Claudia S. v. Superior Court

Filed 5/19/08 Claudia S. v. Superior Court CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

Original proceedings; petition for a writ of mandate to challenge orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, Carolyn Kirkwood, Judge. Petition denied.

Law Office of J. Michael Hughes and Lawrence A. Aufill for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Benjamin P. de Mayo, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Julie J. Agin, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest Orange County Social Services Agency.

No appearance for Real Parties in Interest J.O., L.Q. and G.Q.

* * *

Introduction

Petitioner Claudia S. (Mother) is the mother of J.O., born in October 2003, L.Q., born in July 2005, and G.Q., born in November 2006. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, Mother challenges findings and orders the juvenile court made following a consolidated 12‑month review hearing on an initial petition and a jurisdictional hearing on a subsequent petition brought under Welfare and Institutions Code section 342 (all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code). The juvenile court found the children came within the courts jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (e), ordered the children detained, denied further reunification services on the initial petition, denied reunification services on the section 342 petition, and set a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 to determine a permanent plan of placement. The section 366.26 hearing is scheduled for June 18, 2008.

In response to Mothers contentions, we conclude: (1) substantial evidence supported the jurisdictional findings on the section 342 petition; (2) the juvenile court did not err by denying Mother reunification services under section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(5) and (c); (3) the juvenile court did not err by not making certain findings necessary to continue the case under section 366.21, subdivision (g)(1); (4) the juvenile court did not err by denying Mother reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6); and (5) the juvenile court did not err by not ordering reunification services for Mothers boyfriend. We therefore deny Mothers petition.

Facts and Procedural History

I.

Background and Facts Leading to Initial Jurisdiction

On December 3, 2006, L.Q. was treated in the emergency room of University of California, Irvine Medical Center for an injury to his left leg. He was reported to have a left transverse fracture of the tibia. Social worker Danise Johnson was called to the medical center to investigate a report that L.Q. had been physically abused. Mother contended L.Q. was injured when his leg was caught in the slats of his crib. The physicians tending L.Q. confirmed Mothers explanation for L.Q.s injuries was possible. Johnson determined the allegation of physical abuse was inconclusive, but placed all three children in protective custody due her concerns of severe neglect. G.Q., only five days old, was hospitalized for jaundice, sepsis, and close monitoring after an apneic episode witnessed by the emergency room staff.

On December 4, 2006, the children were released to Mother because L.Q.s treating physicians reported Mothers explanation for L.Q.s injuries could be true. Mother agreed to participate in voluntary family services to address the concerns of neglect.

On December 5, 2006, Child Abuse Services Team medical director, Dr. Fredric Bruhn, examined L.Q., and follow-up X‑rays were taken. The X‑rays revealed L.Q. had two fractures, one of which was a corner fracture. Dr. Bruhn reported the corner fracture revealed by the X‑rays was highly suspicious of physical abuse and not consistent with Mothers explanation for L.Q.s injuries. On December 6, a new child abuse report was prepared, and all three children were placed in protective custody.

On December 7, 2006, the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) filed a juvenile dependency petition as to all three children, alleging serious physical harm ( 300, subd. (a)) and failure to protect ( 300, subd. (b)). As to serious physical harm, the petition alleged L.Q. had been treated for two acute fractures to his left leg, the fractures were suspicious for non‑accidental trauma, Mothers explanation was not consistent with the injury sustained, Mother exercised poor judgment by waiting to take L.Q. to the hospital, and J.O. and G.Q. were at risk of physical abuse. In addition, as to failure to protect, the petition alleged Mother failed to obtain regular and consistent medical care for L.Q and J.O.; L.Q. was not developing properly; G.Q. had jaundice, for which Mother failed to seek treatment; G.Q. had been admitted to the hospital for an episode of apnea and was found to have sepsis; and Mother and J.O.s father had a history of domestic violence.

On December 8, 2006, the juvenile court ordered the children detained, permitted mother to have monitored visits with the children, and authorized reunification services.

On January 18, 2007, SSA filed an amended petition adding a charge of severe physical abuse of a child under the age of five ( 300, subd. (e)) based on the same allegations of serious physical harm as in the initial petition.

A hearing was held on February 1, 2007. On SSAs motion, the juvenile court dismissed count one (serious physical harm). Mother pleaded no contest to the remaining counts. The juvenile court found counts two (failure to protect) and three (severe physical abuse) true by a preponderance of the evidence and declared all three children to be dependent children of the juvenile court. Mother was required to complete an SSA-approved domestic violence program, attend a parenting class, and participate in counseling to assist her in meeting the childrens nutritional and health needs. All three children were placed with the same foster parents.

