In re E.W.
Filed 5/29/07 In re E.W. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yuba)
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In re E.W. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | |
YUBA COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SHERYL W., Defendant and Appellant. | C054143 (Super. Ct. Nos. JVSQ05002 & JVSQ05003) |
Sheryl W., mother of the minors, appeals from orders of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, 395 [further undesignated statutory references are to this code].) Appellant contends the court erred in terminating her parental rights over the objections of the minor, P.W. We affirm.
FACTS
The minors P.W., age 11, and E.W., age 2, were removed from parental custody for neglect in January 2005. Appellant failed to reunify and the court set a selection and implementation hearing pursuant to section 366.26.
According to the report for the section 366.26 hearing, P.W., who was by then 12 years old, told the social worker she would like to go home to her mother but if she could not, she would want to live with her prospective adoptive family forever. The assessment from the state Department of Social Services stated P. W. told the adoptions specialist she would like to go home to her mother, but if that was not possible she would like to be adopted.
At the hearing in October 2006, appellant argued she had visited the minors regularly and there was a beneficial relationship between them. Appellant noted that P.W. wanted to continue their relationship and that adoption would sever it. Appellant did not suggest that P.W.s statements to the social worker and adoptions worker constituted an exception to termination of her parental rights. P.W.s attorney submitted the matter without argument or additional evidence. The court, having considered the evidence and the minors wishes, terminated appellants parental rights, finding by clear and convincing evidence the minors were likely to be adopted.
DISCUSSION
I
Appellant contends the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights over the objections of P.W.
At the selection and implementation hearing held pursuant to section 366.26, a juvenile court must make one of four possible alternative permanent plans for a minor child. . . . The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption. [Citation.] [Citation.] If the court finds the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights absent circumstances under which it would be detrimental to the child. (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368.) There are only limited circumstances which permit the court to find a compelling reason for determining that termination [of parental rights] would be detrimental to the child. ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)
One of the circumstances in which termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the minor occurs when [a] child 12 years of age or older objects to termination of parental rights. ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) If appellant claimed an exception applied, she had the burden of establishing the existence of any circumstances which constitute an exception to termination of parental rights. (In re Cristella C. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1373; In re Melvin A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1252; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.725(e)(3); Evid. Code, 500.)
While appellant argued against termination of her parental rights on the grounds the minor would benefit from continued contact with her ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)), she neither argued nor presented evidence that the minor objected to termination and has forfeited the issue. (In re Christopher B. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 551, 558; In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 501-502; In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. 2.)
Appellant attempts to avoid forfeiture by pointing to her counsels argument that the minor wished to continue their relationship. This general statement did not put the court or other parties on notice that appellant was contending that the minor objected to termination.
Even assuming the issue is properly before us, appellant cannot prevail. The minors statements to the social worker and the adoptions worker do not constitute unequivocal objections to adoption, but are simply expressions of the minors conflicting preferences and are dependent upon whether return to appellant was possible or not. (See In re Christopher L. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1334-1335.) Had the juvenile court been asked to evaluate the minors statements in the context of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B), it could not have concluded the minor objected to adoption.
If appellants argument is construed as failure to consider the minors wishes, appellant still cannot prevail. At all [termination] proceedings . . . , the court shall consider the wishes of the child and shall act in the best interests of the child. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, subd. (h).) The court considered the reports which contained the minors statements of her wishes and resolved the matter in the minors best interests. (In re Diana G. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1468, 1480.) No error appears.
II
Appellant contends that, if the order terminating parental rights is reversed as to P.W., it must also be reversed as to E.W. because they constitute a sibling group and termination of parental rights of one child would interfere with the sibling relationship. As we have concluded reversal is not required for P.W., we need not address this contention further.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
BLEASE , Acting P.J.
We concur:
RAYE , J.
CANTIL-SAKAUYE , J.
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