In re Sarah L.
Filed 9/29/10 In re Sarah L. CA4/1
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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COURT
OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
In re SARAH L. et al., Persons
Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN DIEGO
COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
NICHOLAS L.,
Defendant and Appellant.
D057019
(Super. Ct.
No. J517610A-D)
APPEAL from
judgments of the Superior Court
of San Diego
County, Carol Isackson, Judge.
Affirmed.
Nicholas L.
appeals judgments declaring his minor children Sarah L., Joshua L., Christa L.
and Nick L. (collectively, the minors) dependents of the juvenile court and
removing them from his custody. Nicholas
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's
jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders. We affirm the judgments.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
In 2003 the
San Diego County Health and Human Services
Agency (Agency) received a referral that the minors had witnessed domestic
violence between Nicholas and the minors' mother, Christina K.[1] Christina sought help at a domestic violence
shelter, got treatment and separated from Nicholas. Christina and Nicholas informally shared
custody of the minors, but had many custody
disputes. Nicholas eventually
obtained legal custody in family court.
In 2005
Christina contacted law enforcement
to report Nicholas hit Joshua with a belt as punishment for crying. Nicholas admitted he spanked Joshua with a
belt and grabbed him by the collar.
Nicholas promised not to use physical discipline in the future, agreed
to participate in therapy, and enrolled in parenting classes. After Christina reported the incident,
Nicholas prohibited her from visiting the minors. In 2007 Nicholas moved with the minors to Florida,
where they stayed for almost two years.
During this time the minors were unable to visit their mother.
Nicholas
continued to physically discipline Joshua by grabbing his neck, slamming him to
the floor, choking him and punching him in the ribs. Because Sarah felt powerless to stop
Nicholas's harsh treatment of Joshua, she became depressed and suicidal and
started cutting herself.
After
Nicholas and the minors returned to San Diego,
Christina located them and resumed visits with the minors. Nicholas's violence toward Joshua
continued. One night, while Christina
was visiting the minors in Nicholas's home, Nicholas forced her to have sex
with him. Nicholas left the bedroom door
open, allowing Sarah to hear her mother crying and saying "no." Sarah reacted by cutting her wrist with a
razor.
In
September 2009 Christina contacted Agency after Nicholas hit Nick in the mouth
with the back of his hand. Nick's mouth
was red and swollen, and he said it hurt. Nick and Christina reported Nick's mouth was
bleeding. The next day Sarah called the
police. The minors cried as they
explained what had happened to Nick, and said they wanted to live with
Christina. The minors were afraid that
Nicholas would hit them for reporting the incident.
Agency
social workers interviewed the family.
Nick said Nicholas hit him with a belt on several occasions, leaving
marks. Christa and Sarah reported
Nicholas hit Joshua, grabbed him by the shirt and pushed him up against a wall. Nicholas admitted hitting Nick, but claimed
he only lightly tapped him to get his attention. Nicholas denied forcing Christina to have sex
with him while the minors were home. He
also denied having a "no crying" rule. The minors believed they would not be safe at
home because Nicholas would be upset with them for talking to the social
workers.
Agency took
the minors into protective custody and filed petitions in the juvenile court
under Welfare and Institutions Code[2]
section 300, alleging Joshua and Nick had suffered, and were at substantial
risk of suffering, serious physical harm as a result of Nicholas's excessive
discipline and physical abuse (§ 300, subd. (a)); Sarah was suffering, or
was at substantial risk of suffering, serious emotional damage and there was no
parent capable of providing appropriate care for her (§ 300, subd. (c));
and the minors were at substantial risk of harm as a result of the abuse of
their siblings (§ 300, subd. (j).)[3] The court detained the minors in foster care
and ordered supervised visits for Nicholas.
