In re Evelyn M.

Filed 6/27/08 In re Evelyn M. CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Antoinette M. and Joseph S. are the parents of Evelyn M., a three-year-old girl. Both appeal from the juvenile courts order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26^[1]ending their parental rights. They claim that the juvenile court misunderstood the statutory scheme for setting a permanent plan under section 366.26. They also claim that the beneficial relationship and sibling relationship exceptions apply against the courts order ending their parental rights. And they claim that the court should not have taken into account the possibility of postadoption family contacts in ending their parental rights.

The juvenile court relied on evidence that because of Antoinette M.s mental health problems and the parents inability to master the needed skills, the parents were incapable of safely raising Evelyn M., though they love their children and had tried to parent them. In the first two and a half years of her life Evelyn M. had already had to be removed from the parents home at least three times for her safety. The court said that [t]his is an extremely difficult case and ruled only with a heavy heart, but ruled correctly inasmuch as it is the best interest of Evelyn M. that governs in these circumstances. We will affirm the orders.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Evelyn M. was born on December 31, 2004, and immediately detained for placement with a relative. On January 4, 2005, the Santa Cruz County Human Resource Agency (Agency) filed a juvenile dependency petition under section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (j) (abuse of sibling) on Evelyn M.s behalf.

Under subdivision (b) of section 300, the petition alleged that Antoinette M. could not provide a stable environment for the infant. As reasons, the petition alleged that Antoinette M. had a long history of mental illness; she was a drug user; she was not prepared to provide suitable care for Evelyn M.; an investigation was underway into a charge that the parents had physically abused a sibling, Lance K., an allegation that was part of a history of involvements Antoinette M. had with the Agency regarding Lance and another sibling, William M., who were currently dependents of the juvenile court; and the father, Joseph S., was unable or unwilling to protect Evelyn M. from Antoinette M.s risky behavior. Similar allegations informed the petition under subdivision (j) of section 300. On January 5, 2005, the juvenile court ordered Evelyn M. to be detained.

The case proceeded to the jurisdictional and dispositional phase. Reports from this phase revealed the parents history of difficulties. Antoinette M. had had an exceedingly difficult childhood and as a child had been the subject of government investigations about her own welfare. (A later report, not available to the juvenile court at this stage, would show that Joseph S. also had a difficult childhood.) Antoinette M. suffered from poorly controlled bipolar disorder, had abused drugs, and had caused dependency investigations on behalf of Evelyn M.s siblings Lance K. and William M. a number of times since 1997, though many of the investigations led to a lack of substantiation or inconclusive results. Antoinette M. was poor and homeless; she had been living in an automobile when she gave birth to Evelyn M., though later the parents found housing. Joseph S.s behavior with William had also precipitated dependency investigations; he was reported to be too physically aggressive in disciplining William and Lance and had improperly secured William with duct tape. The investigations were discontinued because neither child complained about their fathers treatment of them. Despite these circumstances, the parents cared about their children and wanted to be better parents.

The Agency recommended that Evelyn M. be returned to the parents with family maintenance services to remediate the parents problems. On February 24, 2005, the juvenile court entered an order in accordance with the recommendation.

Subsequent review plan reports showed a mix of progress and continued child-rearing difficulties. The parents continued to desire to raise their children properly and strove to comply with the Agency case plan but often appeared overwhelmed by the task. There were reports (some of them substantiated, others not) that both parents were applying improper corporal punishment and/or other unorthodox forms of restraint and discipline to Lance K. and William M. The parents could not maintain the family home in a safe and sanitary manner, despite help the Agency provided to show them how to do this. Lance and William appeared not to have been bathed during one two-week period. William, only eight years old, had tried to get a five-year-old boy at school to orally copulate him and would expose himself in the classroom. A therapist had noted Lances rage and sexualized behaviors; Lance was only age four. Both boys presented a physical danger to Evelyn M.

