In re J.G.
Filed 2/27/12 In re
J.G. CA3
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
----
In re J.G., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
C067462
(Super.
Ct. No. JD227026)
SACRAMENTO
COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JENNIFER F. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
Jennifer F.
(mother) and Bobby G. (father) appeal from the juvenile court’s order
terminating their parental rights as
to the minor, J.G. (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 366.26.)
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] Mother contends the court (1) wrongly denied
her section 388 petition, and (2) wrongly found the beneficial parental
relationship exception to adoption inapplicable. Father raises no issues on his own behalf,
but joins in mother’s second contention.
We shall affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On
February 20, 2008, Sacramento County
Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) filed a section
300 petition as to the almost two-and-a-half-year-old minor, alleging that
mother’s live-in boyfriend had severely beaten and threatened to kill mother,
sometimes in the minor’s presence. An
amended petition further alleged: (1)
mother also had a history of domestic violence with the alleged biological father,
Bobby G., who was in county jail facing multiple felony charges; and (2) mother
had a substance abuse problem, in that
the minor tested positive for methamphetamine and opiates at birth.
The
jurisdiction/disposition report stated that mother’s live-in boyfriend had been
charged with attempted murder, assault, and kidnapping, although she had
recanted her charges against him. She
had had other abusive domestic partners.
Mother had a
criminal history including prostitution.
She tested positive for methamphetamine and opiates when the minor was
born.
According to
mother, in childhood she was physically and sexually abused by family
members. She was also born with a
deformed foot, which was operated on 10 times beginning at 11 months of age;
the operations removed more and more of her leg and left her in constant
pain. The pain and the sexual abuse
together had “a devastating impact on her emotional stability.” She became a dependent of the juvenile court
at the age of 15.
Mother admitted
past use of alcohol and marijuana, but denied current problems with them. Methamphetamine had been her drug of choice
since she was 18.
Mother reported
diagnoses of depression and bipolar disorder, but claimed her mental health was
stable.
Mother’s primary
care physician reported she had a long history of depression “related to status
post lower extremity amputation . . . and Chronic Pain Syndrome
related to a poorly fitting prosthesis.”
He had prescribed multiple pain medications; he was not concerned that
she might become dependent on them.
Although he considered her psychologically fragile, he believed her to
be an excellent parent.
At the
jurisdictional and dispositional hearings in June 2008, the juvenile court
sustained the amended section 300 petition.
ordered reunification services for mother.
At the six-month
review hearing in October 2008, the juvenile court ordered six more months of
services for mother.
The 12-month
review report recommended terminating mother’s services. It alleged that mother was using crack
cocaine, living with a boyfriend who also used it, and prostituting
herself. Her visitation was once more
supervised. She had had administrative
dirty drug tests and had become hard to reach.
At the 12-month
review hearing in April 2009, the juvenile court terminated mother’s services
and set a section 366.26 hearing.
The section
366.26 report, filed in August 2009, recommended continued out-of-home
placement with the minor’s current caregiver and a goal of legal
guardianship. The current caregiver was
not recommended as a legal guardian because she was not properly managing the
minor’s problems of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), speech
delays, and extreme aggression toward other children.
Mother reported
she was no longer seeing her former live-in boyfriend and had a restraining
order against him. She said she was in
school four days a week, doing paralegal studies. She continued to have supervised visitation
with the minor, to which he looked forward eagerly. The Department thought the minor would
benefit from continuing his relationship with her.
On August 13,
2009, the juvenile court found that termination of mother’s parental rights
would be detrimental to the minor. The
court ordered continued placement with the caregiver and a goal of legal
guardianship, along with continued visitation for mother.
On August 21,
2009, the Department filed a section 387 petition to remove the minor from his
current caregiver. The juvenile court
sustained the petition, ordered the minor removed from his placement and set a
section 366.26 hearing.
On
March 29, 2010, mother filed a section 388 petition requesting the
reinstatement of services. She alleged
she had participated in services on her own and had visited the minor as
regularly as permitted. She also alleged
she would graduate with a degree in paralegal studies in May 2011, continued to
attend NA/AA support group meetings, had support from a church fellowship, and
regularly attended a “women’s recovering group.”
The Department’s
new section 366.26 report, filed April 19, 2010, recommended a 180-day
continuance for further assessment as to services and home finding.