In the six‑month status review report, SSA recommended Mother receive six more months of reunification services. SSA reported that Mother had completed the 24‑week parent education component on June 28, 2007; had been in individual therapy since April 16; and on May 12 started having unmonitored visits with the children in her home. The report stated: The foster mother has reported on numerous occasions that the child, L[.Q.], continues to put his legs, and sometimes arms through the crib slats. [The foster mother] reported that initially, she would check on the child every two hours at night to ensure that he did not get caught. She noted that she constantly had to reposition him and pull his limbs back onto the mattress. [The foster mother] noted that on one occasion the child was stuck at the knee and that in the time she went to get the baby oil to help ease his leg out, the child pulled his leg out forcefully. She noted that it did not swell or bruise.

At the six‑month review hearing on July 25, 2007, the juvenile court adopted SSAs recommended case plan and visitation plan, and found SSA had provided or offered reasonable services. The court ordered a permanent plan of returning the children to Mothers custody.

II.

The Section 342 Petition

The children started a 60‑day trial visit with Mother on August 30, 2007. On October 13, G.Q. was taken to the hospital emergency room, where he was found to have a subdural hematoma (brain bleeding), and bruises on his face, ears, abdomen and extremities. G.Q. was placed on hospital hold. He remained hospitalized for nine days. The children were removed from Mothers care on October 14, 2007.

On October 25, 2007, SSA filed a juvenile dependency petition under section 342[1] alleging counts under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), (e), and (j). The petition alleged G.Q. was treated in a hospital emergency room on October 13 for a head injury, and also was found to have bruises on his face. G.Q. underwent a comprehensive medical examination and was diagnosed as having life‑threatening injuries, including bilateral acute and subacute subdural hematomas. The petition alleged: The child further sustained multiple bruises to his face, abdomen, head, and legs. The child was also diagnosed with a hemorrhage in the childs right eye. Said injuries were sustained while the child was in the sole and primary care and custody of the mother and the mothers live-in boyfriend, Cesar Gonzalez. On October 19, a physician reviewed the magnetic resolution imaging report of G.Q. and noticed a small right frontal subdural hematoma next to the frontal lobe. The physician also noticed G.Q. had one or more old hematomas caused by trauma sometime before October 14. The petition alleged G.Q.s injuries were not consistent with Mothers explanation.

At a hearing on the section 342 petition on October 26, 2007, the juvenile court ordered the children detained and placed in protective custody. The court authorized Mother to have monitored visits and ordered reunification services.

In the jurisdiction/disposition report filed December 6, 2007, SSA recommended the juvenile court sustain the petition and deny reunification services to Mother. The report stated: The undersigned reviewed the injuries sustained by the child, G[.Q.] The undersigned asked the childrens mother for a reasonable explanation about the childs bilateral subdural hematomas, retinal hemorrhage, multiple head and facial bruises, and the bruises on his legs and abdomen. The childrens mother stated that she believes the child, J[.O.], harmed G[.Q.] The childrens mother began to explain how J[.O.] is always very aggressive with G[.Q.] and frequently hits him. The childrens mother also stated that she believes J[.O.] jumped on G[.Q.]s head and caused the injuries. The undersigned asked the childrens mother whether she has ever seen J[.O.] jump on G[.Q.]s head and she stated, No. The childrens mother explained that J[.O.] has stated that he likes to jump in G[.Q.]s crib and make G[.Q.] go up and down. The childrens mother stated that she has seen J[.O.] sitting in G[.Q.]s crib multiple times, but she did not see him sitting in the childs crib on October 13, 2007, the day the child was taken to the hospital for his injuries. Mother claimed G.Q.s leg was bruised when it became stuck in crib. When asked about circular marks on G.Q.s head, Mother told the social worker, it must have been from one of his toys.

The report continued: The childrens mother reported that the bruises on [G.Q.]s cheeks were due to him hitting himself with a toy rattle. The childrens mother believes the bruises on the childs head were due to the child, J[.O.], pushing [G.Q.] against the door jamb when the child was in the swing. The childrens mother never observed J[.O.] pushing the child in the swing on the day he was taken to the hospital for his injuries. [] The childrens mother stated that she didnt see the bruise on the childs abdomen until the child was taken to the hospital. The childrens mother believes the bruises occurred because his diaper was on too tight.

III.