The case
was reassigned to social worker Mark Hood, who interviewed the family before
the jurisdiction hearing. Nicholas
denied physically abusing Joshua, stating he only threatened his children to
get their attention. Sarah said she
stopped cutting herself. Joshua denied
recent physical abuse. Christa could not
remember any physical abuse of her brothers other than one incident involving
Joshua. Christa and Joshua said they
were not afraid of Nicholas. Nick said
visits with Nicholas went well. Based on
this information, Hood recommended the court dismiss the petitions and return
the minors to Nicholas's custody.
However, counsel for the minors objected to this recommendation, and the
court set the matter for a contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing.
In the
meantime, Nicholas completed a parenting class and participated in individual
therapy. Christa and Joshua attended
supervised visits with Nicholas, but then refused to have contact with him. Conjoint therapy sessions between Nicholas
and Joshua were cancelled after Joshua consistently became ill during the
scheduled appointment time.
Shortly
before trial, Hood reassessed the case, noting the minors wanted to live with
Christina, and the three older children refused to have contact with
Nicholas. Hood now recommended the court
sustain the allegations of the petitions, remove the minors from Nicholas's
custody and order reunification services.
At a
contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing in February and March 2010,
10-year-old Christa testified Nicholas had strict rules, including not allowing
her to be in the kitchen or have access to the refrigerator. If any of the children broke a rule, Nicholas
would get upset, yell, and hit Joshua or Nick.
Christa saw Nicholas hit, grab and choke Joshua on three occasions. When Nicholas occasionally spanked Christa,
it burned. Christa did not want to live
with Nicholas or have unsupervised visits because she was afraid of him. She did not want to have supervised visits
with him because he made negative comments about her siblings.
Christa's
therapist, Shameka Curtis, testified she was addressing Christa's mild anxiety
regarding Nicholas. Christa disclosed
she was afraid for her safety, feared Nicholas would treat her like he treated
Sarah, and was worried that Nicholas would hit Nick if he were returned home.
Sixteen-year-old
Sarah testified she felt constant stress when she lived with Nicholas. He frequently insulted her, made demeaning
comments, and threatened to play cruel mind games with her. Nicholas imposed many restrictions on the
minors, such as prohibiting them from playing at friends' homes or having
friends come to their home. Nicholas
monitored the minors' telephone calls and did not allow them to whisper to each
other.
Sarah said
Nicholas hit or punched Nick in the chest, back and legs whenever Nick wet the
bed. Although Nicholas never hit her,
Sarah was sure he would do so if he got really upset. Sarah cried when Nicholas hit Joshua or
Nick. When she complained to Nicholas
about his treatment of the boys, he would forbid her to talk to anyone for
three days. Because Sarah felt powerless
when Nicholas hit the boys, she started pinching and cutting herself as a way
to avoid crying.
Sarah
refused to have contact with Nicholas because she worried he would try to
manipulate and control her. She feared
Nicholas's behavior would escalate if she and her siblings were returned home.
Thirteen-year-old
Joshua testified about the physical abuse Nicholas inflicted on him for many
years, including lifting him by the collar or neck, slamming his head to the
floor, choking him, slapping him in the face and punching him in the chest,
shoulder and arm. When Sarah called the
police after Nicholas hit Nick in the mouth, Joshua was afraid Nicholas would
get upset and become physically violent.
Joshua worried that Nicholas would blame him for the court's
involvement. Joshua was afraid to live
with Nicholas, and refused to go to an unsupervised visit with him because he
did not feel safe.
Donald
Jaszewski, Joshua and Nick's therapist, testified that Nick had not disclosed
much about physical abuse in the home, other than to say Nicholas was sometimes
mean. Jaszewski was treating Joshua for
anxiety and depression. Joshua felt
intimidated by Nicholas, who physically abused him and called him names. Joshua felt unsafe because of the violence. Visits with Nicholas made Joshua feel
anxious. Two conjoint therapy sessions
between Joshua and Nicholas did not go well.
Social
worker Hood testified he initially recommended the court dismiss the dependency
petitions so Agency could offer Nicholas voluntary services. Hood recently learned the details of the
physical abuse that occurred. The older
children refused to visit Nicholas.