The report
stated that mother had supervised visits with the minor once every two weeks
for two hours, during which she had to continually redirect his behavior. The foster mother said the minor did not
request visits or talk about mother.
Although the minor (now in preschool) had improved in his speech, he
remained impulsive, aggressive, and angry.
The foster mother had not committed to adopting him. He was not generally adoptable due to his
“extreme” special needs and troubled behavior, which needed “highly
sophisticated parenting.” While mother
loved him, her history showed inadequate parenting skills; therefore, the
Department did not recommend reinstating her services.
On
April 29, 2010, the juvenile court denied mother’s section 388
petition.
On June 15,
2010, the juvenile court authorized the administration of psychotropic
medication to the minor.
On August 25,
2010, mother requested a bonding assessment, and the court subsequently ordered
it done.
On October 4,
2010, mother filed a new section 388 petition, making the same request as
before.
bonded, as the Department had acknowledged; (2) she had worked hard to
establish a life of sobriety and to address all the flaws in her lifestyle to
become a better parent; (3) she had completed parenting classes and counseling
and had become a “parent leader” at the Meadowview Family Resource Center; (4)
her visits were temporarily increased to once a week, and the social worker,
after observing a visit, had been very impressed; (5) although the visits had
been reduced to once a month, they remained appropriate and loving, with no
concerns noted.
title="">[4]
An addendum
report filed October 15, 2010, recommended terminating parental rights and
choosing a permanent plan of adoption.
Mother continued to visit the minor regularly, the visits continued to
go very well, and the minor’s foster parent had decided against adoption. But the Department had located a new foster
parent who wanted to adopt the minor, and he had been moved into her home on
September 10, 2010.
The potential
adoptive parent had adopted and successfully raised three children with greater
special needs than the minor’s, while preserving lifelong relationships with
the children’s biological families. She
had shown great skill and ability in dealing with the minor. His behavior in kindergarten was improving,
with the help of increased medication and the foster mother’s regular presence
at school. He already related to her as
a parent, spoke about being part of her family and growing up in her home, and
called himself her son. The benefits of
permanence for him there far outweighed any bond he might have with
mother.
The
court-ordered bonding assessment, performed by Jeffrey Miller, Ph.D., was filed
February 16, 2011.
Dr. Miller reported
that mother said she was drug-free, living alone in a two-bedroom home, and
working for the Child Abuse Prevention Council.
The minor called her “mom” and called the foster mother his “new mom.” He told mother he was happy in his current
placement. His behavior had improved
since he was placed on medication. He
used to cry when visits ended, but now he could separate from mother without
significant problems; mother thought this was because he now understood he
would be seeing her again. She had never
received negative feedback about visitation.
The foster
mother reported that the minor was doing well in his new placement. He looked forward to visits and phone
contacts with mother and appeared to enjoy his time with her, but had no
difficulty separating from her after visits.
He did not talk about mother, ask to see her, or dream about her between
visits. He was receiving therapy,
focused on helping him adjust to his current placement.
Dr. Miller
observed one visit between mother and the minor for 30 minutes. They appeared to be bonded and the visit went
well, but during a brief separation the minor seemed unconcerned, and he
separated from her at the end without difficulty.
Dr. Miller later
observed the minor with his foster mother.
His behavior was very similar on this occasion. He called the foster mother “mom.” She used their play to parent him by teaching
him about fairness and following rules.
They appeared to have “a close and positive, mother-son type of
relationship.”
Dr. Miller
interviewed the minor after each observation.
The minor said he called both mother and the foster mother “mom.” He had a satisfactory relationship with the
foster mother, and no complaints about being placed with her. His favorite person in the foster home was
his foster brother. When asked where he
would prefer to live, he said “[a]t my real mom’s home.” If he could no longer contact her, he would
feel “sad, because I’d miss her.” But
when asked to draw a picture of his family, he drew his foster brother and
foster mother; he could not draw a picture that included mother.
In Dr. Miller’s
opinion, the minor had “a fairly equal attachment to, and bond with, his mother
and [the foster mother].” Both reported
that he was “fairly adaptable.” Mother
thought if he no longer had contacts with her, he would act out more and suffer
emotional detriment “at least on a short term basis.” The foster mother thought he would not suffer
emotional detriment if she adopted him.
Dr. Miller
concluded that reunification with mother would be in the minor’s best interests
and he would suffer emotional detriment if not reunited with her.
