CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Alai Kimberly Toure, who is proceeding in propria persona, appeals from numerous orders entered in her marital dissolution action. The orders on appeal relate to attorney fees, child visitation and custody, and page limits on trial court documents. After requesting and receiving supplemental briefing, Court conclude there is no final appealable judgment or order in this case. Consequently, we dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

Torrell Allen appeals from a conviction of attempting to commit a lewd act upon a child. He contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the definition of involuntary intoxication as it applied to the facts of the case. He additionally contends his conviction must be reversed due to ineffective assistance of counsel in that his attorney failed to request jury instructions defining involuntary intoxication and directing the jury to consider the effect of intoxication and of mental disorder in determining whether appellant had the specific intent required for the offense. Court affirm.

Appellant Marcus Eric Davis appeals from a judgment of conviction following a guilty plea, contending the trial court erred by imposing penalty assessments in connection with a laboratory analysis fee (Health & Saf. Code, 11372.5, subd. (a)) and a drug program fee ( 11372.7, subd. (a)). Because we conclude that the imposition in this case of penalty assessments under Government Code sections 76104.6 and 76104.7 violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws, Court strike those assessments but otherwise affirm the judgment as modified.

Appellant James William Murray appeals from an order extending his commitment to Napa State Hospital for an additional two years pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.5, subdivision (b),[1] which authorizes extended commitment for treatment of a person found not guilty of a felony by reason of insanity. Appellant first contends that the trial courts extended commitment order is not supported by substantial evidence that he had a mental disease, defect, or disorder that caused serious difficulty in controlling his dangerous behavior. Appellant also contends that the order must be reversed because the court failed to secure his personal waiver to a jury trial, although his counsel made an on the record waiver on appellants behalf. Court reject appellants contentions and affirm the order.

In this appeal, the court-appointed counsel for appellant Noelle Mary Donahue has briefed no issues and asks this court to review the record as required by People v. Wende(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Appellant, who was convicted of embezzlement and grand theft by larceny following a jury trial, appealed her conviction to this court.[1] We reversed the judgment and remanded the matter with directions to hold a hearing pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). We directed the trial court to reinstate the judgment of conviction if (1) the Marsden motion is denied, (2) the Marsden motion is granted but substitute defense counsel declines to file a new trial motion or other appropriate motion, or (3) the Marsden motion is granted but the trial court denies a new trial motion or other appropriate motions filed by substitute counsel. The judgment is affirmed.

M.G. (father) is the father of two young girls, T.G. and A.G., and he is appealing the juvenile courts order terminating his parental rights regarding these two children pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. He claims that insufficient evidence supported the courts finding that his two children were adoptable. He also challenges the lower courts summary denial of his section 388 petition to reinstate reunification services. Court affirm the lower courts judgment.

Edward Wax appeals from a judgment and sentence following his guilty plea to one count of driving with a .08 percent or higher blood alcohol level, one count of misdemeanor driving with a suspended license, and one count of misdemeanor driving with an open bottle of alcohol in a vehicle. He also admitted that his blood alcohol content was above .15 percent and that he had previously been convicted of three driving under the influence (DUI) offenses. His court-appointed counsel has filed a brief seeking our independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. Court find no such issues and affirm.

Kenneth Walters was a dependent adult who executed a will leaving his estate to his long-time friend and care custodian, Alexander Niella. Under Probate Code section 21350,[1]a donative transfer by a dependent adult to a care custodian is invalid, unless an exception provided in section 21351 applies. Section 21351 permits such a transfer if the dependent adult obtains a certificate of independent review from an independent attorney, who must attempt[] to determine if the intended transfer is the result of undue influence, and who issues the certificate if she concludes that it was not. Walters obtained a certificate of independent review from attorney Marie Cioth, who concluded Walterss will was not the result of undue influence.
Newman contends this court should reverse the judgment, on the sole ground that Cioth (according to Newman) was not qualified to provide a certificate of independent review and failed to undertake a sufficient investigation before doing so. Court conclude there is no merit to Newmans claims. Cioths attempt to determine whether the will was the product of undue influence was reasonable under the circumstances, and therefore in compliance with statutory requirements. Moreover, a further investigation could not have uncovered more than was revealed after weeks of trial: a record totally devoid of any evidence demonstrating that undue influence was exerted. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment.

