CA Unpub Decisions

On May 4, 2004, the Fresno County Department of Children and Family Services (department) filed a petition against appellant, Debbie M., alleging that Derek, then 3 years old, and two siblings came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g). On September 18, 2006, the juvenile court found Dereks two siblings were adoptable and terminated parental rights of the mother and father. The court continued the matter as to Derek. On December 4, 2006, the juvenile court found Derek was likely to be adopted and terminated the mothers parental rights. On appeal, Debbie M. contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile courts finding that Derek was adoptable and that the order terminating her parental rights to Derek must be reversed. The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.

Defendant appeals from a final judgment, declaring him a ward of the court, which was entered after he admitted possessing a weapon on school grounds. Before defendant admitted the allegations, the court denied his motion to suppress the weapon, a butterfly knife. Defendant contends the court wrongly denied his motion because an assistant principal found the knife during an illegal search. The record shows the assistant principal reasonably suspected defendant possessed some kind of contraband. Thus, the court correctly denied the suppression motion. Court affirm.

Appellant Nenette Hoffman and respondent Steven Hoffman were married in Reno, Nevada in 1989. In 2004, Steven[1] petitioned for dissolution of marriage. Less than one year later, Steven amended his petition to seek a judgment of nullity of marriage. He asserted that his marriage to Nenette was void because it was bigamous, due to her prior marriages to Romeo Lim in 1982 and to Crisanto Cabalic in 1985.
After a trial, the court found that Nenettes marriage to Crisanto Cabalic had been dissolved prior to her marriage to Steven. However, the court ruled that Nenette was still legally married to Romeo Lim at the time of her marriage to Steven, and therefore the parties marriage was void. Additionally, the trial court determined that Steven (but not Nenette) had entered into their marriage in a good faith belief that it was a valid marriage, and granted Steven putative spouse status. For reasons that Court explain, Court determine that sufficient evidence supports the trial courts findings, and therefore Court affirm the judgment.

Defendants Jose Monsivais[1] and Marcos Amparo, members of the Sureo gang, were found guilty at jury trial of the attempted murders of California Highway Patrol (CHP) Officers Jeremy Bowen and Quincy Gowenlock and numerous other offenses arising out of a high speed chase as well as two vehicle thefts, two robberies, one carjacking, and firearms related offenses occurring during a 10 day crime spree preceding the chase. They appeal, raising issues of the admissibility and sufficiency of the evidence, competence of counsel, and sentencing error.

Defendant Elton Flenaugh appeals from a judgment entered after he admitted a probation violation. Defendant was placed on probation on May 20, 2004, after he pleaded no contest to one count attempted second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 664, 211, 212.5, subd. (c)), one count felony failure to appear while released on bail (Pen. Code, 1320.5), and one count use of an altered, stolen, or counterfeit access card (Pen. Code, 484g, subd. (a), 487). On February 10, 2005, a petition for modification of probation was filed and on April 21, 2005, defendant admitted to the enumerated violations in exchange for a promised sentence to state prison for two years. The court then sentenced defendant pursuant to the terms of the bargain and awarded a total of 632 days presentence credit, and imposed a restitution fine.Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, Court have reviewed the entire record and have concluded that there is no arguable issue on appeal.

Defendant Ya Thaing was found guilty at jury trial of three sex crimes against a child and was sentenced to 15 years to life in state prison. On appeal, he claims he was deprived of due process and a fair trial because of erroneous jury instructions, prosecutorial misconduct, and possible incompetence of counsel. The judgment is affirmed.

The Monterey County District Attorney filed a complaint charging defendant Frederick Jefferson with possession of cocaine base and possession of drug paraphernalia. (Health & Saf. Code, 11350, 11364.) The complaint also alleged that defendant had a prior strike conviction and was ineligible for probation because of three prior drug convictions. Defendant pleaded guilty to drug possession and admitted the strike. He was then placed on probation for drug treatment under the provisions of Proposition 36, the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000 (the Act). (Pen. Code, 1210 et seq.)[1]

The district attorney later filed three petitions to revoke defendants probation. Defendant admitted alleged probation violations in two of the petitions: failuring to enroll in a treatment program and testing positive for drug use. The third petition alleged that defendant had been arrested for a drug offense. After a contested hearing, the court found that defendant had committed the violation. Thereafter, the court dismissed the prior strike conviction and imposed a two year term for the underlying offense. The court also imposed various fines and fees.
Court reverse and remand for resentencing.