Soon thereafter, Evelyn M.s counsel concluded that the parents household was chaotic, the parents were incapable of learning how to rear their children, and the risk of harm to her and her siblings remained dire. Counsel filed a section 388 modification petition on February 27, 2006, asking the juvenile court to end family maintenance services for Evelyn M. and set a section 366.26 hearing for a permanent plan. The Agency agreed that Evelyn M. (and in fact all of the children) should be removed but argued that a permanent plan for her was premature and that reunification services for her should continue.

Following a contested hearing over four days, the juvenile court essentially sided with the Agency. On April 26, 2006, it entered an order removing Evelyn M., who was 15 months old at that point, from the home, but also ordering reunification services rather than the setting of a permanent plan. The parents subsequently improved living conditions in the home to the point that the Agency recommended that Evelyn M. be returned to her parents with family maintenance services, and on October 27, 2006, the court so ordered. A status review report commented, however, that because of the parents limitations, progress has been slow despite their willingness to learn parenting skills and that the risk level to Evelyn remains high.

About three months later, the Agency decided the risk to Evelyn M. was excessive and filed a supplemental petition urging that she again be removed because the home was again unsafe. The Watsonville police department had taken Evelyn M. into protective custody due to severe neglect by her parents. The parents house was filthy, disheveled, cluttered, and grossly unsanitary. The parents had turned uncooperative, Antoinette M.s mental state was deteriorating, and Antoinette M.s mental defects were now in a poorly controlled state. On February 5, 2007, the juvenile court once again removed Evelyn M. Following the courts action, the Agency, in its jurisdiction/disposition report on the supplemental petition, recommended ending reunification services and establishing a permanent plan for Evelyn M., who was now in foster care, under which a maternal aunt and uncle in Washington state might adopt her. The Agency opined that it is unlikely that any amount of services will assist the parents in making changes to their longstanding parenting patterns.

In a subsequent permanent plan report under section 366.26, the Agency contended that Evelyn M. was highly adoptable and the aunt and uncle were suitable prospective adoptive parents. The aunt was a psychiatric nurse and the uncle worked in manufacturing.

A contested selection and implementation hearing took place on September 19, 20, and 25 of 2007. A social worker testified that Evelyn M. was, in essence, not bonded to her biological parents and that it would benefit her to have the parents rights ended with regard to her. Another social worker testified that Evelyn M. enjoyed William M.s company and the two had a close, even special, brother-sister relationship.

The trial court gave a detailed oral pronouncement at the conclusion of the hearing. It stated that the difficulty for the Court is certainly emotional commitment and the love that the parents have [shown] towards Evelyn after this final removal. [] Clearly, if the purpose of the Courts decision were to decide what was best for the parents, Evelyn should be returned to them in a heartbeat. Because they love her more than anything in this world, and that comes through in their testimony . . . .

[] . . . [] . . . [I]f my choice were to determine what is best for you, . . . I would place her back in your care in a heartbeat. [] Unfortunately, that is not my duty today. And my duty under the law is to determine what is best for Evelyn. . . . Shes too young, of course, to perhaps know what is best for her down the line in her life. . . .

