Dease v. Vanek
Filed 8/2/12
Dease v. Vanek CA2/2
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
TWO
ASHLEY DEASE et
al.,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
v.
ALLEN VANEK, as Trustee, etc.,
Defendant and Appellant.
B222504
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BP116615)
APPEAL
from an order of the Superior Court
of
County. Michael I.
Levanas, Judge. Affirmed.
Morrison
& Foerster, Joseph L. Wyatt, Jr. and Monica D. Castillo; John B. McIlroy
for Defendant and Appellant.
Fuller
& Fuller, Bruce P. Fuller and Christine M. Allen for Plaintiffs and
Respondents.
Allen
Vanek (trustee), Trustee of the Miriam C. Vanek Revocable Trust dated June 14,
2008 (trust) appeals from an order made pursuant to former Probate Code section
21320 (section 21320).
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] Ashley B. Dease and Alexander Dease
(collectively respondents), beneficiaries of the trust, filed a petition
pursuant to section 21320 (safe harbor petition) in order to determine if their
proposed petition to compel accounting and for order surcharging successor
trustee (proposed petition) constituted a contest within the terms of the no
contest clause of the trust.
The
superior court determined that the proposed petition does not constitute a
contest of the trust. We affirm.
The
trustee contends that both the safe harbor petition and the proposed petition
constituted contests of the trust in that they designated the settlor’s
ex-husband, Edward Dease, as a person interested in the trust.
The
trustee further contends that the probate court’s order is invalid because
respondents’ counsel engaged in a fraud upon the court, and that the trial
court’s denial of the trustee’s request for judicial
notice was an abuse of discretion.
Settlor
Miriam Vanek executed the trust on June
14, 2008. The trust
contained the following two provisions:
“
No-Contest Clause
“If
any beneficiary under this instrument or any amendment thereto in any manner,
directly or indirectly, contests or attacks this instrument or amendment
thereto or any of its provisions in any legal or equitable proceeding that is
designed to thwart my wishes as expressed herein, any share or interest in the
Trust Estate given to such beneficiary under this instrument is revoked and
shall be disposed of as if he or she had predeceased me without Issue.”
“
“Edward
Dease, my ex-husband, has no interest in my estate and shall have no access to
any information or decision-making power with respect to my property, including
(but not limited to) my house or any of the proceeds from any sale of my house
by the Trustee. It is my express
direction to the Trustee, the Guardian of my minor children, and the earnest
request to my children as adults that Edward may not live in the house with my
three children. Since he is neither a
beneficiary nor an heir, he is entitled to no rights under this trust as if he
were such an heir, beneficiary, or otherwise interested in the trust estate in
either an individual or fiduciary capacity.”
By
the terms of the trust, Miriam Vanek appointed her brother, Allen Vanek, as
trustee in the event that she ceased to act as the trustee.
Miriam
Vanek died on June 25, 2008. Her three children, Ashley B. Dease,
Alexander B. Dease, and Leslie A. Dease, are beneficiaries of the trust.
was an adult. Alexander became an adult
on October 25, 2008, four
months after his mother’s death. Leslie
Dease, born July 8, 1998,
was 10 years old at the time of her mother’s death. Leslie’s father, Edward Dease, has had
custody of Leslie during the litigation and she resides with him.
In
May 2009, pursuant to section 21320, respondents filed a safe harbor petition
to determine if the proposed petition would be considered a contest within the
no contest clause of the trust. The
proposed petition asks that the court order an accounting of the trust and
further requests orders surcharging the trustee for alleged wrongful actions;
requiring him to return trust property; and seeking monetary sanctions.
In
paragraph 4 of the safe harbor petition, and paragraph 10 of the proposed
petition, the respondents listed “[t]he names, addresses, ages and
relationships of all persons interested in this trust and entitled to notice of
this hearing.” The persons listed in
both petitions are Ashley, Alexander, Leslie, the trustee (listed as the
settlor’s brother), Virginia and Frank Vanek (listed as the settlor’s parents),
and Edward Dease, whose relationship to the settlor is described as “Father of
Leslie Dease (Minor).”
