Robert P. v. Superior Court
Filed 3/5/12 Robert P. v. Superior Court CA4/1
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and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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COURT
OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
ROBERT P. et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF SAN
DIEGO COUNTY,
Respondent;
D060953
(San Diego
County
Super. Ct.
No. SJ12371)
SAN DIEGO
COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
Real Party in Interest.
PROCEEDINGS
in mandate after referral to a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26
hearing. Ronald F. Frazier, Judge. Petition denied. Request for stay denied.
Robert P.
the parents) contend the juvenile court
erred when it set a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 366.26 to select and implement a permanency plan for their son,
R.P. The parents contend the evidence is
insufficient to support the finding that return to N.T.'s custody would be
detrimental to R.P.'s safety, protection, or physical or emotional
well-being. We deny the petition.
FACTUAL AND
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Robert P.
and N.T. are the unmarried parents of R.P.
They met while they were hospitalized for treatment of paranoid
schizophrenia. After suffering a
medications to have a baby. R.P. was
born healthy in November 2007. Robert and N.T. maintained a relationship but
did not live together.
In May
2010, after not being able to contact N.T. for several days, R.P.'s maternal
aunt found her at home in a "zombie like" state. N.T. told her she could not answer the
telephone because of the government. She
said she wanted to commit suicide by starvation. The home was in shambles. R.P. was extremely dirty and hungry.
N.T. was hospitalized due to her
psychotic condition. She said voices had
been telling her to starve herself and R.P., and he would die slowly from
starvation. After a two-week hospital
stay, N.T. stabilized on medications and was released. She denied trying to starve herself or R.P.,
and said she would never do anything to hurt or harm her child.
When the social worker interviewed
Robert, he presented as completely incapacitated and disoriented. He was unable to understand who the social
worker was. Family members reported that
Robert was unable to care for himself.
The
Agency (Agency) filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (b), on
behalf of R.P., and detained him in protective custody. The petition alleged N.T. and Robert were not
able to provide regular care for R.P. because of their mental health diagnoses
of paranoid schizophrenia. The juvenile
court appointed a guardian ad litem for Robert.
In August 2010, the juvenile court
sustained the petition and ordered Robert and N.T. to undergo psychological
evaluations. Robert had a 30-year
history of paranoid schizophrenia. He
was noncompliant with medications and depended on family members to care for
him. At the time of the evaluation,
Robert did not know who or where he was.
The psychologist stated Robert's behavior was influenced by delusions
and hallucinations, and his communication and judgment were seriously impaired.
N.T. was diagnosed with
bipolar type, and brief psychotic episode, with marked stressors. The psychologist stated that at the time of
her psychological evaluation, N.T. did not present with a mental disability
that would render her unable to care for her child. She appeared to be emotionally stable,
without psychotic symptomatology. The
psychologist believed that N.T. was able to utilize reunification services and
benefit from those services within a 12-month period, provided she continue
with appropriate medical treatment. The
psychologist also stated N.T.'s history suggested if she were under stress,
N.T. may experience psychotic episodes with suicidal ideation, jeopardizing
R.P.'s safety.
The court ordered a plan of
reunification services for N.T. The
court also ordered reunification services for Robert, pending a second
psychological evaluation to determine whether he would be able to benefit from
services.
Robert underwent a second
psychological evaluation. The
psychologist said Robert was "basically psychotic" unless medicated,
and was totally unable to parent his child at that time or in the foreseeable
future due to his severe mental disorder and noncompliance with prescription
medication.
Robert was committed under section
5150 from November 8 to 19, and from December 1 to 10, 2010. In November Robert was delusional and
disoriented; he had been throwing rocks at a streetlight, yelling at his
elderly mother in a threatening manner and refusing to eat. He was discharged with medication. In December Robert hit his brother and broke
objects in the family home. Robert's
mental health condition was diagnosed as Paranoid Schizophrenia with acute
exacerbation. He was again discharged
with medication.
On January 6 and 11, 2011, N.T.
brought Robert with her to visit R.P.
Throughout the visits, Robert talked to himself, rocked back and forth,
and did not engage with R.P. On January
20 N.T. told the social worker she was taking Robert to a parenting class. When the social worker voiced concerns about
Robert's mental health condition, N.T. said Robert was stabilized on medication
and asked the social worker to "give him a chance." A few days later, N.T. told the social worker
Robert was not paranoid even if it appeared that way to other people.
The social worker met with Robert
on January 24. When she asked him about
his medication, Robert replied, "The baby's doing fine. He's not penalized. There's a translator." He then gave the social worker a document
unrelated to the juvenile court proceedings and said, "I'd hold. There's an Indian forelord with a high
percentage."
On January 27, the social worker
again spoke to N.T. of her concerns about Robert's aggressive behaviors against
his mother and brother, and advised her that having Robert present at visits
presented a risk to R.P.'s safety. N.T.
disagreed with the social worker's assessment, saying Robert would never hurt
his son. The social worker told N.T.
that she would seek a no contact order at a juvenile court hearing on January
31.
