In re Abigail Q.











Filed 9/26/11 In re Abigail Q. CA2/7






NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.



IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re ABIGAIL Q. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.	B231869 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK78707)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MEAGHAN F., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Valerie Skeba, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.
Eliot Lee Grossman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and O. Raquel Ramirez, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________________
Meghan F. (“Mother”, the mother of minors Abigail Q., Allison Q., and Destiny M., appeals from orders denying her Welfare and Institutions Code^[1] section 388 petitions after hearings and the court’s subsequent order terminating her parental rights. With respect to the section 388 petitions, Mother asserts she showed both changed circumstances and the best interests of the children warranted reunification services. Although Mother participated in classes and programs to address the issues that led to the dependency proceedings, and visited her children after her release from prison, she failed to demonstrate how reunification services would be in the best interests of her children. Consequently the court did not err in summarily denying the petitions. Likewise, we conclude the court did not err in failing to apply the parental-relationship exception to the termination of parental rights. Mother did not demonstrate that she had developed a sufficient parental relationship to warrant the application of the exception. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Circumstances Leading to Detention
On August 24, 2009, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (“Department” received a referral alleging Meghan F. was physically abusing and neglecting Abigail (then three years old) and Allison (then two years old). The Department immediately reported the referral to the Sheriff’s Department. An emergency response social worker and a sheriff’s deputy promptly visited Mother’s home and observed that Allison had multiple bruises, some of them pinkish and others dark purple, on her head, face, back, chest, and legs. Allison’s upper lip and the area around her right cheek and eye were swollen, she had numerous bumps on her head, part of her right nipple appeared to have been scratched off, and the hair on the right side of her head was gone. Abigail and Allison were also infected with scabies. Abigail told the social worker and the sheriff’s deputy that Roger M., Mother’s live-in companion, had inflicted the injuries on Allison. Roger M. is not the father of Abigail or Allison. Abigail stated that Roger M. would always get mad and hit Allison on various parts of her body, and had pinched off Allison’s nipple. Abigail also told the sheriff’s deputy that Roger M. “jumped out the window and left” when the deputy and the social worker arrived at the home. Mother denied that she or Roger M. had abused Allison, and attributed Allison’s injuries to accidents.
The children’s maternal grandmother, who lived in the home, told the social worker that she was the person who alerted the Department, because she was disturbed that Allison had received repeated, serious injuries and Mother had given implausible explanations for the injuries. Abigail and Allison were taken into protective custody and the Department placed them into a foster home.
A physician who examined Allison at the hospital emergency room on August 24, 2010, indicated Allison had multiple contusions, in various states of healing, on her face, head, chest, legs, and back. The physician stated that he was highly suspicious of child abuse, because it was apparent Allison had been struck multiple times over a period of at least two to three weeks.
B. Detention
On August 27, 2009, the Department filed a petition under section 300 to declare Abigail and Allison dependent children of the juvenile court. The petition included an allegation that Allison had suffered severe abuse by Roger M. (§ 300, subd. (e).)^[2] The court ordered the children detained and continued the matter to September 4, 2009, for a pre-release investigation hearing for placement of Abigail and Allison with Linda A., a maternal aunt.
In a report for the September 4, 2009, pre-release investigation hearing, the Department recommended that Abigail and Allison be placed with Linda A. The Department further reported that Mother and Roger M. had been arrested and remained incarcerated. At the hearing, the juvenile court ordered Abigail and Allison detained with Linda A. at her home in Riverside County. On September 18, 2009, the Department removed the children from Linda A.’s care and placed them in the home of their paternal grandparents. On September 30, 2010, the Department filed an amended section 300 petition, including allegations of domestic violence by Mother and Roger M., substance abuse by Roger M., sexual abuse by Roger M. against Abigail,^[3] and Mother’s failure to protect Abigail from the sexual abuse.
C. Jurisdiction
On October 9, 2009, the Department submitted a report for the jurisdiction hearing. The Department reported that, in an interview conducted on September 28, 2009, Abigail told the social worker that Roger M. hit and kicked Allison in the presence of Mother. Abigail also told the social worker Roger M. kissed and licked Abigail’s buttocks, pressed his buttocks against hers, and put “his privacy on [Abigail’s] privacy.” Abigail told the social worker that she reported Roger M.’s conduct to Mother.
