CA Unpub Decisions

Petitioner, in propria persona, seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from respondent courts order issued at an uncontested dispositional hearing setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing[1]as to his son F. Court will deny the petition.

J.F. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile courts order terminating her parental rights to her daughter, S.W., pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 (all further code references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated). Mothers trial attorney had signed a stipulation to terminate parental rights, and the juvenile court found a factual basis for the stipulation based on reports submitted by the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA).
Court affirm without deciding whether the juvenile court had an obligation to determine whether Mother knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently stipulated to terminating her parental rights. We conclude (1) any error in failing to make those determinations, if of constitutional magnitude, was not structural, but is subject to a harmless error analysis; and (2) any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the Chapmanv.California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 standard. Court therefore affirm.

Defendant was convicted by no contest plea of continuous sexual abuse of a child under 14 (Pen. Code, 288.5, subd. (a)).[1] He filed a motion to withdraw his plea, contending that the plea was the result of coercion, and not the product of the informed exercise of free will. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to withdraw the plea. The court subsequently sentenced defendant to 12 years in state prison. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal and request for certificate of probable cause, but the trial court denied the request for certificate of probable cause.[2] On appeal, defendant contends that he was deprived of the opportunity to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his [c]onstitutional [r]ights when the change of plea was coerced by a threat of a life sentence first delivered to [him] when the matter was called [and] assigned out for preliminary examination. He further contends that he was deprived of effective representation when his trial counsel failed to consult with him, to investigate the facts and defenses, and other[wise] prepare a defense. For the reasons stated below, Court dismiss the appeal.

After his motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, 1538.5)[1] was denied, defendant Kenneth Robert Rangel entered negotiated guilty and no contest pleas to various drug and weapons offenses. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced defendant to eight years in state prison. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, as the officer did not have probable cause to search his vehicle, and that the subsequent consent to search his house was the fruit of the unlawful search of the vehicle. Court will affirm the judgment.

The minor, J. L., appeals from the dispositional order committing him to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ)[1] after he admitted violating probation by failing to return to placement, as alleged in an August 22, 2006 notice pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 777.[2] On appeal, the minor contends that section 733, subdivision (c), bars the juvenile court from committing him to the DJJ. Relevant here, section 733, subdivision (c), precludes the court from committing a minor to the DJJ unless, among other things, the most recent offense alleged in any petition and admitted or found to be true by the court is an offense described in section 707, subdivision (b). The minor argues that the most recent offenses admitted and found to be true an attempted second degree robbery alleged in a December 15, 2006 petition under section 602, and the probation violation alleged in the August 22, 2006 notice under section 777 were non-707(b) offenses and, therefore, section 733 precludes his DJJ commitment. The minor also contends that an assault alleged in an earlier March 14, 2006 petition, which the juvenile court relied upon as the most recent offense under section 733, subdivision (c), in committing him to the DJJ, is not one of the offenses listed in section 707, subdivision (b), and thus he could not be committed to the DJJ based on that petition.
As we will explain, because the assault alleged in the March 14, 2006 petition is the most recent offense alleged in any petition and admitted or found to be true by the court and is an offense described in section 707, subdivision (b), the juvenile court was not precluded by section 733, subdivision (c), from committing the minor to the DJJ. Accordingly, Court affirm the dispositional order.

James Boelks motorcycle was stolen on May 25, 2006. Boelk had purchased the 1999 Yamaha motorcycle for $8,300 in March 2006, and he had ridden it only 13 miles before it was stolen. On May 31, 2006, defendant Paul Lacerda was seen speeding and doing wheelies on Boelks motorcycle just before he crashed into William Kellys semi-truck. Both the motorcycle and the truck were seriously damaged in the collision. The restitution orders are affirmed.

Defendant Edward Gilfilian Hulton pleaded guilty to one count of arson (Pen. Code, 451, subd. (d)) and one count of making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, 422). The court imposed the three-year upper term for the arson count and a consecutive eight‑month term for the criminal threat count. In his first appeal, defendant contended that the trial court violated Penal Code section 654 when it imposed terms for both counts, and he claimed that the trial court violated his jury trial rights by imposing an upper term for the arson count based on factors that had not been found true by a jury or admitted by him. This court originally rejected both of his claims. The judgment is affirmed.

Appellant sued the City and County of San Francisco (hereafter CCSF) and one of its paramedics for personal injuries he suffered after falling in a Municipal Railway (hereafter Muni) station in San Francisco on a rainy night in February 2003. The trial court granted respondents motion for summary judgment. Appellant appeals claiming there were disputed issues of material fact. Court disagree and thus affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.

Objector Crystal Echeverria and two other objectors appeal from a judgment approving the terms of a settlement agreement entered in this class action against defendant Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (Foot Locker). They contend the trial court erred in finding the terms of the settlement to be fair, reasonable and adequate without any evidence of the amount to which class members would be entitled if they prevailed in the litigation, and without any basis to evaluate the reasonableness of the agreed recovery. The settlement was reached in arms-length negotiations between competent counsel with the assistance of an experienced mediator and may well, in fact, be entirely reasonable in view of the strength of the claims and defenses and the cost and risks of further litigation. Nonetheless, we agree with objectors that the court bears the ultimate responsibility to ensure the reasonableness of the settlement terms. Although many factors must be considered in making this determination, and the court is not required to decide the ultimate merits of the class members claims before approving a proposed settlement, an informed evaluation cannot be made without an understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation. It is possible that the data necessary to make such an evaluation in this case was given to the trial court during informal discussions with counsel, but no such information appears in the record. Therefore, we must vacate the order approving the settlement and remand the matter to permit the trial court to reconsider the fairness and adequacy of the settlement in light of such additional information as the parties may present concerning the value of the class members claims should they prevail in the litigation and the likelihood of their so prevailing. The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The parties shall bear their respective costs on appeal.

J.L. appeals a dispositional order of the Sonoma County Juvenile Court, entered February 20, 2008, which established him as a ward of that court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. He challenges the courts underlying jurisdictional finding, that he committed petty theft, a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code section 484, and contends the court also erred when it ordered reimbursement under section 903.1 in the sum of $100. As discussed below, Court agree the jurisdictional finding is erroneous and reverse the dispositional order. Court also direct the juvenile court to follow the statutory procedure set out in section 903.45 prior to issuing any new order of reimbursement pursuant to section 903.1.

Edgar Delgado and Antonio Padilla each appeal from the judgments entered after their convictions by a jury on four counts of attempted first degree murder (Pen. Code, 664, 187, subd. (a)) with true findings on multiple firearm and gang allegations as to each count ( 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d), & (e)(1) & 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(c) & (b)(4)). Court affirm.

Michael A. Hecht appeals from the grant of a summary judgment in favor of his disability carrier. The trial court, relying on Erreca v. West. States Life Ins. Co. (1942) 19 Cal.2d 388, ruled that there were no triable issues of fact and that appellant was not "totally" disabled. Given the state of the record and appellant's concessions that certain facts are undisputed, Court affirm. Our standard of review is de novo. (Artiglio v. Corning Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 604, 612.)

Plaintiff Ellen Michaelson (Michaelson) sued her employer, defendant Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), for breach of contract, gender and age discrimination, and discriminatory pay after she was terminated. The trial court granted summary judgment for Allstate. Court affirm.