Consolidated 12-Month Review Hearing on Initial Petition and Trial on Section 342 Petition

A. Evidence at the Hearing/Trial

A consolidated 12-month review hearing on the initial petition and trial on the section 342 petition commenced on February 7, 2008. The juvenile court received in evidence the SSA jurisdiction/disposition report dated December 7, 2007; the SSA addendum report dated January 7, 2008; and the SSA addendum report dated February 7, 2008. The court heard testimony from Dr. Sandra Murray, Nicol Deveaux, Nancy Perez, Nora Sanchez-Love, Dr. Thomas Grogan, and Mother.

1. Dr. Sandra Murrays Testimony

Dr. Sandra Murray is a pediatrician employed by the University of California, Irvine. She evaluated G.Q.s medical records and medical history and concluded that on admission to the emergency room on October 13, 2007, G.Q. had two bilateral subdural hematomas, with the right‑sided hematoma being larger.[2]

Dr. Murray reviewed photographs of G.Q. and identified bruises on his forehead, cheeks, scalp, and ears. Its a fair amount of bruises for a young child, Dr. Murray observed. She noticed some of the bruises were in areas where childhood injuries commonly are seen, but some bruises were in areas over soft tissue, where injuries in children are less common. She noted too that [e]ar bruises are very uncommon in accidental injuries in children. Looking at other photographs of G.Q., Dr. Murray noticed bruises on the back of the leg and thigh, an unusual area for children to get accidental bruises, and noticed small bruises on the scalp forming a line with several small red dots, a pattern which she believed could have been caused by an object such as a hairbrush. She also noticed a small area of injury on the inner side of G.Q.s lower lip.

Dr. Murray testified G.Q. had been observed and monitored closely while at the hospital, and his subdural hematomas resolved themselves without the need for surgical intervention. Dr. Murray understood G.Q. had no obvious defects from the subdural hematomas when he left the hospital, but, she testified, [t]ime will tell whether he ultimately will have defects.

As to the cause of the injuries, Dr. Murray testified that while some of G.Q.s injuries could have been caused by accident, when you take a look at the entire picture of the subdural hemorrhages and the multiple bruises in areas, particularly bruises in areas that are uncommonly seen in accidental injuries, this is very likely to be from nonaccidental trauma. She concluded most of G.Q.s injuries probably were the result of nonaccidental trauma likely inflicted by an adult. When asked whether a child weighing 40 pounds could have caused the injuries, Dr. Murray answered, [t]hats a very unlikely situation. She testified there were too many bruises to have been caused by G.Q. hitting himself with a rattle because [m]ost children at 11 months of age will stop doing something that causes them pain, and there were too many bruises to have been caused by G.Q. falling on a tile floor or by hitting his head on a doorway. Dr. Murray testified the bruises on G.Q.s abdomen likely were not caused by tight diapers, and she had never seen a bruise caused by diapers being too tight.

Dr. Murray concluded, with a high level of certainty, most of G.Q.s injuries were caused by physical abuse.

2. Nicol Deveauxs Testimony

Nicol Deveaux is employed as a social worker by SSA. She was the senior investigating social worker for this case and prepared the three reports received in evidence.

Deveaux testified that Mother never has reported seeing J.O. jump up and down in G.Q.s crib, did not report any remarkable episodes of G.Q. screaming on October 13, 2007, and did not report seeing anyone else hitting or jumping on G.Q. on October 13 or during the previous week. Mother offered Deveaux several explanations for G.Q.s injuriesthat G.Q. hit his face with a rattle, that J.O. hit G.Q., that G.Q. hit his head on a doorjamb while in his bouncy seat, or that G.Q.s diapers were too tight. Deveaux testified Mother continued to maintain those explanations. Mother claimed she saw G.Q. hit his head on the doorjamb while jumping up and down in the bouncy seat. She told Deveaux that G.Q. had been fussy on October 13 because he had pink eye.

Deveaux testified G.Q.s three treating physicians told her that G.Q.s injuries were nonaccidental. None of the three believed a child could have caused the injuries.

As part of the investigation, Mothers boyfriend, Cesar Gonzalez, was interviewed more than once. He reported that either he or Mother was with G.Q. at all times on October 13, 2007. During the interviews, Gonzalez never reported seeing J.O. jumping in G.Q.s crib, seeing J.O. hit G.Q., or hearing remarkable episodes of G.Q. screaming on October 13 or during the prior week. Gonzalez told Deveaux he believed that J.O. hurt G.Q., that G.Q. hit his head on a doorjamb, or that G.Q hit himself with a toy.

