In re Matthew P.

Filed 8/29/08 In re Matthew P. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Carolyn Kirkwood, Judge. Affirmed.

Jennifer Mack, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Edith P.

Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Duane P.

Benjamin P. de Mayo, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Aurelio Torre, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * *

Edith P. (mother) and Duane P. (father) appeal from the juvenile courts order terminating their parental rights and freeing Matthew, now age 10, Steven, 7 years old, and Christopher, age four, for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code,  366.26; all further unlabeled section references are to this code.) Father and mother contend the juvenile court erred in concluding they failed their burden to demonstrate the benefit exception ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i), former subd. (c)(1)(A)) applied to avoid terminating parental rights. Finding no basis to overturn the juvenile courts conclusion, we affirm the termination order.

I

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Two Costa Mesa police officers and a social worker from Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) detained seven-year-old Matthew, four-year-old Steven, and two-year-old Christopher in June 2005 when father and mother failed to fill medically necessary prescriptions or otherwise treat antibiotic-resistant staph infections (MRSA) plaguing the children. The younger boys suffered from open sores covering their bodies, and Matthew developed sores after the parents failed to take action following an earlier visit by the social worker. On SSAs second visit, the worker found father with swollen cuts on his face, and mother had done nothing to remedy her own pervasive, heavily infected sores. Despite doctors orders to maintain rigorous hygiene, the familys living conditions remained filthy, garbage littered their motel room, the parents had not changed the childrens dirty clothing, and the clean linens provided on the social workers first visit remained in an unopened bag.

Father and mother had previous experience with the dependency system. The juvenile court intervened four years earlier, in 2001, to declare Matthew and Steven dependents based on allegations the parents used marijuana in the childrens presence, failed to obtain medical care for the children, such as immunizations for Matthew or use of a prescribed sleep apnea monitor for Steven, and exposed the pair to unhealthful and dangerous living conditions in which cockroaches infested the living space, including infant Stevens bedding, and cigarettes, lighters, and pills lay within Matthews reach. The couple regained custody of the boys in 2002.

On June 28, 2005, the juvenile court authorized SSA to detain Matthew, Steven, and Christopher at Orangewood Childrens Home. Father soon gained visitation with the children after providing a medical clearance conditioned on washing his hands before and after contact with his children as well as keeping the wound on his right temple covered with a dressing . . . . Mother failed to obtain a similar clearance until mid-July 2005. The parents joint visits did not go well; a social worker at Orangewood observed mother and father were verbally aggressive towards each other and remain[ed] inappropriate during their visits, bickering over responsibility for the childrens bad behavior, which neither adult supervised.

Father and mothers relationship deteriorated further, with mutual accusations of infidelity, hallucinatory mental instability, and drug relapse. Mother confused the children by bringing, without SSA approval, her new male friend Roy to visits, and father compounded their distress by deploying the children against mother, instructing them to reject Roy because he was gay. Matthew worried that Dad wants to kill Roy . . . .

Father failed to attend his counseling sessions, and both mother and father were terminated from their parenting classes because of absences. Father regularly visited with the children, but mother often failed to arrive for her separate visits or canceled at the last minute, leaving the children bewildered and hurt. Mother slurred her words and sounded trashed when the visitation coordinator called to advise her of the schedule. Learning in early November that mothers staph infection had returned, the social worker provided a free medical referral for treatment so she could resume visiting the children, but mother delayed treatment for 10 months.

Father spiraled out of control. The childrens foster mother complained of chronically missed visitation. When Steven confronted father, why did you cancel other times, father explained, I woke up sick, but the visitation monitor observed father appeared hung over. The foster mother expressed concern for the childrens emotional welfare, noting that fathers chronic last-minute cancellations . . . set[] the children up for false hopes and expectations, leading to disappointment, anxiety, frustration and aggressive behavior. Father missed appointments with the social worker and, when he finally met with her in December 2005, admitted he had been arrested for possession of a meth pipe and other drug paraphernalia. He claimed the pipe was mothers and he was simply taking the paraphernalia to the mother to show her how bad she was, but father was later convicted of the crime.

