P. v. Gaeta

Filed 12/22/09 P. v. Gaeta CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Lance A. Ito, Judge. Affirmed.

Charlotte E. Costan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey and Mary Sanchez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

A jury convicted Christopher Gaeta (defendant) of first degree murder. (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a).)[1] In a bifurcated proceeding, defendant admitted that he had suffered a prior conviction for a serious or violent felony under the Three Strikes law ( 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)), and had served a prior prison term for that conviction ( 667, subd. (a), 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for a term of 55 years to life.

On appeal, defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial error by: (1) denying his request for a mistrial after a witness volunteered a purportedly prejudicial statement; (2) admitting evidence of defendants membership in a gang; (3) admitting evidence of one incident of domestic violence against a woman other than the victim; and (4) admitting evidence of defendants threats against his father and brother. Defendant also contends that there was insufficient evidence of deliberation and premeditation to support the first degree murder conviction. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Ana Flores (Ana) testified that in 2001, she was living with her sister Claudia Flores (Claudia).[2] At the time, Claudia was dating defendant, who was living with his parents Manuel Gaeta (Manuel) and Connie Gaeta (Connie). In May 2001, Claudia told Ana that she was pregnant[3] and had decided to move in with defendant and his parents. Ana testified that defendant and Claudia appeared excited about the pregnancy. Lisa Hammer (Lisa), defendants sister, however, testified that defendant appeared as though he did not want the baby and was scared to have a child. In early June 2001, Ana received a telephone call from Claudia. She could hear Claudia crying and defendant instructing Claudia to hang up.

Manuel testified that on June 8, 2001, defendant told him that defendant had killed Claudia earlier that day by drowning her in the Gaetas backyard swimming pool. Manuel went into his backyard and saw something that appeared to be a human body wrapped up in a painters canvas. Defendant asked Manuel to help him dispose of Claudias body. Manuel left without saying anything and did not return home until that evening. The next morning, Manuel went into the backyard and saw that the body was gone. Defendant told Manuel that he had gotten rid of the body with the assistance of a person named Beck.

On June 10, 2001, defendant told Ana that he and Claudia had an argument that Claudia decided to end the relationship, and that Claudia moved away.

On June 13, 2001, Bryan McDaniels (Bryan), met with defendant and saw a small bruise underneath his right eye.[4] Bryan asked defendant about Claudia, and defendant told him that Claudia had ended the relationship and had moved away. Also on that date, Mirna Alarcon (Mirna), Claudias older sister, met with defendant to inquire about Claudias disappearance. Mirna noticed that defendant had a bruised right eye and a deep and long scratch over his neck. On June 26, 2001, defendant told Bryan that he was engaged to a woman named Andrea and would soon move in with her.

On July 4, 2001, a hiker came across a skeleton partially buried in the dirt along a trail in the Bluffs area of Pacific Palisades. The hiker called the authorities, who later used dental records to identify the skeleton as the remains of Claudia. A deputy medical examiner performed an autopsy on Claudias remains but could not determine the cause of death due to the extensive soft tissue deterioration.[5]

Lisa testified that on December 31, 2001, Manuel told her that defendant had killed Claudia by drowning her in the swimming pool. According to Lisa, Manuel was reluctant to come forward with the information because Beck was involved, and Manuel was afraid of what Beck would do in retaliation. Shortly thereafter, Lisa repeated Manuels revelation to her two siblings, Kimberly Gaeta (Kimberly) and Noah Gaeta (Noah), and their mother Connie.

On February 5, 2007, almost six years after Claudias death, Noah met with Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Detective John Shafia (Shafia) and told him that defendant had killed Claudia. According to Noah, defendants aggression toward their parents had escalated to such a point that Noah feared defendant would kill them. After Noah spoke with Shafia, he informed Manuel that he had revealed everything to the police, and asked Manuel to come to the police station to confirm his statements. Manuel complied.

