CA Unpub Decisions

A jury found defendant guilty of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211),[1] and evading a police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)). The jury also found him guilty of personally using a handgun during the robbery (§ 12022.5, subd. (b)). Defendant does not challenge his convictions for robbery and evading the police, but argues that the jury's finding that the gun enhancement was true should be reversed because the lower court erred in refusing to give defense's pinpoint instruction that a firearm must be real and not a replica to find the gun use enhancement true. We conclude that the lower court did not err in refusing to give the pinpoint instruction, as the instruction would have been duplicative. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment.

Darryl K. Jones appeals from an injunction entered against him pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the injunction and also contends he was denied due process. court affirm.

Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of misdemeanor assault (Pen. Code, § 240).[1] In this appeal he claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct during voir dire and closing argument. Court find that no prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct occurred, and affirm the judgment.

This case returns to us after we reversed the conviction on one of the counts of which defendant Juan Jose Morales was found guilty and remanded for resentencing. (People v. Morales (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1085 (Morales I).) Defendant contends that the trial court erred in not staying sentence on one of the remaining counts; that it misunderstood the scope of its discretion in imposing two enhancements; and that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel. Court affirm.

Appellants Radiant Skincare Clinic, a Delaware corporation, and Radiant Medical Group, a California corporation, contend the trial court erred in denying their motions for attorney fees and for prejudgment interest after a jury verdict was returned in their favor. We conclude the attorney fees clause in the operative agreement between appellants and respondent Linda Moore (Moore) does not provide for the recovery of attorney fees in this instance. We also conclude appellants made an untimely request for prejudgment interest. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying both motions, and Court affirm the judgment.

The trial court sustained allegations that appellant R.I. committed vandalism and violated juvenile probation orders by participating in a series of events that led to the breaking of two windows. On appeal he contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish that he aided and abetted an act of vandalism or otherwise violated his probation. We agree, and reverse.
Background
Monterey County authorities filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging that appellant R.I., age 15, came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court because he had engaged in misdemeanor vandalism by damaging or destroying a window, in violation of Penal Code section 594, subdivision (b)(2)(a). The petition alluded to prior juvenile court proceedings and alleged that the dispositional orders entered in them had proven ineffective in achieving R.I.'s rehabilitation. A separate notice was filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 seeking a finding that R.I. had violated existing terms of probation by (1) â€

After appellant R.L., a minor documented to be a member of the Norteno gang, attacked and robbed two individuals late in the evening of April 17, 2009, after a social gathering involving drinking, the Santa Clara County District Attorney's Office filed a juvenile wardship petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a). The petition alleged one count of robbery in the second degree (Pen. Code, § 211-212.5, subd. (c)), and one count of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1).) The petition further alleged that the minor personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim within the meaning of Penal Code sections 12022.7, subdivision (a), Penal Code section 1203, subdivision (e)(3), Penal Code sections 667 and Penal Code section 1192.7. Following the contested jurisdictional and dispositional hearings, the juvenile court ordered that appellant continue as a ward of the court, ordered him to be placed in the Glen Mills Juvenile Facility in the State of Pennsylvania, and set his maximum time of confinement at 8 years. The minor filed a timely notice of appeal from this order.

A jury convicted defendant Cortes of murder in the first degree and found true the allegation that he used a deadly and dangerous weapon, a knife, in the commission of the murder. (Pen. Code, § 187, 12022, subd. (b)(1).)[1] He was sentenced to prison for 25 years to life, consecutive to one year for the weapon enhancement. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred prejudicially by unduly restricting the testimony of his psychiatric expert. We agree with this contention and will reverse the judgment on that basis.

An amended information charged defendant Israel Antonio Olarte with one count of aggravated sexual assault of a child (Pen. Code, §§ 269, subd. (a)(5), 289, subd. (a)(1); count 1)[1] and one count of forcible lewd act on a child under 14 (§ 288, subd. (b)(1); count 2). The jury found defendant guilty of two counts of a lesser included offense, namely, lewd acts on a child under 14 (§ 288, subd. (a)). The court sentenced defendant to concurrent middle terms of six years in state prison.

Tanya M. Cantarella (wife) and Joseph S. Cantarella (husband) entered into a marital settlement agreement (the Agreement). The court entered a judgment dissolving their marriage and dividing their property in accordance with the Agreement. Wife later moved to set aside part of the judgment and the Agreement, contending the family business was mistakenly undervalued. The court denied her motion. Wife appeals.[1] We affirm.

Appellant, Ratoni Jamila Brown, pled no contest to five counts of theft from an elder or dependent adult (counts 1, 5, 10, 13, & 16/ Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (d)).[1] Brown also admitted allegations that she had a prior conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (§ 1170.12, subds. (a) & (d)) and an on-bail enhancement (§ 12022.1)
On December 21, 2009, the court sentenced Brown to an aggregate 10-year term.
On appeal, Brown contends: 1) the matter must be remanded to the trial court for resentencing; and 2) the court erred in imposing an on-bail enhancement. We conclude there is merit to Brown's first contention and that her second contention is moot. In all other respects, we will affirm.

On January 17, 2008, the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board rejected appellant Joseph Martin's claim No. G571728.
On June 20, 2008, appellant, an inmate at Corcoran State Prison, filed a complaint in Kings County Superior Court for medical malpractice, personal injury, and negligence arising from the treatment of his diabetes within the prison. Appellant named as defendants the respondents Thanit Hasadsri, M.D., William McGuiness, M.D., W.J. Greenough, M.D., V. Yamamoto, CDW-HCM, Licensed Vocational Nurses Gonzales and M. Tomayo, Senior Registered Nurse III C. Schutt, Facility Captain M. Hodges-Wilkins, and J. Kim, M.D. Appellant prayed for compensatory and punitive damages according to proof.

Plaintiff John G. Fisher was severely injured when he crashed while skiing at the Sierra Summit ski resort. He sued defendants Sierra Summit, Inc., and Snow Summit Ski Corporation, contending he crashed because he skied into a hole in the snow that was present because of their negligence. He also claimed that ski patrol personnel at Sierra Summit contributed to his injuries by providing first aid negligently.

Defendant and appellant Wayne Clinton Howell was charged with possession of child pornography (Pen. Code, § 311.11, subd. (b), count 1),[1] and failure to register as a sex offender (§ 290, subd. (b), count 2). As to count 1, it was also alleged that he was previously convicted of section 311.11, subdivision (a). On November 16, 2009, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to count 1. In exchange, the trial court dismissed count 2, and he was sentenced to two years in state prison, as agreed upon. The court also ordered defendant to pay restitution. (§§ 1202.4, 1202.45.)
On June 23, 2010, defendant filed an application for â€