At the
consolidated section 388/section 366.26 hearing in February 2011, mother, the
foster mother, Dr. Miller, and the adoptions social worker testified.
Dr. Miller
opined that adoption would cause detriment to the minor in the short term
(i.e., six months or less), but could not say whether it would do so in the
long term. Even in the short term,
however, adoption would not cause “significant emotional detriment” if the
minor still had contact with mother. Dr.
Miller had not considered whether it would be detrimental to the minor to
remove him from his foster mother and foster siblings.
Mother testified
as follows: She had supervised visits
with the minor twice a month for an hour at a time and spoke to him once a week
on the telephone; she had not had unsupervised visits since August 2009. During visits they would talk and play. She sometimes had to “set boundaries with
him” because the minor could be hyperactive.
He always greeted her eagerly, hugging and kissing her; when visits
ended, he would hug her and tell her he loved her, but did not get as upset as
he used to because he knew he would see her again.
Mother rented a
two-bedroom duplex on a year-to-year lease.
There was a room for the minor.
Mother had been
employed by the Child Abuse Prevention Council since August or September 2010
as a “parent leader,” counseling other parents in situations like hers; she had
also taught two parenting classes. She
would complete her work for a paralegal certificate at the end of the
month.
Mother had
learned a great deal from her parenting classes that she could apply during
visitation. She had learned techniques
of discipline; she had also learned how the domestic violence in her life had
helped to cause the minor’s developmental delays, anger, and aggression. When he acted out, she would sometimes ask
him if he remembered how her boyfriend had hurt her.
In the first
year of the proceedings, she had not benefited from her domestic violence class
because she was in denial and thought she was being punished; now she realized
that her choice to stay with her abuser could have caused the minor’s death. Her program with WEAVE had opened her eyes to
the cycle of domestic violence, including her own past role in picking abusive
partners. She now recognized the warning
signs of a potential abuser.
Mother’s
stepfather physically abused her for most of her life, then sexually abused her
from the ages of nine to 12. After her
father took custody of her, he physically abused her when she was 15. She then went into a foster home until she turned
18.
Mother’s
relationship with Bobby G., over a period of months in late 2004 until
mid-2005, was physically and emotionally abusive, and ended before the minor
was born. She had had a previous abusive
relationship in high school.
Mother’s
relationship with her previous live-in boyfriend began in 2003. (He was incarcerated when she met Bobby
G.) It resumed in 2006. After another period of incarceration, he
moved in with her in December 2007. His
physical abuse lasted from then until February 2008, when the minor was
removed. She recanted her charges
against him because she thought if people believed he had not been abusive, she
would get the minor back. She would not
let him see the minor again.
Mother had had
no relationships since then and did not intend to have one in the near
future. She wanted to focus on getting
her life in order.
Mother’s abusive
relationships and her history of prostitution stemmed from low
self-esteem. Now, however, she felt
proud of herself and what she had accomplished.
Her support system included her former foster sisters and foster mother,
her teachers, her coworkers, and her pastor’s wife, who counseled her
individually.
Mother still
suffered from chronic pain,
including leg pain from her foot
arthritis in her knees and fingers.
She began using prescription pain medications at age 15, including
Vicodin, Norco, OxyContin, and Methadone, but weaned herself off all of them
over the last year. She now used only
prescription-strength Naproxen and a nonnarcotic pain medication for
arthritis.
Mother used
methamphetamine first at 19, got clean for quite a while, resumed in 2003 or
2004, quit again in 2005, then resumed again in February 2007 after a friend
died. She finally quit for the last time
in January 2009.
Mother had a
glass of wine with her family on Christmas Day 2010, not seeing it as a lapse
because alcohol had not been her main problem.
But after speaking to her sponsor, she realized that using any substance
was a problem because she is an addict.
She considered Christmas 2010 to be her “clean date” now, meaning she
had not lapsed since then.
Mother went
through substance abuse classes during her reunification period. For the last eight months she had been in a
weekly recovery program at her church.
She also had a sponsor through NA.
She recognized her personal red flags for substance abuse and knew what
to do when she spotted them.
She had had a
good relationship with the foster mother in the beginning, but things were
tenser now because the foster mother was upset that mother wanted the minor
back. Mother thought he was well taken
care of in the foster mother’s home, but was overmedicated; she thought she
could take care of him better. She could
support him financially and emotionally.