Sarah wanted to remain out of Nicholas's care, and Josh, Christa and
Nick wanted to live with Christina. Hood
changed his recommendation, and now believed the court should assume
jurisdiction and remove the minors from Nicholas's custody.
Nicholas
testified he did not have a rule that the minors could not cry or whisper to
each other. He denied calling the
children names, but admitted he occasionally cursed at Joshua. Nicholas admitted holding Joshua against a
wall, and hitting, pushing and shoving him as a form of discipline. He admitted those actions were not
appropriate. Nicholas denied physically
disciplining Sarah or Christa. When he
"popped" Nick in the mouth, it did not cause any swelling or redness.
After
considering the evidence and argument of counsel, the court sustained the
allegations of the petitions, declared the minors dependents and removed them
from Nicholas's custody. The court
placed Sarah in foster care and placed the other minors with Christina.
DISCUSSION
I
Nicholas
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's
jurisdictional findings that: (1) Joshua and Nick suffered or were at risk of
suffering serious physical harm as a result of Nicholas's use of corporal
punishment (§ 300, subd. (a)); (2) Sarah was seriously emotionally
disturbed or at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional harm
(§ 300, subd. (c)); or (3) the minors were at substantial risk of harm as
a result of the abuse of their siblings (§ 300, subd. (j)).
A
Standard of Review
In
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, we consider the entire
record to determine whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's
findings. Evidence is
"substantial" if it is " 'reasonable, credible, and of solid
value.' " (In re S.A. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th
1128, 1140, citation omitted.) We do not
pass on the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the
evidence, or weigh the evidence. Instead,
we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, view the record
favorably to the juvenile court's order and affirm the order even if other
evidence supports a contrary finding. (
52-53; In re Baby Boy L. (1994) 24
Cal.App.4th 596, 610.) The appellant has
the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature
to support the order. (
947.)
B
Findings
Joshua and Nick
Section
300, subdivision (a) provides a jurisdictional basis for the court when:
"The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk
that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally
upon the child by the child's parent . . . .
For the purposes of this subdivision, a court may find there is a
substantial risk of serious future injury based on the manner in which a less
serious injury was inflicted, a history of repeated inflictions of injuries on
the child or the child's siblings, or a combination of these and other actions
by the parent . . . which indicate the child is at risk of serious physical
harm. . . ." The statute excludes
from the category of serious physical harm "reasonable and age-appropriate
spanking to the buttocks where there is no evidence of serious physical
injury." (Ibid.)
In enacting
section 300, the Legislature intended to protect children who are currently
being abused or neglected, "and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical
and emotional well-being of children who
are at risk of that harm." (§
300.2, emphasis added.) The court need
not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction
and take the steps necessary to protect the child. (In re
Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 194-196; In re Michael S. (1981) 127 Cal.App.3d 348, 357-358.) The focus of section 300 is on averting harm
to the child. (In re Jamie M. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 530, 536.)
Here, the
evidence showed Nicholas used excessive discipline on Joshua by grabbing him by
the neck, lifting him by the neck or shirt collar, scratching him, slamming his
head to the floor, choking him, slapping him in the face, and punching him in
the chest, ribs, shoulder and arm. The
physical abuse caused Joshua to have scratches, soreness and bruises. As to Nick, the evidence showed Nicholas hit
him in the mouth, causing redness, swelling and bleeding. Nicholas also hit Nick with a belt, leaving
marks. These repeated incidents and
resulting harm were not within the range of legally acceptable punishment, and
thus, were sufficiently serious to support the court's exercise of jurisdiction
under section 300, subdivision (a). (See
In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th
1426, 1439.)