Because Mother’s attorney objected to any interview by the social worker with Mother, the Department’s report relied on information taken from recorded interviews between Mother and sheriff’s detectives and written reports of these interviews. In the interviews, Mother denied ever seeing Roger M. hit Allison but stated she had heard him slap Allison from another room on several occasions. Mother also stated that she stood between Roger M. and the children when Roger M. got mad, did not know what happened to Allison’s nipple, and had not noticed any bruises on Allison. Mother told the detectives that Roger M. had been diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder and he “could not handle” the children’s screaming.
In telephone interviews with the social worker, Roger M. admitted he injured Allison by hitting her on the buttocks when she kept screaming, and by grabbing her roughly out of her crib. Roger M. stated that Mother was present in the room several times when he hit Allison, she observed the bruises on Allison, and she told him that he should not hit the children. Roger M. stated he did not know what happened to Allison’s nipple or her hair. In an interview with sheriff’s detectives, Roger M. stated he had long fingernails, and the injury to Allison’s nipple must have occurred when he grabbed her. Roger M. also admitted he had applied pressure on Allison’s nipple with his long fingernails, and added that he had “anger issues.” A criminal background check revealed that Roger M. had numerous arrests for offenses involving violence and drugs.
In an interview with the social worker, the physician who examined Allison in the hospital emergency room on August 24, 2009, stated it was possible that Allison’s nipple was pulled off intentionally. Another physician who examined photographs depicting Allison’s injuries told sheriff’s detectives that the injuries could not have been sustained accidentally. The physician added that the injuries reflected “one of the worst cases of child abuse I have ever seen.”
The Department recommended the section 300 petition be sustained as to Abigail and Allison, without family reunification services for Mother in light of the allegations of severe physical abuse (§ 361.5 subd. (b)(5))^[4] and her current incarceration (§ 361.5, subd. (e)(1)).^[5]
In a report submitted to the juvenile court on November 10, 2009, the Department indicated Mother had been convicted of inflicting willful injury to a child under circumstances likely to produce great bodily harm or death (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)) and sentenced to a two-year prison term. Roger M. was convicted of the same charge, and had been sentenced to 14 years in the state prison. The Department recommended the section 300 petition be sustained as to Abigail and Allison with no reunification services for Mother or Roger M. On November 10, 2009, the juvenile court set the matter for a contested adjudication hearing.
D. Destiny
In April 2010, Mother gave birth to Destiny M. in the state prison. Destiny’s
father is Roger M. The Department detained Destiny in a foster home and filed a section 300 petition alleging Destiny was at risk of serious physical or emotional harm as a result of the abuse upon her sisters. The court ordered Destiny detained and set an arraignment hearing for April 15, 2010. On April 15, 2010, the court continued the arraignment hearing, as well as the contested jurisdiction hearing as to all three children to June 7, 2010.
E. Jurisdiction/Disposition
In a report for the jurisdiction and disposition hearing submitted on June 7, 2010, the Department recommended that the court deny family reunification services to Mother as to Destiny. On June 7, 2010, the juvenile court ordered Destiny detained in shelter care.
The jurisdiction hearing was conducted on July 28, 2010, Mother having waived her appearance.^[6] After the court received the Department’s various reports into evidence, counsel for Mother requested dismissal of the dependency petitions, urging there was insufficient evidence to support the allegations in the petitions. The court dismissed some of the counts in the petitions and sustained others, including the allegation of severe physical abuse in the petition regarding Abigail and Allison (§ 300, subd. (e)) and an allegation in the petition as to Destiny that her siblings had been abused. (§ 300, subd. (j).) The court proceeded to deny reunification services to all three parents. The court observed that Mother was currently incarcerated but would likely be released within a few months. The court explained, however, that it had sustained an allegation of severe sexual abuse pursuant to subdivision (e) of section 300, and found that reunification with Mother would not be in the best interest of any of the children. The court then set the matter for a hearing pursuant to section 366.26.
F. Writ Proceeding
On September 20, 2010, Mother filed a Petition for Extraordinary Writ. She challenged the juvenile court’s July 2010 jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (e) as well as the juvenile court’s disposition findings and order denying her family reunification services. On November 8, 2010, her petition was denied.
G. First Section 388 Petition
Mother was released from prison on October 6, 2010. She filed a section 388 petition requesting reunification services with all three children on November 15, 2010. For changed circumstances, she alleged that she had time to think about the mistakes she made that subjected her children to harm. She had participated in several programs while in prison that taught her how to protect the children and herself from future abuse, and she had been visiting the children as often as allowed after being released from prison. For the best interests of the children, Mother alleged that the least restrictive placement was always in the children’s best interests, that her children should not be denied the opportunity to have a relationship with her, and that she had been participating in treatment to protect herself and her children.