He told her he wanted to live with her.
She had set up counseling programs and other programs to help him, and
had worked to make a smooth transition from the foster mother’s home to hers. She would maintain his contact with the
foster family.
The foster
mother testified as follows: She had two
biological children (a 15- and an 18-year-old son) and three adopted children;
two of them were now adults and did not live with her, but regularly saw her
and the minor. The 15-year-old son and a
15-year-old adopted daughter lived with her.
Two of her adopted children had or probably had ADHD, and one also had
special needs. The foster mother
encouraged her foster children to maintain ties to their biological
families. If she adopted the minor, she
would do the same with him.
The foster
mother had been employed for five years by the Office of Education, working
with “moderate to severe” special needs children up to the age of five.
The minor
displayed ADHD behavior, needing constant refocusing. At first he was aggressive toward others, but
responded to discipline.
The foster
mother worked with the minor’s school on his problematic behaviors. He now went for only half a day and was in
the smallest available classes.
When the minor
came to live with her, the foster mother gave him a choice of calling her by
her first name or “mom.” He chose
“mom.”
When she went
out with the minor, he sometimes asked if mother would be there, but only if
they were near a place where he had visited her.
The minor’s
15-year-old foster sister related well to him.
He loved his 15-year-old foster brother, going to his high school
basketball practices and seeing him as a role model.
The minor told
both foster siblings he loved them. He
also told the foster mother that “all the time.” He had talked about his future with the
foster family. He had never said he
wanted to go back and live with mother.
The foster mother “very much” wanted to adopt him.
Adoptions social
worker Lisa Wittorff testified that mother’s visitation was reduced from two
hours to one because the minor got restless.
Mother requested more time, but Wittorff replied that mother was already
receiving more visitation than usual in cases where adoption was the plan. Afterward, in the interest of moving forward
with adoption, Wittorff decreased the visits until the juvenile court ordered
them restored to twice per month. She
believed that increasing visitation was not in the minor’s best interest, given
the plan to adopt.
Because the
minor had spent almost half his life in foster care and mother had had many
chances to reunify, Wittorff decided as of July 2010 that the minor could not
wait further for stability. Wittorff
knew mother had made progress since then, but parts of mother’s testimony
concerned her. Nothing since July 2010
had changed her assessment of the minor’s best interest.
In Wittorff’s
judgment, the foster mother (with whom Wittorff had worked on prior adoptions)
was very skilled at dealing with the minor’s special needs. She was very involved with his school and
knew how to get him the help he needed there.
Her household was good for him because it had a high level of
activity.
After hearing
argument under both section 388 and section 366.26, the juvenile court ruled:
Although there
were troubling points in mother’s testimony, she had proved a change of
circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence.
the court felt mother had turned her life around. However, granting her section 388 petition
would not be in the minor’s best interest.
The court gave
little weight to Dr. Miller’s opinion because it did not properly consider the
relationship between the minor and his foster family. Dr. Miller appeared to think reunification
with mother would serve the minor’s best interest only because she was his
biological parent and was doing well, which is not the
In light of the
minor’s need for permanence and stability, the court had to consider that
mother was still at risk of relapsing.
The court also had to consider the detriment to the minor if removed
from his present family. Though he had
told Dr. Miller he wanted to live with mother, he imagined his future with his
foster family and could not even draw a picture of his family that included
mother.
On the other
hand, Dr. Miller saw only short-term detriment to the minor from severing ties
with mother, and that opinion seemed to be based only on mother’s opinion. The court found the foster mother’s contrary
opinion credible.
Under the test
of In re Kimberly F. (1997)
56 Cal.App.4th 519, mother had clearly ameliorated the issues that led to
the dependency, but the minor’s bonds to the foster mother and foster siblings
were now stronger than his bonds to mother.
Given how long
the case had lasted already, how well the minor was doing in his current home,
the risk that mother might relapse again, the detriment to the minor from
removing him from his foster home, and his need for stability and permanence,
his best interests would be served by denying mother’s section 388
petition.
As to section
366.26, the minor was adoptable by clear and convincing evidence and was in a
prospective adoptive home which was already approved for adoption. The only exception to adoption raised by
mother, the beneficial parental relationship exception, did not apply because
the detriment to the minor from severing the relationship did not outweigh the
benefit to him from adoption.
