Mendoza v. United Air Lines

Filed 8/5/09 Mendoza v. United Air Lines CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

Appellant Louisa Mendoza (Mendoza) brought suit against respondents United Air Lines, Inc. (United) and Tish DeVere (DeVere) after her employment was terminated. The trial court granted United and DeVeres motion for judgment pursuant to a settlement by proposed order. (Code Civ. Proc.,[1] 664.6.) On appeal, Mendoza appears in propria persona to challenge both the signing of the proposed order and the granting of the underlying motion itself. We affirm the judgment.[2]

I. FACTS

Mendoza was an employee of United. In 2001, she suffered physical injuries that rendered her an individual with a disability. She continued to work in her position until January 2003, when United expressed concern that because of her injury, she might be unable to perform her work tasks. Two months later, Mendoza met with DeVere, Uniteds human resources manager. At that time, Mendozas employment with United was terminated because of her disability.

Mendoza brought this suit against United and DeVere[3] in March 2005, alleging causes of action for failure to accommodate; failure to engage in a good faith interactive process on accommodations; retaliatory termination; wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Gov. Code, 12900-12996.) In an October 2006 mediation, the parties reached agreement on many issues but were unable to resolve the amount of damages. In November 2006, United circulated a revised settlement agreement. For a year and a half, the parties discussed minor modifications to the agreement. Mendoza never signed a final settlement agreement.

On May 1, 2008, United filed a motion for judgment enforcing the proposed agreement. ( 664.6.) Mendoza submitted partial opposition to the motion on May 13, 2008, stating that she did not oppose finalizing the settlement, but that she had not yet agreed to all of its terms. She listed changes that she would make to the agreement. United accepted all of Mendozas proposed changes and asked that they be incorporated into the settlement agreement. The trial court issued a tentative ruling indicating that it would grant Uniteds motion for judgment on those terms. Mendoza did not appear to contest the tentative ruling, which automatically became the final ruling the next court day. (Rule 3.1308(a).)

As the trial court directed, United sent a proposed order consistent with that ruling to the trial judge and to Mendozas counsel on July 11, 2008. Five days later, Mendozas counsel filed a notice of objection to the proposed order. In it, he stated that Mendoza might have objections to the proposed order, that she was then reviewing the document, and that she would inform her counsel within 24 hours of her specific objections. On July 29, 2008, almost two weeks later, Mendozas counsel sent the trial judge a letter stating that Mendoza had reviewed the documents and would be transmitting any additional proposed changes to the agreement to United.[4] When no specific objection to the proposed order was received by August 8, 2008, the trial judge accepted Uniteds proposed order. Notice of entry of this order was soon given.

II. GRANTING OF MOTION

Mendoza challenges the substance of the trial courts order granting Uniteds underlying motion. She waived her right to challenge the merits of the trial courts decision. A trial courts tentative ruling will become the ruling of that court if the parties do not give notice of intent to appear and contest the tentative ruling. (Rule 3.1308(a)(1).) Mendoza did not give notice of her intent to appear to challenge the tentative ruling. Therefore, that tentative ruling granting Uniteds section 664.6 motion, automatically became the ruling of the court. (Rule 3.1308(a)(1).)

Typically, an appellate court will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been made, but was not, in the trial court. (Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184-185, fn. 1; Boyle v. CertainTeed Corp. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 645, 649.) The waiver doctrine is intended to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so trial courts have the opportunity to correct or avoid them. (See People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1023.) Because Mendoza failed to give any notice of intent to contest the tentative ruling, she waived her right to challenge that ruling.

III. SIGNING OF ORDER

Mendoza also contends that the trial court abused its discretion by signing the proposed order formalizing its ruling granting Uniteds motion to enforce the settlement agreement. ( 664.6.) She claims the trial court deprived her of the right to litigate her claims. She asserts that she was unaware of the contents of the proposed order and was not afforded the requisite time to review and propose changes to it. Mendoza asks that the proposed order be rescinded or amended.

Mendoza has not preserved this issue for appeal. An opposing party has five days to notify the prevailing party whether or not the proposed order is approved. The party must state reasons for disapproval; the failure to do so within the time required shall be deemed an approval. (Rule 3.1312(a).) Mendoza had ample opportunity to review the proposed order, but did not assert specific objections to it in the trial court. Mendozas notice of objection stated only that she may have concerns, without detailing any of them. Almost a month after the proposed order was sent out, Mendoza still had not detailed her objections to it. Suggesting that she may have objections without a specific objection does not constitute a sufficient notice of objection.

Under these circumstances, without a specific objection, the trial judge was required to deem Mendozas failure to provide adequate notice of objection as approval of the proposed order. (Rule 3.1312(a).) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in signing and entering the proposed order.

Assuming that we could overcome this procedural hurdle, Mendozas claim of error would also fail on the merits. On appeal, we evaluate a trial judges decision to sign an order memorializing an earlier ruling for an abuse of discretion. (Estate of Ockerlander (1961) 195 Cal.App.2d 185, 188.) We will overturn the trial courts ruling only on a showing of a miscarriage of justice. (Estate of Gilkison (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1449.) Discretion is only abused when the trial courts action exceeds the bounds of reason. The burden is on Mendozaas the party alleging an abuse of discretionto show a blatant case of abuse that clearly appears to effect injustice. (See Dorman v. DWLC Corp. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1808, 1815.)

The trial court had evidence to support its implied finding that Mendoza knew of the content of the proposed order. That order with the settlement agreement attached were mailed to Mendozas counsel on July 11, 2008. Her counsel twice reported that Mendoza was reviewing the proposed order. On these facts, the trial court properly inferred that Mendoza was aware of the contents of the proposed order.

The judgment is affirmed.

_________________________

Reardon, Acting P.J.

We concur:

_________________________

Sepulveda, J.

_________________________

Rivera, J.

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[1] All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.

[2] Mendoza assumes that the order granting Uniteds motion for judgment pursuant to settlement constitutes a judgment. Whether this is so is unclear. In her opening brief, Mendoza failed to explain why that order is appealable. This omission violated California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(B) (hereafter rules). United made no objection to this omission in its brief. While the orders language that judgment shall be entered may be construed to command a future act, we will construe the order as a judgment, thus rendering it appealable. (See 904.1, subd. (a)(1).)

[3] For convenience, we hereafter refer to both respondents as United.

[4] The letter is not included in the clerks transcript, but was submitted as an exhibit to Mendozas opening brief. Mendoza also referenced the letter in the proposed order that she filed August 15, 2008.