On July 13, 2007, LAPD Detective Benjamin Macias (Macias) and his partner interviewed Andrea Huete (Andrea) at her home and recorded the interview. The jury heard the following portions of the interview: Andrea and defendant were high school sweethearts. After they broke up, she had no contact with him for five years. Sometime in 2001, defendant contacted her, and they rekindled their relationship and spoke of marriage. Andrea ordered engagement rings from a local jewelry store.[6] Around the same time, Andrea learned that Claudia was missing and pregnant. When Andrea asked defendant about Claudia, defendant told Andrea that he and Claudia had an argument and Claudia decided to leave everything behind. Despite defendants explanation, Andrea believed that something happened to [Claudia] because she found it difficult to believe that a young pregnant woman would suddenly leave her friends and family. Sometime after Claudia disappeared, defendant said to Andrea, as they were standing by the Gaetas swimming pool, Oh, shut up before what happens to Claudia happens to you. Andrea pointed to a pile of dirt in the backyard and asked defendant, Is that where you buried her? Defendant responded, Shut up, Andrea. You dont even know. Although these statements were apparently made in jest, Andrea thought that the conversation was weird. On another occasion, defendant asked Andrea whether she would protect him and stand up for him if the police ever came for him.

At trial, Andrea testified that she lied during the entire interview with Macias because she was angry at defendant. Andrea testified that she was a pathological liar, that her entire life was a lie, and that she did not expect the jury to believe anything she said during the interview or during trial.

Defendant did not testify or call any defense witnesses.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion for Mistrial

A. Defendants Contention

Defendant contends the trial court deprived him of his constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process by denying a request for a mistrial after his sister, Lisa, volunteered a purportedly prejudicial statement during her direct testimony.

B. Summary of Proceedings Below

On direct examination, Lisa testified that Manuel had told her that defendant had killed Claudia. The prosecutor followed up with: What did [Manuel] say? Lisa answered: He said thathe said that [defendant] called him and told him to meet him when my dad was at work. [Defendant] went to meet [Manuel], and [defendant] told him that he had killed Claudia. And my dad didnt believe him. He thoughthe just didnt believe him, and [defendant] told him what happened. [Defendant] said that they got in a fight and he hit her, she was bleeding, and she said she was going to call the police, and he Defense counsel objected and the testimony ended there.[7]

Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel indicated that he had spoken to the prosecutor before Lisas testimony and was under the impression that Lisa would only testify as to the date on which Manuel told her about defendants actions, and would not go into any further detail. The prosecutor acknowledged that Lisas testimony was somewhat unexpected, but argued it was nonetheless admissible because it went to Manuels credibility. Because the prosecutor had not yet interviewed Lisa, the trial court held an Evidence Code section 402 hearing to get a sense of Lisas potential testimony. During the hearing, Lisa testified that Manuel told her that defendant told him that after Claudia threatened to call the police, defendant tied Claudia up, threw her into the pool, and she drowned. The prosecutor confirmed that Lisa had not revealed this to the detective that interviewed her, and that this was the first time the prosecutor had learned of such information. The trial court adjourned for the day to give defendant an opportunity to determine his next course of action.

The next day, defendant requested a mistrial strictly based on Lisas testimony to the jury that Manuel told her that defendant had told him that Claudia was bleeding and was going to call the police. According to defendant, that portion of Lisas testimony was prejudicial hearsay. The trial court denied defendants request. It reasoned that the first part of the challenged testimony, i.e., that Claudia was bleeding, was a logical conclusion that could be drawn from the evidence that was already in the record, and the second part of the challenged testimony, i.e., that Claudia said she would call the police, was not so prejudicial as to warrant a mistrial. The trial court offered to strike the portion of Lisas testimony pertaining to calling the police, but defense counsel declined, stating: I think Im going to ask the court to ignore it at this point in time on that tactical ground. I dont want them to pay any more attention to it.

C. Relevant Authority

A trial court has broad control over the proceedings during criminal trials. ( 1044.) A mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or instruction. [Citation.] Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions. [Citation.] (People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 854.) A trial court should grant a mistrial only when a partys chances of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably damaged, and we use the deferential abuse of discretion standard to review a trial court ruling denying a mistrial. [Citation.] (People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 555.)

D. Analysis

We note at the outset that defendants argument on this issue is somewhat inconsistent. On the one hand, he criticizes the trial court for dissecting Lisas statement into two components, one that pertained to Claudia bleeding and the other that pertained to Claudia saying she would call the police. According to defendant, the two components were part and parcel of the same event and when considered together, the adverse impact of [Lisas] testimony was devastating. Yet, on the other hand, defendant concedes that the testimony about Claudia saying she would call the police was innocuous and that the damning evidence was the fact that Claudia was bleeding. Rather than ferret out defendants exact argument, we conclude that the challenged portion of Lisas testimony, whether considered as two components or a single unit, did not irreparably damage defendants chances of receiving a fair trial.