Mother attached a declaration to the petition explaining how the domestic violence with Roger M. lasted several weeks, and she did not know how to escape. She further explained that she ended her relationship with Roger M. and she has dedicated her life to building a better relationship with her children. She said that she has been exercising her best efforts to visit with all of her children as much as possible. The court denied a hearing as to Destiny, and granted a hearing for Abigail and Allison.
Abigail and Allison’s paternal grandparents said that the children were exhibiting negative behaviors after visits with their mother. Abigail cried in her sleep and was disrespectful. She also had nightmares and would say bad words. Allison also began to have nightmares and cry in her sleep after visiting Mother. She also said bad words and humped the bed.
The paternal grandparents remained committed to adopting Abigail and Allison, and Destiny’s foster mother remained committed to adopting Destiny.
H. Second Section 388 Petition Hearing and Section 366.36 Proceedings
On February 16, 2011, Mother filed another section 388 petition, this one regarding Destiny only, requesting reunification services. The petition was the same as her previous section 388 petition, but with additional contentions. She said that she had 14 visits with Destiny as of February 15, 2011. She detailed her interactions with Destiny. She always brought a bottle of peach juice to give Destiny. She tried feeding her baby food from a jar, but she did not seem to like it. She now brought snack puffs. Destiny loved them, but Mother would only give her the portion suggested for children her age. She also bought a Baby Einstein Classical Music Radio for Destiny, which she brought to visits and Destiny seemed to enjoy. She also brought her own diaper bag to visits, which included diapers, wipes, food, baby oral-gel for teething, a teething ring, a bottle with juice, and toys. She said that she was very bonded to Destiny, and Destiny was very bonded to her.
The juvenile court granted a hearing on the section 388 petition.
A February 21, 2011, progress report from Mother’s domestic violence program said Mother had attended 11 sessions and that she was doing a satisfactory job. A letter from Mother’s therapist stated that Mother was diagnosed with Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Anxiety and Depressed Mood. She had attended eight individual sessions and was showing some signs of progress.
Abigail’s therapist submitted a letter regarding Abigail and Mother’s visits and Abigail’s therapy sessions. He observed that Abigail engaged with Mother during the visit, and did not show any reluctance to interact with Mother.
I. Mother’s Testimony
Mother testified that the parenting class she took while incarcerated, and the parenting class she took after her release were extremely helpful. The classes taught her how to communicate effectively with her children. Mother also explained that domestic violence counseling was helping her learn how to avoid another domestic violence relationship. She said that Roger M. told her if she did not like how he was disciplining her children, she could leave. She knew she could have gone to a shelter, but felt she had nowhere to go. She said the physical fights she had with Roger M. occurred when she tried to protect her children. However, she failed to do anything to stop the abuse by Roger M.
Mother claimed she would do things differently than she had in the past. She said she was focused on doing what she needed to do to get her children back. She said she would have gone to a shelter instead of suffering abuse by Roger M. She felt she could protect herself and her children from a domestic violence relationship. She had no contact with Roger M. and no interest in a romantic relationship with anyone at the moment. She did not believe she was the same person today as she was when the case first came before the court. She took responsibility for her part in the abuse and admitted she chose Roger M. over the children.
Mother said she was working on many things in individual counseling, including opening up and expressing her feelings verbally, decreasing her anxiety, developing better coping skills, coping with childhood trauma, and discussing the domestic violence to her and her children in her relationship with Roger M.
Mother said that she had no contact with the children when she was incarcerated, but she did contact their social workers. Since her first visit with her children on November 10, 2010, she had not missed or canceled any visits. She was able to use her learning in her parenting skills classes during her visits with Allison. She also brought whatever foods Abigail and Allison wanted to their visits, as well as games and toys. The girls were reluctant to end the visits at times, and both called her “Mom.”
J. Testimony of Abigail’s therapist, Alex Garcia
Mr. Garcia is a Marriage and Family Therapist intern, supervised by a licensed therapist. He received Abigail’s case in October 2010, and saw her once a week. According to Abigail’s former therapist, Abigail was sexually abused by Roger M. He stated that this was the most severe trauma case he had ever dealt with.
