In re G.W.
Filed 5/7/08 In re G.W. CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
In re G. W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | B197589 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. FJ40127) |
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. G. W., Defendant and Appellant. |
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Shep Zebberman, Referee. Affirmed.
Patricia Winters, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Nima Razfar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________
G.W. challenges the probation condition requiring her to maintain satisfactory grades imposed after the juvenile court found she had committed assault with a deadly weapon. We affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After fighting with her sister, then 14-year-old G.W. attempted to stab her mother with a kitchen knife. The district attorney filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging G.W. had committed assault with a deadly weapon upon her mother in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a).
Following a jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found true the allegations in the petition, sustained the petition, determined the offense a felony and declared G.W. a ward of the juvenile court. At the disposition hearing, the court ordered G.W. into suitable placement with a maximum physical confinement period of four years and imposed several conditions of probation, including that she maintain satisfactory grades, attendance and citizenship.
DISCUSSION
The juvenile court is empowered to impose conditions of probation in juvenile cases and has broad discretion when formulating such conditions. A juvenile probationer may be subject to any and all reasonable conditions the court may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 730, subd. (b).) In deciding what probation conditions are appropriate, the court shall consider not only the circumstances of the offense but also the minors entire social history. Such conditions are valid and enforceable unless they bear no reasonable relationship to the underlying offense or prohibit conduct that is neither criminal in nature nor related to future criminality. (In re Josh W. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1, 5-6.) When it comes to satisfactory grades conditions, it is well-established that there is a correlation between education and crime rates. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 607.)
On appeal, the courts exercise of discretion will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion. (In re Josh W., supra, at pp. 5-6.)
G.W. contends the imposition of a satisfactory grades condition was an abuse of discretion and fundamentally unfair given her inability to function at grade level. To support her claim, G.W. points to the probation report of her having been in special education all her life and a ninth grade report card of her having failing grades in four of six courses. G.W. argues her situation is similar to those of In re Robert M. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 812 (Robert M.) and In re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1 (Juan G.). In each case, a similar probation condition was ordered stricken on appeal based on an evidentiary showing that compliance with the disputed condition was beyond the minors capacity. (Robert M, at pp. 816-818; Juan G. at pp. 6-8.)
The term satisfactory grades has been defined to mean passing grades of D or above in each graded subject. (In re Angel J. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1102.) The evidence upon which G.W. relies fails to establish her inability to attain satisfactory grades. G.W. wishes us to infer from her report card that she has made an effort to do well in her courses, but simply could not do so. G.W. fails to mention that in the four courses in which she earned an F grade, including Advanced Physical Education (P.E.), she had numerous absences, from 16 to 30. In each of her two remaining courses, composition and English, she achieved a D grade, notwithstanding 18 and 14 absences, respectively. G.W. was withdrawn from all courses the following semester. While it is true, according to the probation report, G.W. has always been in special education classes, her most recent Individual Education Program (IEP) recommended that she be taken out of special education classes after one year if her behavior improved.
G.W.s situation differs markedly from those of Robert M. and Juan G. In Robert M., the court held that probation could not be revoked for failure to achieve satisfactory grades where the probationer was 13 years old, in the seventh grade, but with an I.Q. of 70, second grade vocabulary skills and third grade reading and math skills. (Robert M., supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at pp. 815-818.) In Juan G., we held a requirement to maintain a B average was an abuse of discretion in the absence of any evidence the probationer could achieve that result. (Juan G., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at pp. 6-8.) Here, the requirement G.W. faces is less stringent than in Juan G.; and, unlike the situation in Robert M., there is evidence of G.W.s ability to earn passing grades.
While what little we know of G.W.s school history reflects a less than average academic performance, the record does not demonstrate her failing grades stem from a lack of ability rather than a lack of effort. We believe the condition requiring G.W. to maintain satisfactory grades is reasonably related to her successful completion of the probationary period without further criminality as well as her future success in society. (See In reAngel J., supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1101-1102 [the imposition of condition of probation requiring satisfactory grades is not unconstitutionally vague and is appropriate for purposes of rehabilitation].) We find no abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ZELON, J.
We concur:
PERLUSS, P. J.
WOODS, J.
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