I think I should follow the structure of the law, the trial court continued. Thats what Im required to do. [] The first thing everyone agrees here that Evelyn is a very adoptable child. There are . . . three families, her own, and the other family member, and also the foster parents, who all want to adopt, or all want Evelyn in their care. So shes very much a child wanted and a very adoptable child. [] Secondly, lets look at the exceptions. On behalf of the parents, have they had consistent visitation and contact with the child? Absolutely. [] . . . Whether or not [section 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i) applies turns on] whether or not the parents had consistent contact on visitation, and thats absolutely the case. [] As to the other exception as to whether or not it would disrupt the sibling relationship[, i]n some respects I believe this to be true, and in others according to the evidence I have some question. [] . . . It seems that every time they were together, Evelyn was actually comforting and leading and parenting William, in many times putting her arm around him, patting him on the head, giving affection to him, basically coddling him, comforting him, directing him. So I do think that they are going to need to be together. She provides a very important relationship to him. [] But does he provide that to her? She knows they are brother and sister. Im sure she derives some satisfaction and completes her in a certain way to be a part of Williams life. So I think thats going to be important to her, but especially to him. [] So, but then, even though these exceptions are met, do those outweigh the benefit of permanency or Evelyn in the long term[?] And thats where I have the big problem here, to say to the child at three years of age you will benefit from a long-term foster care placement all your life, and thats going to be more beneficial to you than to know that you have a permanent and constant home, and yet many other people in your life that love you. I think the benefit of knowing for her that she has a permanent and constant home is going to be more important in the long run to her than being in a long-term foster care. [] All the studies and statistics that we see in trying to do this job show that children in foster care tend to suffer setbacks and shortcomings many times in their life. And its sometimes a stigma that they never get over that Im a foster child. Nobody loved me enough to adopt me. Nobody cared about me enough to let go of me, to let go of me so I could have the best in my life, or nobody thought that would be important to me, they only thought about their own well-being. And I dont think that is the case here. I know in your hearts you want her in your home and you want to be her parents more than anything. But what is best for her is really to have a stable permanent home with you still in her life. . . . [] . . . [] . . . [M]any of the things that cry out, I believe, for Evelyns need of permanency and stability in her life, and as she grows older, and these will get to be more important. [] And so at this time it is with a heavy heart that I . . . rule that . . . the parental rights should be terminated. However, I do feel that both father and mothers request for the matter to be referred to the Consortium for Children is in the best interest of Evelyn, and that sibling visitation should continue, as well as extended family and grandparents contact. . . . [] . . . [] . . . Sometimes a clean [break] is a lot better. But in this case, I do believe she benefits from her contact relationship with her parents and with William. [] . . . [] . . . I will just say my finding is that the benefit of stability and permanency outweighs the exceptions that were met. And thats for both foster care and legal guardianship.

DISCUSSION

I. Improperly Comparing Permanent Plans for the Minor

Both parents contend that the juvenile courts concluding remarks at the contested permanency hearing show it misunderstood the statutory framework for deciding on a permanent plan. They maintain that the court improperly compared all possible permanent plansadoption, guardianship, and long-term foster carefor the strength of their permanency and came up with the tautological conclusion that because adoption is the most stable of all of the statutory options, the only option was adoption. In so doing, they maintain, the court disregarded the statutory scheme that provides for guardianship and long-term foster care as alternatives to adoption.

As we have previously quoted, the juvenile court commented: I have the big problem here, to say to the child at three years of age you will benefit from a long-term foster care placement all your life, and thats going to be more beneficial to you than to know that you have a permanent and constant home, and yet many other people in your life that love you. I think the benefit of knowing for her that she has a permanent and constant home is going to be more important in the long run to her than being in a long-term foster care. The court also remarked that to say that the government knows better than the hearts of parents at times is very hard. And its very hard for, as an arm of the government to say we know best that permanency will be best in the long run for this child, that is very difficult to swallow in some cases. [] Most of the time, yes. Especially older children or very, very young infants. But three years old when they are starting to become their own people and express feelings and desires, I think its hard sometimes for us to say we know better for their lives. [] However, I asked minors Counsel to expand a little bit about why she felt that Evelyns need was greater for permanency and stability than to have these other relationships take priority in her life and to be unsettled herself for the rest of her life. And you indicated to me that many of the things that cry out, I believe, for Evelyns need of permanency and stability in her life, and as she grows older, and these will get to be more important.

Regardless of the nature of the juvenile courts comments at the oral pronouncement of its ruling, the question before us is whether there was substantial evidence to support the courts decision that Evelyn M. should be adopted rather than placed in guardianship or long-term foster care.   [A] ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for a wrong reason. If right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be sustained regardless of the considerations which may have moved the trial court to its conclusion. [Citation.]  (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976.)

