CA Unpub Decisions

The buyers of a house chose not to go through with the purchase when their inspection revealed unexpected defects. They timely cancelled the sale. Pursuant to their purchase agreement, buyers were to be refunded their initial deposit. However, the seller refused to execute escrow cancellation instructions which would have resulted in the deposit being refunded to the buyers. The buyers brought suit against the seller for breach of contract and specific performance. Seven months later, the seller executed the cancellation instructions and the buyers were refunded their deposit. The buyers then sought, and were awarded, their attorney fees, as prevailing parties, pursuant to an attorney fee clause in the purchase agreement. The seller appeals, arguing that the escrow cancellation instructions executed by both parties contained a mutual release which extended to the claim for attorney fees. Court disagree and affirm.

Real party in interest Ernestine Forrest (an attorney representing herself on appeal) appeals from a portion of a trial court judgment granting in part a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., 1094.5) filed by Forrests employer, California Department of Corporations (the Department). The Department challenged an administrative decision by the State Personnel Board (SPB) determining that the Departments dismissal of Forrest from her job as Corporations Counsel was an excessive penalty for her deficient job performance. The trial court determined that certain SPB factual findings in favor of Forrest were unsupported by the evidence, but the court upheld the SPBs determination that Forrest be reinstated to her job. Forrest contends (1) the portion of the judgment favorable to the Department relates to issues forfeited by the Department and subject to laches; (2) the evidence does not support the trial courts setting aside of SPB findings; and (3) SPBs post-judgment action exceeded the scope of the judgment. Court conclude Forrest failed to provide an adequate record for review of evidentiary contentions and fails to show grounds for reversal. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant Lamarrieo Young appeals from an order extending by two years his commitment to a state mental hospital which arose from his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity to a charge of violating Penal Code section 245, assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, 1026 [commitment upon plea of not guilty because insane], 1026.5, subd. (b).)[1] Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction patterned after this courts opinion in People v. Galindo (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 531, requiring the prosecution to prove defendant has serious difficulty in controlling dangerous behavior. Defendant also contends the trial court erred in denying a defense motion to dismiss the case based on the prosecutions failure to present evidence on this control issue, and the order should be reversed for insufficiency of the evidence. Court conclude any instructional error was harmless, and denial of the dismissal motion was proper because substantial evidence supports the order. Accordingly, Court affirm the order extending defendants commitment.

M.S. (appellant), the mother of A.S. (the minor), appeals in pro per from an order of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, 395.) Appellants sole contention on appeal is that the court should not have given . . . [the] Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services [(DHHS)] the absolute right to arbitrarily deny [her] the right to see [the minor] on a regular basis. Court affirm the judgment (order terminating parental rights).

Several minor females responded to newspaper advertisements offering $600 for modeling sessions. The victims met with defendant Christopher Lee Crowell at his home or a local motel. He showed them pictures of other females, some of whom were nude. He also showed them pictures of him engaging in sexual intercourse with females. Then he interviewed the victims, photographed their identification, and photographed the victims clothed and wearing thong underwear and bras. He later contacted them and arranged paid photo shoots during which the victims posed in clothing, underwear, bikinis, lingerie, and, in the case of one victim, nude.
The judgment is affirmed.

At approximately 9:00 or 10:00 p.m. on November 16, 2006, Dave Avner walked to the Palomar trolley station. Approximately seven or eight juveniles were there in a group. One of the male juveniles came up to Avner and asked for a cigarette. When Avner refused, the male juvenile slapped Avner's head. One of the female juveniles got very close to Avner's face and began making threatening gestures and comments. Affirmed.

A jury found Darryl Gartley guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a)(1))(count 1) and guilty of being a felon in possession of ammunition ( 12316, subd. (b)(1)) (count 2). In a bifurcated hearing, he admitted two prior prison terms ( 667.5, subd. (b), 668) and a strike ( 667, subds. (b)-(i)). The court struck the prison priors and sentenced him to prison for two years eight months: two years eight months on count 1 (twice the lower term) and a stayed term on count 2. Gartley appeals. Court affirm.

