CA Unpub Decisions

E.G. (Mother) appeals from the order terminating parental rights to her daughter, F.F. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26.) She contends the juvenile court erred by failing to apply the parental benefit exception to termination of parental rights. ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Court find no error and affirm the order.

In this family law matter, respondent Stacy Lynn Marcus appeals from two postjudgment orders. The first is an order denying her request to modify child support. Stacy[1] challenges that order on the ground, among others, that the existing child support amount was below the statutory guideline. (Fam. Code, 4050 et seq.)[2] The second order determined the status of assets that Stacy claimed were omitted from the original division of community property. As to it, Stacy argues that she was deprived of due process when the trial court met with the forensic accountants in her absence. She also maintains that the court erred in awarding petitioner Ittai Bareket his attorney fees as the prevailing party in a prior motion. Stacy has demonstrated error only with regard to the final argument. Court shall modify the order to strike the attorney fees award and, as modified, affirm.

A jury found appellant guilty of 20 counts of sex offenses against his nine-year-old twin stepdaughters. The trial court sentenced him to a state prison term of 300 years to life. On appeal, he contends that his confession was involuntary, that there was insufficient evidence as to certain counts, that a hearsay statement should not have been admitted, and that there was sentencing error. He also requests that this court conduct an in camera review of certain documents pertaining to the victims. Court affirm.

Richard Michael Martinez appeals from an order involuntarily committing him for an indeterminate term to the custody of the Department of Mental Health (Department) after a jury found him to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) within the meaning of the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). (Welf. & Inst. Code, 6600 et seq.)[1] Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the commitment petition after the Department failed to evaluate him pursuant to a valid standardized assessment protocol. Appellant also challenges the constitutionality of the SVPA, as amended in 2006 by Proposition 83, on due process, equal protection, ex post facto, and double jeopardy grounds. Court reject these contentions and affirm the order.

Defendant Manuel Ray Varela and two other men took four rolls of cyclone fencing material and a metal gate from a school. Defendant had told the two men that the materials belonged to his brother-in-law and offered to pay the two men for their assistance in transporting the materials. In fact, the materials belonged to the school. Defendant sold the materials to a construction company for $100 and gave one of the men $50. When questioned by the police, defendant admitted that he had picked up the materials and sold them to the construction company, but he claimed that another man named Mario had suggested that defendant pick up the materials and sell them.

Michael Edward Boutta (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted him of forcible rape (Pen. Code, 261, subd. (a)(2)). He contends the trial court erred in: (1) admitting evidence of his prior sexual offenses; (2) admitting evidence of Rape Trauma Syndrome; (3) instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 10.64; (4) denying his motion to strike a prior strike; and (5) imposing a sentence that constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Court reject the contentions and affirm the judgment.

Steven Houston appeals from an order revoking his probation. He contends the trial court abused its discretion because there was insufficient evidence he had violated probation. Court affirm.

Defendant Monterrio Davis appeals his conviction by a jury of three counts of murder and several related felonies and enhancements arising out of a one night robbery spree committed by defendant with several other members of the so-called Nut Case Gang. His sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erroneously admitted statements that he assertedly made involuntarily during an extended interrogation at the Oakland Police Department. Court disagree and shall affirm the judgment.

This is the second appeal arising from the dissolution proceedings in the marriage of appellant Valerie Behrendt (wife) and respondent J. Russell Pitto (husband).[1] Wife now appeals certain rulings in the trial courts Order After Hearing filed on July 22, 2008. On September 2, 2009, we issued an order dismissing this appeal in part for lack of jurisdiction.[2] Specifically, we dismissed that portion of the appeal purporting to challenge the trial courts ruling regarding pendente lite attorneys fees because the order of July 22, 2008 was not a final ruling on that issue. In our order, we also denied wifes motions to augment the record and ruled as follows: All portions of the parties briefs on appeal which refer to matters subsequent to, or argue legal issues not encompassed within, the trial courts order of July 22, 2008, are hereby stricken and will not be considered by this Court for purposes of its disposition on the merits of the remaining issues on appeal. We now address the remaining issues on appeal in accordance with our order of September 2, 2009.

Gregory A. Moss (Moss) appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence imposed after he pled guilty to possessing a gun as a felon and a jury convicted him of felony assault with a semiautomatic firearm on a peace officer. He contends: (1) the jurys verdict was not supported by substantial evidence; (2) his guilty plea should be set aside because he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel when his attorney advised him to enter the plea; (3) the jury verdict should be set aside because his attorney did not inform the jury about the plea; and (4) he is entitled to withdraw his plea because he was sentenced by a judge other than the one who accepted it. Court affirm the judgment.

This action arises from the death of Robin Wright (decedent) on March 19, 2003. Almost three years after decedents death, her siblings (appellants) sued Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital (Hospital) for wrongful death. Pursuant to section 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure,[1] the issue of standing was tried first. The trial court concluded that appellants lacked standing to sue for decedents wrongful death and subsequently that appellants complaint did not plead a survivor cause of action for damages under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (Welf. & Inst. Code 15600, et seq. (Elder Abuse Act)). Appellants now seek review of the judgment entered in Hospitals favor and the order denying their motion for new trial,[2] arguing that they have standing to sue for decedents wrongful death and that the trial court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend the complaint to plead a cause of action for elder abuse. Court affirm the judgment.

This appeal comes to us following rulings by the trial court that sustained defendants demurrer without leave to amend to plaintiffs action for declaratory and injunctive relief and damages, and entered judgment in favor of defendant. Plaintiff claims that his appeal is not moot, and challenges the trial courts ruling that he was not entitled to fair procedure before his removal from a supervisory committee of the San Francisco Police Credit Union (SFPCU or the union). We find that plaintiffs appeal has been rendered moot in part by the expiration of his term on the Committee, and plaintiff has not properly alleged that he is entitled to rights under the common law doctrine of fair procedure. Court therefore affirm the judgment.

Kenneth George Torres appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of receiving stolen property. (Pen. Code, 496, subd. (a).) The trial court, sitting without a jury, found true the allegations that appellant had served three prior prison terms. (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b).) The trial court imposed the midterm of two years on the substantive offense, and imposed an additional consecutive term for each of the three prior prison terms, for a total sentence of five years.

Appellant E.S., the daughter of respondent Z.S. (Mother), appeals from an order following a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 in which the juvenile court declined to terminate parental rights under the beneficial parentchild relationship exception. ( 366.26, subd, (c)(1)(B)(i).) E.S., who is joined by the Agency in this appeal, argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in making this finding. Court disagree and affirm the order.