By the time Lisa made the challenged statement, Manuel had already testified that defendant admitted to drowning Claudia and disposing of her body with the help of another individual. The jury also heard testimony that defendant had a bruised eye and a noticeable scratch on his neck shortly after Claudia disappeared. Additionally, the jury heard evidence that defendant was unhappy about Claudias pregnancy and had announced his engagement to another woman just two weeks after Claudia disappeared. From this evidence, the jury certainly could have concluded that defendant managed to drown Claudia after a physical struggle and that he was motivated to kill Claudia in order to escape his perceived obligations as a father and to start a new life with another woman. Evidence that Claudia was bleeding before defendant drowned her and that Claudia said she would call the police was not incurably prejudicial given the damaging evidence already admitted against defendant. (People v. Haskett, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 854.)

We further reject defendants bald assertion that the prosecution engaged in trial by ambush. The prosecutor explained that because Lisa lived in another state and had flown in that morning to testify, there was not the opportunity to interview Lisa before she took the stand. The prosecutor further explained that Shafia had interviewed Lisa over the telephone and during this interview, Lisa simply confirmed that Manuel had told her that defendant had killed Claudia and provided no additional details. Despite the trial courts chastisement that the prosecution should have interviewed Lisa before Lisa took the stand, the trial court found the prosecutors representations credible, stating: I accept that this is a surprise to everybody. We decline to second guess the trial courts credibility findings on this point.

Defendant correctly points out that the jury requested a rereading of Lisas first day of testimony, which contained the challenged statement. This fact alone, however, does not demonstrate that defendants chances of receiving a fair trial [had] been irreparably damaged by Lisas testimony (People v. Bolden, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 555) or that the testimony was incurably prejudicial (People v. Haskett, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 854). In sum, we conclude the trial court acted within its broad discretion when it denied defendants motion for mistrial.[8]

II. Gang Evidence

A. Defendants Contention

Defendant contends the trial court deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial by admitting evidence of defendants involvement with a gang.

B. Summary of Proceedings Below

Manuel testified in an Evidence Code section 402 hearing that defendant was a gang member, but that his membership in a gang played no role in Manuels initial reluctance to come forward with information on Claudias death. On this basis, the defense sought to exclude all evidence of defendants gang membership at trial. The prosecution made an offer of proof that Noah would testify that he did not come forward when he learned that defendant had killed Claudia because defendant was a member of a gang and he was afraid of what the gang might do in retaliation. Given the role that defendants gang membership played in Noahs reluctance to come forward, the trial court ruled the prosecution has to have the opportunity to explain to the jury why theres been a nineor ten-year lapse in time and why theyre coming forward now. The court described the probative value of the gang evidence as substantial.

Ultimately, the gang evidence admitted at trial was fairly limited. During trial, Manuel testified that defendant and Beck belonged to a gang. Manuel denied that defendants membership in a gang played any role in his initial decision not to report defendants role in Claudias death. Manuel admitted, however, that he did tell Noah that he feared retaliation from Beck. On cross-examination, Manuel testified that he had hired members of the Mid City Stoners gang to work for him on construction projects in the past, and that Beck and defendant belonged to different gangs. During Noahs direct examination, Noah testified that he did not report defendants actions when he learned of them because he felt there was an immediate threat to the family, given Becks gang membership, and defendants possible gang membership. Noah went on to testify that sometime before he met with Shafia in February 2007, he called the authorities to tell them that defendant had killed Claudia but refused to give his name for fear that these guys [might] hurt my family or me.

Connie testified that when she learned of defendants actions, she did not report them because she was afraid. When asked what she was afraid of, Connie testified: [Defendant] used to be in a gang, so we were nervous about, you know, maybe coming after that, and that one that was involved with him.

During trial, the trial court gave the following limiting instruction: Ladies and Gentlemen, as you know, we have heard testimony from some of the witnesses concerning gang members, gang involvement and I am allowing that testimony concerning gang membership or gang activity for a limited purpose and that limited purpose is so that you can assess the credibility, the mental state of the witness as it relates to their willingness to testify. So that is the sole purpose of [gang evidence] being presented to you and that is the only reason you can use it.