N.T. brought Robert with her to
visit R.P. on January 31. On the same
day, the juvenile court issued a temporary order restraining Robert from having
contact with R.P. The order also stated
N.T. was not permitted to bring Robert to her visits with R.P.
The social worker informed N.T.
about the temporary restraining order and a pending contested hearing on the
order on February 24. N.T. said it was
not in R.P.'s best interests not to have contact with his father because Robert
was a gentle person and R.P. needed him.
N.T. said she understood the court's order and would comply with it.
In April the court terminated
Robert's reunification services. In May
the court entered a no contact order between Robert and R.P.
N.T. regularly visited R.P. and
participated in her case plan. She
remained stable on her medication. N.T.
was very loving and appropriate with R.P. but was afraid to set limits with him
to avoid a tantrum. If angry, R.P. would
hit N.T. or pull hard on her clothing.
She was unable to redirect him, set limits, provide consequences for his
behaviors or discipline him appropriately.
N.T. deferred to R.P.'s wishes and allowed him to direct the
visits. To assist N.T. in implementing
limits, the Agency referred her and R.P. for Child Parent Psychotherapy (CPP).
By the time of the 12-month
hearing, the Agency reported that N.T. had participated in nearly every service
available to her through the Agency, including individual therapy, parenting
education, day treatment program for persons with chronic mental illness,
medication management and CPP. During
the past six months, N.T. had implemented the same routine for all visits. She fed R.P. the same items, cradled him for
extended periods of time and spoke to him about matters he was too young to
understand. She did not allow any
deviations from the visitation routine.
The social worker stated N.T.'s rigid parenting posed a great risk to
R.P., and did not allow her to meet any challenges that might test her ability
to parent outside her established routine.
The 12-month hearing was originally
scheduled for July 20, 2011, but was continued for various reasons to November
2 and 18. The court admitted the
Agency's reports in evidence and heard testimony from the social worker, her
supervisor, the foster mother and N.T.
The Agency recommended the court
terminate N.T.'s reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing to allow
R.P.'s adoption by his current foster parents.
The social worker believed it would be detrimental to return R.P. to
N.T.'s care. N.T. had an enmeshed
relationship with Robert, and did not believe that he presented a safety risk
to R.P.
The social worker testified N.T.
did not demonstrate an emphatic understanding of R.P.'s needs. N.T. established a highly structured routine
for visits and did not deviate from her routine. She discouraged R.P. from engaging in other
activities, infantilized him and spoke to him about subjects too advanced for
his age. She was unable to set limits
for R.P. and instead exhibited rigidity in her parenting routine. The social worker said N.T. was unequipped to
handle R.P.'s behaviors. She could not
set appropriate boundaries for R.P., or discipline him, and she was aloof to
conditions that presented safety hazards to him. During longer visits in which R.P.'s behavior
problems became more apparent, the social worker had to intervene numerous
times because N.T. could not control his behaviors.
The social worker's supervisor
testified that N.T.'s treatment of R.P. showed she was not attuned to the role
of parenting a three-year old. Despite
participating in PPC, the visits were relatively unchanged since April
2010. The supervisor did not see any
indication N.T. could handle novel situations effectively, and was concerned
about N.T.'s ability to apply parenting skills in non-structured circumstances.
N.T. testified she brought a bean
and cheese burrito to R.P. at every visit as a family ritual. She also brought juice, apples, raisins and
oranges. She held R.P. at the beginning
of every visit because he asked her to hold him. The time she spent holding R.P. varied. If he wanted to play, then they played. N.T. said she had a support system and was
able to care for R.P.
N.T. said she saw Robert every day
at their day program. They participated
in a group program. They had not been in
a relationship for several months. N.T.
knew Robert was not supposed to see R.P., and he had not seen him. When asked whether she ended the relationship
because she believed Robert posed a risk to R.P.'s safety, N.T. replied,
"I ended the relationship because we both decided my son needs to come
home. He only needs to be around his
mother and father. And . . . to be back
with at least his mother is the most important thing."
The juvenile court said it reviewed
the entire case file and found numerous instances where N.T. was unwilling to
comply with the no contact order, and her continued relationship with Robert
would expose R.P. to a substantial risk of physical and emotional
detriment. The court terminated
reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing for March 12, 2012.
N.T. and
Robert petition for review of the court's orders and request a stay of the
section 366.26 hearing. (§ 366.26,
subd. (l); Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.452.) They ask this court to vacate
the order setting a section 366.26 hearing and order the juvenile court to
return R.P. to her custody. This court
issued an order to show cause and the Agency responded. The parties waived
DISCUSSION
N.T. contends there is insufficient
evidence to support the juvenile court's finding return to her custody would
create a substantial risk of detriment to R.P.'s physical or emotional
well-being. She argues the evidence
showing she had an ongoing relationship with Robert and supported his
relationship with R.P. does not establish there was a risk to R.P.'s safety in
her care. N.T. states the record shows
she did not violate any order prohibiting Robert from having contact with R.P.,
and there was no evidence to support the juvenile court's finding she would
violate the no contact order if R.P. was returned to her care. She further asserts the criticisms about her
parenting skills do not constitute substantial evidence of detriment.