The best interest of the child controls (In re Fernando M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 529, 534) and adoption, not guardianship (and still less long-term foster care), is the preferred alternative. ( 366.26, subd. (b), (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(5).)  The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption. [Citation.] [Citation.]  The Legislature has decreed . . . that guardianship is not in the best interests of children who cannot be returned to their parents. These children can be afforded the best possible opportunity to get on with the task of growing up by placing them in the most permanent plan and secure alternative that can be afforded them.   (In re Josue G. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 725, 732.)

By ordering Evelyn M. placed for adoption, the juvenile court did what the Legislature mandated. Accordingly, we cannot question its decision unless it failed to follow the legal roadmap in carrying out the legislative mandate. The parents would be entitled to relief if, under a substantial evidence standard, the record belied the courts conclusion that there was clear and convincing evidence ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)) that Evelyn M. was adoptable. But it does not.

We review the juvenile courts adoptability determination for substantial evidence. [Citation.] Our circumscribed role on appeal and limited vantage point require that we draw all inferences and resolve any evidentiary conflicts in favor of the juvenile courts order. (In re Y.R. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 99, 112.)

As noted, the Agency contended in a written filing before the hearing that Evelyn M. was highly adoptable with an aunt and uncle who were suitable prospective adoptive parents. At the hearing a social worker testified that the little girl was above average in the verbal subset of intellectual capacity, had exceptional social skills, and had a happy demeanor. Evelyn M. also had the advantage of her extreme youth. The juvenile court commented: The first thing everyone agrees here that Evelyn is a very adoptable child. There are . . . three families, her own, and the other family member, and also the foster parents, who all want to adopt, or all want Evelyn in their care. So shes very much a child wanted and a very adoptable child. The record contains substantial evidence to support that observation.

When the juvenile court was presented with clear and convincing evidence to support a conclusion that Evelyn M. was adoptable, the court was required to terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption. ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) The court did not misapply the statutory scheme.

II. Improperly Discounting the Exceptions to the Adoption Preference

The parents also claim that the juvenile court misapplied the law by discounting the statutorily mandated exceptions to adoption. The parents concede that adoption is the preferred permanent plan in dependency proceedings ( 366.26, subds. (b), (b)(1)), but argue that when an exception codified in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), applies, the court must, in order to safeguard the childs best interest, select a permanent plan other than adoption. This, they argue, the courts oral pronouncement shows it erroneously failed to do.

The juvenile court asked rhetorically, even though these [beneficial relationship and sibling relationship] exceptions are met, do those outweigh the benefit of permanency or Evelyn in the long term[?] In concluding its oral pronouncement, the court stated, I will just say my finding is that the benefit of stability and permanency outweighs the exceptions that were met. (Italics added.)

Elsewhere, however, the juvenile court implied that the exceptions existed in a moral sense but not in a legal sense, i.e., not in a sense that could overcome the statutory preference for adoption. Moreover, the court noted that William M., not Evelyn M., was the more likely to benefit from continued sibling contact, a benefit to William that the court appeared to be aware it could not take into account legally (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 49-50, 54)though it could note it in impressionistic termsin deciding on a permanent plan for Evelyn M. Specifically, the court stated: Whether or not . . . the parents had consistent contact on visitation, . . . thats absolutely the case. [] As to the other exception as to whether or not it would disrupt the sibling relationship[:] In some respects I believe this to be true, and in others according to the evidence I have some question. [] I do believe that William and Evelyn should continue to have contact, whether it is more for the benefit of Evelyn or for William remains to be the question here. It seems that every time they were together, Evelyn was actually comforting and leading and parenting William, in many times putting her arm around him, patting him on the head, giving affection to him, basically coddling him, comforting him, directing him. So I do think that they are going to need to be together. She provides a very important relationship to him. [] But does he provide that to her? She knows they are brother and sister. Im sure she derives some satisfaction and completes her in a certain way to be a part of Williams life. So I think thats going to be important to her, but especially to him.

