P. v. Matthews
Filed 6/28/12 P. v. Matthews CA2/8
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IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
EIGHT
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
OLIVER LAQURON MATTHEWS,
Defendant and Appellant.
B227596
(Los Angeles
County
Super. Ct.
No. PA061568)
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior
Court of
County.
Richard F. Walmark, Judge. Affirmed.
Joy
A. Maulitz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Lance E. Winters, Scott A. Taryle, and Douglas L. Wilson, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
___________________________________
A jury
returned a verdict finding Oliver Matthews guilty of the crime of
base. (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11352, subd. (a).) Upon a court
trial of prior conviction allegations, the court found that Matthews had
suffered a prior strike, six prior felony convictions with a prison term, and
prior drug-related convictions. (Pen.
Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 667.5, subd. (b); Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11370.2.) The court sentenced
Matthews to an aggregate term of 16 years in state prison. We affirm the judgment.
FACTS
On August 6, 2008, Los Angeles Sheriff’s
Department Deputy Roland De La Maza and his partner, Deputy Jennifer Harris,
recovered a baggie containing small bindles of aluminum foil from Matthews
during a traffic infraction stop. Based on
the manner of packaging, Deputy De La Maza suspected the baggie contained some
kind of narcotic. Subsequent testing
showed the baggie contained 39 bindles of rock cocaine. During an inventory search of the car, Deputy
Harris recovered $620 in currency, two cellular telephones, and aluminum
foil. The search and seizure of the rock
cocaine became an issue upon the filing of a motion to suppress evidence; the
facts presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress are reviewed in more
detail below in addressing Matthews’s claim that his motion to suppress should
have been granted.
In 2009,
the People filed a second amended information charging Matthews as follows:
possession of a controlled substance, cocaine base, for sale (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11351.5; count 1) and transportation of a controlled substance,
cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a); count 2). Further, the information alleged that
Matthews suffered a prior strike conviction for attempted robbery in 1996 (Pen.
Code, § 667, subds. (b)-(i)), and six prior convictions with a prison term
(Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b).)
The information alleged two prior drug-related
convictions (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (a)). Finally, the information alleged Matthews was
released on bail on another case when he committed his current offenses (Pen.
Code, § 12022.1).
The case
was tried to a jury in October 2009. At
trial, the prosecution presented evidence establishing the facts summarized
above. Matthews took the stand on his
own behalf; he testified that he possessed the rock cocaine for personal use
and not for sale. The trial court
instructed the jury on the crime of transporting a controlled substance as
alleged in count 2. As to count 1,
possession of a controlled substance for sale, the court instructed the jury on
the greater offense as alleged (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5), and on
the lesser offense of simple possession of a controlled substance (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)). The
case was submitted to the jury.
On October
26, 2009, the jury returned a verdict finding Matthews guilty as to count 2 of
the crime of transporting a controlled substance, cocaine base (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)). At
the same time, the jury advised the court that it could not reach a verdict as
to the greater offense alleged in count 1, possession of a controlled substance
for sale, but that it had reached a unanimous verdict on the lesser offense of
simple possession of a controlled substance.
Following an exchange between the court and counsel about what to do
with count 1 (everyone recognizing that the “verdict” on the lesser offense was
improper without a verdict of acquittal on the greater offense), the prosecutor
moved to dismiss count 1 pursuant to Penal Code section 1385, and the court
granted the motion.
On June 22, 2010, the trial court found
all the prior conviction allegations
to be true. On July 12, 2010, the trial court sentenced Matthews
as to count 2 to an aggregate term of 16 years in state prison. The sentence is as follows: a 5-year upper term as to count 2, doubled to
10 years for the prior strike, plus two 3-year terms pursuant to Health and
Safety Code section 11370.2, for an additional 6 years.
DISCUSSION
I. The Motion to Suppress Evidence
Matthews
filed a motion to suppress the cocaine base involved in his case. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5.) The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Matthews contends the trial court
erred in denying the motion.
Specifically, Matthews contends the initial traffic stop violated his
rights under the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] We disagree.
