CA Unpub Decisions

In March 2004, defendant Erick Lara approached a plainclothes peace officer in his car, flashed a gang sign, said Norteo, and used the closed fist of his right hand to strike the officer on his left eye. Defendant appeared to be intoxicated.
Defendant pleaded no contest to resisting an executive officer. (Pen. Code, 69.) The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for three years on the conditions, among others, that he serve 120 days of incarceration and report to the probation officer as required. The judgment is affirmed.

This case comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Having reviewed the record as required by Wende, Court affirm the judgment. Court provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.) The facts underlying the offenses are taken from the probation report.

Defendant and appellant Tim Alan Hambelton appeals his conviction of one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition. Defendant contends his trial attorney rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to certain evidentiary matters. Court affirm.

Defendant and appellant Michael Dwayne Bolton appeals his conviction of two felony drug offenses. He has abandoned a procedural issue regarding transcription of the jury instructions, and otherwise raises sentencing issues. Court direct that the abstract of judgment be corrected to reflect that his prison term priors were stricken, rather than stayed. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

Following a court trial, appellant Stephen Ray Cox was convicted in count 1 of making criminal threats, in count 2 of assaulting his wife, Carla Cox, with a firearm and in count 3 of assaulting a peace officer, Hank Ramirez, with a firearm. (Pen. Code, 422; 245, subd. (b); 245, subd. (d)(2); 12021, subd. (a)(1).) The court found true section 12022.5 firearm use enhancement allegations that were attached to counts 1 and 2 and section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c), firearm use enhancement allegations that were attached to count 3. ( 12022.5, subd. (a)(1); 12022.53, subds. (b) & (c).) Appellant pled no contest to the crime of illegally possessing a firearm (count 4). Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 25 years imprisonment, calculated as the mitigated term of five years for count 3 plus a consecutive 20 year term for the section 12022.53, subdivision (c) enhancement. Concurrent terms of eight months each were imposed for counts 1, 2 and 4 and for a single count of possessing a controlled substance from a prior case. Two concurrent terms of one year and four months were imposed for the section 12022.5 enhancements. A 10 year term was imposed and stayed for the section 12022.53, subdivision (b), enhancement. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the assault convictions. Also, he contends that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during his rebuttal closing argument. Finally, he argues that the court erred by concluding that it lacked discretion to dismiss the section 12022.53 enhancements in the interests of justice. All of these arguments lack merit. Court affirm.

Respondent Duane Hartman was employed as a pipe racker by appellant Golden State Drilling Inc. (Golden State). After Hartmans employment ended, he sued Golden State for wrongful termination and intentional infliction of emotional distress. A jury awarded him $44,000 on his intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claim, and $56,000 on his wrongful termination claim. In a special verdict, the jury expressly found that Golden State had not actually discharged Hartman from employment, but that he had been constructively discharged by being subjected to working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person in [his] position would have had no reasonable alternative except to resign. The trial court entered judgment accordingly.

This is an appeal from summary judgment granted on cross-defendants motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. Court determine appellants have failed to show triable issues of material fact or to show respondents are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (See Code Civ. Proc., 437c, subd. (c).) Court also conclude that appellants remaining contentions lack merit. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment.

In December 2004, pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant Kenneth Eagles pled no contest to one count of willfully failing to register as a sex offender. (Pen. Code, 290, subd. (g)(2).) In January 2005, the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed appellant on three years probation. The conditions of probation included that appellant serve one year in county jail and have no contact with the minor, alleged to be the victim in four counts of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor (Pen. Code, 261.5) that were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement.
In March 2006, following a probation revocation hearing, the court found appellant violated the no-contact condition of probation. In April 2006, the court imposed the three year upper term on the instant offense and awarded appellant 420 days of presentence credit.
Court hereby vacate our March 2007 decision. Upon reconsideration, in light of Black II and Sandoval, Court issue the following decision, in which Court affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On May 12, 2006, the Tuolumne County District Attorney filed a domestic complaint in superior court charging appellant Noah Scott Kolpack as follows: count Icorporal injury to a cohabitant (Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a)) with a prior conviction for domestic violence ( 273.5, subd. (e)(1)), two prior prison terms ( 667.5, subd. (b)), and six prior felony convictions ( 1203, subd. (e)(4)). On May 26, 2006, the Honorable Douglas C. Boyack, judge of the superior court sitting as a magistrate, deemed the complaint to be an information and ordered it filed in the superior court. The judgment is affirmed.

A modification decision.

Yolanda McCloud appeals from a conviction of felony child abuse (Pen. Code, 273a, subd. (a))[1]and the finding that she inflicted great bodily injury within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a). She contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing her to state prison instead of granting probation and in refusing to strike the punishment for the great bodily injury enhancement. Court affirm.

This appeal arises from the domestication of a Texas judgment in Santa Barbara Superior Court, pursuant to the Sister State Money Judgments Act. The judgment debtors allege procedural error by the California trial court in entering the judgment and request that Court take judicial notice of documents in a federal court action in California. Court affirm the judgment of the trial court and deny their request for judicial notice.

Plaintiffs Amerisource Mortgage, Inc. and Angelo Di Nallo sued defendant Sean J. McConville, Amerisources President, for conversion and other related claims based upon McConvilles withdrawal of over $111,000 from Amerisources bank account. McConville moved for summary judgment, asserting that he had accepted an offer by Amerisource that allowed him to keep the funds if he was willing to surrender his interest in the company and enter into a release of all claims between himself and the company. Although the parties were not able to agree on the terms of the release, McConville contended that the offer and acceptance constituted an agreement only to negotiate in good faith, and that the $111,000 was the consideration Amerisource paid him to enter into that agreement. Plaintiffs argued that the parties intended that there would not be an agreement until there was a signed release. The trial court granted McConvilles motion and entered judgment in his favor. Court find that the language of the offer is ambiguous, and that McConville failed to meet his burden on summary judgment to present evidence to resolve the ambiguity. Accordingly, Court reverse the judgment.

Defendant Bankers Insurance Company (Bankers) appeals from an order denying its motion to vacate forfeiture of bail and to exonerate a bail bond issued on behalf of a criminal defendant, who failed to appear as ordered by the trial court. Court reverse the order with directions.