Once both parties had rested, the trial court again instructed the jury: Now, certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose; specifically the evidence concerning street gangs. At the time this evidence was admitted you were instructed that it could not be considered by you for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which it was admitted. Do not consider this evidence for any purpose except the limited purpose for which it was admitted.

C. Relevant Authority

In cases not involving the gang enhancement, we have held that evidence of gang membership is potentially prejudicial and should not be admitted if its probative value is minimal. (People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1049.) But evidence of gang membership is often relevant to, and admissible regarding, the charged offense. (Ibid.) Consequently, gang evidence may be relevant to establish the defendants motive, intent or some fact concerning the charged offenses other than criminal propensity as long as the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. (People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 223-224; see also People v. Avitia (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 185, 192 [Gang evidence is admissible if it is logically relevant to some material issue in the case other than character evidence, is not more prejudicial than probative, and is not cumulative].)

D. Analysis

Here, although gang evidence was not relevant to prove defendants motive or intent, it was certainly relevant to a material issue in this case, namely the credibility of Manuel, Noah, and Connie. All three individuals were crucial to the prosecutions case because their testimony directly implicated defendant in Claudias death. That all three waited over six years to contact the police with such incriminating evidence called into question their credibility as witnesses. Evidence that they feared retaliation from defendants gang or Becks gang was certainly probative as to why they might have waited so long before notifying the authorities and was therefore directly relevant to their credibility. (People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 301 [Generally, evidence that a witness is afraid to testify is admissible as relevant to the witnesss credibility]; People v. Olguin (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1368 [evidence that a witness is fearful of retaliation similarly relates to that witnesss credibility and is also admissible].)

In any event, we conclude admission of the gang evidence if error, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).)[9] First, any prejudice stemming from the gang evidence was effectively cured by the trial courts instructions. The trial court twice instructed the jury that it could only use the admitted gang evidence for the limited purpose of assessing a witnesss credibility, and his or her mental state of the witness as it relates to his or her willingness to testify. We must assume that the jurors are intelligent persons and capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions which are given. [Citations.] (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1148-1149.) We can, of course, do nothing else. The crucial assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury is that jurors generally understand and faithfully follow instructions. (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 689, fn. 17.)

Defendant argues that the trial courts instructions were meaningless because [n]othing has more prejudicial impact in Los Angeles than informing the jury that the accused is a gang member. We summarily reject this argument. It is simply unreasonable to adopt the position that a trial courts limiting instructions on gang evidence should be disregarded anytime the case happens to originate in Los Angeles. Moreover, in our view, the gang evidence in this case was not inflammatory. There was no evidence about defendants entrenchment in the gang or the gangs tendency to engage in violent conduct. Nor was there any evidence that the gang was even a criminal street gang. Although the jurors heard the name Mid City Stoners, there was no additional information as to what types of activities that gang engaged in. As far as gang evidence goes, the evidence in this case was fairly limited. (Compare People v. Albarran, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 228 [even though trial court struck gang allegations, it erroneously admitted evidence of threats to kill police officers, descriptions of the criminal activities of other gang members, and reference to the Mexican Mafia [that] had little or no bearing on any other material issue relating to [defendants] guilt on the charged crimes and approached being classified as overkill].)

Furthermore, there was overwhelming evidence from which the jury could have concluded that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The direct evidence could not have been more incriminating. Manuel testified that defendant admitted to drowning Claudia in the Gaetas swimming pool and disposing of her body the next day. Manuel himself saw a painters canvas wrapped around what appeared to be a human body. The circumstantial evidence was likewise significant. Defendant was unhappy with Claudias pregnancy. Several witnesses saw defendant with physical injuries shortly after Claudias disappearance. There was evidence that defendant was engaged to another woman, Andrea, just two weeks after Claudias disappearance. Finally, defendants statement to Andrea, as they were standing by the swimming pool, wherein he threatened to do to her what he did to Claudia, was certainly incriminating even if the statement was purportedly made in jest.

III. Evidence of Prior Act of Domestic Violence

A. Defendants Contention

Defendant contends the trial court deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial when it permitted the prosecution to introduce evidence of one incident of domestic violence that defendant committed after Claudias death.