Nicholas
asserts the minors' accounts of physical abuse were inconsistent and
unreliable. He is essentially asking us
to reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile
court. This we cannot do. (In re
Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 53.) The court expressly found the testimony of
Joshua, Sarah and Christa, all of whom described the abuse inflicted by
Nicholas, was reliable. The court also
considered, but rejected, Nicholas's testimony that the physical discipline he
used did not result in serious injury to Joshua or Nick. In this regard, we defer to the trial court,
having no power to judge the effect, value or weight of the evidence, consider
the credibility of witnesses or resolve conflicts in the evidence. (In re
S.A., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 1140; In re Rubisela E. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 177, 194.) "We review a cold record and, unlike a
trial court, have no opportunity to observe the appearance and demeanor of the
witnesses." (In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 199-200.)
In any
event, substantial evidence supports the court's jurisdictional findings that
Joshua and Nick were at substantial risk of serious physical harm inflicted
nonaccidentally by Nicholas. Although
"the past infliction of physical harm by a [parent], standing alone, does
not establish a substantial risk of physical harm," evidence of past
conduct may be probative of current conditions if there is some reason to
believe these acts may continue in the future.
(In re Rocco M. (1991) 1
Cal.App.4th 814, 824.)
The
evidence here showed Nicholas physically dominated and intimidated Joshua and
Nick. He threatened to "knock
[Joshua] out," and repeatedly used excessive physical discipline for
relatively minor transgressions, such as when Joshua failed to put away boxing
gloves, when Joshua got bad grades in school, or when Nick repeated the word
"Mom" to get his mother's attention.
Consequently, Joshua and Nick were afraid to live with Nicholas.
Further,
when Agency investigated allegations of physical abuse in 2005, Nicholas
promised to refrain from using physical discipline, agreed to participate in
therapy, and enrolled in parenting classes.
However, the pattern of abuse continued and even escalated, permitting a
reasonable inference that Nicholas's violent acts may continue in the future
because he had not learned and applied appropriate disciplinary techniques and
effective communication skills. (See
1163, 1169 [a parent's past conduct is a good predictor of future behavior].) As the juvenile court found, Nicholas
minimized his use of physical discipline and lacked awareness of the impact his
behavior had on the minors. From this,
the court could reasonably find the manner in which Nicholas used corporal
punishment constituted excessive force and placed Joshua and Nick at
substantial risk of serious future injury.
(§ 300, subd. (a).)
C
Finding
Under Section 300, Subdivision (c) as to Sarah
Nicholas
contends the evidence was insufficient to support the court's finding under
section 300, subdivision (c) that Sarah was seriously emotionally disturbed or
was at risk of serious emotional damage.
He asserts that at the time of the jurisdiction hearing, Sarah was a
bright, independent and well-adjusted 16-year-old, who was not experiencing any
emotional problems other than mild depression and anxiety.
Section
300, subdivision (c) provides a basis for juvenile court jurisdiction if
"[t]he child is suffering serious emotional damage, or is at substantial
risk of suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety,
depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others,
as a result of the conduct of the parent or guardian or who has no parent or
guardian capable of providing appropriate care. . . ." Under this provision, juvenile court
intervention is appropriate when: (1) Agency can show parental fault, which
caused the emotional harm; or (2) the child is suffering serious emotional
damage through no fault of the parent, but the parent is unable to provide
appropriate care. (In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 329, 330 [court
properly assumed jurisdiction under § 300, subd. (c) where minor was suffering
serious emotional damage due to deplorable conditions in the home and minor had
no parent capable of providing appropriate care].)
In making
its jurisdictional findings, the court must determine "whether
circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the minor to the defined risk
of harm." (In re Rocco M., supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 824, italics
omitted.) As we previously noted, the
court may consider past events when determining whether a child presently needs
the juvenile court's protection, as long as there is some reason to believe the
acts may continue in the future. (
1127, 1135, disapproved on another ground in Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 748, fn. 6;
The
petition filed on behalf of Sarah alleged she had an emotional disorder or
disability requiring mental health treatment, and she had no parent capable of
providing appropriate care. The evidence
showed Sarah was depressed and suicidal, and she began pinching and cutting
herself because she felt powerless to prevent Nicholas from physically abusing
Joshua. Sarah engaged in these behaviors
as a way to express her feelings because Nicholas discouraged her from
crying. On one occasion, Sarah cut her
wrist with a razor as a way to cope when Nicholas forced Christina to have sex
with him. Sarah was under constant
stress as a result of Nicholas's unreasonably rigid rules and his frequent
insults, demeaning comments and threats to play cruel mind games with her. Nicholas was not a parent who was capable of
providing Sarah with appropriate mental health care.