At the
12-month review hearing, the court must return the child to the physical
custody of his or her parent unless the Agency proves, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that return to the parent would create a
substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well-being of the child (detriment finding). (§ 366.21, subd. (f); see In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 308; In
re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 420.)
The failure of the parent to participate regularly and make
substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs is prima facie
evidence that return would be detrimental to the child. (§ 366.21, subd. (f).) At a review hearing, the focus is on the
child's well-being, rather than on the initial grounds for juvenile court
intervention. (In re Joseph B. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 890, 899.)
affirm an order setting a section 366.26 hearing if it is supported by
substantial evidence. (James B. v.
Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1020.) "When a trial court's factual determination is attacked
on the ground that there is no substantial evidence to
sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with
the determination as to whether, on the entire
there is substantial evidence,
contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the
determination." (Bowers v.
Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873-874; Elijah R. v.
Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.) The judgment will be upheld if it is
supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial evidence to the
contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a different result
had it believed other evidence. (
Cal.App.4th 212, 228.)
Contrary to
the juvenile court's finding there were "numerous instances" where
N.T. was unwilling to comply with the no contact order, we do not find any
indication in the record to show that N.T. was unwilling to comply with any
order prohibiting Robert from having contact with R.P.
restraining order on January 31, she said she did not agree with the order but
would comply with it. There is no
evidence in the record to show she then attempted to facilitate, or
facilitated, contact between Robert and R.P.
the case that Robert did not present a risk to R.P., there is no evidence to
show she attempted to violate, or violated, any no contact order.
However,
the appellate court reviews the judgment of the juvenile court, not its
rationale. As a general rule, if the result
reached below was correct on any theory of the law applicable to the case, the
judgment must be sustained regardless of the considerations which may have
moved the trial court to its conclusion.
(People v. Smithey (2006) 20
Cal.4th 936, 972; D'Amico v. Board
of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 19.) As we discuss below, N.T.'s insistence that
it would benefit R.P. to maintain a relationship with Robert, who was
psychotic, and the social worker's observations about her rigid parenting
skills constitute substantial evidence of her inability to properly assess
R.P.'s needs.
The record
shows that throughout the 18-month long dependency proceedings, the Agency
continually assessed N.T.'s ability to safely parent R.P. The Agency determined it could not implement
unsupervised visitation because the risk to R.P. was too great. Outside a highly structured environment, N.T.
could not set limits or boundaries with R.P.
He often dictated what food and toys he wanted N.T. to bring to
visits. N.T. followed his commands to
avoid dealing with his behavior problems rather than implementing
age-appropriate discipline or redirection.
The social worker observed a reversal of the parent/child relationship. The foster father reported that N.T. treated
R.P. as an equal.
According to her therapist, N.T.
lacked the ability to apply specific parenting techniques outside an
established routine. The therapist said
N.T. did not fully understand R.P.'s age-appropriate cognitive, emotional,
developmental and physical needs. A
developmental specialist said N.T. lacked "common sense" in her role
as a caregiver. The social worker and
foster parent said N.T. did not consistently recognize safety risks to
R.P. For example, she boosted three-year
R.P. up on monkey bars that were approximately six feet from the ground, and
did not closely supervise him while he swung upside down from his knees. On another occasion she allowed him to climb
outside safety bars on a high structure and did not redirect him. N.T. dismissed concerns about R.P.'s safety,
stating that he was a "very capable climber."
The social
worker stated that although N.T.'s mental health condition had improved, the
rigid aspects of her personality limited her ability to adequately parent and
protect R.P. in a manner consistent with his developmental and emotional
needs. She was unable to recognize how
Robert's severe mental illness limited his ability to be a parent to R.P. Her insistence that R.P. needed his father
indicated she did not appreciate the severity of Robert's mental health
condition and the risks Robert's psychotic behaviors presented to R.P. Further, the social worker believed that
N.T.'s mental health condition was a complicating factor in any decision to return
R.P. to her care. The evaluating psychologist
said N.T. had a history of experiencing psychotic episodes with suicidal
ideation when under stress, which would jeopardize R.P.'s safety. Although N.T. had stabilized her mental
health condition, the record permits the reasonable inference that any
decompensation in her mental health would present a serious safety risk to
R.P.'s safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being.
In view of the multiple factors
adversely affecting N.T.'s ability to appropriately and safely parent R.P., we
conclude there is substantial evidence to support the finding that return to
the parent would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child. (§ 366.21, subd. (f).) Thus the court did not err when it set a
section 366.26 hearing to select and implement a permanency plan for R.P.
DISPOSITION
The petition is denied.
The request for stay is denied.
O'ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN,
Acting P. J.
HALLER,
J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] Robert joins with the arguments raised
by N.T. in her petition. He does not
raise any arguments on his own behalf.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] Statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
