P. v. Baldwin
Filed 3/2/09 P. v. Baldwin CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GARY DON BALDWIN, Defendant and Appellant. | C057165 (Super. Ct. No. 03F03076) |
A jury convicted defendant Gary Don Baldwin of 13 counts of sexual abuse committed against his stepdaughter (Pen. Code 269, subd. (a)(4); 288, subd. (b)(1); 288, subd. (a)), and two counts of child abuse committed against another daughter and son. (Pen. Code, 273a, subds. (a), (b).) Defendant admitted a charged prior conviction and the court sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of 126 years, 8 months plus 90 years to life.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in (1) admitting evidence of uncharged acts under Evidence Code sections 1108 and 352, and (2) excluding testimony relating to other allegedly false charges made by defendants wife, G., and stepdaughter M. There was no error, and we therefore affirm the judgment.
Facts and Proceedings
Given the nature of defendants claims on appeal, a detailed recitation of the facts is unnecessary. Suffice it to say, defendant sexually abused his stepdaughter, D., by committing acts of oral copulation, attempted sexual intercourse, attempted sodomy, and unlawful touchings. He also beat two of his other children. Among the witnesses testifying at trial was another stepdaughter, M., who described uncharged acts of sexual abuse that defendant had committed against her.
Defendant denied any culpability and argued that his wife and children fabricated these charges in order to get him out of the house. The jury rejected this claim and convicted defendant of all 15 counts.
Discussion
I
Evidence of Uncharged Acts
Defendant contends that the court erred in permitting evidence of uncharged sex acts perpetrated by defendant against his stepdaughter, M. This evidence was properly admitted under Evidence Code sections 1108 and 352. (Unspecified section references that follow are to the Evidence Code.)
Section 1108 is an exception to the general prohibition on propensity evidence and permits the admission of other sex crimes, in a sex offense prosecution, for the purpose of showing a defendants propensity to commit such crimes. The admissibility of this evidence is subject only to the weighing of probative value and prejudicial impact under section 352. (See People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 911; People v. Britt (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 500, 505.) Rather than admit or exclude every sex offense a defendant commits, trial judges must consider such factors as its nature, relevance, and possible remoteness, the degree of certainty of its commission and the likelihood of confusing, misleading, or distracting the jurors from their main inquiry, its similarity to the charged offense, its likely prejudicial impact on the jurors, the burden on the defendant in defending against the uncharged offense, and the availability of less prejudicial alternatives to its outright admission, such as admitting some but not all of the defendants other sex offenses, or excluding irrelevant though inflammatory details surrounding the offense. (People v. Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 917.)
By subjecting evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct to the weighing process of section 352, the Legislature has ensured that such evidence cannot be used in cases where its probative value is substantially outweighed by the possibility that it will consume an undue amount of time or create a substantial danger of undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury. [Citation.] This determination is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge who is in the best position to evaluate the evidence. (People v. Fitch (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 172, 183.)
Here, the prosecution sought to introduce testimony from M., defendants stepdaughter. M. would testify that defendant: (1) often entered the bathroom and watched her when she was unclothed and showering, (2) once pulled a towel from her and touched her breast, and (3) threatened to make M. his sex toy and take [her] virginity if she did not improve her school grades.
The court permitted this testimony, noting that when these acts occurred, M. was about the same age as the current victim, another stepdaughter. The court concluded that this evidence was the type contemplated by section 1108, and found it admissible under section 352 because its probative value outweighed any potential for prejudice, undue consumption of time, or confusion.
Contrary to defendants claim, this ruling was well within the courts discretion. This evidence had strong probative value. The victims in each case were defendants preteen and teenage stepdaughters. M.s testimony was not unduly prejudicial and was unlikely to confuse or distract the jury. Unlike People v. Harris (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 727, 738, a case relied upon by defendant, the incidents involving M. were far less serious than the charged offenses and would not evoke an emotional bias against defendant. (See People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 320.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling this evidence admissible under section 352. There was no error.
II
Evidence of Other Allegations of Child Molestation
To support his claim that his wife, G., had conspired with her children to fabricate the charges against him, defendant sought to introduce testimony from L.R. and J.W. that G. had lodged similar false charges against them. The trial court excluded this evidence under section 352, a ruling defendant challenges on appeal. Again, the courts determination was well within its discretion.
Defendants claim centers around the following:
When M. was two or three years old, she returned from a visit with her father, L.R., and reported to G. that her father had touched her genital area and that it hurt. G. took M. to a medical center for examination but no charges were filed due to M.s age. According to defense counsel, a detective had interviewed L.R. and his girlfriend, but counsel knew nothing else about the investigation or its outcome.
When M. was five years old, she reported to her day care provider that her stepfather, J.W., had showed her pornographic movies and touched her. The day care provider relayed this information to G., and the authorities were notified. According to the prosecutor, J.W. was monitored by Child Protective Services but nothing further happened.
Defendant asserted that the charges against both L.R. and J.W. were trumped up, and supported his theory that G. had made similar false allegations in the present case.
The trial court excluded this testimony under section 352. The court found that the probative value of the proffered evidence was weak, noting that while in the earlier cases it was G. who had reported the men to the authorities, here it was the victims stepfather (the same J.W.), who called law enforcement to report his daughters claims. Given these circumstances, the [G.]-as-common-link theory was less than compelling.
The court also observed that the circumstances surrounding the claims against L.R. was complicated and would require a multitude of witnesses, because it was not clear why the case was not prosecuted. As the court stated, [T]here could be many different [explanations] . . . not all of which rests on a determination that the accusation was false.
The same problems were present in the incident involving J.W. The court noted that G. had custody of M. at the time of the incident involving J.W., weakening defendants argument that G. had a motive to fabricate a claim against J.W. Proving the falsity of the accusations against J.W. would require testimony from a number of witnesses, not just J.W. and G.
The court concluded that the slight probative value of the proffered evidence was outweighed by a substantial likelihood of confusing the jury, requiring an undue consumption of time, and prejudicing defendant. The court therefore excluded this evidence under section 352.
A trial court enjoys broad discretion under section 352 in assessing whether the probative value of particular evidence is outweighed by concerns of undue prejudice, confusion or consumption of time. [Citation.] (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124.) The courts determination will not be overturned on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of that discretion, upon a showing that the trial courts decision was palpably arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd, and resulted in injury sufficiently grave as to amount to a miscarriage of justice. (People v. Lamb (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 575, 582.)
Defendant cannot demonstrate an abuse of discretion here. Defendants theory focused on G.s motivations for fabricating claims of abuse. But the charges here were raised not by G., but by the victim herself, who reported defendants conduct to her father, J.W., and it was J.W. who called authorities. Under these circumstances, the court properly concluded that evidence of prior accusations made by G., were of minimal, if any, relevance.
Perhaps most importantly, defendants theory depends on the prior allegations in fact having been false. That was not established. Given the state of the evidence, the court concluded that minitrials on each of the prior incidents would be necessary, a digression that posed a substantial risk of confusing the jury while requiring an undue consumption of time.
Given these circumstances, the trial court acted well within its discretion in excluding defendants proffered evidence, and there was no error.
The proper exercise of discretion under section 352 also disposes of defendants claims that his constitutional rights to due process and confrontation were violated. (See People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 623; People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 58; People v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 350.) The application of the ordinary rules of evidence generally does not infringe on a defendants constitutional rights, and defendant has not established any exception to this rule. (See People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1229.)
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
HULL , J.
We concur:
SIMS , Acting P. J.
ROBIE , J.
Publication courtesy of San Diego free legal advice.
Analysis and review provided by Santee Property line attorney.