Father admitted he once had an anger problem as the result of the death of his younger brother and the rigid military life he lived, but threatened the social worker, If you write this down I will break your pen. I am not saying I will hurt you or anything but I will break your pen. Matthew lamented that on his last visit, father called him the F word and previously called him the B[] word. The juvenile court reinstated monitored visitation after father struck Steven very hard on the head, making him cry. Matthew noticed father had become irate because Steven, referring to the foster mother, kept saying, Mom, Mom, Mom, to which father angrily rejoined, Dont call her . . . mom. She is not your mother! The childrens behavior improved significantly once fathers unmonitored visitation terminated.

Mothers boyfriend telephoned the social worker in early December, alarmed that he had not heard from her for three days; father discounted the two- to four-day binge absences as routine for mother. The social worker advised Roy to file a missing person report, but mother resurfaced in mid-December, complaining father manipulated Matthew with a threat that if he or his brothers spoke with mother on the phone, he would never visit them again.

Disregarding court orders, mother also manipulated the children in phone conversations, urging them to request visits from Roy and falsely informing them they would soon live with her and Roy. Ignoring no-contact orders, Roy left a long answering machine message for the children in January detailing his breakup with their mother. Mother immediately resumed her relationship with Roy despite his New Years Eve arrest on felony charges for assault with a deadly weapon and battery on a police officer; she visited him every day in jail but chose not to seek medical treatment to resume visits with the children until eight months later. During a monitored phone call with Matthew, father informed the boy that he got his own apartment, had spent three nights with their mother and discussed other personal issues. The monitor alerted the father that whenever he brings these issues up to the children they end up crying . . . .

Father tested positive for methamphetamines in January 2006 and SSA deemed mother to have tested positive because she submitted a diluted sample and skipped several tests. In late January, the visitation monitor reported father returned from the bathroom totally incoherent, completely hammered . . . . At first his eyes were very narrow and he was mumbling, then he just fell asleep. . . . It was obvious he got high in the bathroom. This isnt the first time hes passed out during the visits. Father and mother missed their parenting classes in January, mother failed to address her infection and despite contrary promises to the children continued to dash their hopes with missed visits. Father skipped his visit on Matthews birthday. Following visits with father, the children suffered from bedwetting. The social worker concluded at the six-month review in March 2006 that the parents reunification prognosis was poor, but recommended an additional period of services conditioned on outpatient drug treatment for father, which the court ordered.

Instead of seeking medical attention for her infection, mother falsified a medical clearance. Fortunately, the social worker discovered the ruse and prevented the childrens exposure. The children still suffered emotionally, however, when mother informed them falsely she would be visiting.

Mother completed her parenting classes, but her chronic absenteeism rendered counseling useless. Father lasted two or three weeks in his sober living home before counselors evicted him for breaking the rules; he failed to attend either his counseling sessions or parenting classes. Mother and father both exhibited formication, described by the social worker as a common skin disorder among methamphetamine users in which large bumps appear on[] the facial skin. Contradicting earlier denials, father admitted using methamphetamine for almost a year but, rebuffing substance abuse treatment, claimed he quit drugs easily this time because he was not an addict.

Father continued to fall asleep during visits with the children. When the monitor attempted to terminate one such visit, father became hysterical and enraged; SSA relocated the visits to its sheriff-patrolled offices because the monitor no longer felt safe. Mother still had not sought treatment for her staph infection through July 2006, and she let weeks pass between telephone visits with the children. In any event, she could not visit the children with another new boyfriend because he was on probation for assault. Mother finally obtained medical clearance to visit the children in August 2006. Christopher, who had been potty-trained since January, promptly regressed, wetting himself nightly and on days mother and father visited.

The social worker had recommended terminating reunification services in July 2006, but continuances pushed the 12-month hearing into October, and the parents gained an extension of services by stipulating to inpatient drug treatment. No program would accept father or mother, however, because both denied having a drug problem. The juvenile court terminated reunification services at the 18-month review in December 2006. The children had grown very attached to their foster parents who, unfortunately, could not adopt them. SSA, however, soon located a prospective adoptive couple, Edna and Jeff and, after the childrens initial visits went well, placed the children with them in early January 2007.

Father and mother began drug testing regularly, resumed counseling, rarely missed visits anymore, arrived at the visits on time, and father no longer fell asleep during the sessions. But father remained so aggressive and overbearing that SSA had to find substitutes for two monitors who feared him.