Mr. Garcia had also seen Mother and Abigail for four or five conjoint therapy sessions. The goals of the sessions were for him to observe and determine the appropriateness and benefit of the interactions between Mother and Abigail. He wrote a letter in January 2011 indicating that Abigail told him she did not feel safe with Mother and was scared to live with her. Mother behaved appropriately and worked hard to show she made an effort to change. Throughout the conjoint sessions, Abigail became more engaged with Mother and smiled more often.
Faced with the question of whether or not the conjoint sessions with Abigail and Mother had been beneficial for Abigail, Mr. Garcia expressed concern with Abigail’s defiant behavior at school. He had not been able to pinpoint its cause. Either the day of the sessions or the day before, Abigail threw herself on the floor, threw her sweater in class, played in the restroom, talked back to the teacher, and disrupted other peers around her. These behaviors did not exist before Abigail had contact with Mother. He discussed the possibility that Abigail’s fear or uncertainty regarding Mother could be leading to her defiant behaviors at school. He did not believe it would have a detrimental effect on Abigail if visits were to stop completely. He said that Abigail felt safe in her current home, and loved her current caregivers. She had not expressed feelings of love for Mother, but she had been affectionate at the end of conjoint sessions.
K. Testimony of Allison’s therapist, Melissa Felix
Ms. Felix is a Marriage and Family Therapist intern supervised by a licensed therapist, and had been seeing Allison for therapy once a week since October 2010. The treatment goals were to reduce night terrors, defiant behaviors, and aggressive behaviors, such as hitting, biting, pinching, and spitting. Her progress on these goals was limited. She exhibited defiance and aggression during play therapy. She shared that Mother and Roger M. had hurt her, and that she was afraid of Mother. Ms. Felix believed Allison’s negative behaviors stemmed from the abuse she had suffered.
The first few conjoint sessions between Mother and Allison were difficult, and she displayed more defiant and aggressive behaviors. However, as the visits progressed Allison became more comfortable and began to look forward to visits with Mother. Mother began to take more of a parental role as the sessions went on.
When asked if the sessions were beneficial to Allison, she said they were if the case plan was to reunify. If there was no plan to reunify, further sessions were not recommended because it would confuse Allison. Ms. Felix observed that Allison felt safe with her caregivers, and there might be detriment if she was removed from their care. The relationship between Allison and her grandparents was a parental one.
L. Abigail’s Statements
Abigail did not qualify to testify, as she could not tell the difference between a lie and the truth. The court asked if anyone wished to be heard, and Mother’s attorney indicated he wanted to ask Abigail a few questions. The court asked if anyone objected to or felt uncomfortable about Abigail testifying, without being sworn. There were no objections. The court said it would weigh “whatever she says appropriately.”
Abigail said she was happy where she was living and that sometimes she was happy about visits with her mother. She did not know if she wanted to continue having visits with Mother. Abigail said that if she could live with anyone, she would live where she currently resided—with the grandmother. Abigail also testified that she did not think she might ever want to live with Mother.
M. The Court’s Findings and Orders Regarding Mother’s 388 Petitions
The court found that Mother had shown a change in circumstances, including admitting that she made a mistake. However, the court could not find it was in children’s best interests to grant Mother’s section 388 petitions. The court indicated that the children were very young and had been out of Mother’s custody for a long time. Though the therapists had good things to say about Mother, their testimony did not support Mother’s claim that it was in the children’s best interests to grant Mother services. The court found that the children were in stable homes and did not seem to want to be reunified with Mother.
The court noted Abigail was guarded and equivocal about Mother, and clear that she loved her grandmother and wanted to remain with her.
The court denied Mother’s section 388 petitions, concluding that the requests for reunification services were not in the children’s best interests.
N. The Juvenile Court’s Findings and Orders Under Section 366.26
The court considered the same testimony with regard to the 366.26 hearing. Mother requested a continuance of the hearing to conduct a bonding study, which the court denied. Mother also requested a continuance so that Abigail could testify further and Allison could testify. The court denied those requests.
The court conceded that Mother had regular visitation and contact with Abigail and Allison. The court also found that she was acting in a parental role, but that was not the issue. The issue was whether the termination of her relationship with them would be so detrimental that it would outweigh the children’s needs for permanence and stability. The court found the relationship between the children and Mother was not sufficiently significant.
With regard to Abigail’s statement, the juvenile court found that she did not seem to have much of a bond with Mother. Abigail did not know if she would be sad if she did not see Mother again.
