find in this record, we cannot conclude the juvenile court was required to
engage in an analysis under section 361.5 or that the father is entitled to
services. We find no error.
The father next argues
the court abused its discretion when it placed the minors with the mother
“because placement with mother was detrimental to the children.” The juvenile court found by clear and
convincing evidence “to vest custody with the father would be detrimental to
the children and to vest custody with the children’s mother is required to
serve the children’s best interest.”
With regard to the mother, the court stated: “There’s no evidence in the reports to
suggest that she could not properly care for these children and the children,
apparently, would like to live with their mom, as well, which I think should
work out well.”
In placing the minors
with their mother, the court followed the procedures set forth in section
361.2, discussed above. If the
noncustodial parent requests custody, the court “shall place the child with the parent unless it finds that placement with that parent would be
detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of
the child.” (In re Z.K. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 51, 70.) We find no error.
III
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s
order is affirmed.
MOORE,
ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
FYBEL, J.
IKOLA, J.
title="">[1] We are aware of
rule 8.416 of the California Rules of Court, which shortens the time for record
preparation and briefing in appeals terminating parental rights “To permit
determination of the appeal within 250 days after the notice of appeal is
filed . . . .” (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.416(e)(1).)
In this case, the mother’s due process rights required us to appoint
counsel for her after Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) filed a letter
brief indicating it would not oppose the father’s appeal. This unavoidably slowed the process of the
appeal so that our opinion was filed beyond the 250 day target.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] All
further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
