CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted Santana Belmont of conspiracy to commit perjury (Pen. Code,[1] 182, subd. (a)(1); count 1), three counts of perjury by declaration ( 118, subd. (a); counts 2, 3 & 4), subornation of perjury under oath ( 127; count 5), and preparing a false paper for a fraudulent purpose ( 134; count 6). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court then found true that Belmont had suffered two prison priors ( 667.5, subd. (b)) and a strike prior ( 667, subd. (b)-(i), 1170.12). The court sentenced Belmont to a total prison term of 12 years. Belmont appeals, contending the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by failing to conduct a sufficient Marsden[3]hearing and by refusing to allow him to represent himself at trial. Belmont also claims the court violated the provisions of section 654 by imposing consecutive terms for the three perjury charges. Court affirm.

John Vaughn appeals from a judgment convicting him of criminal threat with a true finding that he used a deadly weapon, misdemeanor battery, and two counts of misdemeanor vandalism. He argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the criminal threat conviction; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting uncharged domestic violence evidence under Evidence Code section 1109; and (3) Evidence Code section 1109 is unconstitutional on its face. Court reject his arguments and affirm the judgment.

In superior court case No. SCD204307, Christina Reynoso entered negotiated guilty pleas to driving under the influence of drugs and causing injury (Veh. Code, 23153, subd. (a)) and child endangerment (Pen. Code, 273a, subd. (a)). As part of the plea bargain, Reynoso also admitted that she personally inflicted great bodily injury on another person (Pen. Code, 1192.7, subd. (c)(8) & 12022.7, subd. (a)) with respect to both counts. With respect to the driving under the influence count, Reynoso also admitted that a minor under the age of 14 years was a passenger in the vehicle (Veh. Code, 23572, subd. (a)) and she caused bodily injury to more than one victim (Veh. Code, 23558). The court denied Reynoso's request for a certificate of probable cause.

In superior court case No. SCD206183, Tiano Alexander Durham entered a negotiated guilty plea to one count of robbery (Pen. Code, 211). In superior court case No. SCD212662, Durham entered a negotiated guilty plea to one count of robbery and admitted allegations that he committed the offense for the benefit of a street gang (Pen. Code, 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and that a principal personally discharged a handgun (Pen. Code, 12022.53, subds. (b) & (e)(1)). The plea bargain called for a stipulated sentence of 14 years for both cases. At sentencing, the trial court struck the gang allegation and sentenced Durham to 14 years in prison. The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant appeals from judgment entered following jury convictions for burglary (Pen. Code, 459)[1]and petty theft with a prior theft conviction ( 490.5 & 666). The court also found true four prior conviction allegations ( 1179.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and two prison priors ( 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 25 years to life in prison. Defendant contends the trial court erred in not giving CALCRIM No. 359; there was insufficient evidence of his convictions for burglary and theft with a prior; there was insufficient evidence of his 1995 prior serious felony conviction enhancement for assault with a deadly weapon; the trial court erred in giving instruction on flight after crime, CALCRIM No. 372; the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants motion to dismiss one or more of defendants prior convictions; the trial court erred in treating defendants offenses as felonies, rather than as misdemeanors; defendants sentence under the Three Strikes law constitutes cruel and/or unusual punishment; and defendants conviction for petty theft with a prior should be stayed under section 654. For the reasons set forth below, Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant Salvador Elias Zuniga was charged with one count of making a criminal threat (Pen. Code 422), one count of discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner ( 246.3) with an enhancement allegation that defendant personally used a firearm ( 667, 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)), and one count of burglary ( 459). Court affirm the judgment.

Appellant Katherine Worden Bowman (Katherine) appeals from the superior courts post-dissolution order that Katherine and respondent Chad Bowman (Chad) share the transportation of their three minor children for weekend visitation. Katherine lives in Glendora and Chad lives in Wasco, just north of Bakersfied. The order specified that the parties meet in Valencia to exchange the children. Katherine contends the court abused its discretion because it based its decision on the frequent and continuing contact standard rather than on the best interests of the children standard, and, by implication, implementation of the best interests standard would have resulted in the outcome Katherine sought. As discussed below, Court conclude that Katherines arguments are without merit.

Defendant appeals following an order denying his motion for incarceration credits against his child support arrearages and for forgiveness for nonpayment of child support owed between 2004 and 2006, which accrued while he was incarcerated in state prison. Court affirm.

On November 28, 2007, a juvenile court found true that minor L.H. committed a felony, threatening and dissuading a witness. (Pen. Code, 136.1, subd. (c).) The court also found true that, in committing the felony, minor personally used a firearm. (Pen. Code, 12022.5, subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8).) Thereafter, the juvenile court declared the maximum period of confinement to be 14 years. On January 16, 2008, the juvenile court adjudged minor a ward of the court and placed her under supervision of the Riverside County Probation Department. The court also designated minor as a dual status youth under Welfare and Institutions Code section 241.1, and ordered her placed in a suitable foster or group home with probation conditions. On appeal, minor contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the firearm enhancement. For the reasons set forth below, Court shall affirm the judgment.

In an open plea to the court, defendants Andres Zaragoza Villela and Hector Alfonso Chavez pled guilty to robbery (Pen. Code, 211)[1](count 1) as a felony and to actively participating in a criminal street gang while promoting, furthering, or assisting in a felony offense ( 186.22, subd. (a)) (count 2) as a misdemeanor. Chavez also pled guilty to being an accessory ( 32) (count 3) as a felony. In return, Chavez was promised a three-year state prison sentence and the reduction of count 2 to a misdemeanor. Villela was promised an aggravated term of five years in state prison as well as the reduction of count 2 to a misdemeanor. Plaintiff, the People of the State of California, objected to the reduction of count 2 to a misdemeanor. Following the taking of their pleas, defendants were immediately sentenced in accordance with the courts promises. The People now appeal, contending that (1) the trial court engaged in illegal plea bargaining when it agreed to reduce count 2 to a misdemeanor in exchange for guilty pleas; and (2) the trial court was without authority to reduce count 2 to a misdemeanor prior to accepting defendants guilty pleas. As explained below, Court agree and reverse the judgment.

T.V. (the father) and T.G. (the mother) appeal from an order terminating their parental rights to their daughter, A.V. Their sole appellate contention is that the notices that were sent to Indian tribes were not in compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) and related federal and state law. Court will hold that the trial court could properly find that there had been at least substantial compliance with all ICWA related requirements. Accordingly, Court affirm.

On December 7, 2007, a petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging appellant, M.N., feloniously assaulted the victim by means likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1), count one),[1]feloniously committed battery with serious bodily injury ( 243, subd. (d), count two), and exhibited a deadly weapon, a misdemeanor ( 417, subd. (a)(1), count three). The petition further alleged that M.N. inflicted great bodily injury ( 12022.7, subd. (a)). At the conclusion of an adjudication hearing, the juvenile court found all of the allegations to be true. At the disposition hearing, the court found that section 654 applied to count two. The juvenile court committed M.N. to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF) for a term of seven years two months. On appeal, M.N. contends there was insufficient evidence to establish great bodily injury. M.N. argues that evidence of great bodily injury was not injury beyond that inherent in the assault.

E.O. (mother) appeals from orders terminating her parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26) to her daughter, N.W. and selecting a permanent plan of guardianship for her son, U.B. Mother challenges the juvenile courts denial, without a hearing, of a section 388 petition she brought to reopen reunification services. Mother also argues the court was unable to ascertain N.s current wishes such that there was insufficient evidence to support the courts finding that she was adoptable. On review, Court disagree with mother and will affirm.

A modification decision.