The
trustee objected to the safe harbor petition and the proposed petition,
claiming that, in violation of clause 2.7 of the trust (the ex-husband clause),
both petitions “specifically allege that ex-husband Edward Dease is one of the
‘persons interested in this trust and entitled to notice of this
hearing.’” The trustee claimed that
these “repeated allegations” attack clause 2.7, the ex-husband clause, and were
designed to “thwart” the settlor’s wishes, in violation of the no contest
clause.
The
trustee further alleged that Edward Dease was trying to obtain an interest in
the settlor’s estate in direct conflict with the interest of his minor daughter
Leslie. In support of this allegation,
the trustee filed a request for judicial notice in support of his objections to
the safe harbor petition and the proposed petition. The trustee requested that the court take
judicial notice of an answer to a complaint in interpleader filed in a federal
action pending in the Central District of California, case No. CV 09-3461 VBF,
captioned “Standard Insurance Company, an Oregon Corporation, Plaintiff v.
Alexander Dease, Ashley Dease, Edward Dease and Edward Dease on behalf of
Leslie Dease, Defendants.” With this
document, the trustee sought to support his allegation that Edward Dease was
“independently seeking to obtain for himself a share of the proceeds of an
insurance policy that was designated by the Settlor as part of the corpus -- in
direct conflict with the interest of the same child he is alleged to
represent.”
The
trustee asked that the safe harbor petition be denied and that both the safe
harbor petition and the proposed petition be deemed to be contests.
At
the hearing on September 17, 2009,
counsel for respondents explained:
“We’re not alleging that Edward Dease has any beneficial interest in
this trust. Nowhere in the petition does
it make any sort of such an allegation.
Under the local rules, we’re required to give notice to the parent of
the minor. That makes sense. That’s the court’s requirement, not ours, and
that’s the only way that he’s been mentioned at all in our petition.” Upon the court’s request for further briefing,
respondents’ counsel directed the court’s attention to rule 7.51(d) of the California
Rules of Court (rule 7.51(d)), which provides:
“Except
as permitted in Probate Code section 1460.1 for guardianships,
conservatorships, and certain protective proceedings under division 4 of the
Probate Code, notice to a minor must be sent directly to the minor. A separate copy of the notice must be sent to
the person or persons having legal custody of the minor, with whom the minor
resides.”
Respondents
argued that pursuant to rule 7.51(d), it is appropriate for notice to go to
Edward Dease, the parent of minor trust beneficiary Leslie, as he is the person
with legal custody of the child and the person with whom she resides.
A
hearing was held on October 22, 2009. The court denied the trustee’s request for
judicial notice, finding that the document filed in the federal court action
was not relevant to the issues before it.
The court further found that the proposed petition was not a
contest. The court signed and filed a
statement of decision on November 25,
2009. Notice of entry of
judgment was served on December 24,
2009.
On
February 19, 2010, the trustee filed his notice of appeal.
I. The proposed petition
A. Standard of review
Where there is no
conflict of evidence or question of credibility regarding extrinsic evidence, interpretation
of a trust is a question of law subject to our independent review. (Fazzi
v. Klein (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1285.) Whether there is a contest within the meaning
of a specific no-contest clause depends upon the factual circumstances of the
case and the language of the trust clause.
(Cook v. Cook (2009) 177
Cal.App.4th 1436, 1442.) It is the
testator’s intentions that control. (
No
contest clauses are favored by the policy of discouraging litigation, but
disfavored by the policy against forfeiture.
(Jacobs-Zorne v. Superior Court (1996)
46 Cal.App.4th 1064, 1073.) A no contest
clause must be strictly construed and may not be extended beyond its plainly
intended function. (Johnson v. Greenelsh (2009) 47 Cal.4th 598, 604 (
B. The probate court did not err in determining
that the proposed petition is not a contest
The trustee argues
that the proposed petition violates section 2.7 of the trust, the ex-husband
clause. In the ex-husband clause, the
settlor deliberately prohibited Edward Dease from having access to any
information about the decedent’s estate or any rights under the trust, “in
either an individual or fiduciary capacity.”
By alleging that Edward Dease is a person “interested in” the trust, the
trustee argues, respondents have “essentially excised” this clause from the
trust.