B. Summary of Proceedings Below

Before the start of trial, the prosecution sought to introduce evidence that in 2006, Manuel witnessed defendant using a knife to threaten a woman (A.), who defendant had brought home to spend the night.[10] Defendant objected on the ground that the prejudicial effect of the evidence substantially outweighed its probative value. The trial court ruled in favor of the prosecution, reasoning that the evidence had substantial probative value because defendants relationship with A. was similar to defendants relationship with Claudia, and the evidence was relevant to why the family ultimately reported defendants actions to the authorities.

During his direct testimony, Manuel testified that sometime after Claudias death, defendant brought A., a woman he had been dating, home to spend the night. The next morning, A. said something that displeased defendant. Defendant retrieved a large knife from the kitchen and chased her around the living room with the knife. Manuel stepped in front of A., told defendant to stop, and then quoted the Bible, after which defendant stopped. Connie testified that Manuel told her about this incident after it had occurred.

C. Relevant Authority

Although evidence of prior bad acts is generally barred by Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), Evidence Code section 1109, subdivision (a)(1), provides an exception to this rule and states in pertinent part: [I]n a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of an offense involving domestic violence, evidence of the defendants commission of other domestic violence is not made inadmissible by [Evidence Code] Section 1101 if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to [Evidence Code] Section 352. In enacting Evidence Code section 1109, the Legislature found [t]he propensity inference is particularly appropriate in the area of domestic violence because on-going violence and abuse is the norm in domestic violence cases[,] and we must be willing to look at that pattern during the criminal prosecution, or we will miss the opportunity to address this problem at all. (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1876 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) June 25, 1996, pp. 3-4.) (People v. Hoover (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1027-1028.)[11]

Under Evidence Code section 352, we examine whether the probative value of the evidence of defendants uncharged offenses is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission [would] . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. [Citation.] (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 404 (Ewoldt).) Generally, when evidence of uncharged prior bad acts is no stronger and no more inflammatory than evidence presented on the charged offense, the potential for prejudice is decreased because it is unlikely that a jurys passions would be inflamed by less severe prior bad acts. (Id. at p. 405.) Furthermore, evidence of a defendants prior acts of domestic violence against a particular victim is highly probative to show the defendants propensity to assault women with whom he has romantic relationships even if the charged crime involves a different victim altogether. (People v. Cabrera (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 695, 705-706 (Cabrera).)

D. Analysis

We first turn to the prejudicial effect of the evidence. Although evidence that defendant chased A. around the Gaeta living room with a knife was certainly not favorable, it was by no means stronger or more inflammatory than the prosecutions charge that defendant had killed his pregnant girlfriend by drowning her in his familys swimming pool and then buried her body in a shallow grave near a hiking trail. Given the severity of the charges against defendant, the potential for prejudice was limited because it was unlikely that the jurys passions would be inflamed by the actions defendant took against A. (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 404.)

We next turn to the probative value of the evidence. Evidence that defendant used physical violence to threaten A., a woman he was dating, was highly probative to show that defendant had a propensity to assault women with whom he had romantic relationships, including Claudia, the victim in this case. (Cabrera, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at pp. 705-706.) Furthermore, the evidence was probative in that it demonstrated how Manuel and the rest of defendants family feared defendants potential for extreme violence, which might have explained in part their reluctance to come forward with information on Claudias death. A trial court has broad discretion in making a determination under Evidence Code section 352, and we see no abuse of discretion here.

Even if the trial court erred by admitting evidence of defendants domestic violence against A., the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.) The trial court instructed the jury that evidence of a prior incident of domestic violence was not sufficient by itself to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the charged offense. Thus, any prejudice from the courts ruling was effectively cured by its instruction. Furthermore, as we explained above, there was overwhelming evidence of defendants guilt: his admission to Manuel, his disposal of the body, the indications that defendant was in a physical struggle, the evidence that defendant was unhappy about Claudias pregnancy and was engaged to another woman two weeks after Claudias disappearance, and the incriminating statement defendant made to Andrea about doing to her what he did to Claudia. (Ante, p. 12.)

IV. Evidence of Defendants Threats against Manuel and Noah

A. Defendants Contention

Defendant contends the trial court deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial when it admitted evidence of prior threats that defendant made against Manuel and Noah. According to defendant, the evidence was propensity evidence, pure and simple, and should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 1101.

