CA Unpub Decisions

In 1981, a jury convicted defendant Stevin Noel Faith of the first degree murder of Deborah Cox. A federal writ of habeas corpus issued and a retrial was held in 2006. This time, the jury acquitted defendant of first degree murder but convicted him of murder in the second degree. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 15 years to life. On appeal, defendant contends that (1) statements of the victim were erroneously admitted, (2) one expert witness impermissibly vouched for another, (3) the admission of a photograph of the victim and her child was unduly prejudicial, (4) the court erred in refusing to instruct on an alternative theory of involuntary manslaughter, and (5) the cumulative effect of these multiple errors compels reversal. Court affirm the judgment.

In July 2006, 11-year-old M. P. told her mother and an investigator that between the ages of six and 10 she had been molested by defendant Pedro Pelayo Zabalza 11 different times in four different locations. The majority of the molestations occurred with defendant touching her vagina and breasts with his mouth and hands, but some incidents also involved penetration with his fingers and touching her mouth with his penis. Defendant denied the allegations in an interview with law enforcement and during four pretext calls with M. P. The judgment is affirmed.

Real party in interest Lucy Cervantes Watkins sued petitioner, The Regents of the University of California (the Regents), alleging she was subjected to various forms of harassment, discrimination and retaliation during her employment with the Regents. The respondent superior court granted the Regents motion for judgment on the pleadings. After entry of judgment of dismissal of the action, the respondent court issued several orders purporting to grant reconsideration of and to vacate the order granting judgment on the pleadings. Because the respondent court lacked jurisdiction to reconsider or vacate the order after entry of judgment, Court shall issue a writ of mandate directing the respondent court to set aside the orders granting reconsideration and vacating the order granting judgment on the pleadings.

A jury convicted Matthew Alan Lawrie of first degree murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a)) and found true an enhancement that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing a person's death. (Pen. Code, 12022.53, subd. (d).) The trial court sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term of 50 years to life. Lawrie contends the trial court violated his state and federal due process rights by admitting into evidence: (1) testimony regarding a pretext telephone call made to his cell phone; (2) Lawrie's writings expressing threats against the victim his mother, Claudia Boehmer (Boehmer) and her family; and (3) testimony identifying Lawrie's truck seen leaving the murder scene. Court affirm.

On appeal, Estrada argues his due process rights were violated because the jury was not fair and impartial. Alternatively, he argues the trial court erred in denying his petition for disclosure of Juror No. 1's identifying information. Court affirm the judgment.

Eduardo Murrillo entered a negotiated guilty plea to first degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211, 212.5, subd (a), 213, subd. (a)(1)(A)) with personal firearm use ( 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (b)). The court stayed the section 12022.5, subdivision (a) enhancement and sentenced him to 13 years in prison: the three year lower term for robbery and 10 years for the section 12022.53, subdivision (b) enhancement. Murrillo appeals. Court affirm.

A.D. appeals a judgment of the juvenile court terminating her reunification services for her four minor children, Jeremy S., Jonah K., Joy K. and J.B. (minors). A.D. contends the juvenile court should have held a Marsden hearing (People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118) after she raised concerns dealing with the adequacy of her court appointed trial counsel. Court reverse the judgment and remand with instructions.

Cross-defendant and appellant William Alvin Lee (Lee) appeals a default judgment against him in favor of cross complainant and respondent Developers Surety and Indemnity Company (Developers Surety), on a cross complaint for indemnity in an underlying construction dispute. We shall modify the judgment to strike an improper element of damage, and otherwise affirm.

The People charged defendant by amended information with petty theft with a prior, a felony (count 1Pen. Code, 666), being under the influence of a controlled substance, a misdemeanor (count 2Health & Saf. Code, 11550, subd.(a)), and possession of a device for smoking controlled substances, a misdemeanor (count 3Health & Saf. Code, 11364, subd. (a)). Prior to trial, defendant stipulated to the fact that he had a prior theft conviction for purposes of the count 1 offense. Prior to the completion of trial, defendant also admitted the truth of three prior strike convictions and four prior prison term allegations. The jury convicted defendant on all counts. The trial court sentenced defendant to 29 years to life, consisting of the following: 25 years to life on count 1; one consecutive year for each of the four prior prison terms; and time served on counts 2 and 3.On appeal, defendant contends his 29 year to life sentence violates the federal and state constitutional proscriptions against double jeopardy because it was based primarily on past offenses for which he had already been punished. In addition, defendant maintains his sentence is violative of the federal and state constitutional prohibitions against cruel and/or unusual punishment. Court find defendants sentence constitutionally valid and, therefore, affirm the judgment in full.

