Shukman v. Nance
Filed 6/18/08 Shukman v. Nance CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
SOL SHUKMAN et al.,
Cross-complainants and Respondents, A117906
v. (San MateoCounty
Super. Ct. No. 358245)
JAMES H. NANCE,
Cross-defendant and Appellant.
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James H. Nance (appellant) appeals from an order denying his motion to vacate the renewal of a judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., 683.170.)[1] We conclude the court correctly denied appellants motion and affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant has not provided us with a complete record so it is not possible to set forth the facts of the underlying dispute. As best as we can tell, H.W. Fisher filed a complaint against respondents Sol and Mila Shukman. The Shukmans then filed a cross-complaint against Fisher and appellant. A stipulated settlement in favor of the Shukmans was negotiated, and on December 18, 1995, the trial court signed and filed an order granting motion to enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the stipulated settlement. As is relevant, it ordered that a judgment be entered as follows:
Fisher & Nance shall pay the Shukmans the sum of $20,000 which amount shall be deemed to compensate the Shukmans for their claims not covered under the Fishers insurance policy . . . . The order was ambiguous because appellant was identified simply as Nance. His full name does not appear anywhere in the document.
The order was not entered as a judgment in the minutes of the court. Rather, it was entered as an order grntg mot to enter jmt pursuant to the terms of the stip settlement . . . .
In May 1996, the Shukmans, through counsel, tried to enforce what they apparently believed was a judgment by filing a writ of execution. The clerk of the court declined to issue the writ because the December 18, 1995 order was not a judgment. In addition, the clerk stated that the names of the judgment debtors in the proposed writ did not correspond to the names set forth in the December 18, 1995 order. The clerk stated that an amended order would be required to cure the defects.
The Shukmans submitted an amended order granting motion to enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the stipulated settlement to the court. The court signed the order on June 28, 1996 and it was filed on July 1, 1996. It clarified that James H. Nance and Harvey W. Fisher were the judgment debtors. The amended order was entered as a judgment in the minutes of the court on July 1, 1996.
By statute, a judgment is valid for 10 years. ( 683.020.) A judgment may be renewed by filing an application for renewal at any time before the expiration of the 10-year period of enforceability . . . . ( 683.130, subd. (a).)
On May 17, 2006, the Shukmans applied for a renewal. The application was granted and appellant was served with notice of the renewal on July 10, 2006.
On March 27, 2007, appellant filed a motion to vacate the renewal. As is relevant, he argued that the judgment had expired before it was renewed.
The trial court conducted a hearing on the appellants motion and denied it. The court ruled the Shukmans had properly renewed the judgment before it expired and that appellant had failed to timely challenge that renewal.
I. DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion to vacate the renewed judgment. He raises several arguments; most are premised upon the assumption that the order issued by the court on December 18, 1995, was a judgment. In his reply, he contends, The document itself says that it is a judgment.
We disagree with appellants fundamental premise that the December 18 order was a judgment. A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action or proceeding. ( 577.) Whether a particular ruling is a final judgment is determined not by the rulings title, but by its substance and effect. (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 698; Joyce v. Black (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 318, 321.)
Applying these principles, we note that the December 18, 1995 order was not, in substance, a judgment. The court ordered that a judgment be entered on certain terms, but it did not in fact enter a judgment. An order for judgment is not a judgment. (Prothero v. Superior Court (1925) 196 Cal. 439, 443; United Taxpayers Co. v. San Francisco (1921) 55 Cal.App. 239, 243.) Even the documents title does not aid appellant, because it is clearly titled, Order Granting Motion to Enter Judgment Pursuant to the Terms of the Stipulated Settlement. Amending the order granting a motion to enter judgment did not cause the original order to become something it never was.
Furthermore, the issuing court did not consider the December 18, 1995 order to be a judgment and it refused to authorize any enforcement efforts based on it. An order that the issuing court refuses to recognize and will not enforce does not have the effect of a judgment.
We conclude the December 18, 1995 order was not in substance or effect a judgment. Rather, as is set forth in the minutes of the court, the sole judgment in this case was filed on July 1, 1996. Because the Shukmans applied to renew the judgment less than 10 years later on May 17, 2006, their application was timely.[2] The trial court
properly denied appellants motion.
At oral argument, appellant urged that any ambiguity in the December 18, 1995 order based on that documents failure to clearly identify the named judgment debtors and judgment creditors does not prevent that document from being a judgment because the ambiguity could be cured by reference to the pleadings in the litigation. It is true that a judgment is not void simply because the names of the parties are not set forth clearly. (See, e.g., Irvine v. Mazurette (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 612, 613.) However, as we have stated, the December 18, 1995 order was not in substance or effect a judgment and it did not become one simply because it was ambiguous in certain respects.
III. DISPOSITION
The order denying appellants motion to vacate the renewal of the judgment is affirmed.
_________________________
Jones, P. J.
We concur:
________________________
Simons, J.
________________________
Reardon, J.*
___________________
Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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[1] All further section references will be to the Code of Civil Procedure.
[2] Having reached this conclusion, we need not determine whether the July 1, 1996 judgment should be deemed an amended judgment that restarted the 10-year period for renewal. (Cf. Iliff v. Dustrud (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1206-1208.) We also need not decide whether appellant failed to timely file his motion to vacate the renewal.