The trustee
challenges only one allegation in the proposed petition: “The names, addresses, ages and relationships
of all persons interested in this trust and entitled to notice of this hearing
are as follows: . . . Edward Dease . . .
Father of Leslie Dease (Minor).”
The trustee
contends that, at a minimum, respondents have indirectly attacked the
ex-husband clause through this allegation.
The trustee claims that respondents triggered the no contest clause when
their lawyers drafted the petition “as a vehicle to insert their other client,
Edward Dease -- as an interested party, thus enabling him to participate in the
trust proceedings.” The trustee states
that respondents wrongly elevated parent/custodian Edward Dease’s limited right
to notice to the forbidden status of a person interested in the trust. By doing so, the trustee argues, respondents
have intentionally thwarted the settlor’s wishes and run afoul of the no
contest clause.
The trial court
concluded that the proposed petition was not a contest under the terms of the
no contest clause. The court noted that
the proposed petition “concerns only the requesting of an accounting of the
actions of the successor-trustee and challenging the actions of the
successor-trustee since the Decedent’s death.”
In addition, the court noted that the “language of the no-contest clause
refers only specifically to challenges to the validity of the Trust.” As the proposed petition is limited to
requesting an accounting and challenging the actions of the successor-trustee,
the court concluded that it did not constitute a challenge under the no contest
clause.
The trial court
overruled the trustee’s objection regarding the inclusion of Edward Dease as a
person “‘interested in this trust and entitled to notice of this
hearing.’” The court noted that it is
appropriate for Edward Dease to receive notice of the proceedings under rule
7.51(d). Thus, the trial court
concluded, it was not a violation of the no contest clause to include Edward
Dease’s name in the petition in this manner.
The court noted that Probate Code section 48, subdivision (b), states
that “[t]he meaning of ‘interested person’ as it relates to particular persons
may vary from time to time and shall be determined according to the particular
purposes of, and matter involved in, any proceeding.” The court reasoned that the meaning of the
words “interested person” are not limited to a meaning which would exclude
Edward Dease, who is required to be mailed notice.
We find that the
trial court did not err. The language of
the no contest clause limits its application to a beneficiary who contests or
attacks the trust instrument “in any legal or equitable proceeding that is
designed to thwart my wishes as expressed herein.” This language must be strictly construed and
may not be extended beyond its intended function. (Johnson,
supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 604.)
Therefore, we find that the language of the no contest clause limits its
scope to proceedings that are
designed to thwart the settlor’s intentions.
In this case, the
proceeding is designed to require the trustee to file an accounting and to hold
him accountable for alleged wrongful actions.
The trustee does not argue that these requests thwart the settlor’s
intention in any way. Because the
proposed petition does not initiate a legal proceeding designed to thwart the
settlor’s intentions, it does not violate the no contest clause.
Applicable law
directs that when determining whether a proposed petition violates a no contest
clause, a court should look to the purpose of the proceeding. In other words, the court must consider what
relief the petitioner ultimately seeks.
A “direct contest” is defined as a pleading “alleging the invalidity of
an instrument or one or more of its terms.”
(Former Prob. Code, § 21300, subd. (b), repealed Jan. 1, 2010.)
a determination that the trust is invalid, nor does it seek to invalidate any
term of the trust. Thus, under the
applicable law, the proposed petition does not constitute a direct contest of
the trust.
In determining
whether a proposed petition constitutes an indirect contest, a court must also
look to the purpose of the proceeding, or the ultimate relief requested. An indirect contest “is one that attacks the
validity of an instrument by seeking relief inconsistent with its terms.” (Johnson,
supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 605.) It is
the “effect of the beneficiary’s
proposed action” that determines whether an action constitutes a contest. (Giammarrusco
v. Simon (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1586, 1608.) Here, again, the respondents seek no relief
that is inconsistent with the terms of the trust, nor does the trustee so
contend.
As the trial court
noted, the language to which the trustee objects does not grant Edward Dease
any prohibited interest under the trust.
The purpose of the language is to inform the court that Edward Dease is
entitled to notice of the proceedings due to his status as guardian of a minor
beneficiary. His relationship to the
settlor is specifically limited: “Father
of Leslie Dease (Minor).” As set forth
in Probate Code section 48, subdivision (b), the meaning of the term interested
person “may vary” and “shall be determined according to the particular purposes
of, and matter involved in, any proceeding.”