B. Summary of Proceedings Before

At trial, Manuel testified that in 2003, defendant was charged with battery after neighbors saw defendant physically beating Manuel. According to Manuel, defendant told Manuel that if he answered the prosecutions subpoena to testify, defendant would kill him. Manuel also testified that sometime after Claudias death, defendant was angry with him and told him that he would do [him] in.

Also at trial, Noah testified that in 1998, defendant threatened Noah after they had gotten into an altercation. Noah refused to see or communicate with defendant after this incident.

C. Relevant Authority

Generally, evidence of a witnesss attitude toward the action in which he testifies or toward the giving of testimony is admissible as relevant to the witnesss credibility. (Evid. Code, 780, subd. (j); People v. Sapp, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 301.) Likewise, [t]estimony [that] a witness is fearful of retaliation similarly relates to that witnesss credibility and is also admissible. (People v. Olguin, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 1368.) Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (c) makes clear that that [n]othing in [section 1101] affects the admissibility of evidence offered to support or attack the credibility of a witness.

A challenge to the admission or exclusion of evidence under Evidence Code section 1101 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 120.)

D. Analysis

The People contend that defendant has forfeited any challenge to this evidence by failing to object on Evidence Code section 1101 grounds below. Defendant contends that his objection to the evidence under Evidence Code section 352 constituted an objection under Evidence Code section 1101 because the rule stated in section 1101 is merely a concrete application of the general principle embodied in section 352. (People v. Ogunmola (1985) 39 Cal.3d 120, 123, fn. 4.)

We need not decide the forfeiture issue because we conclude there was no abuse of discretion in admitting the evidence. Evidence that defendant had threatened to kill Manuel and Noah in the past was admissible notwithstanding Evidence Code section 1101 because the evidence explained why both individuals feared defendant and waited approximately six years before reporting his involvement in Claudias death, and was thus directly relevant to both witnesses credibility.

Assuming for argument that the trial court erred, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.) Even if evidence of defendants threats against Manuel and Noah had not been admitted, there was still overwhelming evidence from which the jury could conclude that defendant was guilty of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ante, p. 12.)

V. Cumulative Error

Defendant contends the alleged errors cited above cumulatively require reversal. Because we conclude the trial court did not commit error, we summarily reject defendants cumulative error argument.

VI. Sufficiency of Evidence

A. Defendants Contention

Defendant contends insufficient evidence supports the jurys conviction for first degree murder. According to defendant, the Peoples proof simply did not support the conviction of deliberate, premeditated murder, and we should therefore reduce his conviction to voluntary manslaughter.

B. Relevant Authority

First degree murder requires a showing of an intent to kill, deliberation, and premeditation. (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1080; 189.) The process of premeditation and deliberation does not require any extended period of time. The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly . . . . [Citations.] (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 767.)

In reviewing a challenge of the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply the following standard of review: [We] consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment and presume the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence in support of the judgment. The test is whether substantial evidence supports the decision, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] The United States Supreme Court has held: [T]his inquiry does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] Instead, the relevant question is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] . . . . The California Supreme Court has held, Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction]. [Citations.] (People v. Gaut (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1430.)

Given this courts limited role on appeal, defendant bears a heavy burden in claiming there was insufficient evidence to sustain the findings. If the findings are supported by substantial evidence, we must give due deference to the jurys findings and not retry the case ourselves. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) The standard for securing a reversal is just as high when the prosecutions case depends on circumstantial evidence. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 792.) As long as there is reasonable justification for the findings made by the trier of fact, a reviewing courts opinion that contrary findings might also have been reasonable does not require a reversal. (Id. at p. 793.)

C. Analysis

We conclude that there was sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation in this case. Defendant admitted to Manuel that he had killed Claudia by drowning her. During his confession to Manuel, defendant did not state that her death was an accident or the result of a sudden quarrel. Based on defendants admission to Manuel alone, the jury could reasonably have concluded that defendant acted with premeditation and deliberation.

