CA Unpub Decisions

Leroy Savage appeals the order continuing his commitment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) (Pen. Code, 2962). He contends that his commitment cannot be continued as a condition of his parole because his severe mental disorders, pedophilia and dementia, are no longer treatable. He alternatively contends that his continued commitment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the state and federal Constitutions. Coourt affirm.

Leah B. appeals an order of the juvenile court declaring that her son is adoptable and terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) She also appeals an order denying her modification petition filed pursuant to section 388. Court affirm.

Miracle G. (the mother) seeks writ review of a juvenile court order terminating family reunification services with the child, Matthew P., and setting a selection and implementation hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. The mother contends there is no substantial evidence that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the department) provided reasonable reunification services. The mother further contends there was no clear and convincing evidence that she failed to make substantive progress or participate regularly in her court ordered treatment plan. Because substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts order, the petition is denied.

In this dependency case brought under Welfare & Institutions Code section 300 et seq., James F., who is the alleged father of the minor children James S. and Joseph F., has filed a petition for extraordinary writ. By his petition, Father seeks relief from a July 10, 2007 order of the dependency court that set this case for a section 366.26 hearing on October 26, 2007. Father has filed his petition in propria persona.
Fathers petition requests that we direct the dependency court to (1) vacate the order setting the section 366.26 hearing, and (2) make an order that provides reunification services for Father and grants custody of the minor children to him. Father has also requested a temporary stay of the section 366.26 hearing. The petition for extraordinary writ filed by Father is denied.

In this appeal we are called upon to decide whether a trial court abused its discretion by failing to continue or extend a trial to a previously reserved relief valve day. Court conclude an abuse of discretion has occurred.

A jury convicted James Edward Newman of second degree murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a))[1] and found that he personally discharged a firearm in committing the crime ( 12022.53, subd. (d)). The trial court sentenced Newman to 40 years to life in prison. On appeal, Newman asserts numerous claims of instructional error. First, he claims the trial court erred in instructing the jury on willfully false or deliberately misleading statements (CALJIC No. 2.03), efforts to suppress evidence (CALJIC No. 2.06) and flight (CALJIC No. 2.52) because the inferences supported by these instructions (i.e., a consciousness of guilt) were irrelevant to the case. Second, Newman contends the trial court erred by giving an extemporaneous instruction of the different mental states required for murder and voluntary manslaughter. As discussed below, Court conclude that the trial court's consciousness of guilt instructions were proper under controlling California Supreme Court case law. With respect to the trial's court extemporaneous instruction regarding the intent requirement for voluntary manslaughter, we conclude that the statement was legally incorrect, but not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal in light of subsequent instructions that cured the court's misstatement. Consequently, Court affirm the judgment.

Hugo Munoz appeals from judgment after conviction by court trial of three counts of assault with a deadly weapon by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)),[1]one count of misdemeanor battery ( 459), and one count of misdemeanor vandalism. ( 594, subd. (b)(2)(A).) The trial court found true allegations that each of the assaults was a serious felony within the meaning of section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(23), and that Munoz personally inflicted great bodily injury against one of the assault victims. ( 12022.7, subd. (a).) The trial court denied Munoz' request for probation, and sentenced him to eight years in state prison, consisting of three years for one assault count plus a consecutive three year term for the infliction of great bodily injury; consecutive one year terms for each of the two remaining assault counts; a concurrent six month term for the battery count; and a concurrent one year term for the vandalism count.
After examining the record, appointed counsel filed an opening brief in this court raising no issues and requested that we independently examine the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Munoz filed a timely supplemental brief in which he contends that his sentence was too harsh because he had no history of serious crimes and had never served a prison term. Court disagree and affirm.