This statute allows a court to read the words “interested person” in a
reasonable way given the context of the phrase.
In the context of the specific matter at hand, the words “all persons
interested in this trust and entitled to notice of this hearing” may be read to
include an individual whose “interest” is limited to his status as the father
of a minor beneficiary, without conferring on him any legal interest to which
he is not entitled by the trust instrument.
In sum, we
conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that the proposed
petition does not constitute a contest under the no contest provision of the trust.
II. The safe harbor petition
The
trustee also argues that the safe harbor petition constitutes a contest under
the terms of the no-contest clause of the trust. The trustee’s argument is based on identical
language found in the safe harbor petition, naming “persons interested in this
trust and entitled to notice of this hearing.”
Listed is Edward Dease, who is described as “Father of Leslie Dease
(Minor).”
Pursuant
to former section 21320, a safe harbor petition does not constitute a contest
as a matter of law. Subdivision (a)
explains that a beneficiary “may apply to the court for a determination of
whether a particular . . . petition . . . would be a contest within the terms
of the no contest clause.” Subdivision
(b) provides that “[a] no contest clause is not enforceable against a
beneficiary to the extent an application under subdivision (a) is limited to
the procedure and purpose described in subdivision (a).”
Thus,
section 21320 makes it clear that an application for an advance ruling pursuant
to the safe harbor provision is not itself a contest -- as long as that
application is limited to the procedure and purpose described in subdivision
(a). (Genger v. Delsol (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1427.) We reject the trustee’s arguments that respondents’
application is not so limited. For the
reasons set forth above in section I.B., the respondents’ language listing
“persons interested in this trust and entitled to notice” does not attempt to
create in Edward Dease any interest that he was specifically barred from
enjoying by the terms of the trust. The
purpose of the respondents’ safe harbor petition did not exceed the limitations
described in section 21320, subdivision (a), and may not be considered a contest.
III. Conflict of interest
The
trustee asserts that respondents’ attorneys committed a fraud upon the
court. Specifically, the trustee argues
that the failure of respondents’ attorneys to disclose their conflicting
representation of Edward Dease to the probate court nullifies the court’s order
finding that respondents’ proposed petition was not a contest. The trustee cites Potter v. Moran (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 873, 878-879 (
that, if an attorney in a probate proceeding fails to disclose her dual representation
of parties with conflicting interests, the court may set aside a contested
order due to extrinsic fraud.
The
trustee’s complaint stems from respondents’ lawyers’ representation of all
three Dease children and Edward Dease in a federal action in which Edward Dease
was seeking a share of Miriam Vanek’s life insurance policy. Preliminarily, we note that this fact was
brought to the trial court’s attention before it made its decision on the safe
harbor petition. The trustee asked the
court to take judicial notice of an answer filed in the federal interpleader
action. The trustee’s counsel
specifically mentioned to the court that it was a request for judicial notice
of the “appearance by counsel on behalf of Edward Dease” in the federal
action. Respondents’ counsel responded
that the federal matter was “a separate case.
We only represent Ashley and Alexander Dease in the matter before this
court.” Thus, respondents’ counsel
implicitly admitted that they represented Edward Dease in a separate matter. The trustee’s position that respondents’
counsel failed to disclose this fact is not supported by the record. Despite its knowledge that respondents’
attorneys represented Edward Dease in a separate federal matter, the trial
court determined that the federal pleading was “absolutely irrelevant” to the
limited question before it: whether the
filing of the proposed petition would constitute a contest under the no contest
clause of the trust.
“Extrinsic
fraud which will warrant a court of equity in setting aside a judgment or
decree consists of fraud which prevents a real trial of the issues involved in
the case, such as conduct which prevents the injured party from receiving
notice of the action or which causes the absence of necessary witnesses. [Citation.]”
(Morales v. Field, DeGoff, Huppert
& MacGowan (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 307, 313 (Morales).) Because the trial
court was aware of respondents’ attorneys’ representation of Edward Dease in a
separate matter, and respondents’ attorneys implicitly acknowledged this fact,
no fraud occurred.