By April 2007, the children referred to Edna and Jeff as mom and dad, thrived in their care, and the social worker believed the new familys obvious bond would strengthen even further as the children overcame their disappointment about separating from their longterm foster parents. The children remained attached to their mother and father but the oldest, Matthew, concluded he would like his new family to adopt him if he could not return to the parents, and his younger siblings agreed.

The juvenile court continued the childrens permanent plan selection and implementation hearing ( 366.26; .26 hearing) from April to July, then September and finally November, after problems arose with the therapist who conducted an initial bonding study, requiring a subsequent study by a different practitioner, Dr. Jennifer Bosch. The juvenile court continued the .26 hearing to November 2007 to allow Dr. Bosch to complete her evaluation.

In the interim, the childrens bond with their prospective adoptive parents grew. They enjoyed a week-long summer vacation in Florida, where Ednas extended family members embraced the children. Meanwhile, father and mother delayed arranging their schedules for an additional visit with the children each week. The children enjoyed their visits with the parents but concluded them easily, with no tears, and no problems with separation. The parents tended to sit and watch the children play on visits, rather than playing with them, or planning activities. Still, the children remained attached to mother and father, closing each visit and phone call with I love you.

In mid-July 2007, the childrens therapist observed the oldest boy, Matthew, struggled the most with the circumstances he and his siblings faced. Matthew acknowledged mother and father had a few things to do before he could return to their care. He voiced that he would be okay with adoption, but reported father tells him that he is not allowed to like Jeff and Edna, causing Matthew to feel confused, angry, and torn. The foster parents noticed a common pattern in which Matthew became aggressive with his brothers after visits with father and mother.

When the social worker notified the children the parents would be missing a visit, they carried on with playing and did not appear upset. Asked if he were disappointed, Matthew responded, Yeah, kind of, but not really. Yet on other occasions, Matthew expressed that he misses his birth parents, while also verbalizing that he likes Jeff and Edna, and feels safe in their care. The therapist worked with Matthew on being able to feel comfortable having affection for the foster parents without feeling guilty or disloyal to his birth parents.

Father tested positive for codeine and morphine, blaming a particular prescription medication (Vicodin), but lab personnel dismissed this explanation as impossible. In August, father tested positive for methamphetamine. The juvenile court, concerned father had become reinfected with staph, suspended his visitation after monitors observed a large, bleeding lesion on his face and others on his arms and legs. Father showed up for two visits despite the courts order. Mothers visits and phone calls dropped off in frequency during fathers suspension, as did fathers phone calls.

A nurse practitioner confirmed fathers staph infection had returned. She recommended a regimen of handwashing, but would not comment on whether father was contagious or not. Based on the amount of time mother and father spent together and their history of poor hygiene and dilatory self-treatment, the juvenile court suspended mothers visitation from the end of September through the .26 hearing scheduled for November, unless she obtained clearance from a medical doctor, which she failed to do, submitting instead a stale exam by an Investigator conducted back in May 2007. Fathers visits remained suspended, and he never obtained the requisite medical clearance. The juvenile court authorized the parents to send video messages to the children, but they failed to take the necessary steps to make the video.

Father and mother turned on SSA and others, spreading blame elsewhere for the childrens detention and dependency. For example, they claimed mothers ex-boyfriend Roy told SSA lies, . . . got the mother to use drugs, and put methamphetamine in fathers drink, causing him to test positive. Yet mother reunified with Roy in August when he was paroled, and married him in October.

On receiving Dr. Boschs bonding study, the juvenile court held the .26 hearing in November 2007. Bosch noted in her report that Matthew warmed the slowest to the prospective adoptive parents, but he had recently become more affectionate with them and had even inquired whether he could change his last name to theirs after adoption. Bosch concluded Matthew knew far too much about what is going on with his parents, leading to conflicted feelings because he loved mother and father and wanted to be with them but realized, even as a child, that they could not provide the necessary support and structure for him or his siblings. Steven expressed a desire to reunite with mother and father, but Bosch observed the child had formed a definite bond with Edna and Jeff, who he loved. Christopher was the most securely bonded to his caretakers. In sum, Bosch opined in her report that the benefits of adoption far outweigh[ed] any detriment from severing parental rights, particularly since Matthew has been parentified to the point where he feels responsible for his parents[] well being and happiness.

