CA Unpub Decisions

This appeal involves an attack on a prison inmate in his jail dormitory. Before his incarceration, that inmate had identified a fellow gang member to police as the shooter in an attempted murder investigation. Two cameras recorded the activities in the jail dormitory at the time of the attack. As a result, six defendants were identified and charged with conspiracy to commit aggravated mayhem, aggravated mayhem, dissuading a witness by force or threat and dissuading a witness in furtherance of a conspiracy, along with gang, personal infliction of great bodily injury and prior conviction allegations. One of the defendants made a deal with the prosecution and testified at the other five defendants trial. All five defendants appeal, challenging their convictions on numerous grounds. Except to the extent two defendants abstracts of judgment should be corrected, Court affirm.

Andre Bohbot, Dan Bohbot, and Bohbot & Son LLC ("the Bohbots") appeal from a judgment entered in favor of George Herrera, on his complaint against them and on their cross complaint against him. Court affirm.

On December 6, 2004, plaintiff and appellant Ronald Wooley was injured at his place of work, Gianera Pontiac dba Foothill Nissan. He sued, inter alia, respondent Pacific Coast Roofing & Construction. As to respondent, appellant alleged that he slipped and fell on a wet floor, that the floor was wet because the roof leaked, and that the roof leaked because it had been negligently repaired by respondent.

Defendant, Hugo Pineda, appeals from his convictions for one count of continuous sexual abuse (Pen. Code,[1] 288.5) and lewd act upon a 14 or 15 year-old child. ( 288, subd. (c)(1).) Defendant argues the trial court improperly sentenced him to state prison rather than granting probation and imposed the upper term as to count 1. At our request, the parties have discussed issues pertinent to the section 290.3 subsection (a) sex offender fine. Upon remittitur issuance, the trial court is to determine whether defendant has the ability to pay the section 290.3, subdivision (a) fine plus additional assessments, penalties, and a surcharge in light of all of his financial obligations.

Gregory Andrew Hall appeals from the judgment following a jury trial in which he was convicted of petty theft with a prior qualifying theft conviction, a felony. Appellant contends his felony sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded to the superior court for further proceedings to address the issue of prior convictions because (1) the trial court never accepted his admission of a prior conviction; (2) the predicate service of a prior term of imprisonment for theft thus was never addressed or established; and (3) there was no showing appellant was advised of the consequences of admitting a prior conviction. Respondent concedes that a remand is necessary for the trial court to complete the taking of admissions to the priors or to conduct the bifurcated trial on that issue as the matter remains unadjudicated. Court affirm the judgment of conviction and remand for further proceedings as to the prior conviction allegations.

Plaintiff and appellant Global Stars Investment, Inc., purports to appeal from a trial court order sustaining the demurrer of defendant and respondent Gin Wong Associates with leave to amend. Because appellant did not challenge an appealable order, Court dismiss the appeal.

Minor V.H. appeals from the order of wardship entered after the juvenile court found that she assaulted minor K.B. with a deadly weapon in violation of Penal Code section 245. The minor contends the evidence is insufficient to support the juvenile courts findings. Court agree and reverse.

Pursuant to a plea bargain, the court sentenced 19-year-old Richard Pasqual to 39 years in prison based on his plea of no contest to one count of attempted murder and his admissions he committed the crime for the benefit of a street gang and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm in doing so. The court denied Pasquals presentence motion to withdraw his plea in spite of undisputed testimony from a clinical psychologist that Pasqual is mentally deficient, that his greatest cognitive weakness lies in comprehending abstract notions of timethe most significant aspect of his pleaand despite evidence that the only witness to identify Pasqual as the shooter subsequently, under oath, identified a different person. After obtaining a Certificate of Probable Cause, Pasqual brought this appeal from his conviction contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his plea. Court reverse. Substantial evidence does not support the trial courts ruling.

This appeal involves the efforts by plaintiff E. Randol Schoenberg to reduce the tax assessment of his residential real property. The issues concern the proper scope of a proceeding by defendant, the Assessment Appeals Board of Los Angeles County (the Appeals Board), and the required procedure for a taxpayer to obtain judicial review of a valuation determination by the Appeals Board. court find that Schoenbergs claim that the Appeals Board failed to assess land and improvements separately is without factual foundation, as revealed by the Appeals Boards written decision denying his application. Also, Schoenberg had no authority to limit the jurisdiction of the Appeals Board to a reassessment of only the value of the land (a valuation he disputed). The Appeals Board was permitted on its own initiative to reassess the value of the improvements on the land (though Schoenberg and the assessor had previously agreed on a lower assessment figure for improvements). Such a total reappraisal was necessary to fulfill the Appeals Boards mandate to equalize property values. Finally, Schoenbergs exclusive remedy was not a petition for a writ of mandate against the Appeals Board, but rather a complaint seeking a refund of taxesa remedy he belatedly pursued against a second defendant, the County of Los Angeles (the County), after it was barred by the statute of limitations.

Plaintiff Law Offices of Nejadpour & Associates, APLC (the "PLC") appeals the trial court's ruling denying it attorney fees as the prevailing party in this lawsuit to recover outstanding fees from a former client. Finding no error, Court affirm.

Misael Chavez appeals from the judgment entered and seeks a writ of habeas corpus following his plea of no contest to one count of committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (a)) and one count of committing a lewd act upon a child who was 14 years of age and at least 10 years younger than Chavez ( 288, subd. (c)(1)). The trial court sentenced Chavez to eight years, eight months in prison. Court affirm the judgment and deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Father J.R. appeals from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders issued by the juvenile court on February 4, 2009, as to his infant son, A.R. Father contends the juvenile court failed to advise him of his trial rights and such error mandates reversal. Respondent the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) contends the failure to give father the standard advisements constituted harmless error and provides no ground for reversal. We agree with the Department and find any error to be harmless. Court thus affirm the orders with a direction to the juvenile court to correct a clerical error.

Plaintiff, Kenneth Barton, purports to appeal from a post-judgment order denying attorney fees incurred in a prior appeal. (Barton v. Khan (Dec. 13, 2007, B190428) [nonpub. opn.].) The prior opinion reversed a demurrer dismissal and the case is currently set for trial on January 25, 2010. Tentatively, it did not appear we had jurisdiction because no final appealable judgment had been entered. Because such an order did not appear to be appealable, we issued an order to show cause concerning possible dismissal of the appeal. (Jenningsv. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126; Olsonv. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 398.) The present matter is not appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., 906; Barnes v. Litton Systems, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 681, 685; Nimmagadda v. Krishnamurthy (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1505, 1509-1510.) The appeal is dismissed without prejudice. (Code Civ. Proc., 913.) All parties are to bear their own costs incurred on appeal.

Appellants S.G. (mother) and G.L. (father) appeal the order terminating parental rights to their approximately two-year-old son E.G. (the child). (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, subd. (c).)[1] Father contends that the juvenile court erred in terminating his parental rights because he had not been proven an unfit parent, and that the juvenile court failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.; hereinafter, ICWA). Mother contends that if fathers parental rights are not terminated, neither should her parental rights be terminated. We find that the juvenile court did not err in terminating fathers parental rights, and there was no ICWA notice error. Mothers contention is thus unavailing.