CA Unpub Decisions

A.S., the mother, appeals from a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 parental rights termination order. The mother contends the parental rights termination order must be reversed because of noncompliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act and related California provisions. The parties have stipulated to a limited reversal of the parental rights termination order to allow compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act. Court accept the parties stipulation.

Veronica G. (Mother), appearing in propia persona, seeks an extraordinary writ to vacate the juvenile courts order terminating reunification services and setting a permanency planning hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Finding no merit to Mothers challenge, Court deny her petition.

T.B., a minor, appeals from an order of the juvenile court denying his motion, made pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 778, to set aside his admission entered two years previously to two counts of continuous sexual abuse of a child. The minor contends the denial of the motion was error because the reporters transcript of the jurisdictional hearing wherein he admitted the charges is now unavailable, thereby rendering the record insufficient for him to obtain meaningful review of whether (1) the admission was knowingly and voluntarily given, and (2) whether the court properly found that he knew his conduct was wrongful. Court shall affirm the juvenile courts ruling.

This is the third of three appeals involving plaintiff Sycamore Ridge Apartments, LLC (Sycamore Ridge) and defendants including Sycamore Ridge tenants and the attorneys who represented them in lawsuits against Sycamore Ridge. The tenants' lawsuits led to malicious prosecution litigation by Sycamore Ridge and special motions to strike (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16) (anti-SLAPP motions) by the defendants. The three appeals concern rulings on the anti-SLAPP motions and related awards of attorneys' fees and costs. In the instant appeal, the parties have filed a joint application for reversal of the orders and remand of the action to the superior court. ( 128, subd. (a)(8).) Court accept the stipulation.

A jury convicted George Johnson of selling cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a)[1]; Pen. Code, 1203.073, subd. (b)(7)) and possessing cocaine base for sale ( 11351.5). In addition, the trial court found true allegations Johnson had two prior convictions for selling drugs and one prior conviction for possessing drugs for sale. ( 11370.2, subd. (a); Pen. Code, 1203.07, subd. (a)(11).) The trial court also found true allegations Johnson had three prior probation denial convictions (Pen. Code, 1203, subd. (e)(4)) and three prior prison convictions (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b), 668). The trial court sentenced Johnson to an aggregate term of 11 years in prison, consisting of a four-year term for the selling cocaine base conviction, plus two 3 year terms for the two prior drug sale convictions, plus a one year term for one of the prior prison convictions. The court struck the remaining enhancement allegations related to the selling cocaine base conviction. The court stayed the sentences for the possession for sale conviction and related enhancement allegations.
Johnson appeals, requesting we independently review sealed police personnel and internal affairs files to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding the files did not contain any discoverable information. In addition, he contends his conviction for possession of cocaine base for sale should be reversed because this crime is punished more severely than possession of cocaine for sale, which violates his constitutional rights to equal protection and substantive due process. Court affirm the trial court's judgment.

A modification decision.

Riverwatch and Pala Band of Mission Indians (together Riverwatch) appeal a judgment denying their petition for writ of mandate that challenged the validity of an agreement between the Olivenhain Municipal Water District (OMWD) and Gregory Canyon Ltd. (GCL) based on OMWD's alleged noncompliance with the California Environmental Quality Act (Public Resources Code, 21000 et seq.)(CEQA). On appeal, Riverwatch contends: (1) the trial court erred by concluding OMWD's approval of the agreement did not require its prior CEQA review of the environmental impacts of the agreement; (2) OMWD was a responsible agency under CEQA; and (3) the County of San Diego Department of Environmental Health (DEH) was not an indispensable party to this action.

A jury convicted defendant Lutfi Elias of attempted murder (Pen. Code, 664/187, subdivision (a), count 1),[1]assault with a semiautomatic firearm ( 245, subd. (b), counts 2 and 3), discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle ( 12034, subd. (d), count 4), making a criminal threat ( 422, count 5), and shooting at an occupied vehicle ( 246, count 6). It also found true the allegation that Elias was a principal in the commission or attempted commission of counts 1 through 4. ( 12022, subd. (a)(1).) Elias had earlier admitted the special allegation that he was released from custody within the meaning of section 12022.1, subdivision (b)[2]when he committed the offenses alleged in counts 2, 3, 4 and 6. The court sentenced Elias to eight years eight months in prison.[3] The sentence included a two-year on-bail enhancement under section 12022.1, subdivision (b). The sole issue on appeal is whether the court erred in imposing, rather than staying, the two-year on-bail enhancement. Court conclude there was no error and therefore affirm the judgment.

Mari N. appeals an order made at a six-month family maintenance hearing continuing services and continuing juvenile court jurisdiction for an additional six months. She contends substantial evidence did not support the order, and the court violated her constitutional rights when it did not terminate jurisdiction. Court affirm.

A complaint filed on August 17, 2004, charged defendant and appellant Noe Garza, Jr., with assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury in violation of Penal[1]Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1) (count 1); and infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or former spouse in violation of section 273.5, subdivision (a) (count 2). Under section 667.5, subdivision (b), the complaint also alleged that defendant had been previously convicted of the crime of spousal abuse.

Defendant and appellant Mario Vincent Lopez appeals following his guilty plea to forgery. (Pen. Code, 470, subd. (d).). Court affirm.

Defendant and appellant Victor Hernandez Garcia appeals after he pleaded guilty to six counts of forcible rape and two counts of forcible oral copulation. He filed an appeal seeking to challenge sentencing or matters occurring after the plea. His appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 [87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493], arguing no issues on appeal. Although he was afforded the opportunity to file a supplemental brief to raise any issues he wishes to discuss, defendant has not filed a supplemental brief. Court have undertaken the required review of the entire record and Court affirm the judgment.

Mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1]as to her son F. H. III (child), who was born in 2007. Mother claims the order terminating her parental rights must be reversed and the matter remanded because notice was defective under the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) (ICWA). As a result of defective notice, mother contends she is entitled to a new section 366.26 hearing.

Defendant Kenneth Wiley was convicted after jury trial of vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence (Pen. Code,[1] 192, subd. (c)(1)) and of hit-and-run driving after an accident involving death or serious injury (Veh. Code, 20001, subd. (a)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court also found that Wiley had suffered a prior strike conviction within the meaning of section 667, subdivisions (c)-(j) and section 1170.12, subdivisions (a)-(e), and that he had served two prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). Wiley was sentenced to a total of 10 years in state prison. The court imposed the middle term of four years, doubled to eight years on the vehicular manslaughter count, plus an additional two years for the two prior prison terms. A concurrent middle term of four years was imposed for the hit and run count. Judgment affirmed.