CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiffs Carl Schafer and Elizabeth Leslie appeal from an order denying their motion for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. Plaintiffs successfully petitioned the trial court for a writ of mandate directing the City of Los Angeles (City) to revoke permits for a commercial parking lot located near two homes Plaintiffs own in the neighborhood. In denying private attorney general fees, the trial court determined Plaintiffs’ private economic interest, as represented by the claimed diminution in the value of their property, was more than sufficient to justify their suit against the City, regardless of any public interest that the legal action also advanced. The court applied the correct legal standard and the evidence supports its conclusion. We find no abuse of discretion. We affirm.

Cross-complainant and appellant Rosalinda Garza-Wiesand (Rosalinda) appeals an order striking her cross-complaint pursuant to a special motion to strike (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16) brought by cross-defendants and respondents Edward Perez (Edward), Elba P. Garza (Elba), and Hector A. Garza, Jr. (Hector, Jr.).
Rosalinda also appeals a subsequent order awarding $19,640 in attorney fees and costs to Edward pursuant to section 425.16, commonly known as the anti-SLAPP statute. (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 57.)
We reverse the order granting the special motion to strike because Rosalinda’s cross-complaint did not arise out of protected activity and therefore did not implicate the anti-SLAPP statute.

Mother, A.S., has petitioned for an extraordinary writ. She seeks an order directing the superior court to vacate its rulings on a supplemental dependency petition that removed her twin children from her care and custody and set a hearing for a permanent plan pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. The superior court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence that the allegations of the petition were true, that its previous disposition did not effectively protect the children and that there would be a substantial danger to the children if they were returned to Mother’s care. The court was also correct to find that Mother had exhausted the time limit for the provision of family reunification services. We deny the petition.

Andrea A. (Mother) appeals from a judgment of the juvenile court establishing jurisdiction over her daughter, A.A. (Minor). The appeal raises three contentions: (1) the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding based on Mother’s conduct is unsupported by substantial evidence; (2) the juvenile court erred in denying her reunification services; and (3) the juvenile court’s visitation order was an abuse of discretion. We affirm.

Dock McNeely, acting in propria persona, appeals from a judgment of dismissal after a demurrer on his petition for writ of mandate against State of California Victim Compensation Board and State of California Department of Justice (collectively, “State”) was sustained without leave to amend. He contends his duty to register as a sex offender has ended due to litigation setting it aside, and he is therefore entitled to collect compensation from the State for time spent in prison notwithstanding Government Code section 13956, subdivision (c), which precludes an award of compensation while a person is required to register as a sex offender. We disagree and affirm.

Defendant Brian Michael Duvauchelle appeals from an order revoking his parole and ordering him to serve 180 days in custody with a possible release after 120 days if a placement was available at a residential substance abuse treatment facility. The court found that defendant had violated two conditions of his parole: failure to attend a sex-offender treatment program and failure to comply with the directive to report for drug treatment. Defendant was then on parole from a two-year prison sentence imposed for evading a peace officer in violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2, subdivision (a). Previously, in 1993, he had been convicted of rape.

Andrea Froncillo challenges his misdemeanor battery convictions. He contends the trial court erred by restricting his right to cross-examine the prosecution’s expert witness and by precluding him from impeaching the victim. We affirm.

A jury convicted Jamariel Valery of conspiracy to commit a felony (Pen. Code, § 182, subd. (a)(1) [Count 1]) and carrying a loaded, unregistered firearm in a vehicle (§ 25850, subds. (a) & (c) [Count 5]), and found true the related gang enhancements. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on probation for three years, subject to various conditions. Valery contends the condition requiring him to obtain his probation officer’s permission before changing his place of residence or traveling out of state (residency/travel condition) is invalid under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) and unconstitutionally overbroad. The Attorney General states, and Valery concedes, that the stay of probation on Count 1 constitutes an unauthorized sentence. We agree that the stay of probation on Count 1 must be vacated. As modified, we affirm the order of probation.

Seeking to avoid the adverse immigration consequences of a 1988 drug conviction based on a guilty plea, appellant Julio Montes Ramirez filed a motion under Penal Code section 1473.7 to vacate the conviction due to ineffective assistance of counsel. (All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.) Ramirez contended his counsel failed to advise him the guilty plea would lead to deportation and made no attempt to negotiate an alternative, immigration-safe plea.
The trial court denied the motion to vacate on the ground Ramirez failed to demonstrate his counsel’s performance was deficient or caused him any prejudice. We affirm.

Saul Villa Avalos appeals from a postjudgment order denying his petition/application for resentencing (the resentencing petition) brought under Health and Safety Code section 11361.8, subdivision (b), by which he sought to have a prior felony conviction for possession of marijuana for sale reduced to a misdemeanor. The trial court found Avalos ineligible for relief because he had also been convicted of murder at the time he was convicted of possession of marijuana for sale.
At the time Avalos committed the offense of possession of marijuana for sale, he had not been convicted of murder. We therefore conclude the trial court erred by finding the murder conviction made Avalos ineligible for relief. In reaching that conclusion, we follow the decision of our colleagues in People v. Smit (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 596 (Smit).

Appellant was charged with sexually abusing his girlfriend’s teenage daughter, Madison D. Madison’s mother, Cynthia, did not believe the allegations, and she ended up testifying for the defense. During her cross-examination, the prosecutor asked if she believed appellant was capable of molesting Madison, and she said no. Based on that exchange, the trial court allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence of appellant’s prior sexual misconduct under Evidence Code section 1108. Even though the court had previously ruled such evidence was inadmissible under section 352, it determined Cynthia’s testimony about appellant being incapable of molesting Madison “opened the door” to evidence of appellant’s past misdeeds. Therefore, it permitted appellant’s ex-wife to testify she and appellant began having sexual intercourse when she was only 17 years old. Claiming this evidence rendered his trial unfair, appellant challenges it on two fronts.

Appellant Estevan Arreola was sentenced in 1985 on multiple counts, including murder with special circumstances. Arreola appealed his convictions, and in a partially published opinion, this court reversed the conviction on one count of attempted murder and affirmed the judgment in all other respects. (People v. Arreola (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1570, 1576 (Arreola).)
Arreola was before the superior court on May 18, 2018, for resentencing. On May 23, 2018, Arreola appealed from the resentencing. Appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We affirm.

On April 5, 2017, a jury convicted appellant Michael Angel Moran of transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a); count 1) and possession for sale of methamphetamine (§ 11378; count 2).
On appeal, Moran contends: (1) one of his conditions of probation is constitutionally vague and overbroad; (2) the minute order for his sentencing hearing contains an error; and (3) the court erred when it imposed penalty assessments on the drug fees it imposed. We find merit to Moran’s first two contentions, modify the judgment accordingly, and affirm the judgment as modified.

On February 8, 2018, a felony complaint charged defendant and appellant Jaylen Holloway with violating Penal Code section 4501.5, a battery by a person confined in state prison upon a nonconfined person (count 1). The complaint also alleged that defendant had a strike prior based on a conviction for first degree burglary.