CA Unpub Decisions

Appellants appeal from the order granting the Probate Code section 21320 application of respondent. The judgment (order granting the section 21320 application) is reversed and the matter is remanded to the probate division to enter an order denying the application.

A modification decision.

Defendant, Father, appeals from the summary denial of his petition filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388, requesting modification of the juvenile court’s visitation order concerning 14-year-old minor. Appellant contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in declining to order a hearing on his section 388 petition which sought to change the prior order for monitored visitation in a therapeutic setting to mandatory weekly and unmonitored visitation outside a therapeutic setting. Court affirmed.

Defendant appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of possession of a firearm by a felon and three counts of carjacking. The jury also found true the allegation that defendant personally used a firearm in committing the carjackings, and defendant admitted he had served seven prior prison terms. Defendant was sentenced to a total state prison term of twenty-four years. Defendant contends that his trial attorney provided constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to pursue a claim-of-right defense on the carjacking charges, and that the court committed various sentencing errors. Court ordered the abstract of judgment modified to reflect the proper presentence custody credits, and to delete reference to the stricken section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements. Otherwise, court affirmed.

Mother appeals from an order of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, terminating her parental rights over minors, and ordering a plan of adoption. The court found that the loving bond between Mother and her two sons, a history of regular visitations and a relationship between the minors and three older siblings were outweighed by the stability offered by the prospective adoptive family such that the beneficial relationship and interference with sibling relationship exceptions set forth in section 366.26, subdivisions (c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(E) were not applicable. Court concluded that the juvenile court’s findings are overwhelmingly supported by substantial evidence and affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of burglary of car, receiving stolen property, petty theft of property, petty theft with a prior, and possession of methamphetamine. Appellant waived his right to a jury trial of the prior conviction allegations and admitted one allegation and the court found a second one true. The court sentenced appellant to state prison for three years and eight months. On appeal, Defendant requested the court independently review the record and submitted a letter contending insufficient evidence to support his convictions. Court found no arguable issues for appeal. Judgment affirmed.

Petitioner is the mother of minor, who was detained at approximately two months of age. In a petition for extraordinary writ, mother contends the juvenile court erred by terminating reunification services and scheduling a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to implement a long term plan for minor. Specifically, mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that real party in interest, the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) provided reasonable reunification services. Court affirmed.

A modification decision.

A jury convicted defendant of possessing a sharp instrument while in prison. The trial court sustained two prior strike allegations and sentenced defendant to 25 years to life. On appeal, defendant contends the denial of his mistrial motion violated his rights to due process, jury trial, and confrontation. Court affirmed.

At a six-month review hearing held on September 14, 2005, the juvenile court denied the request of appellant to terminate jurisdiction over his child, minor, or in the alternative, to place the minor in the father’s care. Appellant appeals from the orders of the juvenile court at the six-month hearing.
Court dispensed with a recitation of the underlying facts as they are unnecessary to disposition of the appeal. Appellant previously appealed from the jurisdictional order, claiming the order adjudging the minor a dependent of the juvenile court must be set aside because it was not supported by substantial evidence. Court rejected appellant’s contention and affirmed the orders of the juvenile court. Appellant’s present appeal raises the same issue that he raised in his appeal from the dispositional order. Appellant merely incorporates by reference his arguments in the prior appeal. The appeal is dismissed.

Defendant was charged with unlawfully driving a vehicle and receiving a stolen vehicle after he was found driving a stolen car, from which the ignition switch had been removed, requiring the use of pliers to turn the car on and off. Notwithstanding defendant’s argument that he did not know the car was stolen, the jury found him guilty of both offenses.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to give the jury a mistake of fact instruction (CALJIC No. 4.35) sua sponte.[1] In the alternative, he contends his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a mistake of fact instruction. The judgment is affirmed.

Plaintiff appeals a judgment entered in favor of defendants the State of California and the California Department of Transportation (together Caltrans) after the court granted defendants motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for slander, defamation/trade libel and discrimination. Plaintiff contends the court erred when it concluded the alleged statements were not defamatory per se and plaintiff was therefore required to prove special damages in connection with its defamation claims, and further erred when it concluded plaintiff's evidentiary showing of special damages was too speculative to withstand defendant's summary judgment motion. Plaintiff also asserts the court erred when it found there were no triable issues of fact on its discrimination claim. Court reversed the judgment.

Defendants acting in propria persona, appeal from a judgment in favor of the City of Encinitas (City) following the trial court's entry of default against them in City's civil suit for declaratory and injunctive relief. City's abatement action concerned a structure located on defendants' property that City alleged was an unlawful garage conversion without a building permit. Defendants contend that during the proceedings of the case they were denied due process of law; City's inspection warrant was improperly issued and executed; City's summons and complaint was uncertain and defective; they were denied a public abatement hearing; and they were improperly subjected to a permanent injunction and a lien for excessive costs and fees. Because defendants have not shown any basis to reverse the default judgment, court affirmed.

Defendants appeal from a judgment entered after a jury trial in which the jury awarded plaintiff damages for breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation. Plaintiff appeals from a postjudgment order denying its request for attorney fees and prejudgment interest on a portion of the damages awarded to plaintiff in the judgment.
Defendant contends on appeal that the jury's verdict is inconsistent in that the jury found that a valid contract existed, but also awarded damages for negligent misrepresentation pertaining to the subject matter of the contract. Defendant further contends that there was insufficient evidence of negligent misrepresentation to support the jury's damage award on that ground.
In a cross-appeal, plaintiff challenges the trial court's determination that it is not entitled to statutory attorney fees and interest under Civil Code[ section 3260. According to plaintiff, defendant failed to pay the full amount due under a June 11 agreement within 45 days after it accepted the floor, thus failing to meet the requirements of section 3260 and rendering defendant liable for attorney fees and interest. Affirmed.