As we have alluded to, the sibling relationship exception permits the trial court to consider possible detriment to the child being considered for adoption, but not a sibling of that child. (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 54; accord, id. at p. 55.) To be sure, evidence of the siblings relationship with the child and, if the sibling is articulate, perhaps of the siblings views of that relationship, might be relevant as indirect evidence of the effect the adoption may have on the adoptive child. (Id. at p. 55.) In this case, however, we have no quarrel with the juvenile courts contemplation that William M., not Evelyn M., was likely to be the more significant beneficiary of any maintained sibling ties.

Nevertheless, some of the juvenile courts commentsthose stating the exceptions were metdid not precisely articulate the method by which the law should be applied to the facts before the court.^[2] Viewed in isolation, they understandably gave rise to the parents suspicion that the court did not understand the statutory scheme. Viewed in context, they are less significant than the parents make them out to be.

We are aided in clarifying the ambiguities in the juvenile courts oral pronouncement by its written decision, in which the court declined to find that either the beneficial relationship or the sibling relationship exceptions applied so as to make the ending of the parents parental rights detrimental to Evelyn M.

As noted, regardless of the nature of the juvenile courts comments at the oral pronouncement of its ruling, the question before us is the validity, under applicable law, of the courts decision that no exception applied to take this case out of the statutory requirement that Evelyn M. be adopted. (People v. Zapien, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 976.)^[3] In other words, this case rests on the question whether the juvenile court erred in finding that the exceptions to adoption defined in section 366.26, subdivisions (c)(1)(B)(i) and (c)(1)(B)(v), did not apply. Those provisions permit a juvenile court to choose an option other than adoption when the parent has maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship (id., subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) and when there would be substantial interference with a childs sibling relationship (id., subd. (c)(1)(B)(v)).

A. Beneficial Relationship Exception

The juvenile courts finding that the beneficial relationship exception did not apply is reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 53.) The burden rested on the parents to establish in the juvenile court that the exception justified departing from the preference for ending parental rights at this stage. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1343-1345.)

With regard to the beneficial relationship exception: If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parents rights are not terminated. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.)

[T]o establish the exception in [former] section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) [now section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i)], the parents must do more than demonstrate frequent and loving contact [citation], an emotional bond with the child, or that the parents and child find their visits pleasant. [Citation.] Rather, the parents must show that they occupy a parental role in the childs life. [Citation.] (In re Andrea R. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1108.)

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts finding that the parents had not shown a compelling reason ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)) to qualify for the exception. In sum, the parents did not demonstrate that their daughter would be greatly harmed (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575) by ending their parental rights, and the positive nature of their contacts was insufficient by itself. (In re Andrea R., supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 1108.)

Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts finding, in essence, that the relationship did not promote[] the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)

B. Sibling Relationship Exception

With regard to the sibling relationship exception: the application of this exception will be rare, particularly when the proceedings concern young children whose needs for a competent, caring and stable parent are paramount. (In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1014.)

As with the beneficial relationship exception, we review a juvenile courts determination on the applicability of the sibling relationship exception for substantial evidence. (In re Jacob S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1017.) Similar to the rule applying to the beneficial relationship exception, it was the parents burden in the proceedings below to show that a sibling relationship exists and that its severance would be detrimental to the child. (Ibid.)

We note that William M. and Evelyn M. lived together for only for about six months, when Evelyn M. was about 18 months to two years old. This case thus bears a resemblance to In re Valerie A., supra, 152 Cal.App.4th 987. In that case, the court concluded that the record clearly shows the childrens best interests were served by adoption and the sibling relationship exception did not apply to preclude termination of parental rights. The children . . . were raised in the same home for a relatively short period of time. Although they had contact . . . since birth, the trial court reasonably could infer the experiences the children shared . . . would not be as meaningful to them, as infants and toddlers, as the experiences were to [a child], who was six years older. Even though . . . interactions . . . were loving, affectionate, playful and nurturing, the court reasonably could determine the childrens long-term emotional interests, due to their ages and needs, were better served by the permanency of adoption rather than by continued sibling contact. (Id. at p. 1013, fn. omitted.)