Deveaux believed G.Q.s subdural hematomas were nonaccidental and were inflicted by an adult. She concluded that reunification would not be in the childrens best interest and all three children would be at significant risk of physical and emotional harm if they were returned to Mothers care.

On cross‑examination, Deveaux testified Mother completed the 24‑week parenting course in June or July 2007, had completed her 52‑week child abuse program, and completed individual counseling in July 2007.

3. Nancy Perezs Testimony

Nancy Perez was the childrens foster mother until the end of July 2007. She testified J.O. had behavioral problems, including hitting, screaming, and throwing tantrums. She saw J.O. hit L.Q., and once had to hold J.O. to prevent him from attacking his brothers.

Perez never saw J.O. in G.Q.s crib (J.O. was not allowed in the room with the crib), but J.O. told her he liked to jump up and down inside the crib. Perez testified that J.O. also liked to jump up and down inside of L.Q.s crib, and I had to take him out of there a lot. She explained J.O. would get inside of the crib, hold on to the side, and jump up and down, causing L.Q. to bounce into the air. Perez was concerned J.O. would hurt L.Q. by jumping in the crib. Perez once saw G.Q. try to stick his leg through the slats of the crib.

4. Nora Sanchez‑Loves Testimony

Nora Sanchez‑Love was the case social worker until the children were redetained in October 2007. Sanchez-Love testified that she interviewed J.O. soon thereafter. She testified that during the interview, J[.O.] said that he would jump in the crib, demonstrated jumping up and down, sometimes G[.Q.] would laugh and . . . he did say that he jumped on G[.Q.] and made him cry.

In September or October 2007, Mother told Sanchez‑Love that J.O. would not listen to her and was prone to tantrums. Although Mother did not request additional services for J.O., Sanchez‑Love made a referral for a psychological evaluation of him.

Sanchez‑Love testified she could not say whether Mother caused G.Q.s injuries. When asked whether J.O. could have caused G.Q.s injuries by jumping on him, Sanchez‑Love answered: I saw the extent of his bruising in the hospital. It would have had to have been J[.O.] in a room with G[.Q.] full fledged going at him without anybody physically there to take him away. This little boy was covered in bruises.

5. Dr. Thomas Grogans Testimony

Dr. Thomas Grogan, a pediatric orthopaedic surgeon, testified as an expert on behalf of Mother. He testified he examined G.Q.s medical records, SSAs jurisdiction/disposition report, and the section 342 petition. Dr. Grogan testified that when G.Q. was treated at the emergency room on October 13, 2007, he had subdural hematomas and cutaneous manifestations of bruises [on] multiple areas of his body.

Dr. Grogan testified G.Q.s hematomas resolved themselves, meaning they no longer were visible. As of October 17, 2007, one hematoma had resolved and the other was in the process of resolving. Other than the subdural hematoma, G.Q. had no other identifiable injuries to his head. Dr. Grogan testified there was no evidence in G.Q.s case of an impact point to suggest G.Q. had been dropped or struck in the head.

As to the cause of G.Q.s subdural hematomas, Dr. Grogan testified: I read reports of an older sibling, four‑year‑old sibling that liked to jump into the crib with the baby. That sibling jumping into the crib with the baby, in my opinion, could bounce the baby up or down on the mattress, and that force I believe is certainly enough to cause a subdural hematoma of a child in this age and size. As to the cause of the bruises over G.Q.s body, Dr. Grogan testified: [T]hey are very nonspecific; meaning, they dont have a particular pattern. They dont look like an outline of a belt. They dont look like the pattern of a hand. They are splotchy around and they tend to be on the outer portion of the extremities and on the side of the head. To me thats perhaps consistent with an older sibling who jumps into a crib with a child and may in fact strike the child jumping into the crib unintentionally.

On cross‑examination, Dr. Grogan testified a neurosurgeon generally would be in a better position than an orthopaedic surgeon to diagnose causation and treatment of a subdural hematoma.

6. Mothers Testimony

Mother testified she had completed a 52‑week parenting course. She testified she has lived with her boyfriend Cesar Gonzalez for about two years, since she was expecting G.Q. She testified she had discussed with him the possibility of separating if necessary to regain custody of her children.

Mother testified she had experienced difficulty managing J.O.: I tried controlling the tantrums. I put him in time-out. That didnt seem to work out. He would just get out. I tried putting a fence, one of the child fences on the door. He climbed over that, got out.

Mother testified she saw J.O. jumping up and down in G.Q.s crib. Moving the crib into Mothers bedroom did not solve the problem. Mother asked Sanchez‑Love to place J.O. in another home while he received counseling to control his behavior. Sanchez‑Love said that was not possible and instead offered referrals.

