In re Tiffany C.
Filed 10/8/08 In re Tiffany C. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
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In re TIFFANY C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | C057305 (Super. Ct. No. JV124313) |
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TIFFANY C., Defendant and Appellant. |
Tiffany C., a minor, appeals from an order of the juvenile court declaring her a ward of the court and committing her to juvenile hall for 45 days, requiring 300 hours of community service, and payment of restitution following a finding that she committed the offenses of vehicular homicide with gross negligence (Pen. Code, 192, subd. (c)(1)) and misdemeanor reckless driving with injury (Veh. Code, 23104, subd. (a)).
On appeal, the minor contends the evidence is insufficient to support the finding of either offense. We disagree and shall affirm the orders of the juvenile court.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A short time after 9:30 p.m. on September 10, 2006, Salvador Martinez was driving his Honda Accord north on Watt Avenue in an unincorporated part of Sacramento County. Accompanying him were his girlfriend, Araceli A., and her 15-year-old daughter, Diana. As Martinez approached Jackson Road he saw two vehicles coming in the opposite direction. The second vehicle had its headlights on and was zigzagging behind the first vehicle. The second vehicle fishtailed into Martinezs lane and collided with Martinezs car as he was trying to pull onto the right shoulder.
Martinez suffered minor injuries, but Araceli, who also had seen the second car zigzagging, was hospitalized for three days with internal bleeding, rib fractures, and injuries to her knee, chest, and ankle.
The minor, who had just turned 17 years old, was the driver of the second vehicle, a 1989 Nissan 240SX. Also in the Nissan at the time of the accident were the minors younger sister, Stephanie C., a friend, Rosa A., and Rosas cousin, Marcos Perez. Because the Nissan had no front passenger seat, 15-year-old Perez sat on pillows facing backward. Rosa A. and Stephanie sat in the back seat. The minor was wearing a seatbelt, but none of the other passengers were doing so. A worn spare tire was mounted on the left rear of the Nissan.
According to Rosa A., while the Nissan was being driven on Watt Avenue, the occupants were pretending that a car was chasing us so we kept saying Go faster; go faster; theyre chasing us; theyre chasing us. Rosa A. described their attempt to pass the first vehicle, a semi‑truck: [W]e were in the left lane, the wrong lane, for a little while trying to pass it, and then I seen the lights and then thats it. Rosa A. said that right before the accident, she looked at the speedometer and it registered 75 miles per hour.
As a result of the collision, Perez was killed and Rosa A. was hospitalized for a month and in a coma for six days, suffering bruising to her lungs and ribs, a fractured pelvis, and amputation of her right leg.
California Highway Patrol (CHP) Officer William Norris, an accident reconstruction expert, opined that the tire marks in the south lane were caused by a change of direction, which could have resulted from either impact or driver steering. Sideways skid marks were consistent with the Nissans being out of control.
Steven Walker, an accident reconstruction consultant who was called to testify by the minor, reviewed the traffic collision and mechanical inspection reports, photographs of the scene, and witness interviews. Walker calculated that the minor could not have been traveling more than 51 miles per hour when the Nissan began making tire marks and that the spare tire was not a contributing factor to the collision.
DISCUSSION
The minor contends the evidence is insufficient to establish that she drove with either gross negligence, as required by Penal Code section 192, subdivision (c)(1), or willful and wanton disregard for the safety of others, as required by Vehicle Code section 23104, subdivision (a). We disagree.
The standard of proof in juvenile proceedings involving criminal acts is the same as the standard in adult criminal trials. [Citation.] [Citation.] In considering the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding, the appellate court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence‑‑such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence [citation] and we must make all reasonable inferences that support the finding of the juvenile court. [Citation.] [Citations.] In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088-1089.)
Gross negligence is the exercise of so slight a degree of care as to raise a presumption of conscious indifference to the consequences. (People v. Bennett (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1032, 1036.) In other words, it is an I dont care what happens state of mind. (Ibid.) The test is objective: whether a reasonable person in the [minors] position would have been aware of the risk involved. (Ibid.)
As to the willful and wanton disregard for the safety of others, willful refers to the intentional disregard for safety and [w]antoness is defined as having consciousness of conduct, intent to do or omit the act in question, realization of the probable injury to another, and reckless disregard of the consequences. (People v. Dewey (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 216, 221.)
The minor argues that because the juvenile court found that neither her speed nor the spare tire were factors contributing to the accident, the only basis left for the courts finding of gross negligence was that she jerked the wheel of the car to the left as she tried to pass another vehicle. However, she continues, expert testimony by CHP Officer Norris refuted such a conclusion because Norris testified that based upon tire marks one could not conclude that the minor was in the southbound lane when she jerked the steering wheel and lost control of the Nissan.
The argument is not persuasive because it fails to take into account the context within which the cited findings were made or additional findings made by the juvenile court.
The court expressly found that the minor and three occupants of her car were all goofing off, joking around, pretending that somebody was chasing them; that the minor was speeding just before she left her lane to pass another vehicle; that the minor was zigzagging while behind the truck, looking for a way to pass it; that whether the minors loss of control occurred just before she went into the left lane to pass or a nanosecond later, she put her vehicle and four people in it right in front of Mr. Martinezs car proceeding lawfully in the opposite lane; that the minor saw the headlights of Martinezs vehicle when she went into the left lane and that she instantly saw what she had done and hit her brakes and fishtailed into Martinezs vehicle.
It is immaterial whether the evidence supports a finding that the minor jerked the steering wheel before or after she entered the left lane. What is material is that she and her friends were goofing around, zigzagging behind the truck and attempting to pass it while playing a game of somebody is chasing us. These acts constitute substantial evidence supporting the juvenile courts findings of gross negligence and willful and wanton disregard for the safety of others.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
BUTZ , J.
We concur:
MORRISON , Acting P.J.
CANTIL-SAKAUYE , J.
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