P. v. Laurie
Filed 8/19/09 P. v. Laurie CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yolo)
----
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EARL WAYNE LAURIE, Defendant and Appellant. | C058499 (Super. Ct. No. 072826) |
Defendant Earl Wayne Laurie pleaded no contest to transportation of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11379, subd. (a)--count one) and cultivation of marijuana (id., 11358--count three), and admitted a prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, 667, subd. (b)-(i)), in exchange for dismissal of other charges and an agreement that he would be sentenced to state prison for a term of four years (the low term on count one doubled based on his strike, with a concurrent sentence on count three). The trial court sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement.
According to evidence presented at the preliminary examination, defendant was stopped by a sheriffs deputy because he was driving a pickup truck with a license plate that was obstructed by a tow hitch ball. Methamphetamine and marijuana plants were discovered during a consensual search of the vehicle. Defendant had a prior conviction for first degree burglary.
Defendant made a motion to suppress the evidence at his preliminary examination, which was denied. In addition, prior to entering his plea, defendant made three separate Marsden (People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118) motions, seeking to have his appointed attorney relieved and to substitute alternate appointed counsel. The first two motions were denied following in camera hearings. Following the second hearing, defendants request to represent himself was granted, although counsel was reappointed at the next hearing pursuant to defendants request. Defendant withdrew the third Marsden motion prior to entering his plea
Defendant appealed.
We appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and requests this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We granted appellate counsels request to have his original opening brief stricken, which raised an issue concerning the erroneous imposition of a drug program fee that was subsequently addressed by the trial court.
Defendant was advised by counsel of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief.
Defendant filed a supplemental brief, challenging the validity of the search of his truck based on the legality of the stop. He also contends the trial court erred by denying his Marsden motions and by failing to order pretrial disclosure of car camera evidence in his case.
As to the last two of these claims, they are not cognizable on appeal because a certificate of probable cause is required to appeal from a plea of guilty or no contest (Pen. Code, 1237.5), except if the appeal is from a denial of a motion to suppress or is based on [g]rounds that arose after entry of the plea and do not affect the pleas validity. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(4)(1)(A) & (B).) Defendant did not obtain a certificate of probable cause and, consequently, his pretrial Marsden and discovery claims are not subject to review on appeal. (Cf. People v. Vera (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 970, 978 [review of post-plea Marsden permissible without certificate of probable cause].)
With regard to his motion to suppress, defendant maintains that, as the deputy sheriff who made the stop was able to read the entire number and the registration tags on his license plate despite the presence of the tow hitch ball, there was no basis for the officer to detain him.
The deputy sheriff who conducted the search testified that his attention was initially drawn to defendants truck because the rear license plate was obstructed by a tow hitch ball, in violation of Vehicle Code section 5201, and that he initiated a traffic stop based on this observation. Photographs of the vehicle admitted at the preliminary hearing showed that the center number on defendants license plate was obstructed by the tow hitch ball. The deputy acknowledged that the number behind the tow hitch ball appear[ed] to be a 1 and that, [b]y the way it look[ed], that was the only number it could be.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress, noting that the test for a violation of Vehicle Code section 5201 is whether there is any blockage of the license plate, not what a particular deputy is able to see. The trial court was correct.
Vehicle Code section 5201 requires that a license plate be mounted in a position so as to be clearly visible and be maintained in a condition so as to be clearly legible. The words clearly visible are unambiguous. Visible means capable of being seen, perceptible to vision, exposed to view, conspicuous. [Citation.] The term clearly means free from obscurity . . . unmistakable . . . unhampered by restriction or limitation. [Citation.] In using the phrase clearly visible in Vehicle Code section 5201, it is apparent that the Legislature meant a license plate must not be obstructed in any manner and must be entirely readable. A license plate mounted in a place that results in it being partially obstructed from view by a trailer hitch ball violates Vehicle Code section 5201 and, thus, provides a law enforcement officer with a lawful basis upon which to detain the vehicle and hence its driver. (People v. White (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1022, 1026.) In White, the appellate court concluded that a vehicle stop based on Vehicle Code section 5201 was lawful when the lower half of the middle number on the defendants license plate was blocked by a tow ball. (Ibid.) The circumstances of defendants detention are indistinguishable.
Defendant claims that if the deputy sheriff was able to read the license plate, there was no violation of the law and that [a]n officer must have a belief that a law is being broken to make a stop. We reject this claim. [T]he decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. (Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 810 [135 L.Ed.2d 89, 95].) The obstruction to defendants license plate by the tow hitch ball constituted a traffic law violation regardless of whether the deputy sheriff was able to figure out the numbers on the license plate. Thus, the deputy made a legal traffic stop, and the consensual search of defendants truck following this stop was proper.
Having undertaken an examination of the entire record in this matter, we find no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
HULL, J.
We concur:
SCOTLAND , P. J.
RAYE , J.
Publication Courtesy of California free legal resources.
Analysis and review provided by Spring Valley Property line attorney.