Mother conceded she was not in a position to care for all three children: I would definitelynot completely for all three children, due to J[.O.] But the other two children I am. J[.O.], if I get the services that I ask for at the beginning, the services that I request, the assistance with J[.O.], yes, I can. But if I dont, its going to be hard also.

Mother testified she believed L.Q. was injured when his leg was caught in the bars of the crib. She maintained her belief that G.Q.s head injuries were caused by J.O. jumping in the crib. She maintained that some, unspecified, injuries of G.Q. were caused by bouncing up and down in the child swing, and that the bruising on his face was caused by G.Q. hitting himself with a rattle. She maintained the bruises on G.Q.s abdomen were caused by tight diapers because the day before this incident occurred, I took him into the emergency room and the doctor himself told me to loosen the diaper up because its causing the bruising.

B. The Juvenile Courts Findings and Ruling

The juvenile court found sufficient evidence did not support count one ( 300, subd. (a)) of the section 342 petition and dismissed that count. The court found counts two, three, and four ( 300, subds. (b), (e), and (j)) of the section 342 petition were true by a preponderance of the evidence, and found by clear and convincing evidence returning the children to Mothers home would present a substantial risk of detriment to their physical or emotional well-being. The court ordered the children declared dependent children pursuant to section 360, subdivision (d).

The court found, pursuant to section 361.5, subdivisions (a)(2) and (b)(5) and (6), reunification services need not be provided, and found Mother failed to meet her burden of showing services would be in the childrens best interest. The court stated: Additionally, there has not been competent testimony to support offering services under any other section. . . . I did note that the evidence in this case, in looking at Dr. Murrays testimony, the evidence in this case, multiple injuries on the surface of the child, injury to soft tissue, injury internally to the brain, bleeding, the abdomen, the soft tissue in the back of the thigh, the soft tissue in the cheeks, is not consistent with the explanations provided by mother and provided to the investigating personnel by Cesar Gonzalez. . . . [S]ome of these injuries may be consistent with an innocent explanation, but the entire constellation of injuries is much more likely to have been inflicted by an adult in a nonaccidental fashion. And the court finds Dr. Murrays opinion to be much more reasonable in this area, given all of the evidence of the injury.

As for the 12‑month review hearing on the initial petition, the juvenile court found pursuant to section 361, subdivision (d) that continued placement was necessary and appropriate, that Mother had been provided reasonable services, reasonable efforts have been made to alleviate or mitigate the causes necessitating placement, and that SSA had complied with the case plan by making reasonable efforts to enable the childrens safe return home and to complete whatever steps are necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the children. The court scheduled the section 366.26 hearing for June 18, 2008.

Discussion

I.

Substantial Evidence Supported the Jurisdictional Findings on the Section 342 Petition.

Mother argues substantial evidence did not support the juvenile courts section 300, subdivision (e) jurisdictional findings on the section 342 petition. Specifically, she argues (1) there was no evidence she knew or had reason to know someone was abusing G.Q. and (2) G.Q.s injuries, if left untreated, would not cause permanent physical disfigurement, permanent physical disability, or death. We conclude substantial evidence supported the jurisdictional findings.

Subdivision (e) of section 300 provides for jurisdiction over a child under the age of five who has suffered severe physical abuse by a parent, or by any person known by the parent, if the parent knew or reasonably should have known that the person was physically abusing the child. The term severe physical abuse includes any single act of abuse which causes physical trauma of sufficient severity that, if left untreated, would cause permanent physical disfigurement, permanent physical disability and more than one act of physical abuse, each of which causes bleeding, deep bruising, significant external or internal swelling, bone fracture, or unconsciousness. ( 300, subd. (e).) Section 300, subdivision (e) does not require identification of the person who inflicted the physical abuse. (In re Kenneth M. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 16, 21.)

In evaluating whether [G.Q.] came under section 300, subdivision (e), we use the substantial evidence standard of review, where we determine whether evidence that is of reasonable, credible and solid value supports the dependency courts findings. We do not reweigh the evidence, nor do we consider matters of credibility. (In re E. H. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 659, 669.)

Substantial evidence supported a finding Mother knew or had reason to know someone was abusing G.Q. and L.Q. A neurosurgeon who treated G.Q. told the social worker G.Q.s head injuries were caused by at least two separate, nonaccidental traumas. Dr. Murrays report stated, [G.Q.s] head injury is a potentially life threatening injury. At trial, Dr. Murray concluded most of G.Q.s injuries probably were the result of nonaccidental trauma likely inflicted by an adult, and were not like inflicted by a child weighing 40 pounds. Dr. Murray testified that none of Mothers explanations was plausible.