Hector G. and Ruby G. (together the parents) appeal an order terminating their parental rights to their son, Hector G. (hereafter, the minor), and Ruby appeals an order summarily denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition.[1] Hector contends the court violated his right to due process by terminating his parental rights without sufficient notice and without a special hearing regarding parental unfitness. Ruby asserts the court erred by denying her petition without a hearing and by finding the beneficial parent-child relationship and the sibling relationship exceptions to termination of parental rights and adoption did not apply. Hector joins in Ruby's arguments which may be to his benefit. Court affirm the orders.

Hector G. and Ruby G. (together the parents) appeal an order terminating their parental rights to their son, Hector G. (hereafter, the minor), and Ruby appeals an order summarily denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition.[1] Hector contends the court violated his right to due process by terminating his parental rights without sufficient notice and without a special hearing regarding parental unfitness. Ruby asserts the court erred by denying her petition without a hearing and by finding the beneficial parent child relationship and the sibling relationship exceptions to termination of parental rights and adoption did not apply. Hector joins in Ruby's arguments which may be to his benefit. Court affirm the orders.

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery (Pen. Code, 211)[1]and admitted that in both counts a principal was armed with a handgun ( 12022, subd. (a)(1)). Defendant also admitted that he had suffered one prior serious felony conviction ( 667, subd. (a)) and three prior strike convictions ( 667, subds. (c)-(e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)). After the trial court denied defendants motion to dismiss his prior strike convictions, defendant was sentenced to a total term of 27 years to life. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in not dismissing his prior strike convictions. Because the record is clear that the trial court misunderstood its sentencing discretion, Court remand the matter for resentencing.

Defendant Tamara Lynette Robinson was convicted of the second degree murder of her 10-year-old niece, Tiana. In addition, she was found guilty of two counts of corporal injury to a child, Tianas sister, P. (We protect the names of P and Tianas other sister, S; because both of their names start with A, we use the second letter of each name.) Defendant appeals, claiming the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of implied malice. In addition, she raises numerous instructional issues, argues that there was prosecutorial misconduct, and asserts there is an error in the abstract of judgment. Court affirm.

On February 22, 2007, Hank M., was charged by petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 with making a criminal threat, a violation of Penal Code[1]section 422, and with communicating a threat to a public officer, a violation of section 71. In addition, the petition alleged that the first count was a serious felony within the meaning of section 1192.7, subdivision (c). At the conclusion of the contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found the allegations of the petition true. The court also found Hank, who was 10 years old at the time of the offense, capable of understanding the wrongfulness of his conduct. ( 26.). Court conclude there is not and will reverse the juvenile adjudication on both counts.

Appellant, Faustino Diaz Martinez, was charged in an information filed June 19, 2006, with possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, count one) and resisting arrest (Pen. Code, 148, subd. (a)(1), count two).[1] The information further alleged a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law ( 667 subd. (d)) and three prior prison term enhancements ( 667.5, subd. (b)). On August 28, 2006, the trial court denied appellants suppression motion ( 1538.5). On February 16, 2007, appellant waived his constitutional rights and entered a guilty plea to count one. He also admitted the prior serious felony conviction and the prior prison term enhancements.
The court sentenced appellant on June 8, 2007, to a prison term of two years on count one, which it doubled pursuant to three strikes, to four years. The court struck the prison priors. Criminal proceedings were suspended and appellant was referred to the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC) for four years. On June 13, 2007, it was determined that appellant was not statutorily eligible for placement in CRC and he was sent to the California Department of Corrections to serve his sentence. Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion.

Dr. Zakiyyah Muhammad sued the Islamic Society of Orange County (the ISOC) for unlawful discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 arising out of the circumstances culminating in her termination as the principal of its Islamic school. She also sued the ISOC and one of its directors, Dr. Fazal Mirza, for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress; she sued the ISOCs treasurer, Refat Abodia, for conspiracy to commit fraud. A jury found in favor of Muhammad on most of her claims; it also found all defendants acted with malice and awarded punitive damages. The defendants appeal, contending there is insufficient evidence to uphold the judgment and that it was infected by prejudicial expert testimony on cultural biases against women. Court find the evidence supports the judgment for unlawful retaliation against the ISOC and for fraud against ISOC and Mirza. Because we affirm on these grounds, Court need not decide whether the evidence supports the judgment against the ISOC for unlawful discrimination or against the ISOC and Mirza for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Roberts v. Ford Aerospace & Communications Corp. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 793, 799.) We find the evidence does not support the judgment for conspiracy to commit fraud against Abodia and reverse that portion of the judgment.