The court found by clear and convincing evidence that Abigail and Allison were adoptable, terminated parental rights, and designated the paternal grandparents as the prospective adoptive parents.
On March 2, 2011, the juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights as to Destiny as well. The court noted that there was an insufficient parent-child bond to stop the termination of parental rights.
Mother appeals.
DISCUSSION
On appeal Mother contends the juvenile court erred when it denied her section 388 petitions and when it terminated her parental rights to Abigail, Allison, and Destiny. Her claims lack merit.
A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying the Section 388
Petitions.

A parent may file a petition in the juvenile court to vacate or modify a previous order on grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence. (§ 388, subd. (a).) The parent, however, must also show that the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child. (§ 388, subd. (d); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570; In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) The proper standard of review for an appeal of a section 388 petition is abuse of discretion. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.) In a dependency proceeding, a reviewing court will not disturb a trial court’s decision unless it exceeds “the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.” (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 421.)
Mother contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying her section 388 petitions. In her view, she clearly demonstrated at her hearings that granting her reunification services would serve her children’s best interests. As discussed below, the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied her petition.
Here, the lower court acknowledged Mother’s change in her circumstances. She had attended many parenting and domestic violence classes, had been released from prison, and had visited her children regularly. Nonetheless, the court concluded Mother had not demonstrated that the request for services would serve the children’s best interests.
In considering the children’s best interests requirement of the section 388 petition, the court looks to several factors. The first factor the court examines is the “seriousness of the reason for dependency in the first place” and the “reasons that problem was not overcome by the final review.” (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 531. (Kimberly F.) As the court observed in Kimberly F., “not all reasons for initial dependency jurisdiction are equal from the point of view of a child's interests.” For example, at one end of the spectrum is a parent who has sexually abused a child or a parent who loses custody because of drug abuse, and whose compliance is incomplete during the reunification period or is newly sober. At the other end of the spectrum is a parent who loses custody because the parental home is unclean. According to Kimberly F., the latter extreme is less serious and could likely be fully remedied prior to termination of parental rights, while the former examples of sexual abuse and drugs cases cannot. (Ibid. [“[W]e doubt that a parent who sexually abused his or her child could ever show a sufficient change of circumstances to warrant granting a section 388 motion”].)
The second important best interests factor the courts consider is “the strength of the parent-child and child-caretaker bonds and the time the child has been in the system in relationship to the parental bond. (Id. at p. 531) The bond between the parent-child “must be strong enough that it would be detrimental to terminate parental rights in a situation where adoption could otherwise be the permanent plan.” (Ibid at fn. 10.) The court then addressed the caretaker-child bond. “While the bond to the caretaker cannot be dispositive,” “the disruption of an existing psychological bond between dependent children and their caretakers is an extremely important factor bearing on any section 388 motion.” (Id. at p. 531)
The final factor the court examines is “the nature of the change, the ease by which the change could be brought about, and the reason the change was not made before bear on any such motion.” (Id.)
In the present case, the court did not abuse its discretion by considering the Kimberly F. factors and rejecting Mother’s petition. The problem leading to dependency was incredibly serious—closer to the sexual and drug abuse end of the spectrum than the “dirty home” end at issue in Kimberly F. The day the children were detained Allison had multiple bruises on her head, face, back, chest, and legs, all in various stages of healing. She had numerous bumps on her head, a swollen upper lip, cheek, and eye, and the hair on the right side of her head was missing. Part of her right nipple was gone. Allison and Abigail were also infected with scabies. Abigail alleged that Roger M. had sexually abused her. Evidence clearly demonstrates that (a) Mother was fully aware that Roger M. had been inflicting physical abuse on Allison over a period of at least several weeks, (b) she failed to protect Allison from the abuse or seek medical attention for Allison’s serious injuries, and (c) she denied that Allison was being abused. Moreover, the dependency situation continued because Mother was convicted and jailed for child cruelty.
Also the relative bonds between the minors and Mother were less than those they shared with the caretakers. Destiny has been with her caretaker, and potential adoptive parent, for her entire life. Destiny’s knowledge of her mother amounts to a single, one-hour visit a week. Clearly the caretaker-child bond is much stronger than the parent-child bond. At the date of the disposition hearing, Abigail was five years old and Allison was three years old. They had been removed from Mother’s custody for almost a year. Their therapists say that both children are well bonded to their prospective adoptive parents.
Finally, while Mother had made significant strides to show she had changed her circumstances, on balance, given the severity of the abuse and the amount of time these young children have been out of their mother’s care, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s section 388 petitions.
