CA Unpub Decisions

This appeal arises from the trial court's dismissal of a civil complaint filed by plaintiff Frederick Jones, Sr., in which he sought a change of his prison inmate custody classification to delete the â€

A jury convicted defendant of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459; unspecified statutory references that follow are to this code), attempted murder (§664/187, subd. (a)) with personal use of a knife (§12022, subd, (b)(1)), and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). Defendant admitted a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and two prior serious felonies (§§ 667, subds. (a) & (b)-(i); 1170.12).
We note that, although defendant admitted his 1998 juvenile adjudication as both a five-year enhancement and a strike, because it was a juvenile adjudication and not a conviction, it does not qualify as an enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a). (People v. West (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 100, 110.) The trial court did not impose an enhancement based on this prior conviction; instead, it imposed a five-year enhancement for the 2005 prior on both counts 2 and 4. (People v. Williams (2004) 34 Cal.4th 397, 405.)

R. A., appearing in propria persona, has petitioned this court for extraordinary writ relief from an order of the juvenile court setting a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] We summarily deny the petition because petitioner has failed to comply with the requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 8.452.[2]

D.J. (appellant), a minor, appeals from the order declaring him a ward of the juvenile court under Welfare & Institutions Code section 602.[1] As part of an agreement, appellant waived his rights and admitted the allegation against him. Appellant was placed at home on probation. The court set the maximum term of confinement at five years and awarded appellant 19 days predisposition credit. Appellant argues that because he was placed at home on probation, the juvenile court erred by setting a maximum term of physical confinement.
We agree with appellant, and order the maximum term of confinement stricken from the court's dispositional order.

Defendant Nathaniel Lewis appeals from sentencing orders entered after he pled no contest pursuant to a plea agreement. He challenges two conditions of probation on the ground that the minutes misstate the trial court's pronouncement. Respondent agrees that the minutes are in conflict with the controlling trial court's pronouncement.
Defendant challenges a third condition -- that he support his dependents -- on the ground that it was unrelated to the crime of selling drugs. We reject defendant's challenge to the third condition, and affirm the judgment with directions.

This appeal is brought by Patricia Hickerson as an individual, Patricia Hickerson, Sandy Jolley, and Julianne Keegan as successors in interest to Richard Hickerson, and Sandy Jolley and Julianne Keegan as co-trustees of the Hickerson Trust dated September 13, 2001 (the Trust). Richard Hickerson (Richard) and Patricia Hickerson (Patricia) entered into a reverse mortgage loan agreement (mortgage agreement) with Pacific Reverse Mortgage, Inc. (PRM), a lender. Respondent, Les Barnhart, was the PRM agent who personally dealt with the Hickersons.
More than three years after the execution of the mortgage agreement, appellants commenced an action against PRM and respondent. The operative complaint alleges six causes of action. The first cause of action is for rescission of the mortgage agreement. The remaining causes of action seek damages for alleged misconduct and negligence.
The judgment as to Barnhart followed the trial court's orders (1) sustaining the demurrer to the first cause of action for rescission, and (2) granting his motion for summary adjudication as to the other causes of action. PRM's demurrer to the rescission cause of action was overruled, but the court granted its motion for summary adjudication as to the other causes of action.

Miguel L. (minor) appeals from a judgment entered after the juvenile court sustained a petition filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 (section 602 petition). Minor contends that the judgment was not supported by substantial evidence. We find sufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings, and affirm the judgment.

Shelly Morita appeals from the judgment granted in favor of respondent Outback Pictures, Inc., on her complaint, after respondent's motion for summary judgment was granted.[1] We affirm.

Appellant James Musselman was convicted, following a jury trial, of one count of first degree murder in violation of Penal Code[1] section 187, subdivision (a). The jury found true the allegations that he personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm in the commission of the murder causing death within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c) and (d). The trial court found true the allegations that Musselman had served three prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (a). The trial court sentenced Musselman to 25 years to life in prison for the murder plus a 25-year-to-life enhancement term for the firearm allegation plus three one-year enhancement terms for his prior prison terms, for a total of 53 years to life in state prison.
Appellant Sarita Elizalde was convicted, following a jury trial, of one count of first degree murder in violation of section 187, subdivision (a). The jury found true the allegations that she personally used a firearm in the commission of the murder within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b). Elizalde admitted that she had served two prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced Elizalde to 25 years to life in prison for the murder, plus a ten-year enhancement term for the firearm allegation and two one-year enhancement terms for her prior prison terms, for a total of 37 years to life in state prison.

Arthur Garcia (Garcia), Julio Ponce Felix, Jr. (Felix), and Ricardo Polanco (Polanco) (collectively â€

Alicia C. (appellant) appeals after the juvenile court sustained one count of misdemeanor battery in a juvenile wardship proceeding (Welf. & Inst. Code § 602).[1] Appellant contends (1) the juvenile court erred when it failed to order a joint assessment report, pursuant to section 241.1, and (2) substantial evidence does not support the court's finding that appellant committed battery. We shall affirm the order.

The Alameda County Sheriff's Office identified a unique welding torch for sale on defendant's eBay Web site and arrested defendant Caprice Anne Manos after a search of her property revealed the stolen item. The trial court denied a motion by defendant to suppress evidence, after which she pleaded no contest to a violation of Penal Code section 12316, subdivision (b), unlawful possession of ammunition.[1] She contends the denial of her motion was reversible error, because the search warrant leading to the seizure of evidence underlying her conviction was impermissibly overbroad. As discussed below, we find no error and affirm.

Defendant and appellant Jose Armas was convicted, following a plea of nolo contendere, of one count of lewd conduct with a person under 14.[1] Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant was sentenced to probation, subject to several conditions, including sex offender registration.[2] Defendant was released from jail immediately following sentencing. Less than two months later, defendant was arrested for violating the Sex Offender Registration Act (the Act). His probation was revoked and the matter set for a probation violation hearing. Defendant was also charged by information with three violations of the Act; his probation violation hearing trailed the proceedings in the new case. A jury found defendant guilty of all three counts; the trial court subsequently concluded defendant had violated probation and declined to reinstate probation. Defendant appeals from his conviction for violating the Act and from the probation violation. Defendant contends insufficient evidence supports the conclusion that he violated the Act (and that the jury was misinstructed). We agree with defendant's contentions with respect to two counts of violating the Act, but the third count is well‑supported. We thus reverse defendant's conviction of two counts and remand for resentencing. We affirm the probation violation.

Y.M. (aka Jenny) seeks extraordinary relief from an order of the juvenile court denying her reunification services and setting the dependency case of her infant daughter Sophia S. for a permanent placement hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)[1] The court denied reunification services based on its findings Jenny had previously inflicted severe physical harm on Sophia's half-brother Isaiah, and it would not benefit Sophia to pursue reunification services with her mother. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(6).) Jenny contends there is insufficient evidence to support these findings, but we disagree and deny her petition.