In re Ryan B.
Filed 8/15/12 In re Ryan B. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
>
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF >CALIFORNIA>
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re RYAN B., a Person
Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
TULARE
COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
MATTHEW B.,
Defendant and Appellant.
F064534
(Super. Ct. No. JJV065184A)
>
>O P I N I O N
THE COURT*
APPEAL from
orders of the Superior Court
of Tulare
County. Charlotte A.
Wittig, Commissioner.
Donna B.
Kaiser, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No
appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Matthew B. (father) appealed from
an order terminating parental rights
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) to his son, 16-month-old Ryan.[1] After reviewing the entire record, father’s
court-appointed appellate counsel informed this court she had found no arguable
issues to raise in this appeal. Counsel
requested and this court granted leave for father to personally file a letter
setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error does exist. (In re >Phoenix> H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844.)
Father has since written this court
to ask that we reverse the termination order because he feels he has been
unjustly treated during earlier phases of Ryan’s dependency. On review, we conclude father’s letter does
not amount to a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error
exists.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Ryan suffered severe physical abuse
while in the parents’ care pursuant to section 300, subdivision (e). On or near January 24, 2011, the child was suffering from a broken
femur which would ordinarily not be sustained except as a result of the
unreasonable or neglectful acts or omissions of the parents. The conduct of both parents endangered the
child’s physical safety and emotional health and well-being, and placed the
child at risk of physical and emotional harm or damage. In early July 2011, the parents stipulated to
a factual basis for the subdivision (e) allegation and the juvenile court found
the allegation true.
Later in July 2011, the juvenile
court found there was clear and convincing
evidence to support its exercise of jurisdiction under section 300,
subdivision (e). It also removed Ryan
from parental custody and denied
the parents reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision
(b)(5).[2]
Having done so, the juvenile court set a hearing pursuant to section
366.26 to select and implement a permanent plan for Ryan.
The parents sought extraordinary
writ relief from the setting order and more specifically the juvenile court’s
order denying the parents reunification services. In our opinion denying the parents’ petition
(Matthew B. v. Superior Court (Nov.
18, 2011, F062980 [nonpub. opn.])), this court concluded there was no error as the parents failed to
meet their burden of proving that reunification
services would likely prevent re-abuse or that failure to try reunification
would be detrimental to Ryan.
The juvenile court later conducted its section 366.26
hearing at which it found Ryan was likely to be adopted and terminated parental
rights.
DISCUSSION
An appealed-from judgment or order
is presumed correct. (>Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d
557, 564.) It is appellant’s burden to
raise claims of reversible error or other defect and present argument and
authority on each point made. If
appellant fails to do so, the appeal should be dismissed. (In re
Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994.)
Father does not raise any claim of error or other defect against the
termination order from which he appeals.
Thus, we have no reason to reverse.
(Ibid.)
Instead, father complains for the
first time about the social worker managing Ryan’s case at the outset of these
proceedings and about the alleged pressure he felt from his attorney and Ryan’s
attorney to accept the section 300, subdivision (e) jurisdictional allegation
and stipulate to a factual basis for that allegation. Father has forfeited these complaints by not
raising them in a more timely fashion. (>In re Anthony B. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th
1017, 1022-1023 [issues which could have been raised by writ petition and were
not are forfeited on review of a termination order].) In addition, especially with regard to
father’s claim regarding counsel, there is no support for it in the
record. Indeed, father overlooks the
record of the July 2011 jurisdictional hearing.
At that hearing, father specifically agreed on the record that: there was a factual basis for the
jurisdictional finding; no one threatened him in order to make him agree; and
he understood all the procedural rights he was waiving.
DISPOSITION
The
appeal is dismissed.
id=ftn1>
* Before
Cornell, Acting P.J., Kane, J., and Detjen, J.
id=ftn2>
[1] All
statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise
indicated.