Premeditation and deliberation may be shown by circumstantial evidence. (People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 25 (Anderson).) Anderson identified three types of evidence significant to the issue of premeditation and deliberation, as follows: (1) facts about how and what defendant did prior to the actual killing which show that the defendant was engaged in activity directed toward, and explicable as intended to result in, the killingwhat may be characterized as planning activity; (2) facts about the defendants prior relationship and/or conduct with the victim from which the jury could reasonably infer a motive to kill the victim, which inference of motive, together with facts of type (1) or (3), would in turn support an inference that the killing was the result of a pre-existing reflection and careful thought and weighing of considerations rather than mere unconsidered or rash impulse hastily executed [citation]; (3) facts about the nature of the killing from which the jury could infer that the manner of killing was so particular and exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a preconceived design to take his victims life in a particular way for a reason which the jury can reasonably infer from facts of type (1) or (2). (Anderson, supra, at pp. 2627.)

We note that the Anderson factors are simply categories of evidence to be used as a framework in the analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence of premeditation and deliberation. (See People v. Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) In People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125, the Supreme Court emphasized that these factors are not the exclusive means of showing premeditation and deliberation.

Following the Anderson guidelines set forth above, we conclude there was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that Claudias murder was premeditated and deliberate. First, although defendant claims there was no evidence whatsoever of planning, the evidence shows that defendant engaged in activity specifically directed toward killing Claudia, namely drowning her, a process that required him to force her under water until her body was so deprived of oxygen that death resulted. Second, there was evidence of motive. Lisa testified that defendant was scared about having a child with Claudia. This fear, coupled with the fact that defendant had intended to rekindle a romance with his high school sweetheart, certainly provided the jury with a sufficient basis to infer motive. Third, the nature of the killing showed a preconceived design. Even if Claudia had fallen into the pool because of a sudden quarrel with defendant, defendant had ample opportunity to assist Claudia before she could no longer breathe.[12] Instead he chose to drown her, thus showing that he intentionally took her life in a particular way for the motives discussed above.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

____________________________, J.

CHAVEZ

We concur:

_____________________________, P. J.

BOREN

_____________________________, J.

DOI TODD

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[1] All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.

[2] Because most of the witnesses share a last name with either the deceased or defendant, we will refer to everyone by their first name for clarity.

[3] A technician who performed an ultrasound on Claudia testified that on May 9, 2001, the fetus was nine weeks and five days old.

[4] Bryan was actually defendants parole officer. To minimize prejudice stemming from this fact, the trial court directed counsel to simply refer to Bryan as an acquaintance.

[5] A senior criminalist with the Los Angeles County Department of Coroner participated in the excavation of Claudias remains, which was buried inside a shallow grave. Inside the grave, the criminalist found a leaf and plant stem, neither of which resembled any of the vegetation naturally growing in the area. A botanist examined the recovered leaf and stem and identified them as belonging to the schefflera pueckleri plant, an ornamental plant typically used in home and commercial landscaping, and not a plant that would grow naturally in the Bluffs area of Pacific Palisades. The botanist viewed some photographs taken of the Gaeta backyard shortly after Claudias disappearance and identified a schefflera pueckleri plant growing in the yard. He could not, however, determine whether the leaf and stem found in Claudias grave came from that particular plant.

[6] A receipt from the jewelry store indicated that Andrea had ordered the rings on July 6, 2001, and was scheduled to pick them up on July 11, 2001.

[7] This was the totality of Lisas testimony on that day. Lisa returned to testify the next day. None of her testimony on the second day is the subject of the present appeal.

[8] Because we conclude there was no error in denying the mistrial, we need not reach the Peoples argument that defendant is estopped from challenging the ruling based on the invited error doctrine.

[9] As a general matter, the [a]pplication of the ordinary rules of evidence . . . does not impermissibly infringe on a defendants right to present a defense. [Citations.] (People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1102-1103.) Because defendant claims the admission of gang evidence resulted in constitutional error, however, we proceed under the more stringent standard of Chapman.

[10] The trial court also permitted the prosecution to introduce evidence that defendant committed an act of domestic violence against Claudia in 1995. Defendant does not challenge that ruling on appeal.

[11] Domestic violence, for purposes of Evidence Code section 1109, is broadly defined as abuse committed against an adult or a minor who is a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or person with whom the suspect has had a child or is having or has had a dating or engagement relationship. ( 13700, subd. (b); see also Evid. Code, 1109, subd. (c)(3).) Abuse [is defined as] intentionally or recklessly causing or attempting to cause bodily injury, or placing another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to himself or herself, or another. ( 13700, subd. (a).)

[12] The medical examiner testified that generally, it takes two to three minutes, perhaps even longer, to drown someone.