At the time of
the section 366.26 hearing, the minor was almost five-and-a-half years old and
had been out of mother’s custody for half his life. He looked to his foster mother to meet his
needs. Although there had been frequent
and loving contact with mother, this was not sufficient to show a significant,
positive emotional attachment such that the minor would be greatly harmed by
terminating parental rights.
Therefore, the court
terminated mother’s and father’s parental rights and set the matter for
adoption.
DISCUSSION
I. Section 388
Petition
Mother contends
the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying her section 388
petition. We disagree.
A petition to
modify a juvenile court order under section 388 must allege facts showing new
evidence or changed circumstances, and that changing the order will serve the
minor’s best interests. (
83 Cal.App.4th 666, 672.) The
petitioner has the burden of proof on both points by a preponderance of the
evidence. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.570(h)(1)(D).) In assessing the
petition, the court may consider the entire history of the case. (In re
Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 189.)
To decide whether
mother met her burden, the juvenile court had to consider such factors as the
seriousness of the problem that led to the dependency and the reason for the
problem’s continuation; the degree to which the problem may be and has been
removed or ameliorated; and the strength of the relative bonds between the
dependent child and the child’s parents and caretakers. However, this list is not exhaustive. (In re
B.D. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1229; In re Kimberly F., supra,
56 Cal.App.4th at p. 532.)
When a parent
brings a section 388 petition after the termination of reunification services,
the best interests of the child are of paramount importance. (In re
Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) Therefore, the juvenile court looks not to
the parent’s interest in reunification but to the child’s need for permanence
and stability. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.)
Where a section
388 petition has been denied after an evidentiary hearing, we review for abuse
of discretion. (In re S.R. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 864, 866.) We reverse only if the ruling exceeded the
scope of the court’s discretion, or if under all the evidence (including
reasonable inferences from the evidence), viewed most favorably to the ruling,
no reasonable judge could have made that ruling. (Great
West Contractors, Inc. v. Irvine Unified School Dist. (2010)
187 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1459; In re
Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351 (Jasmine D.).) Where the
evidence conflicts, we reverse only if the evidence compels a finding for the
appellant as a matter of law. (
1517, 1527-1529.)
The juvenile
court rested its ruling on the second prong of section 388: the child’s best interest.
ruling.
As the court
found with respect to “changed circumstances,” mother had removed or
ameliorated the grave problems (substance abuse and domestic violence) that
caused the minor’s removal. However,
this alone did not mean it was in the minor’s best interest to reinstate
mother’s services or place the minor in her custody, and other factors the
court could properly consider showed otherwise.
Detained at age
two years five months, the minor had been out of mother’s custody for half his
life. After a string of unsatisfactory
placements, he had found a foster parent who not only wanted to adopt him but
had the skills and experience to meet his special needs. He had bonded with his foster family and
imagined his future with them. Given his
attachment to his foster mother and foster siblings, it was reasonable to
conclude that his bonds to the foster family were now stronger than his bonds
to mother, whom he saw for only two hours a month and from whom he parted
without difficulty when visits ended.
Furthermore,
though mother has taken great strides toward a healthy and stable future, her
efforts are still a work in progress.
She is in the early stages of establishing herself as a self-sufficient
adult. Since she has avoided
relationships with men, it is not yet proven that she can avoid falling into
the wrong kind of relationship yet again.
And, although a relapse into substance abuse may be unlikely, the court
could not realistically find it impossible or extremely improbable. Mother has been off methamphetamine and
prescription pain medications for a relatively short time compared to the time
she had been on them. Her chronic pain
remains and may well worsen. Whether her
current nonnarcotic regimen can alleviate her pain in the long term is
unknown. Thus, even assuming that
mother’s Christmas glass of wine was only a one-time slip, her ultimate success
at recovery is far from certain. The
uncertainty of mother’s future outlook in all these respects is adverse to the
minor’s need for permanence and stability, which controls at this stage of the
case. (In re Stephanie M., supra,
7 Cal.4th at p. 317; In re
Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th
at p. 309.)
Mother relies on
Michael D. (1996)
51 Cal.App.4th 1074 (Michael D.),
in which the appellate court affirmed the juvenile court’s order granting a
mother’s petition to modify prior orders by returning her five-year-old son to
her custody and terminating a legal guardianship. (Id.
at p. 1078.) That case is
procedurally and factually distinguishable.
First, because the
lower court in Michael D. granted
the mother’s petition, the ruling returning the minor to her custody was
reviewed deferentially for abuse of discretion.