An action seeking enforcement of a money judgment for sanctions is not a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) suit, because the action is not based on any act of the judgment debtor in furtherance of his or her petition or free speech rights within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The trial courts order so concluding, and consequently denying the judgment debtors motion for attorney fees, is affirmed.

A jury convicted defendants Romulo Monge, Ruben Castro and Gerardo Lara of kidnapping ( 207, subd. (a))[1]and attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder ( 664/187, subd. (a)). In addition, the jury found true the allegation that the crimes were committed to benefit a criminal street gang ( 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)), as well as numerous allegations involving a firearm.
Defendants raise contentions about inadmissible evidence, instructional error, and sufficiency of the evidence. Court find no merit to any of the contentions and therefore affirm the judgments.

Plaintiff and appellant A.Z. Mashiah, Ltd. (Mashiah) purports to appeal from a trial court order granting the motion of defendant and respondent Christopher Ranch, LLC (Christopher Ranch) to change the venue of this action from Los Angeles County to Santa Clara County. Mashiahs attorney, Jacob N. Segura (Segura) separately objects to the trial courts order requiring him to pay attorney fees in the amount of $2,090 to Christopher Ranch. Because neither of these trial court orders is appealable, Mashiahs and Seguras appeal is dismissed.

Michelle Hill, a former associate with the law firm of P.K. Schrieffer LLP (PKS), filed this action in June 2006 alleging various tort and wage claims against her former employer, its principal Paul Schrieffer, and his wife Norma Schrieffer, the firm administrator, as well as claims for interference with contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress against a second law firm, Kaufman, Borgeest & Ryan LLP (KBR), and one of its New York partners, Judith Fisher. In December 2006 the trial court granted Fishers motion to quash service of summons and sustained defendants respective demurrers to most portions of the first amended complaint without leave to amend. Six months later, in May 2007, the trial court granted PKSs motion for summary judgment on the remaining wage claims and entered judgment on the complaint in favor of PKS. In November 2007 Hill filed what purported to be a dismissal of the first amended complaint and appealed the trial courts orders sustaining the demurrers without leave to amend and granting Fishers motion to quash. Court dismiss her appeal in part and affirm in part.

Two talent agents filed separate lawsuits against the agency that employed them, asserting their employment contracts contained provisions illegal under California law, and seeking a declaration that they had the right to terminate the agreements at will. The following day, the employer responded by having the two agents escorted from the companys office, and by delivering letters to them temporarily modifying their job duties and, among other things, instructing them not to come to the office, not to use company e-mail, not to attend any client or industry functions, not to have telephone conversations or communications with clients or other employees, and so on. The next day, the agents lawyers wrote to the employer, asserting that its conduct constituted constructive termination; the same day, press reports appeared on-line stating the two agents had launched a new talent agency. The day after that, the employer formally terminated the employment of the two talent agents.
A few weeks later, the agents amended their lawsuits to include causes of action for retaliation and wrongful termination, based on the employers conduct the day after their lawsuits were filed. The employer responded with a special motion to strike those causes of action under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute, asserting the agents claims arose from the employers protected First Amendment activity, and that the two agents could not show a probability of prevailing on the claims. The trial court in each case denied the motion, finding the two causes of action did not arise from protected activity. Court agree and affirm the orders.

Defendant, Vahan Nazarian, appeals from his conviction for willful, deliberate and premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code,[1] 187, subd. (a), 667) and the findings that he personally used a deadly weapon and inflicted great bodily injury. ( 12022, subd. (b)(1), 12022.7, subd. (a).) Defendant argues: there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction; the prosecutor improperly granted immunity to Emma Nazarian; the prosecutor committed misconduct; and the trial court improperly denied his new trial motion. Court affirm with a minor modification.