In re Tianna M.
Filed 5/2/08 In re Tianna M. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re TIANNA M. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | B203453 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK65319) |
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANGELA M., Defendant and Appellant. |
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.
Debra Losnick, Judge. Affirmed.
Diana W. Prince, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens and Tracey F. Dodds, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________
Angela M. appeals from the trial court order terminating her parental rights to her twin daughters, Tianna and Kianna. We affirm, as we explain:
Because the sole issue on appeal concerns the Indian Child Welfare Act, we need include only the briefest summary of the facts.
The Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition was filed on October 12, 2006, when the children were two years old. It was sustained under subdivisions (a), (b), (d), and (j), on factual allegations concerning appellant's history of substance abuse, her bipolar disorder and noncompliance with her psychiatric treatment plan, and allegations that appellant and her male companion had engaged in a physical altercation, and that appellant's male companion had sexually abused one of the children. Because appellant had failed to reunify with her two older children, reunification services were not offered to her. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 361.5, subd. (b)(10).) Appellant identified the children's father, and DCFS later located him, but he is not a party to this appeal.
Both appellant's mother and her aunt were interested in adopting the children. DCFS investigated both possible placements. The aunt had adopted appellant's two older children (also twins) through dependency proceedings in Oklahoma, and by August, she had been identified as the prospective adoptive parent. In August, the children were placed with her and parental rights were terminated.
Now to the ICWA facts: When appellant was first interviewed by DCFS, she was asked about Indian heritage and said that she thought she had such ancestry but had very little information about her biological parents. She said something similar in court, on October 19. The court asked whether there was American Indian heritage in her family, and she answered "There may be, but I don't know it." The court asked "What makes you think there might be?" She answered "My grandmother and my aunt and uncle had Native American background, but I wasn't raised by them. So I honestly don't know." She also said that she thought that the children's father might have Indian heritage. The court ordered DCFS to determine whether the ICWA applied by interviewing the parents and any known relatives. DCFS could not at that time interview appellant, who was being extradited to Oklahoma, where she was incarcerated throughout the dependency. DCFS did speak to appellant's mother, who said that there was no Indian history in the family.
In November, the court instructed DCFS to speak to appellant, noting that there could be Indian heritage through her father's family. In December, DCFS reported that both appellant and her mother denied any Native American heritage, and that the children's father had stated that he had no such heritage. The court found that no further inquiry was required as to appellant or her family, and that "At this point there is no reason to believe that the Indian Child Welfare Act applies as to the mother."
However, in May, for reasons which we cannot discern from the record, DCFS reported that the children might have Blackfoot heritage, through their mother's family. DCFS thus noticed that tribe, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The court repeated its finding that the ICWA did not apply, but asked DCFS to report on any responses to the notices sent. DCFS reported that it received no responses, and that it had re-interviewed appellant's mother, who said that she knew of no Indian heritage on either side of the family.
On those facts, appellant contends that her October statements about the possibility that she had Indian heritage triggered the notice requirements of the ICWA, and that the ICWA notices which DCFS sent were defective because they did not include all the necessary information, and for other reasons.
We agree with DCFS that no notices were required in this case. Appellant
relies on familiar principles concerning ICWA notices: "The notice requirement applies even if the Indian status of the child is uncertain. [Citation.] The showing required to trigger the statutory notice provisions is minimal; it is less than the showing needed to establish a child is an Indian child within the meaning of ICWA. [Citation.] A hint may suffice for this minimal showing. [Citation.] 'The determination of a child's Indian status is up to the tribe; therefore, the juvenile court needs only a suggestion of Indian ancestry to trigger the notice requirement.' [Citation.]" (In re Miguel E. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 521, 549.)
As applied to this case, those principles mean that if appellant's October statements were the only information before the court, ICWA notices would have been required. However, given that the "hint" of Indian status was disproved, no notices were required.
Disposition
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ARMSTRONG, J.
We concur:
TURNER, P. J.
KRIEGLER, J.
Publication Courtesy of California lawyer directory.
Analysis and review provided by Escondido Property line Lawyers.