Bosch explained at the hearing that there definitely would be a detriment to Matthew in the wake of termination of parental rights, but the security and stability provided by his new adoptive home would outweigh such concerns. Bosch acknowledged Matthew cried briefly during his bonding study interview, which Bosch attributed to feeling very caught in the middle in an adult matter. Bosch initially described Matthews bond with his parents as more negative than positive, but later characterized the bond as more insecure than negative, recognizing Matthews and Stevens relationships with their parents had both positive and negative elements. Bosch noted the prospective adoptive parents seemed open to fostering future contact between the children and mother and father.

Matthew testified he liked living with his parents previously, wanted to continue seeing them, and expressed that it hurt a little when they were unable to visit. He believed adoption meant he would never see his parents again, which made him sad, though he felt it would be good for us, because they need to get their life in order. Steven liked visiting with his parents and talking with them on the phone. He opposed adoption because it meant his visits with mother and father would cease; ideally, he hoped to return to their care someday. Christopher was too young to testify. Mother and father believed severing their rights would be detrimental because the children told them on visits how much they loved them and missed them.

Observing the three boys have a great need for resolution, permanency and stability, the juvenile court rejected long-term guardianship or some other plan because the children had suffered from the uncertainty of their circumstances. The court found the parents had burdened the children with adult problems through inappropriate disclosures and behavior. The court recognized [t]heres no dispute that there are some positive aspects of the childrens attachment to the birth [parents], but concluded the interests of these children that they have a permanent and stable adoptive home is not outweighed by the detriment that the children would suffer if the bond with the birth parents is severed. The juvenile court terminated parental rights, and mother and father now appeal.

II

DISCUSSION

Father and mother contend the juvenile court erred in finding the so-called benefit exception ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i), former  366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)) did not apply. The benefit exception authorizes the juvenile court to avoid terminating parental rights if it finds termination would be detrimental to the child [because] . . . [t]he parents or guardians have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship. (In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 424 (Cliffton B.).) Once a parent fails to reunify with a child during the prescribed statutory period and the juvenile court terminates reunification services, the parent bears the burden of proving termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350 (Jasmine D.).) The benefit exception does not permit a parent to thwart the permanency and stability of adoption merely by showing the child would derive some benefit from continuing a relationship maintained during periods of visitation with the parent. (Id. at p. 1348.)

Instead, the benefit exception applies only if the relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 (Autumn H.).) Autumn H. explains the requisite analytical framework: [T]he court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated. (Ibid.) Thus, the juvenile court must engage in a balancing test, juxtaposing the quality of the relationship and the detriment involved in terminating it against the potential benefit of an adoptive family. (Cliffton B., supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at pp. 424-425.)

Factors bearing on the parent-child bond include [t]he age of the child, the portion of the childs life spent in the parents custody, the positive or negative effect of interaction between parent and child, and the childs particular needs . . . . (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) Even if these factors reveal a strong bond, the parent faces a heavy burden to overcome the Legislatures preferred permanent plan of adoption. (See 366.26, subd. (b)(1) [identifying adoption as preferred plan]; see also Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1348 [Adoption is the Legislatures first choice because it gives the child the best chance at [a full emotional] commitment from a responsible caretaker]; In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1419 [most permanent and secure alternative affords children the best possible opportunity to get on with the task of growing up].) Stability and permanence become paramount goals once reunification efforts cease. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.)

By the .26 hearing, the dependent child is entitled to stability now, not at some hypothetical point in the future. (In re Megan S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247, 254.) Thus, the statutory exceptions to termination, including the benefit exception, merely permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) We review the juvenile courts conclusion concerning whether the benefit exception applies for substantial evidence. (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.)

Challenging the validity of Autumn H., father and mother would have the juvenile court apply the benefit exception without weighing any benefit derived from the parental relationship against the benefits of adoption. Father and mother argue the balancing test articulated in Autumn H. has no statutory basis. According to father, [t]he statu[t]e in no way directs the juvenile court to engage in any weighing process. Individual statutes, however, are not to be read in isolation. [W]e do not construe statutes in isolation, but rather read every statute with reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole may be harmonized and retain effectiveness. [Citation.] (Estate of Garrett (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 831, 836; see Gately v. Cloverdale Unified School Dist. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 487, 494 [Statutory provisions that are in pari material, i.e., related to the same subject, should be construed together as one statute and harmonized if possible]; accord, In re Sean W. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1183.) In short, [t]he meaning of the enactment may not be determined from a single word or sentence; the words must be construed in context. [Citation.] (State of California ex rel. Dockstader v. Hamby (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 480, 487.)