Edward Valdez, Jr., through his guardians ad litem, sued Loma Linda University Medical Center (hereafter LLUMC), Prism Technologies, Inc., Prism Health Care and Mother Labs Services, Inc. (hereafter collectively Prism), for personal injuries he received as a newborn infant, when a nurse at LLUMC placed a heel warming device manufactured by Prism on his left heel, resulting in a third degree burn and permanent scarring and deformity to his heel. Valdez settled with Prism prior to trial for $140,000. A jury awarded Valdez $665,000 against LLUMC. The award against LLUMC was offset by the portion of the settlement with Prism representing economic damages. LLUMC filed a timely notice of appeal. The judgment is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of willfully fleeing or evading a pursuing police officer (Veh. Code, 2800.1, subd. (a)) (count 1); carrying a loaded firearm with a prior felony conviction (Pen. Code, 12031, subd. (a)(1), (2)(A)) (count 2); and possession of a firearm with a prior felony conviction (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a)(1)) (count 3). The trial court thereafter found true that defendant had suffered a prior prison term within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). Defendant was sentenced to a total term of four years in state prison: the upper term of three years on count 2, plus an additional one year for the prior prison term enhancement; the sentence on count 3 was stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654. He was also sentenced to 32 days in county jail, credit for time served, on count 1.
Court agree the abstract of judgment must be corrected but reject defendants remaining contentions.

The narrow issue presented in this case is whether the City of Riverside (City) can enact an exemption from its zoning code that eliminates planning commission review of public projects. Court answer in the affirmative notwithstanding appellants contention that broader, more complicated concerns are implicated by the Citys action. The trial court denied the petition and Friendss reconsideration motion. Court affirm the judgment because the Amendment not create the dire consequences Friends foresees.

In May 2000, minor, represented by counsel, admitted to possession of vandalism tools (Pen. Code, 594.2, subd. (a)) and receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, 496); in return, the remaining charges of vandalism (Pen. Code, 594, subd. (b)(3)) and burglary (Pen. Code, 459) were dismissed, and it was stipulated the probation officer could consider all allegations for purpose of disposition and restitution. Subsequently, minor was declared a ward of the court and placed on probation in the custody of his mother on various terms and conditions.
Minor appealed, and upon his request this court appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 [87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493] setting forth a statement of the case, a summary of the facts, and potential arguable issues and requesting this court to undertake a review of the entire record.

In a previous appeal, No. F048765, we affirmed the 2004 conviction of defendant Thomas Joe Shadden of felony offenses arising from his firing of several shots at an unoccupied car belonging to the mother of his children, which was parked in the carport of her apartment complex. In this case, he stands convicted of committing a felony violation of Penal Code section 136.1, subdivision (a)(2), by attempting to prevent or dissuade a witness to the shooting from testifying at his trial in the prior case. Having been convicted in 1997 of felony offenses arising from his burning of another womans car, defendant received an enhanced three strikes sentence of 35 years to life, to be served consecutively to the 16 year term he received for the car shooting.At trial, the prosecution played a tape of a telephone call defendant made to Vanessa from jail on November 10, 2004. One topic defendant and Vanessa discussed was a plan by which Vanessa and Jason were to contact the police and retract their statements incriminating defendant: For all these reasons, we conclude defendants sentence is not grossly disproportionate and therefore not cruel or unusual. (Ewing v. California, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 23; People v. Romero, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1431.) The judgment is affirmed.

Appellant, Ametheus Labrennon Taylor, was charged in an information with second degree burglary (Pen. Code, 459, count one) and receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, 496, subd. (a), count two).[1] The information further alleged a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law and a prior prison term enhancement. Taylor was found guilty of count one and acquitted of count two after a jury trial. In a bifurcated proceeding, Taylor waived a jury trial on the remaining allegations which the trial court found true. On appeal, Taylor contends the trial court instructed the jury in such a way that it could have convicted him of a legally impossible offense. Taylor also contends that CALCRIM No. 224 altered the burden of proof, requiring him to affirmatively prove his innocence. The judgment is affirmed.

On June 28, 2006, a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602) was filed in Fresno County Superior Court case No. 01CEJ600888-5 (case No. 888 5), in which it was alleged that appellant Jerry S., a minor, committed battery (Pen. Code, 242).[2]In a detention hearing memo prepared June 28, it was alleged that in committing this offense, appellant violated probation granted in a previous wardship proceeding. On July 13, appellant admitted the violation of probation, and the court dismissed the June 28 wardship petition. The judgment is modified to provide that appellant is awarded 743 days of predisposition credits.