The
cases cited by the trustee are factually distinguishable. The trustee first relies on
In Morales, attorneys for a
testamentary trustee reassured the beneficiary that “‘[s]ince all aspects of
probate administration will be under court supervision and subject to court
orders, you should feel reasonably assured that your interests will be
protected.’” (Morales, supra, 99 Cal.App.3d at p. 312.) The same attorneys also represented various
third parties with whom the trust carried out business transactions. Upon the beneficiary’s later challenges to
these transactions, the court held that the trustee’s attorney had an
obligation to disclose to the beneficiary that they represented not only the
trustee but also the company with whom the trustee was doing business at the
time of the business transaction. (
respondents’ attorneys represented Edward Dease in any business transaction
affecting the trust. In addition, the
beneficiaries are not the complaining parties.
Instead, the trustee complains that the beneficiaries’ attorneys
represented a third party, Edward Dease, in a separate proceeding in federal
court. Unlike in Morales, this fact was known to the trial court before it made its
ruling. In short, Morales does not support a determination that the judgment should
be vacated in this matter.
The
trustee also cites Potter, supra, 239
Cal.App.2d 873. In Potter, the same attorneys were representing the trustee and the
guardian of the estates of the minor beneficiaries. The court was not informed of this conflict
of interest, and one of the beneficiaries later sought to remove the trustee
and challenged certain orders awarding fees to the trustee and his
attorneys. Because the court was not
aware that “the attorneys for the guardian were those who could not give it
impartial and fair advice,” the appellate court concluded that “no valid order
could be made while the attorneys represented the conflicting interests.” (Id. at
pp. 876, 879.) Again,
matter before us. First, respondents’
attorneys did not represent both the trustee and the guardian of the minor
beneficiary. In fact, in the matter
before the court, the respondents’ attorneys represented only the
respondents. Further, in
informed as to all facts that might influence the decision to be made.” (Id. at
p. 877.) Here, in contrast, the court
was informed of respondents’ attorneys’ representation of Edward Dease in a
separate matter. The court found this
fact to be irrelevant to its decision.
We find no error in this determination.
IV. Denial of request for
judicial notice
An
appellate court applies the abuse of discretion standard of review to any
ruling by a trial court on the admissibility of evidence. (See People
v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 717.)
Specifically, “it examines for abuse of discretion a decision on
admissibility that turns on the relevance of the evidence in question.” (Ibid.) Here, the trustee challenges the trial
court’s decision not to grant his request for judicial notice of a federal
pleading -- a decision made due to the trial court’s determination that the
document was irrelevant. A trial judge’s
decision not to take judicial notice “‘will be upheld on appeal unless the
reviewing court determines that the party furnished information to the judge
that was so persuasive that no reasonable judge would have refused to take
(Willis v. State of California (1994)
22 Cal.App.4th 287, 291.)
The
trustee contends that the trial court’s decision was an abuse of
discretion. He argues that judicial
notice was compulsory under Evidence Code sections 452 and 453. Section 452 provides that a court may take
judicial notice of, among other things, the records of “any court . . . of the
United States.” (Evid. Code, § 452,
subd. (d).) Section 453 provides that
the trial court “shall take judicial notice of any matter specified in Section
452 if a party requests it” and (1) gives each adverse party sufficient notice
of the request; and (2) furnishes the court with sufficient information to
enable it to take judicial notice of the matter. (Evid. Code, § 453.)
However,
Evidence Code section 453 does not compel the court to admit irrelevant matters
that would result in the undue consumption of time. (Mitroff
v. United Services Automobile Assn. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1243.) Here, the trial court reasoned:
“The
Safe Harbor Petition is inherently limited in its subject matter. It exclusively requests that the Court
examine the Proposed Petition sought to be filed by Petitioners and to
determine whether filing that particular pleading would violate the no contest
clause of the Trust. The Answer in the
federal court interpleader action is absolutely irrelevant to that limited
question.”
