Florida Decisions

Defendant appeals the circuit court's denial of his postconviction motion to vacate his conviction of first degree murder and sentence of death and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Court have jurisdiction. See art. V, S 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. Court affirm the trial court's denial of Peede's postconviction motion and deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Defendant appeals the circuit court's denial of his postconviction motion to vacate his conviction of first degree murder and sentence of death and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Court have jurisdiction. See art. V, S 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. Court affirm the trial court's denial of Peede's postconviction motion and deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Defendant appeals the circuit court's denial of his postconviction motion to vacate his conviction of first degree murder and sentence of death and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Court have jurisdiction. See art. V, S 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. Court affirm the trial court's denial of Peede's postconviction motion and deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Court have on appeal a decision from the Fourth District Court of Appeal declaring invalid portions of section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes (2003), as applied to appeals to the district courts. Court have jurisdiction. See art.V, S 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons explained below, we reverse the decision of the district court and hold that the district courts of appeal have discretionary jurisdiction over nonfinal appeals certified by the county court to be of great public importance when the order is one that is otherwise appealable to the circuit court under section 924.07, Florida Statutes.

Court initially accepted jurisdiction to review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in University of Miami v. Ruiz, 916 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2005), certifying conflict with Orlando Regional Healthcare System, Inc. v. Alexander, 909 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005), on a question of law. See art. V, S 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Upon further consideration, court have now determined that Ruiz and Alexander address different situations and are not in conflict. Because there is no conflict, court exercise our discretion and discharge jurisdiction. Accordingly, this review proceeding is hereby dismissed.
It is so ordered.

Court have for review State v. Sachs, 926 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006), in which the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's ruling based upon the parties' stipulation at the trial level as to the controlling effect of State v. Harden, 873 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004), aff'd, 938 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 2006). At the time the Third District Court issued its decision in Sachs, Harden was pending review in this Court. Court recently affirmed the Third District Court's decision in Harden. See State v. Harden, 938 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 2006). As a result, court issued an order on September 20, 2006, directing the appellant to show cause why this Court should not summarily affirm Sachs in light of our decision in Harden. Appellant agreed that "Harden is controlling in the instant case, and summary affirmance is appropriate." Therefore, based upon our decision in Harden and the appellant's response to the order to show cause, court summarily affirm the decision of the Third District Court in Sachs.
It is so ordered.

The Criminal Procedure Rules Committee has filed an out of cycle report of proposed rule amendments in accordance with Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.140(e). Court have jurisdiction. See art. V, S 2(a), Fla. Const.
After reviewing the comments and the committee's proposals, court adopt the proposals filed by the committee, with the exception noted below. The major substantive changes are discussed in this article.

Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett and Frappier, et al., seek review of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett & Frappier v. Cole, 896 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), on the ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of the Third District Court of Appeal, Boca Investors Group, Inc. v. Potash, 835 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), on a question of law. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, S 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Court limit our review to the question of law upon which jurisdiction was granted, and hold that the litigation privilege applies in all causes of action, statutory as well as common law. Accordingly, court quash the contrary decision of the First District and remand for further proceedings consistent with our holding.
Given the precedent established by Levin, court hold that the litigation privilege applies in all causes of action, whether for common law torts or statutory violations. Accordingly, court approve the decision in Boca Investors, quash the decision of the First District herein, and remand for further proceedings consistent herewith.
It is so ordered.

Court review Perry v. State, 846 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal followed Tillman v. State, 807 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), quashed, 934 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 2006), which was pending review in our Court, and cited as contrary authority Taylor v. State, 740 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Court have jurisdiction. See art. V, S 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.; Jollie v. State, 405 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. 1981). The issue is whether section 776.051(1), Florida Statutes (1997), which prohibits the use of force to resist an arrest, applies apart from arrest scenarios.
Court quash the Fourth District's decision because it is contrary to our construction of section 776.051(1) in Tillman. The Fourth District relied on the Fifth District's decision in Tillman, which we later quashed, for the proposition that the use of force against a known police officer extends to illegal stops, searches, and detentions. See Perry, 846 So. 2d at 587. Court expressly rejected this view in Tillman, and cannot permit the same erroneous interpretation of section 776.051(1) to stand here. However, we decline to decide whether an arrest under section 776.051(1) encompasses post-arrest intake procedures such as the strip search in this case. Neither the Fourth District in this case nor this Court in Tillman addressed this issue. This matter, as well as a separate jury instruction issue raised by Perry, are for the Fourth District to address in the first instance under the changed legal landscape of our decision in Tillman.

A decision regarding (1) intentionally touching the victim's genital area or the clothing covering it, contrary to section 800.04(5), Florida Statutes (1999); (2) intentionally touching the victim in a lewd or lascivious manner by kissing the victim's neck, contrary to section 800.04(6), Florida Statutes (1999); (3) intentionally touching the victim in a lewd or lascivious manner by rubbing penis on the victim's stomach area, contrary to section 800.04(6), Florida Statutes (1999); and (4) intentionally exposing genitals in a lewd or lascivious manner in the presence of the victim, contrary to section 800.04(7), Florida Statutes (1999).