A police
officer is permitted to initiate an investigative stop or detention of an individual without
violating the Fourth Amendment when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity may be afoot. (See Terry
v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 30; and see, e.g., People v. Conway (1994)
25 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) Reasonable
suspicion is an objective standard; it is not based on the particular officer’s
subjective state of mind at the time of the stop or detention. (People
v. Conway, supra, 25
Cal.App.4th at p. 388; see also People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50
Cal.4th 99, 147 (Letner).) The
test for determining whether reasonable suspicion exists requires the detaining
officer to point to articulable facts which, considered in light of the
totality of the circumstances, provide an objective basis for the conclusion
that the person detained may have been involved in criminal activity. (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224,
230.) In determining whether reasonable
suspicion is present, a court is allowed to employ commonsense judgments and
inferences about human behavior. (Letner,
supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 146.)
When presented with a claim on
appeal that a motion to suppress should have been granted, the reviewing court
defers to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where
supported by substantial evidence. In
determining whether, on the historic facts so fixed, the search or seizure was
permissible under the Fourth Amendment, the reviewing court exercises
530, 563; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 384.)
Subject to exceptions that are not
involved in Matthews’s current case, Vehicle Code section 5204, subdivision
(a),
requires the use of a “tab” to indicate “the year of expiration” of the
vehicle’s registration and the use of a tab to indicate “the month of
expiration” of the vehicle’s registration.
Section 5204, subdivision (a), further provides: “Current month and year tabs shall be
attached to the rear license plate assigned to the vehicle for the last
preceding registration year in which license plates were issued
. . . . Vehicles that fail to display current
month and year tabs or display expired tabs are in violation of this section.”
Police officers have authority to
arrest persons for traffic offenses, i.e., infractions, pursuant to so-called
“cite and release” procedures prescribed by statute. (See, e.g., Pen. Code,
§ 853.5; Veh. Code, §§ 40300 et seq.; 40500 et seq.)
In this case, Deputy De La
Maza testified to the following facts at the hearing on the motion to
suppress. On August 6, 2008, Deputies De
La Maza and Harris were on patrol on Sierra Highway in Canyon Country. At the intersection of Soledad Canyon Road,
the deputies saw a 2005 Nissan Altima, and routinely ran the license plate
number through the Mobile Digital Terminal (MDT) in their patrol car. The deputies received information that the
vehicle registration assigned to that license plate number was valid until
September 2008. However, the
registration stickers on the license plate indicated that the registration was
valid only through August 2008.
name="_ftnref3" title="">[3] The license plate was assigned to a Nissan
Altima. Deputy De La Maza was aware from
his training and experience that people sometimes switched date stickers or
entire license plates on cars to make it appear that a car’s registration is
current. The deputy was also aware that
sometimes, when a vehicle is stolen, the thief will also steal a license plate
from another vehicle of the same type and put it on the stolen vehicle. This is known as a “cold-plated” car. Based on his observations, the deputy
believed there was at least a possible violation of the registration statute,
section 5204, subdivision (a). Deputy De
La Maza also wanted to make sure that the license plate actually belonged to
the car. The deputies initiated a
traffic stop.
Deputy De La Maza approached the car
and contacted the driver, Matthews.
The deputy asked Matthews for his driver’s license and proof of
registration. The deputy intended to use
the registration document to confirm that the car was properly registered, and
that the vehicle identification number (VIN) matched the license plate affixed
to the car. When Matthews stated that he
was driving to the DMV because his driver’s license was suspended the deputy
asked him to get out of the car.
name="_ftnref4" title="">[4]
As Matthews was getting out of the
car, Deputy De La Maza saw a baggie containing small bindles of aluminum foil
in Matthews’s left hand. The deputy took the baggie and placed it on the hood
of the car. Based on the packaging,
Deputy De La Maza suspected that the baggie contained some kind of
narcotic. Matthews spontaneously stated,
“That’s mine and my friend’s for personal use.”
was driving with a suspended license, and that his car would be towed, Deputy
Harris conducted an inventory search of the car. She found $620 in currency, two cellular
telephones, and some aluminum foil.
name="_ftnref6" title="">[6]
For his part, Matthews called Kylie
Roberson, the owner of the Nissan Altima, to testify at the hearing on the
motion to suppress. Roberson testified
that she purchased the Nissan new on August 31, 2005. She was sent license plates with the
expiration stickers of August 2006.