This decision was
not an abuse of discretion. As the trial
court noted, the determination to be made on respondents’ safe harbor petition
was very limited. The court’s role was
to consider only whether the proposed petition violated the no contest clause
of the trust. When interpreting a trust,
extrinsic evidence is generally only admissible to determine whether an
ambiguity exists and to interpret the clause in order to decide the
petition. (See, e.g.,
1122, 1135.)
title="">[5] The evidence offered by the trustee was not
relevant to the question of the proper interpretation of the trust or whether
the proposed petition constituted a violation of the no contest clause. Under the circumstances, the information
offered in the trustee’s request for judicial notice cannot be considered “‘so
persuasive that no reasonable judge would have refused to take judicial notice
of the matter.’” (Willis v. State of California, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p.
291.) The court’s exclusion of this
evidence was not error.
name="_ftnref6" title="">[6]
Even if error had
occurred -- which it did not -- we would find that such error is not
reversible. A trial court’s error in
excluding evidence is grounds for reversal only if it is reasonably probable
that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in
the absence of the error. (
772, 783.) Contrary to the trustee’s
contentions, it is not reasonably probable that the trial court would have
interpreted the proposed petition as a contest if it admitted the federal
answer into evidence. As set forth
above, the court was aware that respondents’ attorneys represented Edward Dease
in the federal action, and the court considered the federal pleading to be
irrelevant to the question before it.
V. Respondents’ motion for
sanctions
Respondents
have filed a motion for sanctions against the trustee and his counsel pursuant
to California Rules of Court, rule 8.276 and Code of Civil Procedure section
907.
An
appeal is considered frivolous “when it is prosecuted for an improper motive --
to harass the respondent or delay the effect of an adverse judgment -- or when
it indisputably has no merit -- when any reasonable attorney would agree that
the appeal is totally and completely without merit. [Citation.]”
(In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982)
31 Cal.3d 637, 650.)
Respondents
argue that the trustee’s appeal is objectively frivolous for several
reasons. First, respondents argue that
the trustee’s arguments are based on repealed law which is not applicable to
the proposed petition. Since the
petition has not yet been filed, respondents argue, if filed, it would be
subject to the new laws related to the enforcement of no contest clauses, not
the old law.
title="">[7]
Second,
respondents argue that the trustee has frivolously appealed beyond the order
issued by the court below. The order
appealed from is a determination that the proposed petition did not constitute
a contest of the trust. The trustee
improperly argues that the safe harbor petition violated the terms of the no
contest clause -- a question that was never before the trial court. In a related argument, respondents point out
that the trustee meritlessly claims that the safe harbor provision violates the
no contest clause of the trust, despite the fact that relevant law at the time
expressly exempted such petitions from constituting a contest.
Further,
respondents argue that the trustee’s brief contains frivolous arguments related
to the actions of Edward Dease, who is not a party to this action. Respondents argue that Edward Dease’s actions
have nothing to do with whether or not the respondents’ proposed petition
violated the no contest clause of the trust.
Finally, respondents argue that several of the trustee’s arguments lack
merit.
Respondents
contend that the appeal was brought for an improper purpose: to harass respondents and delay the trial of
the trustee regarding his actions as trustee.
Respondents reference the transcript of a status hearing on December 13,
2011, where the trustee’s attorney attempted unsuccessfully to have the trial
court proceedings stayed due to this appeal.
Respondents seek sanctions in the form of payment of their attorneys’
fees and costs in this appeal.
An
appeal that is without merit is not by definition frivolous. (In re
Marriage of Flaherty, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 650.) Imposition of sanctions should be used
sparingly, to deter only the most egregious conduct. (Id. at
p. 651.) While the trustee’s appeal
lacks merit, his arguments are not totally devoid of merit. We do not find sufficient evidence of the
type of egregious conduct which warrants sanctions. Therefore, we deny respondents’ motion.
The
order is affirmed. Respondents are
entitled to their costs of appeal.
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_________________________,
J.
CHAVEZ
We concur:
___________________________, P. J.
BOREN
___________________________, J.
DOI TODD
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] Effective January 1, 2010, the Legislature repealed section
21320 and related sections of the Probate Code and enacted new statutes
governing no contest clauses. Former section 21320 and the other repealed statutes were in effect
at the time of the decision at issue in this appeal and therefore govern the
questions before us.
(See Prob. Code, § 3, subds. (e) &
(g).)
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] The children of Miriam Vanek shall be referred to by their
first names, for ease of reference.