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Determination to
Terminate Mother’s Parental Rights.

Mother also challenges the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights. She does not, however, contest the court’s adoptability finding. Rather, she complains that the court erred in failing to apply the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) exception to the termination of parental rights. Mother claims that her regular contact with her children after her incarceration, as well as her substantial bonds with all her children, established the parent-child relationship exception.
Our review in the present case is dictated by the procedural posture of the dependency proceeding. “At the selection and implementation hearing held pursuant to section 366.26, a juvenile court must make one of four possible alternative permanent plans for a minor child.’ [Citation.]” (In re Ronell A. (1995) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368.) Here, reunification efforts never began, because the circumstances of the child abuse were so grave the court denied Mother reunification services. At this point, if “the child is adoptable, the court must select adoption unless it finds terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the child under at least one of five statutory exceptions. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)-(E); see also In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 401; In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal App.4th 823, 826.)” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.)
“Once reunification services are ordered terminated, the focus shifts to the needs of dependent children for permanency and stability. [Citation.] A section 366.26 hearing is designed to protect these children’s compelling rights to have a placement that is stable, permanent, and allows the caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the child. [Citation.] If, as in this case, the children are likely to be adopted, adoption is the norm. Further, the court must terminate parental rights and order adoption, unless one of the specified circumstances in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), provides a compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child. [Citation.]
“‘The specified statutory circumstances – actually, exceptions to the general rule that the court must choose adoption where possible – must be considered in view of the legislative preference for adoption when reunification efforts have failed.’ [Citation.] At this stage of the dependency proceedings, ‘it becomes inimical to the interests of the minor to heavily burden efforts to place the child in a permanent alternative home.’ [Citation.] The statutory exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation] to choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption.’ [Citation.]” (In re A.A. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1320; italics in original.) A single statutory exception is implicated in the present case: “where a parent has maintained regular visitation and contact with a child who would benefit from continuing that relationship (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)).” (Id. at p. 1324.)
The beneficial parental relationship exception requires the parent contesting the termination of parental rights to show both regular visitation and contact and the benefit to the child in maintaining the parent-child relationship.” (In re Helen W. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1039.) The language “benefit from continuing the relationship” has been interpreted “to mean ‘the relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.’” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.)
To determine if the beneficial parental relationship exception applies, “’the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated. [Citation.]” (In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 297.) “[I]f an adoptable child will not suffer great detriment by terminating parental rights, the court must select adoption as the permanency plan.” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 229.) “No one factor controls the court’s analysis. It is a balancing test.” (Id. at p.231.)
The fact of a parent’s regular visitation and development of a favorable, loving bond with the minor does not suffice to establish the parental relationship exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i)). “A parent must show more than frequent loving contact or pleasant visits. [Citation.] ‘Interaction between natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child. . . . . The relationship arises from day-to-day interaction, companionship, and shared experiences.’ [Citation.] The parent must show he or she occupies a parental role in the child’s life, resulting in a significant, positive, emotional attachment between child and parent. [Citations.] Further, to establish the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) exception the parent must show the child would suffer detriment if his or her relationship with the parent were terminated. [Citation.]” (In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 555, fn. omitted.)
We agree with the juvenile court’s assessment that the evidence did not establish the beneficial parent-child relationship exception in this case.
Mother visited the children after her release from prison. However, she was incarcerated for a large portion of the dependency proceeding, and during that time she did not contact her children. Her children are very young. The trial court repeatedly denied her requests for reunification services because the abuse that brought about the dependency proceeding was so severe. While the children’s therapists could not say that visits with Mother were unequivocally bad for the children, they did not observe a
parent-child bond between Mother and any of the children. Allison and Abigail became receptive to Mother and would play with her and Destiny eventually no longer cried at visits, but this evidence did not establish that the children are significantly emotionally bonded to Mother or that she occupied a parental role. Further, Abigail and Allison demonstrated some negative behaviors that may have resulted from visits with Mother. All three children are well settled in adoptive families. Their therapists testified that they are bonded to their caregivers. Mother failed to show that her parental rights outweighed giving these children stable, loving, permanent homes.
In sum, in view of all of the evidence in the record, we conclude the court did not err in failing to apply the parent-child relationship exception to the termination of parental rights.^[7]
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.

WOODS, Acting P. J.

We concur:

ZELON, J. JACKSON, J.



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