Mothers expert, Dr. Grogan, testified the force caused by J.O. jumping up and down in G.Q.s crib was enough to cause G.Q.s subdural hematomas. The juvenile court considered Dr. Murrays testimony and Dr. Grogans testimony, and stated: I considered their qualifications, their testimony, what they base their opinion on. Both, obviously, have extensive training in the medical field and have qualifications. But I do note that Dr. Murray has specialized training and experience in the area of child abuse and specifically head trauma. So to the extent that there is conflict in the evidence, the court resolves that conflict in favor of Dr. Murrays testimony.

No injuries were reported when G.Q. was treated for pink eye on October 12, 2007. Mother and her boyfriend Cesar Gonzalez were G.Q.s only caregivers the next day, when G.Q. was injured. Mother did not see J.O. in the crib with G.Q. that day. Neither Mother nor Gonzalez claimed G.Q. was in distress until after Mother left the home at 9:00 p.m. to run an errand. Gonzalez reported that G.Q. began to vomit around 9:00 p.m. Vomiting is a symptom of a subdural hematoma. Shortly thereafter, G.Q. was taken to emergency for treatment, and bruises were found on his face, ears, abdomen and extremities.

Gonzalez also was taking care of L.Q. when he suffered two leg fractures and bruises on his face in December 2006. Gonzalez asserted he had found L.Q. with his leg caught in the bars of the crib while Mother was asleep. Dr. Bruhn, who examined L.Q. and the follow-up X‑rays, reported L.Q.s injuries were not consistent with that explanation and were highly suspicious of physical abuse. Nevertheless, Mother stood by Gonzalezs story. The juvenile court found Mother was protective of Gonzalez, had stayed with him during the dependency proceedings, and clearly aligned with him.

In sum, the evidence supported either a finding that Mother inflicted G.Q.s injuries or a finding that Mother knew or had reason to know Gonzalez inflicted them. Although the juvenile court did not expressly make either finding, we will infer a necessary finding provided the implicit finding is supported by substantial evidence. (In re S.G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1260.)

Substantial evidence also supported a finding G.Q. suffered severe physical abuse. A neurosurgeon who treated G.Q. told the social worker his injuries were of sufficient severity that, if left untreated, could cause permanent physical disfigurement, permanent physical disability, or death. Dr. Murray in her written report stated, [G.Q.s] head injury is a potentially life threatening injury. At trial, Dr. Murray testified a subdural hematoma can lead later in life to neurological damage affecting motor and cognitive skills. Time will tell, she testified, whether G.Q. suffered permanent injury.

In addition, the evidence established G.Q. suffered more than one act of physical abuse, each of which causes bleeding, deep bruising, significant external or internal swelling, bone fracture, or unconsciousness. ( 300, subd. (e).) G.Q.s treating neurosurgeon reported, and a magnetic resonance imaging showed, that one of G.Q.s subdural hematomas was older than the other and was inflicted at an earlier time. Dr. Murray testified G.Q.s head injuries were [m]ore likely to be from multiple infliction of trauma.

II.

The Juvenile Court Did Not Err by Denying Mother Reunification Services Under Section 361.5,

Subdivisions (b)(5) and (c).

Mother argues the juvenile court erred by denying reunification services under section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(5) and (c). The juvenile court may deny reunification services if it finds by clear and convincing evidence the child was brought within the jurisdiction of the court under subdivision (e) of Section 300 because of the conduct of that parent or guardian. ( 361.5, subd. (b)(5).) The juvenile court shall not order reunification services in that circumstance unless it finds that, based on competent testimony, those services are likely to prevent reabuse or continued neglect of the child. ( 361.5, subd. (c).)

We review an order denying reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b) for substantial evidence. (In re Albert T. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 207, 216.) We examine the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile courts findings and conclusions, defer to the juvenile court on issues of credibility, resolve all conflicts in the evidence in support of the juvenile courts findings, and draw all legitimate inferences to uphold the juvenile courts order. (Ibid.)