At the time
of the jurisdiction hearing Sarah was no longer cutting herself. However, she had ongoing symptoms of
depression, and recently told her psychiatrist she felt "really
horrible" and wondered if life was worth living. Sarah's most recent diagnosis was major
depressive disorder, and her psychiatrist recommended psychotropic medication
to manage symptoms, which included depression, anxiety, insomnia and
nightmares, binging on food and smoking marijuana. Contrary to Nicholas's characterization of
Sarah, this was not a well-adjusted teenager who simply wanted to gain
independence from her parents. (Cf.
1373, 1377-1378, 1380 [insufficient evidence to support finding under § 300,
subd. (c) where minor was healthy, never engaged in self-destructive behavior
and had no diagnosis of a mental disorder].)
Moreover,
Nicholas had a poor track record of complying with services designed to protect
his children. Although Nicholas promised
to forego using corporal punishment on the minors, participated in therapy and
attended a parenting class, he continued to physically abuse Joshua and Nick. He has never acknowledged Sarah's serious
emotional problems, and he denied calling her names, belittling her or
discouraging her from expressing her emotions in a healthy way. Based on this evidence, the juvenile court
could reasonably find Nicholas would not follow through with mental health
treatment for Sarah. Substantial
evidence supports the court's findings as to Sarah under section 300,
subdivision (c).
D
Findings
Under Section 300, Subdivision (j)
Nicholas
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence under section 300, subdivision (j)
to support the court's findings the minors were currently at substantial risk
of harm as a result of the abuse of their siblings. He asserts the minors were not siblings of an
abused child, and were not at risk of being abused.
Section 300,
subdivision (j) provides a basis for juvenile court jurisdiction where
"[t]he child's sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined in
subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e) or (i), and there is a substantial risk that the
child will be abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions." In determining the risk of abuse or neglect
to the sibling, the court looks to factors such as the circumstances and nature
of the abuse or neglect, the sibling's age and gender, the abusive parent's
mental condition, and any other factors the court considers probative as to
whether there is a substantial risk to the sibling. (§ 300, subd. (j); In re Maria R. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th
48, 64-65 [court has great latitude, under any of the enumerated subdivisions,
to exercise jurisdiction as to a child whose sibling has been found to have
been abused]; In re Joshua J. (1995)
39 Cal.App.4th 984, 994.)
As we
previously concluded, substantial evidence supports the court's jurisdictional
findings that Joshua and Nick had been abused within the meaning of section
300, subdivision (a). Thus, each of the
minors qualifies as a sibling of an abused child under section 300, subdivision
(j). The evidence also supports a
finding there is a substantial risk that each of the minors will be abused or
neglected based on Nicholas's physical abuse of Joshua and Nick. Although Nicholas had made progress in
individual therapy and claimed he would no longer use corporal punishment, he
continued to minimize his use of physical violence, both toward the minors and
Christina, and he lacked insight as to the impact his behavior had on the
minors. Thus, substantial evidence
supports a finding Joshua and Nick remained at risk of further abuse under
section 300, subdivision (j).
Sarah and
Christa were also at risk of physical abuse by Nicholas. Although Sarah reported Nicholas had not hit
her, she described how he berated, controlled and threatened her. She was confident that he would resort to
physically abusing her if sufficiently provoked. Consequently, Sarah lived in fear, became
depressed, and engaged in self-destructive behaviors to cope. The evidence showed Nicholas had spanked
Christa, using force that caused the spanking to "burn." Christa's fear of being hit by Nicholas was
also grounded in having seen him hit her brothers when he became angry. Based on the circumstances and nature of
Nicholas's use of physical punishment, and his failure to fully accept
responsibility for it, a reasonable inference could be drawn that without court
intervention, Nicholas's mistreatment of Sarah and Christa would escalate to
physical abuse. Substantial evidence
supports the court's findings as to Sarah and Christa under section 300,
subdivision (j).