However, the registration documents from the DMV indicated that the
registration period ran from September 2, 2006 to the following year. After the incident involving Matthews,
Roberson went to the DMV, and explained there appeared to be a disparity with
her registration stickers. The DMV gave
Roberson a September sticker to replace the August sticker.
Matthews contends there was no
reasonable suspicion to support the traffic stop involved in his case because:
(1) there was no evidence suggesting that a crime had been committed; (2) the
vehicle did not fail to display current month and year tabs; and (3) the
vehicle did not display expired tabs.
Matthews argues Deputy De La Meza’s explanation that he and his partner
officers stopped the vehicle, in part, to investigate whether it may have been
stolen “makes no sense.”
According to Matthews: “The discrepancy between the August sticker
on the plate and the September date shown by the MDT had nothing whatsoever to
do with the car underneath the plate. A
concern that a car might be stolen might make sense if the MDT showed that the
license plate did not match the . . . vehicle make, model
or year, but the license plate did match the vehicle here, according to the MDT
information. The discrepancy noted by
the deputy here related only to the license plate itself, and did not have any
bearing at all on the identity or status of the car. [¶] It
was not reasonable to suspect that the car was stolen when the plate matched
the car in every regard.”
The trial court rejected Matthews’s
theme, and so do we. The issue is
whether the discrepancy between the license plate and the registration records
was enough to support a reasonable suspicion justifying a traffic stop. We are satisfied that it was.
Based on the information received
from the MDT, the car driven by Matthews did not display the accurate month of
expiration of registration as was reflected in the DMV records. We agree with the trial court’s common sense
conclusion that deputy could have had a reasonable suspicion, as he testified,
that something was askew. The deputy was
justified in making an investigatory stop to determine whether the car was
properly registered and/or was using the license plates and tabs assigned to the
car. That some later, innocent explanation could and did account for the
discrepancy between the month tab on the license plate and the expiration date
shown on the MDT, is insufficient to find no reasonable suspicion arising from
the facts existed at the time of the traffic stop. (Letner, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 148
[“possible innocent explanations for an officer’s observations do not preclude
the conclusion that it was reasonable for the officer to suspect that criminal
activity was afoot”].) Matthews’s
argument that no reasonable car thief would have put an August-to-August
license plate on the Nissan had it been stolen gives far too much credit to the
intellect and foresight of car thieves, and does not negate that reasonable
suspicion existed.
In order to confirm nothing was
afoot – either in that the tabs were wrong or to ensure that the license plates
were assigned to that car – the deputy needed to inspect the registration
documents and VIN. This could be
accomplished only by stopping the car. In the end, had Matthews possessed a valid
driver’s license, the discrepancy may well have been resolved, and he could
have been on his way. We disagree with
Matthews that there may have been less intrusive means to ascertain the needed
information; he offers no authority for his proposition that the deputies
should have tried calling the DMV in an attempt to learn what may have been
wrong as between the August registration tab and the September registration
expiration date.
In summary, the totality of the
circumstances established the existence of objective reasonable suspicion to
stop the car. Thereafter, all remaining
evidence of Matthews’s criminal activity –– from his driving with a suspended
license, to the bindles of rock cocaine –– was admissible because the remaining
scope of the search was supported by probable cause.
500 U.S. 565, 579-580; People v. Superior Court (Nasmeh) (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 85, 100.)
II. Discovery
of Deputies De La Maza and Harris concerning complaints by members of the
public of dishonesty and falsification of police reports and similar categories
bearing on credibility. (See
Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess); see also Penal
Code, § 832.5; Evid. Code, § 1043 et seq.) The trial court
ordered the custodian of records of the LAPD to produce the personnel files,
and conducted an in camera review to determine whether relevant, discoverable
material existed. The court ordered
discovery of five items.
Matthews
has requested our court to conduct an
and made a proper ruling after the in camera hearing on his
v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216.) We have reviewed the
transcript of the in camera hearing and conclude the trial court conducted the
hearing properly, describing the nature of all complaints, if any, against the
officers, and we find the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the
custodian of records to disclose discovery as noted above.
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed.
BIGELOW, P. J.
We concur:
RUBIN,
J.
SORTINO,
J.
name="_ftn1" title="">
name="_ftn2" title="">
are to that section of the Vehicle Code.