Mother contends she could complete new reunification services, if ordered, because she was cooperating with [SSA] and was in full-compliance with her services. As SSA points out, completion of services is not the same as benefitting from services. Indeed, this case demonstrates the principle that simply complying with the reunification plan . . . is not determinative. (In re Dustin R. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1143.) In January 2007, after the children were initially detained, Mother was offered reunification services, including participation in a child abuse treatment program. She completed parenting education in June 2007 and individual therapy in July 2007. She received favorable reports. G.Q. was abused in October 2007, after Mother had received these services and the children were returned to her on a trial basis.

Despite receiving services, Mother refused to acknowledge an adult had intentionally injured G.Q. She maintained J.O. had injured G.Q., or G.Q. had hit himself with a rattle, or G.Q.s diapers were too tight, or G.Q. hit his head while in the bouncy seat. Dr. Murray testified none of those explanations was plausible. Deveaux testified she believed reunification services were not in the childrens best interest because the childrens mother has been offered over 12 months of services and this incident has occurred after mother has complied with services. Mother testified she and Gonzalez had discussed separating if necessary for the children to return to her care, but the juvenile court was entitled to doubt Mothers credibility and sincerity.

The juvenile court therefore did not err by denying Mother reunification services under section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(5) and (c).

III.

The Juvenile Court Did Not Err by Not Making Findings Necessary to Continue the Case Under Section 366.21, Subdivision (g)(1).

With respect to the 12‑month review findings, Mother argues the juvenile court erred by not making findings necessary to continue the case under section 366.21, subdivision (g)(1). Specifically, she asserts the juvenile should have found (1) she had made significant progress in overcoming the problems leading to the initial detention and (2) there was a substantial likelihood of returning the children to her custody by the 18‑month review.

The juvenile court may extend services at the 12‑month review hearing and continue the case for up to six months if the court finds there is a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical custody of his or her parent . . . and safely maintained in the home within the extended period of time or that reasonable services have not been provided to the parent. ( 366.21, subd. (g)(1).) To make this finding, the juvenile court must find the parent has made significant progress in resolving problems that led to the childs removal from the home, and the parent has demonstrated the capacity and ability both to complete the objectives of his or her treatment plan and to provide for the childs safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being, and special needs. ( 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(B) & (C).)

Mother contends she had made significant progress in overcoming the problems leading to the initial detention because Dr. Grogan, her medical expert, testified G.Q.s injuries could have been caused accidentally by J.O., and because Dr. Murray did not rule out that possibility. The juvenile court was the ultimate judge of credibility (In re Albert T., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 216), and it found Dr. Murrays testimony more credible than Dr. Grogans. Dr. Murray could not rule out the possibility that J.O. caused G.Q.s injuries, but her testimony, along with the other evidence presented at trial, made that possibility highly unlikely.

Mother contends there was a substantial likelihood of returning the children to her custody by the date of the 18‑month review hearing because she complied with her case plan and is willing to participate in any reunification services the court might order. As explained in part II of the Discussion, Mothers compliance with her case plan and participation in a parenting course and therapy did not prevent G.Q. from being physically abused. She continues to assert both L.Q.s and G.Q.s injuries were accidental. Mothers contention she has implemented what she has learned from her services is plainly wrong: G.Q.s severe physical injuries showed Mother failed to eliminate the conditions that led to the original detention and failed to demonstrate the ability and capacity to protect the children from physical abuse.

IV.

The Juvenile Court Did Not Err by Denying Mother Reunification Services Under Section 361.5, Subdivision (b)(6).

Mother contends the juvenile court erred by denying her reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) because the court did not identify who inflicted G.Q.s injuries.

Under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6), the juvenile court may deny reunification services if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence the child has been adjudicated a dependent pursuant to any subdivision of Section 300 as a result of . . . the infliction of severe physical harm to the child, a sibling, or a half sibling by a parent . . . and the court makes a factual finding that it would not benefit the child to pursue reunification services with the offending parent or guardian. A finding of infliction of severe physical harm may be based on . . . deliberate and serious injury inflicted to or on a childs body . . . by an act or omission of the parent or guardian. (Ibid., italics added.) We review an order denying reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b) for substantial evidence. (In re Albert T., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 216.)

Mothers challenge to the order denying reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) fails for at least three reasons. First, the juvenile court correctly denied reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5). No additional basis for denying reunification services was necessary. (See In re Kenneth M., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at pp. 21‑22.)

Second, as SSA points out, the juvenile court had sustained allegations in the initial petition that L.Q. had suffered leg fractures while in the primary care of his mother . . . and her live-in boyfriend. Mother pleaded no contest to this count for severe physical abuse. The juvenile courts jurisdictional findings are preclusive because Mother did not challenge them. (See Tyrone W. v. Superior Court (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 839, 854.) Mothers infliction of severe physical harm on L.Q. satisfies section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6)s requirement of severe physical harm to the child, a sibling, or a half sibling by a parent.