Section 366.26, subdivision (b)(1), explicitly provides that the Legislatures first preference among permanent plans for dependent children whose parents have failed reunification services is to: Terminate the rights of the parent or parents and order that the child be placed for adoption . . . .  Subdivision (b)(1)(B)(i) identifies the benefit exception as a basis for the juvenile court to avoid terminating parental rights, but stipulates the parents showing must be compelling. ( 366.26, subd. (b)(1)(B).) A showing that appears compelling in the abstract may prove less so when weighed against the permanency and stability of adoption. To construe the benefit exception without reference to the Legislatures preference for adoption would nullify that preference. Our role in construing statutory language is to give effect to the Legislatures intent. (Code Civ. Proc.,  1858.) We therefore reject father and mothers interpretation of the benefit exception and their unfounded criticism of Autumn H. (See Williams v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 337, 357 [interpretations nullifying statutory language are to be avoided].)

True, as father and mother note, the Legislature has not codified Autumn H.s holding. But the Legislatures decision to remain silent on Autumn H., undermines fathers and mothers position. When . . . a statute has been construed by judicial decision, and that construction is not altered by subsequent legislation, it must be presumed that the Legislature is aware of the judicial construction and approves of it. [Citations.] (People v. Meloney (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1145, 1161; accord, California School Employees Assn. v. Governing Bd. of South Orange County Community College Dist. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 574, 587.) The Legislature has amended section 366.26 more than a dozen times since 1994 without countermanding the balancing test articulated in Autumn H. We therefore presume the Legislature is aware of and endorses Autumn H. as correctly concluding the benefit exception in section 366.26 must be weighed against the Legislatures preference for adoption in the same section. Father and mothers attack on Autumn H. therefore fails.

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts conclusion termination of parental rights would not cause the children detriment, and that termination was in the childrens best interest. Under Autumn H., father and mother bore the burden of establishing termination of parental rights would greatly harm the children (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575; accord Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350), and the juvenile court could reasonably conclude they failed to meet that burden. On review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order. (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.)

In re Jerome D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1200 (Jerome D.) and In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681 (Amber M.) illustrate the compelling evidence necessary to establish the benefit exception. In Jerome D., the child seemed lonely, sad, and . . . the odd child out in his placement. (Jerome D., at p. 1206.) He wanted to live with his mother and had enjoyed unsupervised night visits in her home. (Id. at p. 1207.) A psychologist opined the child and his mother shared a strong and well[-]developed parent-child relationship and a close attachment approaching a primary bond. (Ibid.) The court concluded that keeping parental rights intact would prevent Jeromes position as the odd child out in [placement] from becoming entrenched by a cessation of visits and the loss of his mother while [his half-siblings] continued to enjoy visits and remained Mothers children. (Id. at p. 1208.)

In Amber M., the court reversed termination of parental rights where a psychologist, therapists, and the court-appointed special advocate uniformly concluded a beneficial parental relationship . . . clearly outweigh[ed] the benefit of adoption. (Amber M., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 690.) Additionally, two older children had a strong primary bond with their mother, and the younger child was very strongly attached to her. (Ibid.) If the adoptions had proceeded, the children would have been adopted in separate groups. (Id. at pp. 690-691.)

Here, father and mother presented nothing remotely resembling the harm that would have ensued from termination of parental rights in Amber M. or Jerome D. Father points to Matthews and Stevens testimony each would be sad not to see father ever again. Father relies on our observation that [s]adness is often all a young child can express, unable to differentiate between devastat[ing] sadness and sadness the child can deal with . . . . (In re Jacob S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1017.) Father asserts the children were expressing insurmountable sadness, but the record amply demonstrates the boys proved themselves capable of overcoming indeed, grew accustomed to their parents absence. After father and mother let them languish in dependency for two and one-half years, frequently skipping in-person or telephone contacts, the children understandably shrugged off missed visits and learned to live without mother and father as parental figures, separating easily from them at the conclusion of visits. The record furnishes no basis to second-guess the juvenile courts evaluation of the childrens emotional connection to their parents. (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924 [issues of fact and credibility are solely for the juvenile court to evaluate].)