This is an appeal from a final judgment entered after a jury found defendant Jamie William Soria guilty of all charges against him. Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence found on two computers, in permitting cross-examination and rebuttal evidence concerning an uncharged crime, and in failing to properly instruct the jury concerning evidence of uncharged conduct. We will conclude the testimony and the computer evidence were relevant and admissible; we will also conclude the court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 in admitting the evidence. Further, we will conclude the trial court had no sua sponte duty to give an uncharged conduct instruction and counsels failure to request the instruction did not deprive defendant of his right to constitutionally effective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment.

Alejandrino Rivera-Sanchez petitions this court for a writ of review (Lab. Code,[1] 5950, 5952; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.494) contending a decision of the Workers Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) reducing his permanent disability award from 38 percent to 28 percent following reconsideration lacks substantial evidence. Court will deny the petition.

A jury convicted defendant Jason Rashad Pezant of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a)(1)),[1]possession of ammunition by a felon ( 12316, subd. (b)(1)), and three counts of unlawful possession of assault weapons ( 12280, subd. (b)). The jury further found defendant committed all the offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang. ( 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A).) Defendant admitted having suffered a prior conviction (but not a prior prison term). The court sentenced defendant to a total prison term of 10 years as follows: the upper term of three years for possession of a firearm by a felon, with four years for the gang enhancement; a consecutive eight month term for one count of possession of an assault weapon with one year and four months for the gang enhancement; a one year enhancement for a prior prison term; and concurrent sentences on the remaining counts.
On appeal, defendant contends (1) the prosecutor peremptorily challenged an African-American prospective juror based solely on group bias; (2) insufficient evidence supported the finding he knew or reasonably should have known three firearms were assault weapons; (3) the court should have bifurcated trial of the gang enhancements; (4) the court should have released juror identifying information to him; and (5) the prior prison term enhancement must be reversed because a prior prison term was not admitted or found true. Court agree the prior prison term enhancement must be stricken. In all other respects, Court affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Mark Ronald Maynarich of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1); all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise specified). Defendant was sentenced to two years in prison, with 332 days of credit awarded. Restitution and parole revocation fines of $200 each were imposed ( 1202.4, 1202.45). A $20 security fee and DNA testing were also ordered and the court retained jurisdiction of victim restitution.
Matthew Stanton testified that he arrived at a bar about 11:00 p.m. and sat right next to defendant; the victim, Sean Foster, sat on the other side of the bar from them. Shortly after Stanton arrived Foster beckoned to him, saying hey come over here; Stanton did not. Soon Foster made another gesture toward Stanton or defendant and said something that Stanton could not hear. Stanton testified that defendant finished his drink, walked up to Foster, and hit Foster with his glass in the face, after which Foster fell to the floor. Defendant then left the bar. Stanton had never seen defendant or Foster before the incident.

Defendant challenges the constitutionality of his commitment to the Department of Mental Health (DMH) for an indeterminate term under the recently amended Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). (Welf. & Inst. Code, 6604 et seq.)[1] He argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to extend his commitment, and applied the revised provisions of the SVPA to his case retroactively; the indeterminate commitment violates due process, because it places the burden on him to prove he is no longer a sexually violent predator, and fails to provide for mandatory periodic review hearings on the question whether continued commitment is warranted. He also argues that indeterminate commitment violates the prohibitions against ex post facto laws, double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishment; that the combination of indeterminate commitment with limited judicial review violates the equal protection clause; and that the limits on judicial review violate his First Amendment right to petition the court for redress of grievances, and that Proposition 83 violated the singe subject rule for initiatives. Finally, he argues that his commitment should be reduced to two years because he has been prejudiced. Court reject these arguments and affirm the courts order committing defendant to the DMH.