Moreover, the juvenile court was confronted with the fact that whereas William M. had to be sent to a group home and required considerable intervention before he would be suitable for permanent placement, Evelyn M. was ready for permanent placement immediately. The court was also aware that William was seriously troubled and, at age eight, already had tried to sexually molest a five-year-old boy, a victim who was not much older than Evelyn M.

Given the foregoing evidence, substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts determination that the sibling relationship exception did not apply in this case.

C. Prejudice

Finally, even if the juvenile court did err in interpreting the statutory scheme, reversal is not required unless there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome to the parents on remand. The California Constitution prohibits a court from setting aside a judgment unless the error has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI,  13.) We have interpreted that language as permitting reversal only if the reviewing court finds it reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to the appealing party but for the error. [Citation.] We believe it appropriate to apply the same test in dependency matters. (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 59-60.) We discern no reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome to the parents here. We have already explained that their own lives were chaotic, even if in part for reasons beyond their control, and that long-standing Agency efforts to teach them to rear their children adequately had failed. Under these circumstances, we discern no reasonable probability that the court would find a compelling reason ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)) exists to conclude termination would be detrimental to the child (ibid.) because the child would benefit from continuing the relationship (id., subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)). Similarly, if for no other reasons than William M.s own behavioral problems, including an attempt to commit a sexual molestation on a child not much older than Evelyn M., and the courts comment that the sibling relationship seemed to benefit him more than her, we discern no reasonable probability that the court would find a compelling reason ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)) exists to conclude termination would be detrimental to the child (ibid.) because, inter alia, ongoing contact is in the childs best interest, including the childs long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit . . . [of] adoption (id., subd. (c)(1)(B)(v)).

III. Reliance on Possibility of Postadoption Contacts

The parents claim that the juvenile court erred by improperly relying on speculative, unenforceable suggestions about postadoptive sibling contact to select a plan that ostensibly served Evelyn M.s best interests. We do not agree.

The juvenile court stated that the Court feels in this particular case it is a very strong benefit in Evelyns life to have . . . continued contact with her parents and with William. . . . I do believe she benefits from her contact relationship with her parents and with William. [] . . . [A]t this point the Court really feels that continued contact is important.

The juvenile court was entitled to offer its opinion about the possible benefits of continued contact between Evelyn M., her brother William M., and her parents. When appropriate, the court can encourage the adoptive parents to agree to visits among the siblings although, as the court recognized in this case, it cannot require them to do so. (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 55; accord, Fam. Code,  8616.5, subds. (a), (b)(1).) The same reasoning applies to the courts effort to encourage continued contact between Evelyn M. and her parents to the extent the competent interested parties could agree on it and it would benefit the minor. (Fam. Code,  8616.5, subds. (a), (d).)

CONCLUSION

The juvenile courts orders are affirmed.

______________________________________

Duffy, J.

WE CONCUR:

______________________________________

Rushing, P. J.

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McAdams, J.

^[1]All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

^[2]Another example, which Antoinette M. notes in her reply brief, is that at one point the juvenile court referred to the exceptions to the adoption preference and then mentioned thats for both foster care and guardianship, leaving it ambiguous on the record whether the court was thinking of guardianship and foster care ( 366.26, subds. (b)(2), (b)(5)) as exceptions rather than contemplating the beneficial relationship and sibling relationship exceptions (id., subd. (c)(1)). Reviewing the entire transcript, we think the court was engaged in the latter process.

^[3]This case is not on the same footing as In re Fernando M., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th 529, on which both parents rely. In that case, which involved issues concerning the mishandling of the minors placement that do not exist here (id. at pp. 533, 536-538), the juvenile courts oral pronouncements showed that it had patently misapplied one legal standard in ending the mothers parental rights and arguably misapplied another. (Id. at pp. 535-537.) In this case, the record, viewed in total, shows that the juvenile court did not apply an incorrect standard.