CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff Al Romero and his company, Advanced Service Solutions, Inc., (together Romero) brought the instant action seeking damages for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Romero alleges he was fired from his position with defendants, the Los Angeles Power Joint Venture et al. (defendants or LAP), in retaliation for making numerous complaints about the safety and effectiveness of a control and monitoring system for a power plant that defendants were renovating for the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (DWP). Romero appeals from the dismissal of the action after the trial court granted defendants motion for summary judgment. Court hold that Romero has demonstrated numerous triable issues of material fact precluding summary adjudication of his cause of action for wrongful termination against public policy based on Californias Occupational Safety and Health Act (Cal-OSHA), Labor Code section 6310. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed.

This case involves a dispute as to whether the bylaws of defendant and respondent the Korean American Federation of Los Angeles (KAFLA) were properly amended in 2000. If so, the president (defendant and respondent Kee Whan Ha, hereinafter Ha) properly sought reelection and became president for a second term. Plaintiff and appellant Simon Bae (Bae) brought this case challenging the election and Has presidency. Court affirm the trial courts judgment in which it concluded that Bae had not met his burden of proof.

A juvenile court found true the allegation that Vincent C. (Vincent) committed the offense of being a minor in possession of a concealable firearm. (Pen. Code, 12101, subd. (a)(1).) On appeal, Vincent contends: (1) the true finding must be reversed because the firearm was discovered pursuant to an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) his statements to the police were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) and should have been suppressed; and (3) even if the true finding is confirmed, the case must be remanded to the juvenile court to exercise its discretion and declare whether the offense is a misdemeanor or felony. Court remand to the juvenile court to declare whether the offense is a misdemeanor or felony and, if necessary, recalculate the period of confinement. In all other respects, Court affirm.

Donna Kobbervig - Harrell, a former sales associate for Nike, Inc., appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Nike and three of its managers in Kobbervig-Harrells action for wrongful termination and related employment claims. Because Nike failed to satisfy its initial burden on summary judgment/summary adjudication concerning Kobbervig - Harrells claim Nike failed to accommodate her pregnancy, Court reverse the judgment in favor of Nike as to that cause of action. In all other respects, Court affirm.

Victor Leon appeals from the judgment entered after he pleaded guilty to two counts of vandalism (Pen. Code, 594, subd. (b)(1)) and challenges a condition of his probation. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a term of probation prohibiting his attending any court hearing or being within 500 feet of any court hearing in which he is neither a defendant nor under subpoena, and requiring him to inform the probation officer prior to any court appearance. Court strike the challenged probation condition and otherwise affirm the judgment.

Charles Robert Adams appeals from his convictions by jury of insurance fraud (Pen. Code, 550, subd. (a)(4)) and perjury ( 118, subd. (a)). He admitted having suffered four prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b) and one prior felony strike conviction within the meaning of sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d) and 667, subdivisions (b) through (i). The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate state prison term of six years. Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing him to impeach a pivotal prosecution witness with pending felony charges or the moral turpitude conduct underlying them, thereby depriving him of his state and federal constitutional rights to due process, to confront and cross - examine witnesses and to present a meaningful defense. Court affirm.

Appellant appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to the charge of first degree murder (Pen. Code, 187 subd. (a)) and the allegation that a principal was armed with a firearm ( 12022, subd. (a)(1)). In accordance with appellants plea bargain, the trial court sentenced appellant to 26 years to life, consisting of 25 years to life for the murder and one year for the firearm enhancement. Court appointed counsel to represent appellant on this appeal. Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that appellants attorney has fully complied with his responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.) Court note, however, that the abstract of judgment and the minute order of judgment contain clerical error. The abstract and minute order indicate that appellant received a one-year enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d). As the reporters transcript states, the court imposed the one-year enhancement under section 12022, subdivision (a)(1). The appeal is dismissed.

A modification decision.

Richard Sammy Vasquez appeals from the judgment entered following a court trial at which he was found guilty of assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1).) He was acquitted of attempted murder. ( 664, 187, subd. (a).) The court found true an allegation that he had personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim. ( 12022.7, subd. (a).)
This is the second time that this matter has come before us. The trial court originally sentenced appellant to prison for six years. In an unpublished opinion, Court reversed the judgment only as to the sentence because appellant had been denied a meaningful opportunity to state his case for an alternative sentence. Court concluded that this denial constituted a violation of procedural due process. Court remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing. (People v. Vasquez, No. B179611, filed Oct. 19, 2005.) On remand, the trial court resentenced appellant to prison for six years. Court again reverse and remand because the trial court's sentencing choice was based on material inaccuracies concerning the facts of the offense. The court's reliance on these inaccuracies rendered the resentencing hearing fundamentally unfair and denied him due process of law.

John L. Chisholm appeals his conviction, by jury, of failing to update his registration as a sex offender annually (Pen. code, 290, subd. (a)(1)(C)(iii)) and of being a transient who failed to update his registration as a sex offender every 30 days. ( 290, subd. (a)(1)(C)(i).) The trial court placed appellant on formal probation for 36 months, on the condition, among others, that he serve 365 days in county jail. Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that appellant's counsel has fully complied with her responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.) The judgment is affirmed.

Jae Cho and Kyu Lee appeal their murder convictions (Pen. Code, 187) on the ground that the trial court improperly dismissed a juror during the trial. Court find no abuse of discretion and affirm the judgment.

Freddy A. appeals from an order declaring him a ward of the juvenile court for unlawfully possessing a knife on school grounds. He contends the evidence against him should have been suppressed because it was discovered through an unlawful search. Court affirm.

Appellant (mother) appeals the juvenile court order finding that her daughter, Jasmine M. (minor), was subject to jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (c), and the juvenile court order establishing a case plan requiring mother to attend individual counseling but not neuropsychological counseling or evaluation. According to mother, the finding under section 300, subdivision (c) was not supported by substantial evidence, and the case plan was not tailored to meet the neurological problems she faces due to a brain injury she suffered in 1994. As to the first argument, Court note that mother does not challenge the juvenile courts finding that the minor was a child described in section 300, subdivision (b). Thus, there is no basis for reversing the finding of jurisdiction. As to the second argument, we find that the case plan was appropriate under the circumstances and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.
Court affirm.

Nery D. appeals an order denying his request for presumptive parent status as to Jonathan G. and purports to appeal an order denying his request for presumptive parent status as to Carolina M. Court affirm the juvenile courts orders.