Third, under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6), infliction of severe physical harm may be the result of an act or omission of the parent or guardian. The evidence supported a finding that Mother directly inflicted severe physical harm on G.Q., or that she failed to protect him from harm.

Mother suggests too the juvenile court failed to make findings required under section 361.5, subdivision (i) necessary to deny reunification services under subdivision (b)(6). Section 361.5, subdivision (i) provides: The court shall read into the record the basis for a finding of severe sexual abuse or the infliction of severe physical harm under paragraph (6) of subdivision (b), and shall also specify the factual findings used to determine that the provision of reunification services to the offending parent or guardian would not benefit the child. The juvenile court here satisfied subdivision (i) of section 361.5. The court expressly found Dr. Murray to be credible and found the evidence in this case, multiple injuries on the surface of the child, injury to soft tissue, injury internally to the brain, bleeding, the abdomen, the soft tissue in the back of the thigh, the soft tissue in the cheeks, is not consistent with the explanations provided by mother . . . [and] the entire constellation of injuries is much more likely to have been inflicted by an adult in a nonaccidental fashion. The court stated reunification services would not be in the childrens best interest because [t]his is a second event of serious injury and mother has basically been provided with [services], and . . . she has not benefited from those services in the reunification of the underlying case.

V.

The Juvenile Court Did Not Err by Not Ordering Reunification Services for Mothers Boyfriend.

Mother argues the juvenile court erred in finding she had been provided reasonable reunification services because Gonzalez, her boyfriend, had not been required to participate in services.

To set a permanency hearing at the 12‑month review, the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable services were provided or offered to the parents or legal guardians. ( 366.21, subd. (g)(2).) Reunification services are reasonable if the social services agency identifies the problems leading to the loss of custody, offers services designed to remedy those problems, maintains reasonable contacts with the parents, and makes reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas in which compliance is difficult. (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 972‑973.)

The juvenile courts finding that reasonable reunification services have been provided to the parent is reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1010.) [I]n reviewing the reasonableness of the reunification services provided by [SSA], we must . . . recognize that in most cases more services might have been provided, and the services which are provided are often imperfect. The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might have been provided, but whether they were reasonable under the circumstances. (Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.)

The case plan approved by the court did not include in‑home services or reunification services for Gonzalez. Mother did not object to the plan. Mother argues the juvenile court erred by returning the children to her custody on a trial basis without requiring Gonzalez to participate in reunification services. But on July 25, 2007, just before the children were returned to Mothers custody on a trial basis, Mother stipulated reasonable reunification services had been provided or offered. After an in‑home parental aide visited Mother twice in October 2007, Mother requested that service be cancelled because she didnt think it was going to work. Under these circumstances, Mother waived the right to assert reunification services were unreasonable. (In re Cody W. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 221, 231.)

Further, reunification services for Gonzalez would not appear to have remedied the problems leading to detention because Mother has failed continually to acknowledge what those problems were. She argues services were necessary for Gonzalez to teach him how to deal with J.O.s behavioral problems. But the evidence established Mother or her boyfriend, not J.O., inflicted G.Q.s severe physical injuries. Further, we doubt the juvenile court had the authority to order reunification services for Gonzalez because there was no evidence he was the childrens parent, statutorily presumed father or guardian. (See  361.5, subd. (a) [whenever a child is removed from a parents or guardians custody, the juvenile court shall order the social worker to provide child welfare services to the child and the childs mother and statutorily presumed father or guardians].)

Disposition

Mothers petition for writ of mandate is denied.

FYBEL, J.

WE CONCUR:

BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.

IKOLA, J.

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[1] Section 342 states, in part: In any case in which a minor has been found to be a person described by Section 300 and the petitioner alleges new facts or circumstances, other than those under which the original petition was sustained, sufficient to state that the minor is a person described in Section 300, the petitioner shall file a subsequent petition.

[2] Dr. Murray explained the meaning of subdural hematoma: Subdural means under the dura. . . . [T]he dura is one of the layers inside under the scalp and over the brain. Theres . . . a potential space. Its like a balloon thats flattened and you can fill up that space. She added: The subdural hematoma is bleeding into that space. And theres veins that come from your brain. They cross through that space. They are called bridging veins. When you have acceleration and deceleration, rotational movements inside of the skull, the brain is moving around and those veins tear; and then the bleeding then ends up in the subdural space.