Defendant Ronald Louis Leyva appeals following the trial courts denial of his request for presentence custody credit.
In October 2006, defendant filed a request for additional presentence custody credit, which the court denied. Defendant filed a notice of appeal in March 2007 after this court granted defendant relief from default for failure to file a timely notice of appeal. The judgment is affirmed.

In this juvenile dependency matter, the mother of two children appeals from the termination of parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26)[1] and from the denial of her petition under section 388 to modify existing orders terminating reunification services. She contends that the court abused its discretion in denying her section 388 petition and that the exception provided in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A), applied here to prevent termination of her parental rights, because the evidence showed she had an ongoing beneficial relationship with her children. Court reject these contentions and affirm the judgment terminating parental rights.

Ramon V. Meza appeals the granting of a petition to confirm an arbitration award. He contends a declaration was erroneously admitted, the action was preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 185), and the petition should not have been confirmed because Meza was not a party to an arbitration agreement and he was not represented by counsel during the arbitration. Court affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Bernard Davis of second degree murder (Pen. Code,[1] 187, subd. (a)) and found true firearms allegations within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (d), personal and intentional discharge of a firearm causing death, and section 12022.5, subdivision (a), personal use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. Davis admitted a prison prior. The trial court sentenced him to a prison term of 40 years to life and imposed an additional one year for the prior prison term enhancement. On appeal, Davis argues the jury committed misconduct in conducting an experiment contrary to its instructions and the court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial based on that misconduct. Court conclude the experiment was within the line of evidence presented, and thus there was no jury misconduct. Accordingly, Court affirm.

A jury convicted Taghrid F. Bakeer of grand theft (Pen. Code,[1] 487, subd. (a), count 1) and embezzlement from her employer, Daniel's Jewelers (Daniel's) ( 508, count 2). The court sentenced her to 5 years of probation on both counts, with 180 days of jail time. She also was ordered to pay $4, 990 in restitution for the wholesale cost of the watches she stole, plus $3,700 to the victims who purchased the watches from her.
Bakeer contends she was erroneously convicted on the two counts because the crimes have the same elements; and, the restitution to Daniel's was excessive because the watches were returned to the store. Court affirm in part and reverse in part.

Any claims which arise out of a citizen's report of alleged criminal activity to law enforcement personnel are subject to a motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Moreover, when a citizen reports suspected criminal activity to law enforcement personnel, the communication is absolutely privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). Here, all of plaintiff's claims against defendant arise out of defendant's report to a sheriff's department of alleged conduct by plaintiff. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to strike and remand with directions to strike plaintiff's complaint and award defendant reasonable attorney fees incurred both in the trial court and on appeal.
The court's denial of Ewing's special motion to strike is reversed, and on remand the trial court is directed to enter a new order striking Stec's complaint.

Following a court trial, Francisco Ernesto Villegas was convicted of committing a lewd act upon a child (Pen. Code,[1] 288, subd. (c)(1); count 1) and oral copulation by a person over the age of 21 on a person under the age of 16 ( 288a, subd. (b)(2); count 2). The court found true allegations that in the commission of the count 1 offense, Villegas inflicted great bodily injury under sections 12022.7, subdivision (a) and 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8). The court sentenced Villegas to two years in prison on count 1 and two years in prison on count 2 to run concurrent to count 1, with an additional three years for the great bodily injury enhancement. Villegas contends we should strike the enhancement because impregnation resulting from non-forcible sexual intercourse does not constitute great bodily injury. He further asks us to recalculate his presentence custody credits because absent the great bodily injury enhancement, he is entitled to an additional 75 days of credit. Rejecting Villegas's contention that pregnancy is not great bodily injury within the meaning of section 12022.7 as applied to this case, Court affirm the judgment.