(Michael D., supra,
51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1087.)
Here, we must give the same deference to the order denying mother’s
petition.
Second, in
legal guardian (the paternal grandmother) sought to adopt him, it appears from
the opinion that, unlike in the present case, the mother’s reunification
services had not been terminated when she petitioned to modify the existing
orders. (Michael D., supra,
51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1079.)
Third, the minor
there testified that he wanted to live with his mother and only to visit his
grandmother. (Michael D., supra,
51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1080.)
Here, though the minor said he wanted to live with both mother and his
foster mother, the strongest evidence indicated that he envisioned his future
in the foster home, not in mother’s home.
Fourth, it
appears from the opinion in Michael D.
that the minor did not have special needs and his legal guardian was no more
skilled at meeting his needs than his mother.
(See Michael D.,
pp. 1078-1081.) Here, the minor has
special needs, and the foster mother, unlike mother, has professional training
and experience in dealing with such needs.
Fifth, and
finally, no party in Michael D.
disputed that it was in the minor’s best interest to live with the mother, and
the lower court found by clear and convincing evidence that it was so.
supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1080.) Here, there was no
agreement or finding that it was in the minor’s best interest to live with
mother.
The juvenile
court did not abuse its discretion by denying mother’s petition.
II. Beneficial
Parental Relationship Exception
Mother,
joined by father, contends the juvenile court erred by finding that the
beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption did not apply.
At the selection
and implementation hearing, the juvenile court must choose one of four
alternative permanent plans for the minor; the permanent plan preferred by the
Legislature is adoption. If the minor is
adoptable, the court must terminate parental rights absent a showing of
detriment to the minor. (
44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368.)
The parent has
the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that a statutory
exception to adoption applies. (
152 Cal.App.4th 987, 998; In re
Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 809.) When the juvenile court rejects an exception
to adoption, we review the court’s finding deferentially. (In re
Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314-1315 [whether standard of
review deemed substantial evidence or abuse of discretion, broad deference to
lower court required]; Jasmine D.,
p. 1351 [abuse of discretion]; In re
Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 [substantial evidence].)
To establish
that the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption applies, the
parent must show that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to
the minor because “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact
with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
“[T]he parent
must show more than frequent and loving contact, an emotional bond with the
child, or pleasant visits—the parent must show that he or she occupies a
parental role in the life of the child.”
(In re I.W.,
p. 1527.) It is not enough simply
to show “some benefit to the child from a continued relationship with the
parent, or some detriment from termination of parental rights.” (Jasmine D.,
p. 1349.) Even if there is a
significant, positive emotional attachment between parent and child, it does
not bar adoption if the child looks to a prospective adoptive parent to meet
his or her needs. (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 231;
p. 811.)
“Because a
section 366.26 hearing occurs only after the court has repeatedly found the
parent unable to meet the child’s needs, it is only in an extraordinary case
that preservation of the parent’s rights will prevail over the Legislature’s
preference for adoptive placement.” (
visitation, and bond with the minor, this is not such a case.
The minor had
been out of mother’s custody for nearly three years, which is a long time in
the life of a young child. Though mother
believed and Dr. Miller opined that her relationship with the minor was
parental, the foster mother had been acting for a substantial time as the
minor’s primary parent, while mother saw him only twice a month in supervised
visits. The foster mother had training
and experience in dealing with the minor’s special needs, and was effectively
doing so at home and at school. (See
454, 467 [child’s age, portion of life spent in biological parent’s custody,
and particular needs must be considered in assessing whether a relationship is
important and beneficial to the child].)
The minor now looked to the foster mother to meet his needs. (In re
Dakota H., supra,
132 Cal.App.4th at p. 231; In
re Zachary G., supra,
77 Cal.App.4th at p. 811.)
Finally, even Dr. Miller—the only witness aside from mother who asserted
detriment from terminating mother’s parental rights—opined only that there
would be some short-term “emotional detriment” to the minor, and even this would not be “significant” if
he were allowed to maintain contact with mother, as the foster mother intended.
Substantial
evidence supported the order terminating parental rights.
DISPOSITION
The order
terminating parental rights is affirmed.
BUTZ , J.
We concur:
NICHOLSON , Acting P. J.
HOCH , J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] Undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] The juvenile court had already entered a
no-contact order as to Bobby G.
