CA Unpub Decisions

On February 9, 2009, a jury convicted Appellant Tyreese Reed of numerous felonies, including three counts of forcible rape, one count of forcible sodomy, four counts of forcible oral copulation, one count of kidnapping and two counts of first degree burglary. At trial, the prosecution introduced extensive DNA evidence implicating Reed in the crimes. Reed appeals his conviction, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated when witnesses testified about the results of DNA analysis and medical examinations that were conducted by non-testifying third parties. Additionally, Reed alleges ineffective assistance of counsel and various evidentiary and sentencing errors. Court affirm Reed's conviction but remand to modify a portion of his sentence.

A jury found defendant Ricardo Villegas guilty of three counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm and found true the special allegation as to each count that defendant personally used a firearm. The trial court entered judgment against defendant and sentenced him to 10 years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing the trial court made various errors during trial.
We agree with defendant that the trial court erred in finding one witness was unavailable for trial and, as a result, permitting the prosecution to use that witness's preliminary hearing testimony. We reject defendant's remaining arguments on appeal. Court modify the judgment accordingly and remand to the trial court for resentencing.

Danny Medina appeals from the judgment entered after he was convicted by a jury of carjacking and second degree robbery. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 15 years in state prison.[1] Medina contends the trial court committed prejudicial error in instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 2.62 (defendant's failure to explain or deny adverse testimony) and in failing to conduct an in camera review of police personnel files pursuant to Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 and Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess). Court conditionally reverse the judgment and remand for the limited purpose of conducting the required in camera review.

By amended information filed August 26, 2008, the Los Angeles County District Attorney charged appellant Rigoberto Martinez and codefendants Bryan Zambrano (Zambrano) and Judith Ann Figueroa (Figueroa) with the attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder of Rosalio Velasquez (Velasquez). (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a); 664, subd. (a).[1]) The information further alleged that a principal to the offense personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily injury to Velasquez (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(e)) and that the crime was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A).)
Following the jury trial, the trial court declared a mistrial when the jury announced that it was hopelessly deadlocked.

Defendant James A. Kay, Jr. (Kay) appeals from a judgment in favor of plaintiffs Bob R. Sharp (Sharp), Pat Pestka (Pestka), Manuel Bravo (Bravo), Vivian Engel (Engel) and Peggy Heathers (Heathers) in this malicious prosecution action. Kay contends the judgment must be reversed with directions to enter judgment in his favor because he was entitled to bring the underlying action, and he relied on the advice of counsel in bringing it. He additionally contends that if we do not find him entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the judgment must be reversed for a new trial due to the introduction of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence. Finally, he contends that, at a minimum, he is entitled to a new trial on the issue of damages. Court reject his contentions and affirm the judgment.

Following the denial of his motion to set aside a consolidated information on the ground that he had been the victim of an unlawful search and seizure, defendant Rashaun Everett Bell entered into a negotiated disposition of all pending charges. Pursuant to this agreement, defendant entered pleas of no contest to possessing methamphetamine while on bail, and to resisting peace officers in the performance of their duty (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); Pen. Code, §§ 69, 12022.1). In exchange for these pleas, the remaining charges were dismissed, and defendant was promised he would be admitted to probation after being given a suspended sentence to state prison not to exceed five years and eight months. Pursuant to the bargain, defendant was sentenced to state prison for five years and eight months, but imposition of that sentence was suspended and defendant was admitted to probation for a period of five years. With this timely appeal, defendant contends only that his motion was erroneously denied. Court conclude there was no error, and affirm.

Defendant John Joseph Perry appeals from a sentence after entering a plea of nolo contendere to one felony count of possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)),[1] one misdemeanor count of possession of controlled substance paraphernalia (glass pipe) (§ 11364), and one misdemeanor count of using or being under the influence of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) (§ 11550, subd. (a)). Perry further admitted allegations that he had four prior convictions, including one strike for assault with a deadly weapon against a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (c)) and three prior prison terms for, respectively, auto theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), possession of a controlled substance (§ 11377, subd. (a)) and domestic violence (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)). After his Romero[2] motion was granted, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Perry on three years formal probation on condition that he serve 365 days in county jail with total credits of 357 days.

In a personal injury action, after the jury found in favor of defendant Lisabeth Kuzma Delbecq, Delbecq sought recovery of statutory costs, including her expert costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 998.[1] Appellants Mandakini and Dushyant Patel brought a motion to tax costs, arguing that Delbecq was not entitled to expert costs because her section 998 offers were ambiguous. The trial court granted the motion in part, but allowed Delbecq to recover her expert costs. The Patels timely appealed and contend that Delbecq's section 998 offers were ambiguous and thus could not support an award of expert costs. In addition, they argue that the aggregate cost award was excessive. Court disagree and shall therefore affirm.

A modification decision.

A jury convicted defendant Christopher Adam Brown of committing a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)).[1] The jury also found it to be true: defendant engaged in substantial sexual conduct with the victim (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)); and defendant committed the offense during the commission of a burglary with the intent to commit an offense specified in section 667.61, subdivision (c), a finding which results in a mandatory 25 years to life sentence (§ 667.61, subd. (a)). Accordingly, the court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life in prison.
Defendant, a resident of the home in which the crime occurred, claims he could not have committed burglary and the jury was improperly instructed with regard to the section 667.61 burglary issue. Defendant also argues his statements to the police should have been suppressed and the court erred in calculating presentence credits. We reject defendant's assertions and affirm the judgment, but instruct the trial court to determine whether defendant is entitled to presentence conduct credits.

Late at night on Super Bowl Sunday 2006, four drug users from Oceanside traveled to an apartment complex near the corner of Culver and Michelson in Irvine, intending on meeting drug dealer Brian Gray, aka â€

A modification decision.

Petitioner City of Merced (Merced) seeks a writ of mandate to prevent enforcement of the trial court's order compelling disclosure of the contingency fee agreement between Merced and its outside counsel, Miller, Axline & Sawyer (Counsel). The fee agreement provides for Counsel's representation in a civil suit against real party in interest Exxon Mobil Corporation (Exxon) and other defendants arising from alleged MTBE and TBA contamination of Merced's public water supply.[1]
Contingency fee agreements on their face are protected by attorney-client privilege under Business and Professions Code section 6149.[2] The Legislature abolished the common law attorney-client privilege when it established a strictly statutory privilege with statutory exceptions. (Evid. Code, §§ 911; 950 et seq.) Exxon contends the Supreme Court implied a nonstatutory exception to the privilege in its decisions in People ex rel Clancy v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 740 (Clancy) and County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 35 (Santa Clara) based on a public policy of ensuring government attorney neutrality in public nuisance actions. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, a nonstatutory exception exists, in our view the proponent of such exception would still be required to make a threshold showing of facts supporting the exception's application. (See Nowell v. Superior Court (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 652, 657 [â€

Plaintiff and appellant C.S. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court's order summarily denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1] petition seeking reinstatement of services and visitation with her son, J.S., and daughter, R.S. Mother's sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court abused its discretion in summarily denying her section 388 petition. Court reject this contention and will affirm the trial court's order in regard to R.S. Court will dismiss the appeal in regard to J.S., since the trial court no longer had jurisdiction over him at the time Mother filed her section 388 petition.