Mother focuses on Matthews and Stevens testimony that they wanted to continue their relationship with their parents. There was, however, no evidence contact would cease; to the contrary, the prospective adoptive parents seemed receptive to a referral for post-adoption contact and, as the juvenile court observed, demonstrated commitment to continually make decisions based upon the best interests of the children.

But even if visits were to end, the juvenile court was charged with determining the childrens best interests. A child may not be able to understand the concept of adoption and, in any event, the court need not follow the childs wishes unless he or she is over the age of 12. (In re Joshua G. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 189, 201;  366.26, subds. (c)(1)(B) & (h).) In assessing the childrens best interests, the juvenile court could consider evidence the children thrived outside mothers and fathers care, while visits from their parents often hindered the childrens development, precipitating aggression or enuresis. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts conclusion termination would not greatly harm the children.

Father turns the childrens use of therapy against them, suggesting resort to counseling to deal with the anxiety of adoption shows it is not the right outcome. The juvenile court, however, could reasonably recognize termination is fraught with roiling emotions that do not, by themselves, tip the balance in favor of preserving parental rights. For instance, the childrens need for therapy stemmed in part from their parentification: mother and father burdened them particularly Matthew with adult issues and concerns, depriving them of their childhood.

Father insinuates that class and lifestyle biases influenced the juvenile courts decision to forego the benefit exception and free the children for adoption. The accusation is baseless. The juvenile court could reasonably conclude the childrens improved behavior and relative indifference to parental absences demonstrated their best interests did not lie in preserving the legal, parental bond, regardless of whether adoption might improve their station in life. No evidence suggests the juvenile court considered any improper factors. The court could reasonably conclude the stability of a loving, permanent home that preserved the three brothers as a sibling set outweighed any benefits in maintaining a legal, parental relationship with father or mother, who never rectified the issues leading to dependency and never progressed to unmonitored visitation. (See In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 51 [parents showing of requisite benefit difficult to make where he or she fails to qualify for unsupervised visitation].)

Mothers reliance at oral argument on the recent case of In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289 is misplaced. S.B. is distinguishable in at least three ways. First, the juvenile court did not base its denial of the benefit exception on, as in S.B., an unenforceable promise by the prospective adoptive parents of continued parental visits posttermination. (Id. at p. 300.) Rather, as we have noted, ample evidence supported the juvenile courts conclusion here that termination served the childrens best interests even if visits ceased. Second, because the prospective adoptive parents in S.B. were relatives, the father there did not have to demonstrate termination would greatly harm his daughter (id. at p. 300, fn. 10, citing  366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)), but he nevertheless did so and the juvenile courts contrary conclusion was unfounded. (In re S.B., at p. 300.) Here, in contrast, as discussed supra, substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts conclusion the parents failed to demonstrate termination would greatly harm the boys. Third, absent a showing of great harm, there is no basis to question the juvenile courts conclusion under Autumn H. that the benefits of adoption outweighed any detriment ensuing from termination. (See Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575 [well-being derived from continuing parent-child relationship must always be measured against Legislative preference for adoption].)

Father and mother contend the option of a guardianship obviated the need to choose between preserving parental rights and affording the children stability. The Legislature has decreed, however, that guardianship is not in the best interests of children who cannot be returned to their parents. These children can be afforded the best possible opportunity to get on with the task of growing up by placing them in the most permanent and secure alternative that can be afforded them. In decreeing adoption to be the preferred permanent plan, the Legislature recognized that, Although guardianship may be a more stable solution than foster care, it is not irrevocable and thus falls short of the secure and permanent placement intended by the Legislature. [Citation.] (In re Beatrice M., supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1419.)

Insisting the juvenile court should have preferred guardianship over adoption, mother argues [t]he idea that a positive relationship can and should be disposed of is outmoded.Mother contends plural adult relationships better serve childrens best interests and, because children should be loved, cared for and adored by as many people as possible, there is no reason to terminate a parental relationship. We note termination of parental rights severs only the legal relationship between parent and child; it does not automatically amount to a no-contact order. In any event, the policy preference mother advocates favoring guardianship is beyond our purview, since it is a legislative rather than judicial question. (See In re Marriage of Tavares (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 620, 628 [The Legislature declares state public policy, not the courts].)

III
DISPOSITION

The order of the juvenile court terminating parental rights is affirmed.

ARONSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

OLEARY, ACTING P. J.

IKOLA, J.

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