CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Reina F., mother of minors D.G., Ju.K., and Ja.K., appeals from juvenile court orders denying appellants petitions for modification as to all three minors and terminating appellants parental rights as to D.G. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, 388, 395.) Appellant makes several contentions of alleged prejudicial errors in the proceedings, requiring reversal. For the reasons that follow, Court affirm.

Shelly Woodall appeals the trial court's ruling granting summary judgment against her on her claim of wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and in favor of her former employer, Asset Marketing Systems Insurance Services, LLC (AMS). The trial court ruled that Woodall failed to identify any established public policy embodied in an applicable statute, regulation or constitutional provision that would support such a claim. Woodall contends that the trial court's ruling was erroneous because she adequately identified "areas of law" that could support a wrongful termination claim and, in the alternative, the trial court erred by declining to grant leave to amend her complaint to specify an applicable statutory basis for the claim.
As discussed in more detail below, we conclude that Woodall's contentions are without merit. Woodall's vague assertions of public policy violations by her former employer were insufficient to establish a triable issue of material fact at the summary judgment stage. Woodall also fails to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to grant leave to amend her complaint, primarily because Woodall never requested an opportunity to do so. Consequently, Court affirm.

Larry Brand appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court sustained the demurrer of defendants the Regents of the University of California (the Regents), Alan Paau, John Woods, Eduardo Macagno, Michael Melman and Daniel Wyman (collectively, defendants)[1]to Brand's lawsuit. The lawsuit alleged that defendants unlawfully retaliated against him for making disclosures protected by the California Whistleblower Protection Act (Gov. Code, 8547 et seq.).
We conclude that except with respect to the third cause of action against Melman (and the second cause of action, which is not at issue in this appeal), the trial court erred in sustaining the demurer. Accordingly, Court reverse the judgment in part.

In 1995 petitioner Abraham Abraham pleaded guilty to a charge of kidnapping for ransom and was sentenced to life in prison with a possibility of parole. Abraham, now 46 years old, has remained in prison for the past 12 years and appears to have been an exemplary prisoner. Nevertheless, the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) found him unsuitable for parole at hearings conducted in 2001, in 2003, and finally in 2006. The most recent denial, challenged by this petition for writ of habeas corpus, was based on the BPH's conclusion that Abraham was not suitable for parole because he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety were he released from prison, even though evaluations have concluded his risk of danger to the public, were he paroled, is no greater than the risks posed by an average unincarcerated citizen.Abraham asserts the BPH's conclusion has no evidentiary support, and therefore violates his due process right to parole. He argues its conclusion was improperly based solely on the circumstances of his offense and there is no evidence he currently poses a risk of danger to public safety. Court would deny Abraham's petition.

A jury found Alexis Hernandez guilty of one count of possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11377; count 9); one count of possession for sale of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11378; count 13), and one count of opening or maintaining a place to sell methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11366; count 12).[1] With respect to count 13, the jury found true the allegation that Hernandez committed the offense while released from custody in another case within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.1.[2] The jury also found codefendant, Zoila Nataran, guilty of nine counts of selling methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11379, subd. (a); counts 1-8, 10); one count of possession for sale of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11378; count 11); and one count of opening or maintaining a place to sell methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11366; count 12). Hernandez and Nataran raise numerous contentions on appeal. Court find no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Christine Rams appeals her conviction of murder (Pen. Code,[1] 187), and aggravated assault upon a child causing death ( 273ab). The court sentenced her to 25 years to life on the felony child assault conviction and stayed the 15-year-to-life sentence on the murder count pursuant to section 654. Rams contends the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions and her sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The Attorney General points out that the abstract of judgment contains a clerical error. Court agree the abstract of judgment requires correction but otherwise affirm the judgment.

A court convicted Mary Ackles of selling cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a)) and found she had a prior conviction for selling cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, 11370.2, subd. (a)) and a strike prior for a 1987 involuntary manslaughter conviction (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i), 668, 1170.12). The court struck the Health and Safety Code, section 11370.2, subdivision (a) allegation and the strike prior and sentenced her to prison for a middle term of four years. Ackles appeals. Court affirm the judgment.

The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) and the children, Maria V. and Alejandra H., appeal from orders dismissing the petitions filed on behalf of the children under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. Appellants challenge the court's finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (Fam. Code, 3400 et seq. (UCCJEA)). Court conclude the court did not err when it determined that it did not have home state or substantial connection jurisdiction under section 3421, subdivision (a)(1) and (2). However, Court reverse the orders dismissing the Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petitions because the court did not consider whether it had emergency jurisdiction after an evidentiary hearing. (In re A. C. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 854, 864, citing In re C. T. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 101, 107, 108, fn. 3.) Court remand the case to the trial court to consider and make proper findings under section 3424. (In re V. F. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 962, 966, 973; In re Marquis D. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1813, 1824; cf. In re Gladys L. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 845, 848-849.)