II
Nicholas
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's dispositional
orders removing the minors from his custody.
He asserts there was no clear and convincing evidence of substantial
danger to the minors' safety, given his expressed remorse and participation in
voluntary services.
A
Standard of Review
Before the
court may order a child physically removed from his or her parent, it must
find, by clear and convincing evidence, the child would be at substantial risk
of harm if returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the child
can be protected without removal. (§
361, subd. (c)(1); In re Kristin H.
(1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1654.) The
court can also remove from parental custody a child who is suffering severe
emotional damage, and there are no reasonable means by which the child's
emotional health may be protected without removal. (§ 361, subd. (c)(3).) The jurisdictional findings constitute prima facie evidence the child cannot
safely remain in the home. (§ 361, subd.
(c)(1).)
The
juvenile court has broad discretion in making dispositional orders to protect a
child's best interests. (
1166, 1179.) The parent need not be
dangerous, and the child need not have been actually harmed before removal is
appropriate. The focus of the statute is
on averting harm to the child. (
at p. 1136; In re Jamie M., supra, 134
Cal.App.3d at p. 536.) We review the
court's dispositional findings for substantial evidence. (In re
Kristin H., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1654.)
B
Substantial Evidence Supports the Court's Dispositional Orders
At
disposition, the court ordered the minors removed from Nicholas's custody,
placed Joshua, Nick and Christa with Christina, and placed Sarah in foster
care. The court's removal orders were
based on findings that Joshua and Nick had suffered, and were at substantial
risk of suffering, serious physical harm as a result of Nicholas's excessive
discipline and physical abuse; Sarah was suffering, or was at substantial risk
of suffering, serious emotional damage and there was no parent capable of
providing appropriate care for her; and the minors were at substantial risk of
harm as a result of the abuse of their siblings. (§ 300, subds. (a), (c) & (j).) As we already concluded, substantial evidence
supports these findings.
The
evidence also showed the minors would be at substantial risk of harm if
returned home because Nicholas had not yet shown, despite his claims to the
contrary, that he would use proper disciplinary techniques. Nicholas maintained he never choked Joshua to
punish him for using a cell phone, and he denied punching Joshua. He characterized his use of corporal
punishment as "strict discipline," as getting the boys' attention,
and as roughhousing. From this, the
court could reasonably infer Nicholas did not believe his actions were
inappropriate, and thus, he would continue to physically abuse the minors. (See In
re S.A., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 1140.)
As to Sarah,
the evidence showed she had a diagnosis of major depressive disorder, a history
of cutting herself, and she had recently expressed suicidal ideation. Nicholas denied calling her names or
otherwise emotionally abusing her, thus supporting a finding he would not
provide her appropriate mental health treatment were she returned to his care.
Further,
Sarah refused to have any contact with Nicholas because she was afraid he would
continue to manipulate and control her.
Christa and Joshua were also afraid of Nicholas and did not want to be
alone with him, even for a visit. (Cf.
282, 286, 288-289 [minor did not fear her parents, who expressed remorse for
using excessive physical discipline on her, and she wanted to go home].) The court considered evidence that Nicholas
was making progress in therapy, as well as Nicholas's testimony denying and
minimizing the physical abuse, and found Nicholas still lacked awareness of the
impact of his behavior on the minors.
Substantial evidence supports the court's findings the minors would be
at substantial risk of harm if returned home, and there were no reasonable
means by which the minors could be protected without removing them from
Nicholas's custody.
DISPOSITION
The judgments
are affirmed.
NARES, J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE,
Acting P. J.
IRION,
J.
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[1] Christina has not appealed.
[2] Statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.