Defendant Ronald Clyde Dean appeals from a jury verdict of continuous sexual abuse of a child in violation of Penal Code section 288.5, subdivision (a)[1](count 2), and two separate lewd acts on a child in violation of section 288, subdivision (a) (counts 1 and 3). The victim of these offenses was defendants daughter, who was under 14 years old at the time the abuse took place. As a result of the jurys verdict, the trial court imposed a total prison term of 26 years. Defendant argues his conviction on all counts should be reversed because the trial court erroneously admitted irrelevant but prejudicial testimony; there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction on count 3; and the trial courts imposition of aggravated terms and consecutive sentences violate his constitutional right to a jury trial as articulated in the Supreme Courts decision in Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 (Blakely). Because it materially affects our analysis of the aggravated terms imposed by the trial court, Court considered supplemental briefing by the parties in light of the Supreme Courts recent decision in Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. [127 S.Ct. 856] (Cunningham).

This action arises out of a workers compensation proceeding that plaintiff Kevin Jen-Kang Yang filed against his former employer, Union Bank of California. His wife, plaintiff Lee Yang, acted as his designated representative in that proceeding. In this separate civil action, the Yangs assert causes of action for disability discrimination, defamation, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.430 (concerning failure to proceed with a deposition). With respect to defendant Robert Buch, they allege that Buch an attorney representing Union Bank scheduled, took, and cancelled depositions in the workers compensation proceeding in ways that inflicted emotional distress on them. Buch filed a special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (SLAPP motion), arguing, among other things, that the Yangs claims against him were barred by the litigation privilege. (Civ. Code, 47, subd. (b).) The trial court granted the motion. It then granted Buchs motion for attorney fees. Meanwhile, it denied three successive motions for sanctions against Buch; in connection with the third motion, it awarded Buch sanctions against the Yangs. The Yangs appeal. Court hold that the Yangs failed to file a notice of appeal from the order granting the SLAPP motion; as a result, we lack jurisdiction to review that order in this appeal. Court further hold that the Yangs have not shown that the trial court erred by awarding Buch attorney fees, by denying their motions for sanctions, or by awarding Buch sanctions against them. Accordingly, Court affirm.

Minor Allen E. admitted that he violated Penal Code section 12101, subdivision (a), possession of a concealable firearm. He also admitted that the violation was committed to promote, further, and assist the criminal conduct of a criminal street gang in violation of Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b). On appeal, minor contends that the juvenile court erred in failing to make an express finding as to whether the possession of firearm charge was found true as a misdemeanor or felony. On a subsequent petition filed against minor, allegations of two robberies with gang enhancements were found true. On appeal, minor contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the gang enhancements.
For the reasons set forth below, Court affirm the judgment.

Following the trial courts denial of defendants motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, 1538.5) at the preliminary hearing, and pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to possession of metal knuckles ( 12020, subd. (a)(1)). In exchange, defendant was placed on formal probation for three years on various terms and conditions. In his appeal, defendant contends (1) the court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, as the initial detention and search of defendant was unlawful; and (2) the suppression motion should be reviewed on the merits, as any failure of trial counsel to renew the suppression motion prior to entering a guilty plea constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Because defendant failed to renew his suppression motion before the superior court to preserve the issue for appeal, Court find the issue has been waived. In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, defendant claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve his right to appeal the suppression motion. Court reject this contention and deny defendants petition, because defendant cannot show his counsel was ineffective for not renewing his suppression motion in the superior court.

Appellant C. H. (mother) appeals from the juvenile courts judgment terminating her parental rights to her daughter R. (child) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 and denying mothers section 388 petition for modification of court order. Specifically, mother argues: 1) the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied the section 388 petition because mother had completed her case plan and the modification would benefit the child; and 2) the juvenile court erred when it found that the beneficial parental relationship exception to the presumption for adoption did not apply. As discussed below, Court reject these contentions and affirm the juvenile courts judgment.

Defendant Gabriel Norman Martinez was convicted by a jury of possession of a stolen vehicle, possession of methamphetamine, and possession of narcotic paraphernalia, and was sentenced by the trial court to a total prison term of four years, eight months. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court was without authority to withdraw its prior approval of defendants plea entered pursuant to a plea agreement. Defendant also seeks independent review by this court of information in a peace officers personnel file. Finally, defendant contends the courts imposition of the upper term violated his constitutional rights. Court affirm.